Recent Working Papers:
- Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris, November 2018
- Information and Market Power, with Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris, November 2018
- The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints, June 2018, with Francisco Castro and Gabriel Weintraub
- Information and Interaction, May 2017, with Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
- Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design, December 2016, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
Recent and Forthcoming Publications:
- Revenue Guarantee Equivalence, American Economic Review, 2019, forthcoming, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
- Markets for Information: An Introduction, Annual Review of Economics, 2019, forthcoming, with Alessandro Bonatti
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction, Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, forthcoming, with Juuso Valimaki
- Information Design: A Unified Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, forthcoming, with Stephen Morris, Presentation Slides
- Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, 10, 177-218, with Johannes Hoerner
- First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction, SIGEcom Exchanges, 2018, 27-37, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
- The Design and Price of Information, American Economic Review, 2018, 108, 1-45, with Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
- Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness, Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, 744-759, with Stephen Morris
- “Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability”, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 168, 329-371, with Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
- First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue, Econometrica, 2017, 85, 107-143, with Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris