Econ 521b: Advanced Economic Theory: Topics (2009)

Spring 2009
9:00-10:20 T/TH, 28 Hillhouse, Room 106

Dirk Bergemann
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #24
432-3592, Email
Office hours T 1:00-3:00

Juuso Valimaki
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #6
432-6519, Email
Office hours T 1:00-3:00

Topic: This course covers selected topics in the economics of information and uncertainty. The first part of the course will cover the theory of mechanism design and some of its applications. The second part of the course will cover some recent papers in communication, learning and networks..

Course Requirements: This course has five basic requirements. They are: (i) reading the assigned papers before the presentation in class, (ii) solving the problem sets, (iii) presenting one research paper, (iv) writing six referee reports (before the presentation of the papers) and (v) writing a term paper. The assignments will be given biweekly. Class participation, assignments, and the term paper will jointly determine the final grade.

Readings: The current reading list will be completed as the class proceeds.

Schedule (complete syllabus):

Tuesday, January 13: Introduction into Mechanism Design

Lecture 1

Thursday, January 15: VCG, Pivot, D’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet

Additional Reading:

Tuesday, January 20: First and Second Price Auctions

Lecture 3
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of Krishna (2002)
Matthews (1988)

Thursday, January 22: Optimal Auctions

Lecture 4
Homework 2
Homework 2 Solution
Chapter 5 of Krishna (2002)
Myerson (1981)

Tuesday, January 27: Bilateral Trade, Single Crossing

Thursday, January 29: Implementation

Tuesday, February 3: Matching Theory

A. Roth and M. Sotomayor (1990); Two-SidedMatching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press.
Lecture 7

Thursday, February 5: Large Matching Markets

A. Roth and E. Peranson (1999) “The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,” American Economic Review, 89 (4) September, 748-780
F. Kojima and P. Pathak (2008), “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets,” forthcoming, American Economic Review.
Lecture 8

Tuesday, February 10: Implementation Theory

Thursday, February 12:
class cancelled, make-up class Tuesday, April, 28th

Tuesday, February 17: Correlated Values and Surplus Extraction