Recent Working Papers:
- Revenue Guarantee Equivalence, May 2018, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
- First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction, May 2018, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
- Selling to Intermediaries, August 2017, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris, Presentation Slides
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction, August 2017, with Juuso Valimki
- Information and Interaction, May 2017, with Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
- The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints, February 2017, with Francisco Castro and Gabriel Weintraub
- Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design, December 2016, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
Recent Publications:
- Information Design: A Unified Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 2018, forthcoming, with Stephen Morris, Presentation Slides
- Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, forthcoming, with Johannes Hoerner
- The Design and Price of Information, American Economic Review, 2018, 108, 1-45, with Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
- Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness, Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, 744-759, with Stephen Morris
- “Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability”, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 168, 329-371, with Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
- First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue, Econometrica, 2017, 85, 107-143, with Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
- Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2016, 106, 586-591, with Stephen Morris
- “Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games”, Theoretical Economics, 2016, 11, 487-522, with Stephen Morris