Cowles Foundation Conference: Dynamic Mechanism Design
Preliminary Program
in conjunction with a Symposium Issue for the Journal of Economic Theory, 6/3-4, 2013
1. Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers, Simon Board (UCLA) and Andy Skrzypacz (GSB Stanford)
2. Calibrated Contracts, Sylvain Chassang (Princeton)
3. Dynamic Contracting with Adverse Selection: An Irrelevance Result, Peter Eso (Oxford University) and B. Szentes, London School of Economics
4. Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority Based Schemes Daniel Garrett (University of Toulouse) and Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
5. Ex Post Information Rents and disclosure in Sequential Screening Daniel Kraehmer (Universitaet Bonn) and Roland Strausz (Humboldt Universitaet zu Berlin)
6. Optimal Dynamic Contracting, Rohit Lamba (Princeton) and Marco Battaglini (Princeton)
7. Contracting with Disagreement on Deserved Performance Evaluation and Compensation, Anqi Li (University of Pennsylvania)
8. Discriminatory Information Disclosure, Hao Li (University of British Columbia) and Xianwen Shi (University of Toronto)
9. Efficient Dynamic Mechanism in Interdependent Valuation Environments Heng Liu (University of Rochester)
10. Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment, Maher Said (Washington University-St. Louis) and Rahul Deb (University of Toronto)
11. Agency Models with Frequent Actions, Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA) and Ennio Stacchetti (NYU)
12. Moral Hazard and Long-Run Incentives, Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton)
13. A Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts, Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)
14. Mechanism for Repeated Bargaining, Juuso Toikka (MIT) and Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz (Stanford)