Cowles Foundation Summer Conference 2013: Dynamic Mechanism Design

June, 3rd and 4th, 2013, Cowles Foundation

The program  is available here.

in conjunction with a Symposium Issue for the Journal of Economic Theory

Guest Editors: Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Pavan

The Journal of Economic Theory plans to publish a special symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design. The Symposium will follow the Workshop on the same topic held at Yale University on June 3-4, 2013, sponsored by the Cowles Foundation. We also invite submissions from those who did not participate in the workshop. Indeed, participation in the workshop is neither necessary nor sufficient for inclusion in the JET symposium.

Submitted papers must meet the usual standards of the Journal of Economic Theory and will be refereed according to the usual JET procedures. All submissions must be in PDF form and must be received before October 1, 2013 at the Journal homepage Please indicate in the cover letter that this is a submission intended for the symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design, organized by Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Pavan. The intention is to have first decisions by the end of 2013 and to publish the symposium in 2014.

Please feel free to contact the editors if you have any question regarding the symposium issue or

Conference on Private Information, Interdependent Preferences and Robustness 2013 

(in cooperation with the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

The program  is available here.

NYCE 2012 New York Computer Science & Economics Day

The Economics of Big Data, Information and Privacy
December 3rd, Simons Foundation, New York City

The program  is available here.

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