Keith DeRose,
Yale University
Dept. of Philosophy

My goal is to pull together some resources in epistemology. I have very limited time for maintaining this page, so it is bound to be very incomplete. Hopefully, though, there will be enough material here for the page to be somewhat useful to those interested in epistemology.

When I started using hit meters on this page, I became aware of the fact that this page gets a lot of internet traffic, much of it apparently from surfers who are referred here from Google searches, mainly on the term “epistemology.” I suspect many of those surfers are looking for more basic information than I provide here.  Indeed, many are probably seeking a fairly basic answer to the question “What is epistemology?”, and/or basic introductory material on what the main topics in the field are, while this page is intended as a research aid for those who already have a pretty good idea of what epistemology is.
So, for those looking for more basic information, see: What Is Epistemology?  A Brief Introduction to the Topic.

Now out: My new book, The Case for Contextualism 

Blog, hopelessly devoted to epistemology: Certain Doubts.

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Contents:

1. Some Epistemology courses with Syllabi/Information On-Line
2. Graduate Programs strong in epistemology
3. Some Epistemologists and Some of Their Epistemological Publications (since 1995)
A . C . F . H . K . M . R . T .
4. Other Epistemology sites

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1. Some Epistemology courses with Syllabi / Helpful Information On-Line:

G. Axtell	University of Nevada, Reno	Phil 440/640.	Theory of Knowledge	Fall 2007
M. Bergmann	Purdue University	Phil. 432	Theory of Knowledge	Spring 2006
T. Black	University of Utah	Phil. 5300/6300.	Epistemology	Spring 2003
D. Braun	University of Rochester	Phil. 516.	Selected Topics in Philosophy of Language: Knowing That, Knowing Who, and Context	Fall 2005
J. Comesaña	University of Wisconsin, Madison	Phil. 903.	Epistemology Seminar: Skepticism and The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions	Fall 2006
T. Cross, K. DeRose	Yale University	Phil. 702.	Safety and Sensitivity of Beliefs	Spring 2006
Joe Cruz	Williams College	Phil. 331.	Contemporary Epistemology	Spring 2009
K. DeRose	Yale University	Phil. 270.	Basic Undergraduate Epistemology Course	Spring 2008
K. DeRose	Yale University	Phil. 704.	Basic Graduate Epistemology Course	Spring 2008
K. DeRose	Yale University	Phil. 441/641	Epistemology seminar, covering main topics, with special focus on skepticism	Spring 1999
K. DeRose	Yale University	Phil. 704	Contextualism vs. Invariantism in Epistemology	Spring 2004
K. DeRose	Yale University	Phil. 300.	Skepticism	Fall 2006
C.E.M. Dunlap	University of Michigan, Flint	Phil.  482	Contemporary Issues in Epistemology	Spring 2005?
C. Elgin	Harvard University	Phil. 159	Epistemology	Fall 2005
R. Feldman	Universtiy of Rochester	Phil. 243/443	Theory of Knowledge	Fall 2002
B. Fitelson	University of California, Berkeley	Phil. 122	Theory of Knowledge	Spring 2007
B. Fitelson	University of California, Berkeley	Phil. 148.	Probability and Induction	Spring 2008
B. Fitelson	University of California, Berkeley	Phil. 290-1	Confirmation (grad seminar)	Fall 2007
B. Fitelson and S. Roush	University of California, Berkeley	Phil. 290.	Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits	Fall 2006
B. Fitelson	University of California, Berkeley	Phil. 290-3.	Contemporary Debates in Epistemology	Spring 2009
B. Frances	Fordham University	PHGA 7358.	Contemporary Responses to Skepticism (seminar)	Fall 2008
T. Gendler	Cornell University	Phil. 361.	Contemporary Epistemology	Spring 2005
Alvin Goldman	Rutgers University	Phil. 595.	Proseminar in Philosophy (1st half on epistemology)	Fall 2008
P. Greenough	University of St. Andrews	Phil. PY4606.	Contemporary Epistemology	Fall 2005
P. Greenough	University of St. Andrews	PY3001	Epistemology	Fall 2003
P. Greenough	University of St. Andrews	PY5102	Current Issues, Epistemology	Spring 2004
Peter Hanks	University of Minnesota	Phil. 4105W.	Epistemology	Fall 2008
G. Harman	Princeton University	Phil. 539	Theory of Knowledge	Spring 2003
T. Horgan	University of Arizona	Phil. 441	Theory of Knowledge	Spring 2004
M. Huemer	University of Colorado, Boulder	Phil. 3340 (pdf doc)	Epistemology	Fall 2006
T. Kelly	Princeton University	Phil. 313 (word doc)	Theory of Knowledge	Fall 2008
T. Kelly	Princeton University	Phil. 513 (pdf doc)	Rationality and Objectivity	Spring 2006
T. Kelly	Princeton University	Phil. 523 (word doc)	Problems of Philosophy: Epistemology: Themes from Boghossian, Christensen and DeRose	Spring 2009
J. Kvanvig	University of Missouri	Phil 4300 (pdf doc)	Epistemology	Winter 2006
J. Lackey	Northern Illinois University	Phil. 311 (pdf doc)	Problems of Knowledge	Fall 2006
J. Lackey	Northern Illinois University	Phil. 511 (pdf doc)	Epistemology	Spring 2005
L. Loeb	University of Michigan	Phil. 389	History of Philosophy: 17th and 18th Centuries [History course, but with lots of epistemology]	Winter 2003
W. Lycan	University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	Phil. 477	Skepticism and Contextualism; Virtue Epistemology	Spring 2002
J. Lyons	University of Arkansas	Phil. 4203/5203 (pdf doc)	Theory of Knowledge	Fall 2006
Ted Poston	University of South Alabama	Phil. 441.	Epistemology	Fall 2008
J. Pryor	Harvard University	Phil. 253	A Priori Knowledge	Fall 2000
J. Pryor	Princeton University	Phil. 313	Theory of Knowledge	Spring 2004
J. Pryor	New York University	G83.1101	Advanced Introduction to Epistemology	Fall 2007
B. Rives	Union College	Phil. 367	Skepticism	Fall 2005
J. Stanley	University of Michigan (Stanley is now at Rutgers)	Phil. 530 (word doc)	Theory of Knowledge (skepticism, closure, contextualism, etc.)	Spring 2004
J. Stanley	Rutgers University	Phil. 650 (pdf doc)	Seminar on Knowing How	Spring 2009
S. Stich	Rutgers University	Phil. 556/656.	Experimental Philosophy – graduate seminar	Spring 2008
M. Tooley	University of Colorado, Boulder	Phil. 3340	Epistemology	Fall 2001
B. van Fraassen, T. Kelly	Princeton University	Phil. 539 (word doc.)	Theory of Knowledge: Evidence	Spring 2008

 

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2. Graduate Programs Strong in Epistemology

From time to time I am asked, mostly by philosophers who have an undergraduate student who is interested in going on to do graduate work in philosophy, which are the best departments to go to for epistemology.  For what it’s worth, here are my thoughts on the subject.

First of all, instead of asking me, you should check out Brian Leiter’s Philosophical Gourmet Report, which is a good resource for anyone interested in graduate work in philosophy.  Particularly helpful is the PGR’s “Breakdown of Programs by Specialties” which, for many particular areas of philosophy, including epistemology, ranks departments by how strong they are in that area.  These specialty rankings are determined by a survey of experts in the field.  (The names of the evaluators for epistemology are listed right below the epistemology rankings.)  Programs are placed in “groups” based on whether their mean score in epistemology is closer to 5, 4.5, 4, 3.5, or 3.  Here are the top 6 programs in epistemology, according to the 2009 PGR: Oxford and Rutgers (listed alphabetically) together form Group 1, with rounded mean scores of 5; New York University is by itself in Group 2, with a rounded mean 4.5; and in Group 3, with mean scores of 4, we find (listed alphabetically) Princeton, University of Arizona, and Yale.  Follow the “epistemology” link above to see the many departments in Groups 4 and 5.  Below are very brief descriptions of the six departments in the first three Groups, and some general advice on choosing programs in epistemology.

Boasting several very prominent epistemologists on its faculty, Rutgers certainly belongs in the top group.  Alvin Goldman, Peter Klein, Ernest Sosa, Jason Stanley, and Stephen Stich constitute a very formidable line-up of senior epistemologists.  Additionally, and importantly, Rutgers also has several excellent faculty members who, though epistemology is not their main area of research, have done or do good work in the area: Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, and Brian McLaughlin.  A graduate student could easily put together an outstanding dissertation committee for a wide variety of dissertation topics in epistemology at Rutgers.  Update, 12/26/09: Rutgers has been (as usual!) involved in some aggressive senior hiring, and have, since the last PGRs came out, greatly strengthened their position in epistemology with these senior hires: Anthony Gillies, Branden Fitelson, Jonathan Schaffer, and Susanna Schellenberg.  I’ve been too busy to write up a proper analysis of just what these new additions do for Rutgers epistemology, but it is safe to say for now that they do mean that Rutgers is now by itself and by a significant margin the best program for epistemology.

Oxford University features Timothy Williamson, one of the world’s top epistemologists and author of Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford UP, 2000), one of the best and most important books in epistemology in recent years.  (In fact, in my view, that’s a bit of an understatement: I’m on record as saying KAIL is the best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.)  Joining Williamson to form an impressive group of epistemologists are Quassim Cassam, John Hawthorne, and Ralph Wedgwood, and several other faculty who have episemology as an area of interest.  And joining this formidable group since the previous (2006) PGRs were done is Scott Sturgeon.  (In the ’06 PGRs, Rutgers was by itself in Group 1.  When it was subsequently announced that Sturgeon had accepted an offer to come to Oxford, I wondered on this page whether that would result in Oxford moving up into Group 1 with Rutgers.  Turns out, it did.)  [But now Rutgers has made additions should result in Rutgers again being by itself as the best program in epistemology: see the update in the above paragraph.]

NYU’s epistemology team is anchored by four excellent senior epistemologists, Paul Bogghossian, Richard Foley, James Pryor, and Crispin Wright.  Foley is serving as a Dean at NYU, as well as being a member of the philosophy department, so there is no doubt very stiff competition for his time and energy.  NYU also has some other outstanding philosophers who, though epistemology might not be among their current main area of research, would be very good to work with there.  Peter Unger, though he now works mainly in other areas, used to be primarily an epistemologist (and an excellent one, too: there’s a reason why I picked 1975 as the year since which Williamson’s KAIL is the best epistemology book: I’d pick Unger’s ’75 skeptical treatise, Ignorance, as the best book in epistemology since I-don’t-know(!)-when).  And there are several other faculty members at NYU whom I think it would be very exciting to work with in epistemology.  For example, though they don’t list epistemology as one of their areas (at least on NYU’s faculty web page), Thomas Nagel and, especially, Stephen Schiffer have each done some fairly recent work there.  NYU should be viewed as having improved in epistemology since the previous 2006 surveys, since Wright, who was listed as only a quarter-time visitor on the 06 surveys, has since become a full-timer at NYU, and was listed as such in the new surveys.  However, the net results of all the changes at the top epistemology departments is that Oxford moved out of its tie with NYU in Group 2 up to a tie with Rutgers in Group 1.  My suspicion is that NYU was probably not that far behind Rutgers and Oxford.  (I wish the PGR would report the actual means, rounded to three significant digits (e.g., 4.78), rather than just the mean rounded to the nearest half point, in its area rankings.  My guess is that this isn’t done because it might encourage readers of the report to put too much weight on small differences in scores.  I would prefer this danger be handled by reporting the means as I suggested, but warning readers against placing too much importance in small differences.  If, for instance, one program’s mean score was 4.76, and so got rounded up to 5 and it was therefore put into Group 1, and another program’s mean was 4.74, and so was rounded down to 4.5 and it was thus put into Group 2, it would be good for readers to know that though the programs ended up in different groups, they were actually extremely close in mean scores.)  At any rate (whatever the results of the new PGR were, exactly), my own opinion is that NYU should be viewed as roughly equivalent to the two programs in Group 1 [this judgment has to be revised in light of Rutgers’ new additions in epistemology: see the update two paragraphs above], and potential epistemologists should choose among these three based on how well their own particular interests within epistemology match up with the work of the faculty in these programs, rather than on the difference in groups between how NYU and the other two fared in the new PGRs.

The University of Arizona is the newcomer to Group 3, moving up from its Group 4 ranking in the 2006 epistemology rankings, due to the addition of a leading epistemologist, Stewart Cohen.  (Moving down out of Group 3 are the St. Andrews/Stirling program, which lost (at least most of) Crispin Wright, and Notre Dame, which didn’t lose any epistemologists off its official PGR faculty lists; however, I suspect many evaluators had heard that Alvin Plantinga was retiring after this year, and so were largely discounting him.)  Cohen joins epistemologists Terry Horgan and John Pollock at Arizona — and Keith Lehrer is listed, but under the heading “Emeritus Faculty Still Doing Some Teaching & Supervision.”  Arizona was long a powerhouse in epistemology, during the glory years of Alvin Goldman (now at Rutgers), Lehrer (now emeritus), and Pollock.  It’s nice to see them making a comeback in epistemology.

Princeton’s place in epistemology is secured largely by the presence of Gilbert Harman, one of the most accomplished and important figures in epistemology.  Harman is joined by two up-and-coming, younger-but-tenured epistemologists, both of whom have very significant, first-rate papers to their name already: Thomas Kelly, whose work is centered squarely in epistemology; and Adam Elga, much of whose work is in the area, though he works in other areas, too.

Yale is my own department, so there is danger of bias here.  Other epistemologists at Yale are George Bealer, much of whose important work has been in epistemology, especially on a priori knowledge, and Tamar Gendler, co-editor (along with John Hawthorne) of the prestigiousOxford Studies in Epistemology, much of whose interesting epistemological work to date is in areas of overlap between epistemology and other areas of philosophy (e.g., philosophy of mind, the theory of modality, philosophy of science).

For the most part, and unsurprisingly, the top departments in epistemology tend to also be among the top programs overall in philosophy.  In fact, the top three programs in epistemology also constitute the top three overall programs in the English-speaking world (though in a different order, NYU being first overall, Oxford second, and Rutgers third).  And the other programs in the top 6 for epistemology aren’t that far behind in overall ratings: Princeton is 4th in the overalls (for the English-speaking world), Yale 9th, and Arizona is in a three-way tie for positions 14-16.  For prospective epistemology students, that’s both good news and bad.  Good because it’s important to go to a program with good over-all strength, and not just one good in your own area of specialization.  Bad because, being among the top overall programs, these top epistemology departments are no doubt highly selective in admissions and therefore tough to get into.  (Just going by overall ranking, which is all I really have to go by here, my guess is that Yale and, to a greater extent, Arizona, should be significantly easier to get into than the others.  But many of the programs in Group 4 in epistemology are probably significantly easier still.)  Prospective students interested in epistemology are therefore well-advised to also look into other programs strong in epistemology; see the list of strong programs in the PGR, following the above links.  There are many programs, especially those listed in Group 4, that would be excellent choices for prospective epistemologists.

But in choosing a program for epistemology, whether it’s one of the “top 6” mentioned above, or one of the Group 4 or Group 5 programs listed in the PGR, or one of the programs that didn’t make the lists, much will depend, of course, on how well your approach, style, and particular interests match up with the faculty at the various programs.  On that score, you might do well to read some of the published papers of the relevant faculty, and find someone whose work interests you.  As a start, you can check out the depatments’ and individuals’ web sites, to which I’ve provided some links (in this section, for some of the departments [for other departments, you can use my list of links to philosophy programs with PhD programs], and below for many of the individual epistemologists).  Unfortunately, you will find that, believe it or not, very many philosophers, including very many from departments with graduate programs, don’t even bother to post their CVs or a reasonably complete list of publications on-line!  Still, many do, and one can get quite a bit of helpful information on-line.

Hope this is of some help, future colleagues in epistemology.  Remember that it’s just one epistemologist’s opinion.  Talk to your advisors about it.

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3. Some Epistemologists and Some of Their Epistemological Publications (since 1995)

This list is far from exhaustive. I add publications and epistemologists willy-nilly as I come across them or as they’re suggested to me.  (So if an epistemology paper of yours isn’t listed, or if you’re an epistemologist who isn’t listed, don’t conclude that I’ve looked at your paper, or at you, but judged them or you unworthy to be included in this index.  It may well even be that I did see your paper and loved it, but didn’t have my computer handy at the time, and then didn’t remember you & your paper when I did get around to revising this page.)  Still, many have e-mailed to tell me that they find this list very helpful, despite its limitations.  Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the list are the links to various epistemologists’ homepages, where you can often find a much more complete description of their epistemological (and other) work (including pre-1995 papers). A few epistemologists are listed without any papers listed below their names.  This is because I’m not aware of any epistemology they’ve published since 1995.  In each such case, they’ve done important epistemology in the past, so it was worth providing a link to their home page, where one can often find references to those golden oldies.

A . C . F . H . K . M . R . T

• Fred Adams, University of Deleware
  • “Tracking Theories of Knowledge,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 11-35.
  • with M. Clarke, “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221.
  • “Knowledge,” in Floridi, ed., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 228-236.
  • with M. Clarke, “Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke,” in W. Loffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian Wittgenstein Society, 2003).
  • “Epistemology,” in McHenry, Yagisawa, eds., Reflections on Philosophy, 2nd Edition (Longman Press, 2003), pp. 81-101.
  • “Epistemic Engineering Audi-Style,” in J. Heil, ed., Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold (Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), pp. 49-58.
• Jonathan Adler, Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center
  • “Withdrawal and Contextualism,” Analysis 66 (2006): 280-285.
  • “Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio,” Pacific  Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 445-458.
  • “Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 37-52.
  • “Reconciling Open-Mindedness and Belief ,” Theory and Research in Education 2 (2004): 127-142.
  • “The Revisability Paradox,” Philosophical Forum 34 (2003): 383-389.
  • Belief’s Own Ethics, MIT Press, 2002.
  • “Akratic Believing?,” Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 1-27.
  • with M. Levin, “Is the Generality Problem too General?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 87-97.
  • “The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 267-285.
  • “Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 891-905.
  • “An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism,” Analysis 56 (1996): 80-84.
  • “Transmitting Knowledge,” Noûs 30 (1996): 99-111.
• Scott Aikin, Vanderbilt University
  • “Modest Evidentialism,” forthcoming, International Philosophical Quarterly.
  • “Contrastive Self Attribution of Belief,” forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
  • “Who Is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?”, Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 191-217.
• Linda Alcoff, Hunter College/CUNY Graduate Center
  • ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1999).
  • “On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?”, Philosophic Exchange 29 (1999): 73-89.
  • Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory of Knowledge (Cornell UP, 1996).
  • “Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?”, Philosophic Exchange 26 (1996): 59-79.
• Robert F. Almeder, Georgia State University, retired
  • “Recent Work on Error,” Philosophia 27 (1999): 3-58.
  • Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (Open Court, 1998).
  • “Carnap and Quine on Empiricism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 349-364.
  • “Dretske’s Dreadful Question” (pp. 449-457) and “Externalism and Justification” (pp. 465-469), Philosophia 24 (1995).
• Marc Alspector-Kelly, Western Michigan University
  • “Knowledge Externalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 289-300.
  • “Seeing the Unobservable: van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience”, Synthese 140 (2004): 331-353.
  • “Stroud’s Carnap”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (March 2002): pp. 276-302.
• William P. Alston, died Sept. 13, 2009; had been emeritus at Syracuse University
  • “Perception and Representation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 253-289.
  • “Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief,” in M. Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 135-145.
  • “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 69-86.
  • “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 181-203.
  • “Perceptual Knowledge,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 223-242.
  • “What is Distinctive About the Epistemology of Religious Belief?” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. IV, Philosophies of Religion, Art, and Creativity.
  • “Chisholm on the Epistemology of Perception,” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Open-Court 1997).
  • “Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith,” in J. Jordan, ed., Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
• D.M. Armstrong, University of Sydney
  • “The Scope and Limits of Human Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2006): 159-166.
  • “A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 77-89.
• Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
  • “Belief, Faith, and Acceptance,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (2008): 87-102.
  • “The Ethics of Belief:  Doxastic Self-control and Intellectual Virtue,” Synthese 161 (2008): 403-418.
  • “Testimony as an A Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects,” Philosophica 78 (2006): 85-104.
  • “The Epistemic Authority of Testimony and the Ethics of Belief,” in A. Chignell and A. Dole, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 175-201.
  • “Intellectual Virtue and Epistemic Power,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 3-16.
  • The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality (Oxford UP, 2001)
  • Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge UP, 2000)
  • “Self-Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 205-228.
  • “Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 271-302.
  •  Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 1998).
  • Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford, 1997).
  • “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 405-422.
  • “Perceptual Experience, Doxastic Practice, and the Rationality of Religious Commitment,” Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 1-18.
• Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• Guy Axtell, University of Nevada, Reno.  Administrator of JanusBlog, a virtue theory (including virtue epistemology) discussion forum.
  • “Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach,” forthcoming, Philosophical Papers.
  • “Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism,” forthcoming in J. Greco, ed., Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford UP.
  • “Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance,” Synthese 158 (2007): 363-383.
  • “Blind Man’s Bluff: The ‘Basic Belief Apologetic’,” Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 131-152.
  • “Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 331-352.
  • “Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues,” in Fairweather & Zagzebski, ed., Virtue Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002).
  • ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
  • “Virtue Theory and the Fact/Value Problem,” in Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology.
  • “The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology,” The Monist 81 (1998): 353-370.
  • “Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 1-26.
  • “Epistemic Virtue-Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (1996): 172-198.
• Dorit Bar-On , University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • “Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge,” in A. Coliva, ed., Self-Knowledge and the Self, Oxford UP, forthcoming.
  • Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2004.
  • “Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression,” Noûs 38 (2004): 430-455.
  • “Avowals and First-Person Privilege” (with D. Long), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 311-335.
  • “Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge,” Synthese 106 (1996): 139-166.
• George Bealer, Yale University
  • “The Origins of Modal Error,” Dialectica 58 (2004): 11-42.
  • “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance,” in Gendler, Hawthorne, eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 71-125.
  • “A Priori Knowledge,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 1-12.
  • “A Theory Of The A Priori,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 29-55.
  • “The A Priori,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 243-270.
  • “Intuition and The Autonomy of Philosophy,” in DePaul, Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 201-239.
  • “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (pp. 121-142) and “A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa” (pp. 163-174), Philosophical Studies 81 (1996).
  • “On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge,” Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 1-34.
• Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico
  • “Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said,” forthcoming, Acta Analytica.
  • “Contrastivism and Lucky Questions,” forthcoming, Philosophia.
  • “Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem,” Philosophical Studies 139 (2008): 353-366..
  • Epistemology Modalized, Routledge, 2007.
  • “Reliabilism and Safety,” Metaphilosophy 37 (2006): 691-704.
  • “Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge?,” Dialectica 60 (2006): 79-84.
  • “Knowing and Possessing Knowledge,” American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 21-36.
  • “Individualism and Self-Knowledge: Tu Quoque,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002): 289-295.
• James R. Beebe, SUNY-Buffalo
  • with W. Buckwalter, “The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect,” forthcoming, Mind & Language.
  • “Constraints on Skeptical Hypotheses,” forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly.
  • “The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction?,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 151-168.
  • “BonJour’s Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 137 (2008): 243-267.
  • “BonJour’s Abductivist Reply to Skepticism,” Philosophia 35 (2007): 181-196.
  • “Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth,” Erkenntnis 66 (2007): 375-391.
  • “Reliabilism and Deflationism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 84 (2006): 495-510.
  • “The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis,” Noûs 38 (2004): 177-195.
  • “Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties,” Synthese 140 (2004): 307-329.
  • “Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman’s Descriptive Epistemology,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (2001): 163-186.
• Michael Bergmann, Purdue University
  • “Reidian Externalism,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  • “Is Klein an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification?,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 19-24.
  • Justification Without Awareness, Oxford UP, 2006.
  • “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 419-36.
  • “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-27.
  • “Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?”, forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “BonJour’s Dilemma,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly.
  • “Externalist Justification Without Reliability,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 35-60.
  • “What’s Not Wrong With Foundationalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 161-65 .
  • “Externalism and Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 159-94. .
  • “Deontology and Defeat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 87-102
  • “Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition,” Synthese 110 (1997): 399-417.
• Sven Bernecker, University of California, Irvine
  • “Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Remembering without Knowing,” forthcoming, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  • “Prospects of Epistemic Compatibilism,” Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 81-104.
  • Reading Epistemology, Blackwell, 2006.
  • “Rule-Following Made Easy,” in W. Löffler, P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief (öbv-hpt, 2004): 63-69.
  • “Believing That You Know And Knowing That You Believe,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge (de Gruyter 2004): 369-376.
  • “Impliziert Erinnerung Wissen?”, in T. Grundmann, ed., Erkenntnistheorie (Mentis Verlag 2001): 145-64.
  • Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. with Fred Dretske (Oxford University Press 2000).
  • “Knowing the World by Knowing One’s Mind,” Synthese 123 (2000): 1-34.
  • “Self-Knowledge and Closure,” in P. Ludlow, N. Martin, eds., Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications 1998): 333-349.
  • “Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge,” Nous 30 (1996): 262-275.
  • “Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism,” Inquiry 39 (1996): 121-139.
• Michael A. Bishop, Northern Illinois University –> Florida State University
  • with J.D. Trout. “The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology,” Noûs 39 (2005): 696-714.
  • with J.D. Trout, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford UP, 2005.
  • with J.D. Trout, “Epistemology’s Search for Significance,” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2003): 203-216.
  • with S. Downes, “The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist or Social Institution,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002): 121-136.
  • with R. Samuels and S. Stich, “Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Normative Disputes about Cognitive Illusions Disappear,” in R. Elio, ed., Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality, Oxford UP, 2002.
  • “In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be?,” Synthese 122 (2000): 179-208.
  • “Why Thought Experiments are Not Arguments,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): 534-541.
  • “An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments,” in N. Shanks, ed., Idealization IX: Idealization in Contemporary Physics, Poznan Studies in Philosophy of Science and Humanities Bookseries, Rodopi, 1998.
• Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  •  “A Warranted-Assertability Defense of A Moorean Response to Skepticism,” Acta Analytica 23 (2008): 187-205.
  • “Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 597-617.
  • “Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  • with P. Murphy, “In Defense of Sensitivity,” Synthese 154 (2007): 53-71.
  • “The Distinction Between Coherence and Constancy in Hume’s Treatise I.iv.2,” The British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2007): 1-25.
  • with P. Murphy, “Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 165-182.
  • “Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 328-336.
  • “The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 96-106.
  • “A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 148-163.
  • “Relevant Alternatives and the Shifting Standards for Knowledge,” Southwest Philosophy Review18 (2002): 23-32.
• Michael Blome-Tillmann, Oxford University
  • “The Indexicality of ‘Knowledge’,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism,” forthcoming, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
  • “Coherentism and Foundationalism From A Contextualist Point of View,” in W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2003, 42-43.
  • “What’s Wrong With Sceptical Invariantism?,” in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz, eds., Selected Papers Contributed to GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, Bielefeld, 22-26 September 2003, Paderborn: mentis, 157-68.
• Paul Boghossian, New York University
  • Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford UP, 2006.
  • “Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (2003): 15-35.
  • “Blind Reasoning,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 77 (2003): 225-248
  • “Inference and Insight,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 633-640
  • “How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?”, Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 1-40.
  • edited, with C. Peacocke, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford UP, 2000.
  • “Knowledge of Logic,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 229-254.
  • “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997): 161-175.
• Laurence BonJour, University of Washington, Seattle
  • “In Defense of the A Priori,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 98-105.
  • “In Search of Direct Realism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 349-367.
  • with Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
    • “Précis” (pp. 669-775) and “Replies” (pp. 743-759), Symposium on L. BonJour and E. Sosa’s Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues,  Philosophical Studies 131 (2006).
  • “Four Theses Concerning A Priori Justification,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 13-20.
  • “Foundationalism and the External World,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 229-249.
  • “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 117-142.
  • In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, Cambridge UP, 1998.
    • “Précis” (pp. 625-631) and “Replies” (pp. 673-698), Symposium on In Defense of Pure Reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001).
  • “Haack on Justification and Experience,” Synthese 112 (1997): 13-23.
  • “Plantinga on Knowledge and Proper Function,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 47-71.
  • “Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness,” Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 207-220.
• Nick Bostrom, Oxford University
  • “The Simulation Argument: Reply to Brian Weatherson,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 90-97.
  • “Are You Living In A Computer Simulation?”, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 243-255.
• Luc Bovens, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • with S. Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
  • with S. Hartmann, “Why There Cannot Be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence,” forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
  • with S. Hartmann, “Coherence and the Role of Specificity: A Response to Meijs and Douven,” Mind 114 (2005).
  • with E. Olsson, “Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions,” Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 137-150.
  • with S. Hartmann, “Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments,” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 29-73.
  • with S. Leeds, “The Epistemology of Social Facts: The Evidential Value of Personal Experience versus Testimony,” in G. Meggle, ed., Social Facts and Collective Intentionality (Frankfurt a.M., 2002).
  • with E. Olsson, “Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks,” Mind 109 (2000): 685-719.
  • with J. Hawthorne, “The Preface, the Lottery and the Logic of Belief,” Mind 108 (1999): 241-264.
  • “Do Beliefs Supervene on Degrees of Confidence?”, in A. Meigers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999).
  • “Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming,” Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 79-101.
  • “‘P and I Will Believe that Not-P’: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief,” Mind 104 (1995): 737-760.
• David Braun, University at Buffalo, SUNY
  • “Now You Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is,” Philosophical Issues 16 (2006): 24-42.
  • “Illogical, But Rational,” Noûs 40 (2006): 376-379.
  • “Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations,” Noûs 34 (2000): 203-236.
  • “Understanding Belief Reports,” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 555-595.
• Bill Brewer, University of Warwick
  • “Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 217-230.
  • “Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 415-432.
  • “Self-Knowledge and Externalism,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 39-47.
  • Perception and Reason (Oxford UP, 1999).
    • “Précis” (pp. 405-416) and “Replies” (pp. 449-464), Symposium on Perception and Reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001).
  • “Experience and Reason in Perception” in A. O’Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1998).
  • “Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 41-55.
  • “Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge,” European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996): 259-275.
  • “Mental Causation II,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 69 (1995): 237-253.
• Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri, St. Louis — blog: Lemmings.
  • with J. Salerno, “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  • with J. Salerno, “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006): 261-270.
  • “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem,” Synthese 139 (2004): 367-386.
  • “Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 351-370.
  • “Adhoccery in Epistemology,” Philosophical Papers 32 (2003): 65-82.
  • with J. Salerno, “Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant,” Analysis 62 (2002): 143-150.
  • “Peirce on Abduction and Rational Control,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1999): 129-155.
• Audre Jean Brokes, Saint Josephs’s University
  • “What Does the Generality Problem Show?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 145-156.
• Fernando Broncano, University of Salamanca, Spain
  • “Reliable Rationality,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 49-59.
• Jessica Brown, University of St. Andrews
  • “Knowledge and Assertion,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “The Knowledge Norm for Assertion,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 89-103.
  • “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning,” Nous 42 (2008): 167-189.
  • “Knowledge and Practical Reason,” Philosophy Compass, 2008.
  • “Internalism and Externalism,” in S. Goldberg, ed., Internalism and Externalism: Mind and Epistemology (OUP, 2008).
  • “Contextualism and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres,” Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 407-435.
  • “Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism?,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 263-285.
  • “Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 319-327.
  • “Doubt, Circularity and the Moorean Response to the Sceptic,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 1-14.
  • “Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism,” Analysis 61 (2001): 213-224.
  • “Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 659-676.
  • “Reliabilism, Knowledge and Mental Content”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 115-135.
  • “Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 59 (1999): 52-59.
  • “The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 55 (1995): 149-156.
• Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barabara
  • “Justification and Moore’s Paradox,” Analysis 66 (2006): 264-6.
  • “Johnsen on Brains in Vats,” Philosophical Studies 129 (2006): 435-40.
  • “Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 384-391.
  • “Contexualism, Hawthorne’s Invariantism and Third-Person Cases,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 315-318.
  • “Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 53-64.
  • “Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing,” Analysis 62 (2002): 197-202.
  • “Anti-Individualism and Analyticity,” Analysis 62 (2002): 87-91.
  • “Bonjour’s A Priori Justification of Induction,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 1-10.
  • “A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available,” Philosophical Studies 104 (2001): 109-114.
  • “Klein on Closure and Skepticism,” Philosophical Studies 98 (2000): 139-151.
  • “Externalism and the A Prioricity of Self-Knowledge,” Analysis 60 (2000): 132-136.
  • “Ambiguity and Knowledge of Content,” Analysis 60 (2000): 257-260.
  • “Two Recent Approaches to Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 251-271.
  • “The Super-Omnicient Interpreter,” Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 526-528.
  • “Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism,” in R. Stern, ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford UP, 1999.
  • “Difficulties in Generating Scepticism about Knowledge of Content,” Analysis 59 (1999): 59-63.
  • “Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 361-364.
  • “Closure and Context,” Ratio 11 (1998): 78-82.
  • “Externalism and Memory,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997): 1-12.
  • “Is Scepticism about Self-Knowledge Incoherent?”, Analysis 57 (1997): 287-290.
  • “Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology,” Nous 30 (1996): 527-536.
  • “Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 79-111.
  • “Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference,” Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 199-201.
• Tyler Burge, University of California, Los Angeles
  • “Perceptual Entitlement,” Philosophy and Phenomonelogical Research 67 (2003): 503-548
  • “Frege on Apriority,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 11-42.
  • “A Century of Deflation and a Moment About Self-Knowledge,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 25-46.
  • “Frege on Knowing the Foundation,” Mind 107 (1998): 305-347.
  • “Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds,” Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998).
  • “Interlocution, Perception, and Memory,” Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 21-47.
  • “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 91-116.
  • “Frege on Knowing the Third Realm” in Schirn, ed., Frege: Importance and Legacy (De Gruyter, 1996)
• Panayot Butchvarov, University of Iowa
  • Skepticism About the External World (Oxford UP, 1998).
• Keith Butler, Western Washington University
  • “Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 773-800.
• Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Perception and Conceptual Content,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 231-250.
  • “How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?”, Noûs 38 (2004): 299-325.
• Joseph Camp, University of Pittsburgh
  • Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge, Harvard UP, 2002
• Herman Cappelen, University of St. Andrews; Oslo University
  • “Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 15-39.
• James Cargile, University of Virginia
  • “The Fallacy of Epistemicism,” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
  • “Scepticism and Possibilities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
  • “On an Argument against Closure,” Nous 33 (1999): 239-246.
  • “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy 73 (1998): 247-275.
  • “Justification and Misleading Defeaters,” Analysis 55 (1995): 216-220.
• Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland
  • “Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory-Theory,” in P.Carruthers and P.K. Smith, eds.,
  • Theories of Theories of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1996), pp. 22-38.
• Quassim Cassam, Oxford University
  • The Possibility of Knowledge, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2007.
  • “Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 43-64.
  • “Mind, Knowledge and Reality: Themes from Kant,” in O’Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge UP, 1998.
  • “Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception,” European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996): 276-295.
• Albert Casullo, University of Nebraska
  • “Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 41-58.
  • A Priori Justification, Oxford UP, 2003.
  • “Experience and A Priori Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 665-671.
  • “The Coherence of Empiricism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 31-48.
  • “Modal Epistemology: Fortune or Virtue?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 17-25.
  • “Is Empiricism Coherent?” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 61-74.
  • ed., A Priori Knowledge (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1999).
  • “A Priori Knowledge Appraised,” in A. Casullo (ed.), A Priori Knowledge (1999).
• David Chalmers, University of Arizona
  • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief,” in Q. Smith, A. Jokic, eds., Aspects of Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2003).
  • “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne, eds., Imagination, Conceivability, and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
• James Chase, University of Tasmania
  • “Indicator Reliabilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 115-137.
  • “Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 227-246.
• Andrew Chignell, Cornell Univeristy
  • “Belief in Kant,” Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 323-360.
  • “Kant’s Concepts of Justification,” Noûs 41 (2007): 33-63.
  • with A. Dole, “The Ethics of Religious Belief,” in A. Chignell, A. Dole, eds., God and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge UP, 2005).
  • “Accidentally True Belief and Warrant,” Synthese 137 (2003): 445-458.
• Matthew Chrisman, University of Edinburgh
  • “From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism,” Philosophical Studies 135 (2007): 225-254.
• David Christensen, Brown University
  • “Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2 (2007): 3-31.
  • “Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News,” Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 187-217.
  • “Three Questions about Leplin’s Reliabilism,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 43-50.
  • Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief, Oxford UP, 2004.
  • “Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality,” Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 349-371.
  • “Measuring Evidence,” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 437 – 461.
  • “What is Relative Confirmation?” Noûs 31 (1997): 370 – 384.
  • (with H. Kornblith) “Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 1 – 20.
  • “Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers,”Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 450-479.
  • Critical Study of Robert Nozick’s The Nature of Rationality, Noûs 29 (1995): 259 – 274.
• Murray Clarke, Concordia University, Montreal
  • with F. Adams, “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221.
  • Reconstructing Reason and Representation, MIT Press, 2004.
  • with Fred Adams, “Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke,” in W. Loffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian Wittgenstein Society, 2003).
  • “Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 75-82.
  • “Knowledge and Indexical Representation,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 178 (1996): 53-62.
• Andrew D. Cling, University of Alabama, Huntsville
  • “Justification-Affording Circular Arguments,” Philosophical Studies 111 (2002): 251-275
  • “Epistemic Levels and the Problem of the Criterion,” Philosophical Studies 88 (1997): 109-140.
• Lorraine Code, York University
  • “Epistemology,” in A. Jaggar, ed., A Companion to Feminist Philosophy (Blackwell, 1998).
  • “What is Natural About Epistemology Naturalized?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 1-22
• E.J. Coffman, University of Tennessee
  • “Warrant without Truth?,” Synthese 162 (2008): 173-194.
  • “Thinking about Luck,” Synthese 158 (2007): 385-398.
  • with D. Howard-Snyder, “Three Arguments against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006): 535-564.
  • “Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism,” Synthese 151 (2006): 257-272.
• Jonathan Cohen, University of California, San Diego
  • with P. Magnus, “Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation,” Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 37-52
• Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University –> University of Arizona
  • “Contextualism Defended,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 56-62.
  • “Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 417-430.
  • “Knowledge, Speaker and Subject,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 199-212.
  • “Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa’s Epistemology,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 17-21.
  • “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 309-329.
  • “Contextualism and Skepticism,” (pp. 94-107) and “Replies [to Klein, Hawthorne, and Prades]” (pp. 132-139), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
  • “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 57-89.
  • “Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1999): 1043-1048.
  • “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 289-306.
  • “Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research58 (1998): 143-159.
  • “Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 913-918.
• Juan Comesaña, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • “Evidentialist Reliabilism,” forthcoming, Noûs.
  • with H. Kantin, “Is Evidence Knowledge?,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, forthcoming, Philosophical Studies 129 (2006): 27-47.
  • “We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 59-76.
  • “Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 367-383.
  • “Unsafe Knowledge,” Synthese 146 (2005):  395-404.
  • “The Diagonal and the Demon,” Philosophical Studies 100 (2002): 249-266.
• Earl Conee, University of Rochester
  • “Self-Support,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • with R. Feldman, “Evidence,” forthcoming in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology (Oxford UP).
  • “Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism,” Philosophical Issues, 2007.
  • “Externally Enhanced Internalism”, in S. Goldberg, ed., Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2007).
  • “The Comforts of Home,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 444-451.
  • “Contextualism Contested,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 47-56.
  • with R. Feldman, “Some Virtues of Evidentialism,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 95-108.
  • with R. Feldman, Evidentialism, Oxford UP, 2004.
  • with R. Feldman, “Typing Problems” (a response to Adler and Levin’s “Is the Generality Problem too General?”), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 98-105
  • with R. Feldman, “Internalism Defended,” American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001):
  • “Seeing the Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998).
  • with R. Feldman, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
  • “Plantinga’s Naturalism,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 183-196.
• Josep E. Corbi, Universitat de Valencia
  • “The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 377-385.
• Edward Craig, University of Cambridge
  • “Response to Lehrer [‘s “Discursive Knowledge”],” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 655-665.
• Thomas Crisp, Biola University
  • “Hawthorne on Knowledge and Practical Reasoning,” Analysis 65 (2005): 138-140.
  • “Gettier and Plantinga’s Revised Account of Warrant,” Analysis 60 (2000): 42-50.
• Joseph Cruz, Williams College
  • with John Pollock, “The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
  • with John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
• Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading and the University of Texas, Austin.
  • “Arguments from Illusion,” Philosophical Quarterly 45(1995): 421-438.
  • “Supervenience, Virtues and Consequences: A Commentary on Knowledge in Perspective by Ernest Sosa,” Philosophical Studies 78 (1995):189-205.
• Charles B. Daniels, University of Victoria
  • “A Theism-Free Cartesian Analysis of Knowledge,” Noûs 33 (1999): 201-213
• Marian David, University of Notre Dame
  • “Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 296-312.
  • “Truth as the Epistemic Goal,” in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty (Oxford UP, 2001)
  • “Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori,” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Open Court, 1997).
• Martin Davies, Australian National University
  • “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 384-414.
  • “Self-Knowledge, Armchair Knowledge, and Knowledge by Inference,” forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. V, Epistemology.
  • “Externalism, Architectuaralism, and Epistemic Warrant,” in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1998).
• Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University
  • “Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 395-438.
  • “Concepts and Epistemic Individuation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 290-325.
  • “Contextualist Theories of Knowledge,” Acta Analytica 20 (2005): 29-42.
  • “Are Knowledge Claims Indexical?,” Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 257-281.
• Michael DePaul, University of Notre Dame
  • “Truth Consequentialism, Withholding and Proportioning Belief to the Evidence,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 91-112.
  • ed., with L. Zagzebski, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Clarendon Press, 2003.
  • “Value Monism in Epistemology,” in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford UP, 2001.
  • ed., Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, Rowman and Littledfield, 2000.
  • “Linguistics is Not a Good Model for Philosophy,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 113-120.
  • ed., with W. Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
  • “Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium?”, DePaul, Ramsey, ed., Rethinking Intuition, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
• Graciela De Pierris, Indiana University
  • “Philosophical Scepticism in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” in R. Popkin, ed., Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Pan-American Dialogue (Kluwer, 1996)
• Michael Della Rocca, Yale University
  • “Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 1-33.
• Keith DeRose, Yale University
  • The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Vol. 1, Oxford UP, 2009.
  • “‘Bamboozled by Our Own Words’: Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 316-338.
  • “Direct Warrant Realism,” in A. Dole and A. Chignell, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 150-172.
  • “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 172-198.
  • “Single Scoreboard Semantics,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 1-21.
  • “Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 22-41.
  • “The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004): 346-350.
  • “Assertion, Knowledge and Context,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 167-203.
  • “Now You Know It, Now You Don’t,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 91-106.
  • “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
  • “Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 697-706.
  • “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 385-413
  • “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 187-205.
  • ed., with T. Warfield, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford UP, 1999).
  • “Responding to Skepticism,” in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (1999), pp. 1-24.
  • “Simple Might’s, Indicative Possibilities, and the Open Future,” The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 67-82.
  • “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 568-580.
  • “Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): pp. 193-197.
  • “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 1-52.
• Michael Devitt, City University of New York, Graduate Center
  • “No Place for the A Priori,” forthcoming in M.J. Shaffer and M. Veber, eds., New Views of the A Priori in Physical Theory, Rodopi Press.
  • “There Is no A Priori,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 105-115.
  • “Underdetermination and Realism,” Philosophical Issues 12 (2002): 26-50.
  • “Naturalism and the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 45-65.
• Dylan Dodd, Arché, The University of St. Andrews
  • “Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic,” The Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007): 635-49.
• Trent Dougherty, Baylor University
  • with T. Rysiew, “Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008): 172-176.
• Igor Douven, University of Leuven
  • “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility,” Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 449-485.
  • with T. Williamson, “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 755-779.
  • with W. Meijs, “Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative,” Synthese 149 (2006): 97-132.
  • “Lewis on Fallible Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 573-580.
  • “A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 207-228.
  • “Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism,” Erkenntnis 63 (2005): 253-291.
  • with F. Hindriks, “Deflating the Correspondence Intuition,” Dialectica 59 (2005): 315-329.
  • with W. Meijs, “Bovens and Hartmann on Coherence,” Mind 114 (2005): 355-363.
  • “A Principled Solution to Fitch’s Paradox,” Erkenntnis 62 (2005): 47-69.
  • “The Context-Insensitivity of ‘Knowing More’ and ‘Knowing Better’,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2004): 313-326.
  • “Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox,” Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 395-404.
• Fred Dretske, Duke University
  • “The Case Against Closure,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 13-26.
  • Perception, Knowledge, and Belief : Selected Essays (Cambridge UP, 2000).
  • ed., with S. Bernecker, Knowledge : Readings in Contemporary Epistemology(Oxford UP, 2000).
  • “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 591-606.
  • “The Mind’s Awareness of Itself,” Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 103-124.
  • “Absent Qualia,” Mind and Language 11 (1996): 78-85.
  • “Phenomenal Externalism” and “Reply to Commentators, ” in E. Villanueva, ed., Perception (Ridgeview, 1996)
  • “Dretske’s Awful Answer,” Philosophia 24 (1995): 459-464.
  • “Introspection,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1994): 263-278.
• Gary Ebbs, Indiana University, Bloomington
  • “Why Skepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining,” Analysis 65 (2005): 237-244.
  • “A Puzzle About Doubt,” in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT, 2003), pp. 143-168.
  • “Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent?,” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58.
• Andy Egan, University of Michigan
  • “Epistemic Modals, Relativism, and Assertion,” Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 1-22.
  • with A. Elga, “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 77-93.
  • with J. Hawthorne and B. Weatherson, “Epistemic Modals in Context,” in Preyer and Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2005).
• Adam Elga, Princeton University
  • “How to Disagree About how to Disagree,” forthcoming in R. Feldman, T. Warfield, eds., Disagreement, Oxford UP.
  • “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41 (2007): 478-502.
  • with A. Egan, I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 77-93.
  • “Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004), 2004.
  • “Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Analysis 60 (2000): 143-147.
• Jim Edwards, University of Glasgow
  • “Burge on Testimony and Memory,” Analysis 60 (2000): 124-131.
• Catherine Elgin, Harvard University (School of Education)
  • “Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 156-167.
  • “Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 291-308.
  • Considered Judgment, Princeton UP, 1996.
  • “Unnatural Science,” Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 289-302.
• Mylan Engel, Nothern Illinois University
  • “The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism,” Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2005): 163-178.
  • “A Noncontextualist Account of Contextualist Linguistic Data,” Acta Analytica 20 (2005): 56-79.
  • “What’s Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox,” Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 203-231.
  • “Internalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (2000).
• Pascal Engel, University of Paris-Sorbonne
  • “The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?,” Mind and Society 2 (2002): 129-148.
  • “Dispositional Belief, Assent and Acceptance,” Dialectica 53 (1999): 211-226.
  • “Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief,” in A. Meijers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999), pp. pages 9-25.
  • “Believing, Accepting, and Holding True,” Philosophical Explorations 1 (1998).
• Theodore J. Everett, SUNY, Geneseo
  • “Antiskeptical Conditionals,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 505-536.
  • “The Rationality of Science and the Rationality of Faith,” Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 19-42.
  • “Other Voices, Other Minds,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 213-222.
• Simon Evnine, University of Miami
  • “Epistemic Unities,” Erkenntnis 59 (2003): 365-88.
  • “The Universality of Logic: On the Connection between Rationality and Logical Ability,” Mind 110 (2001): 335-67
  • “Learning from One’s Mistakes: Epistemic Modesty and the Nature of Belief,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 157-177.
  • “Believing Conjunctions,” Synthese 118 (1999): 201-227.
• Evan Fales, University of Iowa
  • “Proper Basicality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 373-383.
  • “Does Religion Experience Justify Religious Belief?: Do Mystics See God?” in M. Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 145-158.
  • critical study of Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, Nous 37 (2003): 353-370.
  • A Defense of the Given, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.
  • “Mystical Experience as Evidence,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (1996): 19-46.
  • “Plantinga’s Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology,” Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 432-451.
• Kevin Falvey, University of California, Santa Barbara
  • “Memory and Knowledge of Content”, in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003).
  • “The Basis of First Person Authority,” Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): 69-99.
  • “Knowledge in Intention,” Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 21-44.
  • “The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 60 (2000): 137-142.
  • “A Natural History of Belief,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 324-345.
• Jeremy Fantl, University of Calgary
  • with Matthew McGrath, “Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • with Matthew McGrath, “On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 558-589.
  • “An Analysis of the A Priori and A Posteriori,” Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 43-69.
  • “Modest Infinitism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 537-562.
  • with Robert Howell, “Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 371-383.
  • with Matthew McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 67-94.
• Paul Faulkner, University of Sheffield
  • “An Epistemic Role of Trust”, in Falcone, Barber, Singh, and Korba, L., ed., Trust, Reputation and Security: Theories and Practice (Springer forthcoming).
  • “On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony,” Synthese 131 (2002): 353-370.
  • “The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 581-601.
  • “Testimonial Knowledge,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000).
  • “David Hume’s Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998).
• Neil Feit, SUNY, Fredonia
  • “Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 29-55.
• Richard Feldman, University of Rochester
  • “Modest Deontologism in Epistemology,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • “Bonjour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism, and Basic Beliefs,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “Clifford’s Principle and James’s Options,” Social Epistemology 20 (2006): 19-33.
  • “Respecting the Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 95-119.
  • “Justification Is Internal,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 270-284.
  • with E. Conee, “Some Virtues of Evidentialism,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 95-108.
  • with E. Conee, Evidentialism, Oxford UP, 2004.
  • “Foundational Justification,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 42-58.
  • with E. Conee, “Typing Problems” (a response to Adler and Levin’s “Is the Generality Problem too General?”), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 98-105.
  • “Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions,” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 61-85.
  • with E. Conee, “Internalism Defended,” American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18.
  • “Kvanvig on Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 43-50.
  • “Epistemology, Argumentation, and Citizenship,” forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. 3, pp. 89-106.
  • “The Ethics of Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 667-695.
  • “Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 170-186.
  • “Contextualism and Skepticism,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 91-114.
  • with E. Conee, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
  • “Plantinga, Gettier, and Warrant,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 199-220.
  • “In Defense of Closure,” Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 487-494.
  • “Authoritarian Epistemology,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 147-170.
• Hartry Field, New York University
  • “Recent Debates about the A Priori,” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
  • “Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle,” Noûs 34 (2000): 1-30.
  • “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 117-149.
  • “Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 1-24.
  • “The A Prioricity of Logic,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 359-379.
• Kit Fine, New York University
  • “Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects,” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• Branden Fitelson, University of California, Berkeley
  • “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • with A. Waterman, “Bayesianism and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens,” forthcoming, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  • with Jim Hawthorne, “Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 505–514.
  • “A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence,” Analysis 63 (2003): 194–199.
  • with D. Bradley, “Monty Hall, Doomsday, and Confirmation,” Analysis 63 (2003): 23–31.
  • “Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction,” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 611–622.
  • with E. Eells, “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 129–142.
  • with L. Bovens, S. Hartmann, J. Snyder, “Too Odd (not) to Be True? A Reply to Erik J. Olsson: ‘Corroborating Testimony,
    Probability and Surprise’,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 539–563.
  • “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications” Philosophy of Science 68 (2001): S123–40.
  • with E. Eells, “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 121–232.
  • “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): S362–78.
  • with E. Sober, “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998) 115–29. Reprinted in R. Pennock, ed., Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics, MIT Press.
  • “Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity,” Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 652–60.
• Robert Fogelin, Dartmouth College
  • “Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for Another” (pp. 43-57) and “Replies [to Rosenberg, Villanueva, Valdes-Villanueva, and Williams]” (pp. 86-93), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
  • “The Sceptic’s Burden,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies (1999): 159-172.
  • “Garrett on the Consistency of Hume’s Philosophy,” Hume Studies 24 (1998): 161-169.
  • “Quine’s Limited Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophy (1997): 543-563.
  • “Prècis” (pp. 395-400) and “What Does a Pyrrhonist Know?” (replies to Dretske, Moser, Stroud, pp. 417-425); Symposium on R. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997).
• Richard Foley, New York University
  • “Is Justified Belief Responsible Belief?” in M. Steup, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), 313-326.
  • “Justified Belief as Responsible Belief,” in M. Steup and E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 313-326.
  • “A Trial Separation between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 59-71.
  • “Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 61-73.
  • Intellectual Trust in Ourselves and Others, Cambridge UP, 2001.
  • “Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 181-188.
  • “Locke and the Crisis of Postmodern Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 1-20.
  • “Rationality and Intellectual Self-Trust,” in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, ed., Rethinking Intuition (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
  • “Chisholm’s Epistemology,” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers (Open Court, 1997): 475-498.
  • “Knowledge is Accurate and Comprehensive Enough True Belief,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 87-95.
• Graeme Forbes, University of Colorado, Boulder
  • “Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited,” Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 205-222.  Reprinted in Skepticism (DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
• Bryan Frances, Fordham University
  • Scepticism Comes Alive, forthcoming, Oxford UP, 2005.
  • “When a Sceptical Hypothesis is Live,” Noûs 39 (2005): 559-595.
  • “A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription,” Analysis 62 (2002): 116-124.
  • “Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles,” Mind and Language 14 (1999): 203-226.
• Elizabeth Fricker, Oxford University
  • “Second-Hand Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 592-618.
  • “Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism is the Epistemology of Testimony,” Mind 104 (1995): 393-411.
• Michael Friedman, Indiana University
  • “Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 367-383.
• Richard Fumerton, University of Iowa
  • “Direct Realism, Introspection, and Cognitive Science,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 680-695.
  • “Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 121-138.
  • “The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 85-97.
  • “Achieving Epistemic Ascent,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 72-85.
  • “Mill’s Epistemology and Metaphysics” in The Modern Philosophers: From Descartes to Nietzche (Blackwell, forthcoming).
  • “Epistemic Justification and Normativity,” in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Obligation: Essays on Epistemic Responsibility and the Ethics of Belief, (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
  • “Classical Foundationalism” and “Response” in M. DePaul, ed., Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
  • “Relational, Non-Relational, and Mixed Theories of Experience,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 21-28.
  • “Williamson on Skepticism and Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 629-635.
  • “Externalism and Epistemological Direct Realism,” The Monist 81 (1998): 393- 406.
  • Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
    • “Prècis” (pp. 905-907) and “A Reply to my Critics” (pp. 927-938), Symposium on R. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998).
• André Gallois, Syracuse University
  • “The Indubitability of the Cogito,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 363-384.
  • The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority, Cambridge UP, 1996
  • with John Hawthorne, “Externalism and Scepticism,” Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 1-26, January 1996.
• Alfonso Garcia Suarez, Universidad de Oviedo
  • “On Wright’s Diagnosis of McKinsey’s Argument,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 164-171.
• Tamar Szabo Gendler, Yale University
  • ed., with J. Hawthorne, Perceptual Experience (Oxford UP, 2006).
  • with J. Hawthorne, “The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies,” Philosophical Studies 124 (2005): 331-352.
  • “Thought Experiments Rethought — and Reperceived,” Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 1152-1163.
  • “On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief,” in D.M. Lopes and M. Kieran, ed., Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts, (Routledge, 2003), pp. 125-141.
  • ed., with J. Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
  • “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 55-81.
  • Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases, Outstanding Dissertations in Philosophy, Garland Press (now Routledge), 2000. (70,000 words)
  • “Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1998): 397-424.
  • “On the Possibility of Feminist Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 27 (1996): 104-117.
• Brie Gertler, University of Virginia
  • “We can’t know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know that water does?”, Analysis, 64 (2004) : 44-47
  • ed., Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Ashgate, 2003).
  • “Can Feminists be Cartesians?”, Dialogue 41 (2002): 91-112.
  • “Introspecting Phenomenal States,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 305-328.
  • “The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics 28 (2001): 125-46.
• Edmund Gettier, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• John Gibbons, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
  • “Access Externalism,” Mind 115 (2006): 19-39.
  • “Knowledge in Action,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 579-600.
  • “Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes,” Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 13-28.
  • “Externalism and Knowledge of Content,” Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 287-310.
• Anthony Gillies, University of Michigan
  • with K. von Fintel, “CIA Leaks,” Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 77-98.
  • with K. von Fintel, “An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2 (2007).
  • “New Foundations for Epistemic Change,” Synthese. 138 (2004): 1-48.
  • “Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics,” Noûs 38 (2004): 585-615.
  • “A New Solution to Moore’s Paradox,” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001):  237-250.
  • “Belief Revision and Epistemology” (with John Pollock), Synthese 122 (2000): 69-92.
• Carl Ginet, Cornell University (emeritus)
  • “Infinitism Is not the Solution to the Regress Problem,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 140-149.
  • “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 267-277.
• Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University
  • “The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial Knowledge,” forthcoming in D. Pritchard, P. Greenough, eds., Williamson on Knowledge (Oxford UP).
  • “Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: The Case of Testimony,” forthcoming in J. Brown. J. Cappelen, eds., Assertion (Oxford UP).
  • “Experts, Semantic and Epistemic,” forthcoming, Noûs.
  • “Internalism, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Linguistic Understanding,” forthcoming, Communication and Cognition.
  • “Reliabilism in Philosophy,” Philosophical Studies 124 (2009): 105‐117.
  • “Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2008): 1-36.
  • Anti‐Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification, Cambridge UP, 2007.
  • editor, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2007.
  • “Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification,” Noûs. 41 (2007): 178-203.
  • with D. Henderson, “Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 576-593.
  • “Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge,” in J. Lackey and E. Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford UP, 2006): 127-144.
  • “Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discrimination,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 87 (2006): 301-314.
  • “Testimony as Evidence,” Philosophica 78 (2006): 29-52.
  • “Testimonial Knowledge from Unsafe Testimony,” Analysis 65 (2005): 302-311.
  • “The Dialectical Context of Boghossian’s Memory Argument,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005): 135-148.
  • “(Non-standard) Lessons from World-Switching Cases,” Philosophia 32 (2005): 95-131.
  • “Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and Testimonial Transmission,” Synthese 138 (2004): 387-416.
  • “Anti-individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism,” Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 53-78.
  • “On our Alleged A Priori Knowledge that Water Exists,” Analysis 63 (2003): 38-41.
  • “What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts?,” in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 241-56.
  • “Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of the Attitudes Capture the Agents’ Conceptions?,” Noûs 36 (2002): 597-621.
  • “Belief and Its Linguistic Expression: Towards a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority,” Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 65-76
  • “Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony,” Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 512-526
  • “Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy,” Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 51-79.
  • “The Semantics of Interlocution,” Communication and Cognition 33 (2000): 249-286
  • “The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 136-156.
  • “The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge,” Synthese 118 (1999): 165-199.
  • “Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner,” Analysis 59 (1999): 212-217.
  • “Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument,” Analysis 57 (1997): 211-219.
  • “The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception,” Minds and Machines 7 (1997): 515-529.
• Alan H. Goldman, College of William and Mary
  • “The Underdetermination Argument for Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism,” Analysis 67 (2007): 32-36.
  • “Reason Internalism,” Philosophy and Phenomonelogical Research 71 (2005): 505-532
  • Epistemological Foundations: Can Experiences Justify Beliefs?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 273-285.
• Alvin I. Goldman, Rutgers University
  • “Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism,” forthcoming in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New Essays (Oxford UP).
  • “Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence,” forthcoming in D. Pritchard and P. Greenough, eds., Williamson on Knowledge (Oxford UP).
  • with E. Olsson, “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,” forthcoming in D. Pritchard et al., eds., Epistemic Value (Oxford UP).
  • “Human Rationality: Epistemological and Psychological Perspectives,” forthcoming in Proceedings of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (GAP.6).
  • “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement,” forthcoming in R. Feldman and T. Warfield, eds., Disagreement (Oxford UP).
  • “Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications,” forthcoming, Supplement to Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2006/2007 Lecture Series on Epistemology, ed. J. Garvey.
  • “The Social Epistemology of Blogging,” forthcoming in J. van den Hoven and J. Weckert, Information Technology and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge UP).
  • “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 1-26 (2007).
  • Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford UP, 2006.
  • “Sosa on Reflective Knowledge and Virtue Perspectivism,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 86-95.
  • “Group Knowledge versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology,” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 1 (2004): 11-22.
  • Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public (Oxford UP, 2002)
  • “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 85-110.
  • “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues,” in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford UP, 2001).
  • “Social Routes to Belief and Knowledge,” The Monist (2001).
  • “Veritistic Social Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 107-114.
  • Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford, 1999).
    • “Précis” (pp. 185-190) and “Replies” (pp. 215-227), Symposium on Knowledge in a Social World, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002).
  • “Internalism Exposed,” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 271-293
  • “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology,” Philosophical Perspectives13 (1999): 1-28.
  • “Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification,” Argumentation 11(1997): 155-164.
  • “Social Epistemology, Interests, and Truth,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 171-187.
• Peter Graham, University of California, Riverside
  • “Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential?,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 84-95.
  • “The Reliability of Testimony,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 695-709.
  • “Transferring Knowledge,” Noûs 34 (2000): 131-152
  • “Conveying Information,” Synthese 123 (2000): 365-392.
  • “What is Testimony?”, Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997): 227-232.
• John Greco, Saint Louis University
  • Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge UP, 2010.
  • “Epistemic Value,” in S.Bernecker, and D. Pritchard, eds., Routledge Companion to Epistemology; New York: Routledge, 2010.
  • “Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting Testimony,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 82 (2009).
  • “Knowledge and Success from Ability,” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 17-26.
  • “Skepticism and Internalism,” Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (2009).
  • “Knowledge and Success from Ability,” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 17-26.
  • “Skepticism and Internalism,” Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (2009).
  • “What’s Wrong with Contextualism?” Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 416-436.
  • “Freindly Theism” in J. Kraft, ed., Religious Tolerance through Epistemic Humility (Ashgate, 2008).
  • “The Value Problem,” in A. Haddock, A. Millar, D. H. Pritchard, eds., The Value of Knowledge (Oxford UP, 2008).
  • ed., The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford UP, 2008.
  • “Skepticism about the External World” ” in J. Greco, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (Oxford UP, 2008).
  • “The Nature of Ability and Purpose of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 57-69.
  • “Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge,” Episteme 4 (2007).
  • “External World Skepticism,” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007).
  • “Reformed Epistemology,” in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Religion (Routledge, 2007).
  • “Epistemology in the Twentieth Century,” in C. Boundas, ed., A Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies (Edinburgh UP, 2007).
  • “Worries about Pritchard’s Safety,” Synthese 158 (2007): 299-302.
  • “Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic,” Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 9-34.
  • “How to be a Pragmatist:  C.I. Lewis and Humean Skepticism,” Transactions of the Charles .S. Peirce Society 42 (2006): 24-31.
  • “Justification is not Internal,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005).
  • “Alston’s Epistemology of Perception,” in H. Battaly, M. Lynch, eds., Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
  • “Justification Is not Internal,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 257-270.
  • ed., Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, 2004.
  • “How to Preserve Your Virtue while Losing Your Perspective,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 96-105.
  • Putting Skeptics in Their Place (Cambridge UP, 2000).
  • “Skepticism, Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 139-147.
  • “Scepticism and Epistemic Kinds,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 366-376.
  • “Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue” (contribution to book symposium for Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
  • “Agent Reliabilism,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 273-296.
  • ed., with E. Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
  • “The Force of Hume’s Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact,” Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 289-306.
  • “Foundationalism and Philosophy of Religion,” in Brian Davies, ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject (London: Cassell, 1998), pp. 34-41.
  • “Catholics vs. Calvinists on Religious Knowledge,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1997): 13-34.
  • “Modern Ontology and the Problems of Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995): 241-251.
  • “Reid’s Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What’s the Big Idea?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 279-296.
• Patrick Greenough, University of St. Andrews
• Tobies Grimaltos, Universitat de Valencia
  • (with Carlos J. Moya) “Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 386-394.
• Stephen Grimm, University of Notre Dame
  • “Ernest Sosa, Knowledge, and Understanding,” Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 171-191.
• Susan Haack, University of Miami
  • “A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification,” in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge, second edition (Wadsworth, 1998): 283-293; also in E. Sosa and J. Kim, ed., Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2000): 226-236.
  • “The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered,” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, 1997.
  • “The Puzzle of ‘Scientific Method’,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (1997): 495-505.
  • “The First Rule of Reason,” in P. Forster, ed., The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, U Toronto Press, 1997.
  • “Reflections of a Critical Common-sensist,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 32 (1996): 359-373.
  • Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Blackwell, 1995
    • “Prècis of Evidence and Inquiry” (pp. 7-11) and “Reply to Bonjour” (pp. 25-35), Synthese 112 (1997).
    • “Prècis” (pp. 611-614) and “Reply to Commentators” (pp. 641-656), Symposium on S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996).
• Alan Hájek, Australian National University
  • “Arguments For – Or Against – Probabilism?,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2008): 793-819.
  • “The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too,” Synthese 156 (2007): 563-585.
  • with L. Eriksson, “What Are Degrees of Belief?,” Studia Logica. 86 (2007): 185-215.
  • “My Philosophical Position Says ‘p’, and I Don’t Believe ‘p’,” forthcoming in M. Green and J. Williams, ed., Moorean Absurdity: Essays on Content, Context and Their Collision, Oxford UP.
  • “Arguments for Probabilism – Or Non-Probabilism?,” forthcoming in F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri, eds., Degrees of Belief, Oxford UP.
  • “Scotching Dutch Books?,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 139-151.
  • “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be”, Synthese 137 (2003): 273-323.
  • “Interpretations of Probability,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003 edition), ed. E. Zalta.
  • “Induction and Probability” (with Ned Hall), in Machamer and Silberstein, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Science (Blackwell, 2002).
  • “Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore” (with Daniel Stoljar), Analysis 61 (2001): 208-213.
  • “Agnosticism Meets Bayesianism,” Analysis 58 (1998): 199-206.
  • “Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen” (with William Harper), Dialogue 36 (1997): 91-100.
• Bob Hale, University of Glasgow
  • with C. Wright, “Implicit Definition and the A Priori,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 286-319.
  • “Transmission and Closure,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 172-190.
• Steven Hales, Bloomsburg University
  • “The Problem of Intuition,” American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2000): 135-147.
  • “Epistemic Closure Principles,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1995): 185-201.
• Richard J. Hall, Michigan State University
  • “The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence” (with Charles Johnson), American Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1998.
• Sven Ove Hansson, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
  • “The False Dichotomy between Coherentism and Foundationalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 290-300.
  • “Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision,” Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 93-108.
  • “Belief Revision from an Epistemological Point of View,” in I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski, eds., Handbook of Epistemology (Kluwer, 2004), pp. 255-279.
  • with E. Olsson, “Providing Foundations for Coherentism,” Erkenntnis 51 (1999): 243-265.
  • “Closure-Invariant Rationality Postulates”, in E. Ejerhed, S. Lindström, eds., Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic (Kluwer, 1997), pp. 113-136.
  • “Hidden Structures of Belief”, in A. Fuhrmann, H. Rott, eds., Logic, Action and Information (de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 79-100.
• Gilbert Harman, Princeton University
  • with S. Kulkarni, Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory; MIT Press, 2007.
    • with S. Kulkarni, S., “Précis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory” and “Replies to Commentators,” and “Response to Shafer, Thagard, Strevens, and Hanson,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 5-9, 47-56.
  • “Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Direct Speaker Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 173-179.
  • “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 559-575.
  • with B. Sherman, “Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 492-500.
  • “Skepticism and Foundations,” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 1-11.
  • “The Future of the A Priori,” in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, APA Centennial Supplement to Journal of Philosophical Research (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 23-34.
  • “Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 417-428.
  • “Rational Insight versus General Foundations” (discussing Lawrence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 657-63.
  • Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind, Oxford UP, 1999.
  • “Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief,” in Kulp, ed., Realism/Anti-Realism and Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
  • “Rationality,” in Smith, Osherson, ed., Thinking: Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, MIT Press, 1995; revised version appears in Harman, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind.
• William Harper, University of Alabama
  • “Paper Mache Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism,” Synthese 116 (1998): 27-49.
• Stephan Hartmann, London School of Economics –> Tilburg University
  • with L. Bovens, “Why There Cannot be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence,” forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
  • with L. Bovens, “An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • with L. Bovens, “Coherence and the Role of Specificity: A Response to Meijs and Douven,” Mind 114 (2005).
  • with L. Bovens, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
  • with L. Bovens, “Solving the Riddle of Coherence,” Mind 112 (2003): 601-634.
  • with L. Bovens, “Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments,” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 29-73.
• Sally Haslanger, MIT
  • “What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 459-480.
• James Hawthorne, University of Oklahoma
  • “Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions,” Mind 114 (2005): 277-320.
  • with B. Fitelson, “Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 505–514.
  • “Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (2004): 89-123.
  • with L. Bovens, “The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief,” Mind 108 (1999): 241-264.
• John Hawthorne, Oxford University
  • with J. Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy.
  • ed., with T. Gendler, Perceptual Experience (Oxford UP, 2006).
  • with A. Egan, B. Weatherson, “Epistemic Modals in Context,” in G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 131-168.
  • “Knowledge and Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 452-458.
  • “The Case for Closure,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 26-43.
  • with T. Gendler, “The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies,” Philosophical Studies 124 (2005): 331-352.
  • Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford UP, 2004).
    • “Précis” (pp. 476-481) and “Replies [to Cohen, Harman and Sherman, and Vogel]” (pp. 510-523), Symposium on Knowledge and Lotteries,  Philosophical Issues 14 (2004).
  • ed., with T.S. Gendler, Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
  • “Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 247-269.
  • “Lewis, the Lottery and the Preface,” Analysis 62 (2002): 242-51.
  • “Implicit Belief and A Priori Knowledge,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 191-210.
  • “Reply to [Stewart] Cohen[‘s ‘Contextualism and Skepticism’],” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 117-120.
  • “The Epistemology of Possible Worlds: A Guided Tour,” Philosophical Studies 84 (1996): 183-202.
  • with André Gallois, “Externalism and Scepticism,” Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 1-26.
  • with Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant,” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 233-258.
• Allan Hazlett, Texas Tech University –> Fordham University
  • “The Myth of Factive Verbs,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Knowledge and Conversation,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Grice’s Razor,” forthcoming, Metaphilosophy.
  • “Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question,” forthcoming, Erkenntnis 65 (2006): 343-63.
  • “How to Defeat Belief in the External World,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 198-212.
• Mark Heller, Syracuse University
  • “Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000.
  • “Relevant Alternatives and Closure,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999): 196-208.
  • “The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 115-129.
  • “Painted Mules and the Cartesian Circle” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1996, pp. 29-56.
  • “The Simple Solution to the Problem of Generality,” Noûs 29 (1995): 501-515.
• David Henderson, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
  • “What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Folk Psychology,” in C. Erneling and D. Johnson, eds., Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
  • with T. Horgan, “The A Priori Isn’t All that It’s Cracked Up to Be, But it Is Something,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2002): 219-250.
  • with T. Horgan, “Practicing Safe Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 102 (2001): 227-258.
  • with T. Horgan, “Iceburg Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61 (2000): 497-535.
  • with T. Horgan, “Simulation and Epistemic Competence” in Karsten Steuber, ed., Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences (Westview Press, 2000).
  • with T. Horgan, “What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 51-86.with Terry Horgan, “Iceburg Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
  • “Epistemic Rationality, Epistemic Motivation, and Interpretive Charity,” ProtoSociology 8/9 (1996): 4-29.
  • “Ceteris Paribus Generalizations and Causal Knowledge: A Response to Rosenberg,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996), Spindel Conference Supplement: 205-216.
  • “One Naturalized Epistemological Argument Against Coherentist Accounts of Empirical Knowledge,” Erkenntnis 43 (1995): 199-227.
•  Stephen Hetherington, University of New South Wales
  • “Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Knowledge’s Boundary Problem,” Synthese 150 (2006), 41-56.
  • “Knowledge that Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models,” in S. Hetherington, ed., Aspects of Knowing (Elsevier, 2006).
  • “How To Know (That Knowledge-That Is Knowledge-How),” in S. Hetherington, ed., Epistemology Futures (Oxford UP, 2006).
  • “Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 129-152.
  • “Shattering a Cartesian Sceptical Dream,” Principia 8 (2004): 103-17.
  • “The Grue Possibility as a Sceptical Possibility?” Philosophia 29 (2002), 253-260.
  • “Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2002): 83-102.
  • “Epistemic Responsibility — A Dilemma.” The Monist (forthcoming, October 2002)
  • Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2001)
  • “A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem,” Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (2001): 307-324
  • “Re: Brains In a Vat,” Dialectica 54 (2000): 307-311.
  • “Epistemic Disaster Averted,” Analysis 59 (1999): 194-200
  • “Knowing Failably,” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 565-587.
  • “Free Will as a Sceptical Threat to Knowing,” Principia 3 (1999): 139-154
  • “Actually Knowing,” The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 453-469
  • “Stove’s New Irrationalism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 244-249
  • “The Sceptic Is Absolutely Mistaken (As Is Dretske),” Philosophical Papers 27 (1998): 29-43
  • “Scepticism on Scepticism,” Philosophia 25 (1997): 323-330
  • Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology (Westview, 1996).
  • “Gettieristic Scepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 83-97
  • “Foley’s Evidence and His Epistemic Reasons,” Analysis 56 (1996): 122-126.
• Christopher Hill, Brown University
  • “Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge,” Analysis 58 (1998): 20-26.
  • “Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 567-581.
• Edward S. Hinchman, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
  • “Telling as Inviting to Trust,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1995): 562-587.
• Thomas Hofweber, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • “Contextualism and the Meaning-Intention Problem,” in K. Korta, E. Sosa, X. Arrazola, ed., Cognition, Agency and Rationality, Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 79 (Kluwer, 1999).
• Jakob Hohwy, Aarhus University, Denmark
  • “Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism: A Contextualist Approach,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002): 235-252.
• Christopher Hookway, University of Sheffield
  • “Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification” (pp. 344-365) and “Replies [to Greco, Corbi, and Moya and Grimaltos]” (pp. 395-399), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
  • “Epistemic Norms and Theoretical Deliberation,” in J. Dancy, ed., Normativity (Blackwell, 2000).
  • “Regulating Inquiry: Virtue, Doubt, and Sentiment,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 149-157.
  • “Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubts,” in R. Stern, ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (Oxford UP, 1999).
  • “Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation’, in J. Preston, ed., Thought and Language (Cambridge UP, 1997)
• Terry Horgan, University of Arizona
  • with D. Henderson, “The A Priori Isn’t All that It’s Cracked Up to Be, But it Is Something,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2002): 219-250.
  • with D. Henderson, “Practicing Safe Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 102 (2001): 227-258.
  • with D. Henderson, “Iceburg Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61 (2000): 497-535.
  • with D. Henderson, “Simulation and Epistemic Competence” in Karsten Steuber, ed., Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences (Westview Press, 2000).
  • with D. Henderson, “What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 51-86.
• Paul Horwich, CUNY Graduate Center
  • “Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 150-169.
• Daniel Howard-Snyder, Western Washington University
  • with E.J. Coffman, “Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2006.
  • with C. Lee, “On a ‘Fatal Dilemma’ for Moderate Foundationalism,” Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005): 251-259.
  • “Foundationalism and Arbitrariness,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 18-24.
  • “Lehrer’s Case against Foundationalism,” Erkenntnis 60 (2004): 51-73.
  • with Frances Howard-Snyder and Neil Feit, “Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 304-327.
  • “On an ‘Unintelligible’ Idea: Donald Davidson’s Case against Experiential Foundationalism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2002): 523-555.
  • “BonJour’s ‘Basic Antifoundationalist Argument’ and the Doctrine of the Given,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1998): 163-177.
  • with J. Hawthorne, “Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant,” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 233-258.
• Michael Huemer, University of Colorado, Boulder
  • “Logical Properties of Warrant,” Philosophical Studies 122 (2005): 171-182.
  • ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, 2002.
  • “Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification,” Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 329-340.
  • Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
  • “The Problem of Defeasible Justification,” Erkenntnis 54 (2001): 375-97.
  • “Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 397-413.
  • “The Problem of Memory Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 346-57.
  • “Probability and Coherence Justification,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1997): 463-72.
• David Hunter
  • “Understanding, Justification and the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 87 (1997):119-141.
• John Hyman, Oxford University
  • “How Knowledge Works,” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 433-451.
• Michael J. Hymers, Dalhousie University
  • “Realism and Self-Knowledge: A Problem for Burge,” Philosophical Studies86 (1997): 303-325.
• Christopher J. Insole
  • “Seeing Off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony,” Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 44-56.
• Frank Jackson, Australian National University
  • “Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 320-332.
• Stephen Jacobson, Georgia State University
  • “Contextualism And Global Doubts About The World,” Synthese 129 (2001): 381-404.
  • “Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms,” Synthese 110 (1997): 381-397.
  • “Skepticism, Mitigated Skepticism, and Contextualism,” in Keith Lehrer et al. (eds.), Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996): 195-205.
• Carrie Jenkins, University of Nottingham.  Blog: Long Words Bother Me.
  • “The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond,” forthcoming in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox (Oxford UP).
  • “Concepts, Experience and Modal Knowledge,” forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann, ed., The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford UP).
  • “Apriorism About Modality: Reply to Scott Sturgeon,” forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann, ed., The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford UP).
  • “Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience,” The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 693-701.
  • “A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments,” Philosophy Compass 3 (2008): 436-50.
  • “Boghossian on the A Priori,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2008): 113-27.
  • “Epistemic Norms and Natural Facts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007): 259-72.
  • “Anti-Realism and Epistemic Accessibility,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 525-51.
  • “Entitlement and Rationality,” Synthese 157 (2007): 25-45.
  • “Knowledge and Explanation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006): 137-63.
  • “Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call,” Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2005): 194-201.
  • “Knowledge of Arithmetic,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005): 727-47.
• Robin Jeshion, University of California, Riverside –> University of Southern California
  • “Frege: Evidence for Self-evidence,” Mind, 113 (2004): 131-138.
  • “The Fallibility of Rational Insight,” Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 301-310.
  • “Frege’s Notions of Self-Evidence,” Mind 110 (2001): 937-976.
  • “Implicit Belief? A Priori Knowledge?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 211-216.
  • “On the Obvious,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 333-355.
  • “Proof Checking and Knowledge by Intellection,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 85-112.
• Bredo C. Johnsen, University of Houston
  • “How to Read ‘Epistemology Naturalized’,” Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 78-93.
  • “Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be,” Philosophical Studies 112 (2003): 225-249.
  • “On the Coherence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 521-561.
  • “Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 385-406.
  • “On Richard Rorty’s Culs-de-sac,” Philosophical Forum 30 (1999): 133-160.
  • “Dennett on Qualia and Consciousness: A Critique,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1997): 47-82.
• Ward E. Jones, Rhodes University, South Africa
  • “Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism?”, Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 433-451.
  • “Why Do We Value Knowledge?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 423-439.
• James Joyce, University of Michigan
  • “How Probabilities Reflect Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 153-178.
• Mark Kaplan, Indiana University
  • “Chisholm’s Grand Move,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 563-581.
  • “Who Cares What You Know?” (Critical Study of T. Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits), The Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (2003): 105-116.
  • “To What Must an Epistemology Be True?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 279-304.
  • Decision Theory as Philosophy, Cambridge UP, 1996.
  • “Skepticism and Pyrotechnics,” Acta Analytica 1996: 157-169.
  • “Believing the Improbable,” Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 117-146.
• Charlotte Katzoff, Bar Ilan University
  • “Counter-Evidence and the Duty to Critically  Reflect,” Analysis 60 (2000): 89-96.
• Kevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University
  • “The Logic of Success,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2000): Supp. 639-666
  • “Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia,” Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 11-58
  • The Logic of Reliable Inquiry, Oxford UP, 1996
• Thomas Kelly, Princeton University
  • “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,” forthcoming in R. Feldman and T. Warfied, eds., Disagreement (Oxford UP).
  • “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization,” forthcoming, The Journal of Philosophy.
  • “Truth and Common Sense: Against Revisionary Ontology, Skepticism, Etc.,” forthcoming, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 32.
  • “Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays?,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 695-712.
  • “Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?”, Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 179-209.
  • “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 167-196.
  • “Epistemic Rationality As Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 612-640.
  • “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes,” Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 163-196.
• Andreas Kemmerling, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Ludwigstr
  • “How Self-Knowledge Can‘t be Naturalized (Some Remarks on a Proposal by Dretske),” Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 311-328.
• Patricia Kitcher, Columbia University
  • “Kant’s Epistemological Problem and Its Coherent Solution,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 415-441.
  • “Revisiting Kant’s Epistemology,” Noûs, 1995.
• Philip Kitcher, Columbia University
  • “A Priori Knowledge Revisited,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 65-91.
• Peter D. Klein, Rutgers University
  • “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning” (pp. 1-17) and “How To Be an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification” (pp. 25-29), Philosophical Studies 134 (2007).
  • “Infinitism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 153-172.
  • “Infinitism is the Solution to the Regress Problem,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 131-140.
  • “What Is Wrong with Foundationalism Is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 166-171.
  • “Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 112-125.
  • “When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 718-729.
  • “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism,” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 75-94.
  • “Skepticism,” in P. Moser, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002): 336-361.
  • “Skepticism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October, 2001: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism
  • “Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 108-116.
  • “The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 7-24.
  • “Why Not Infinitism?” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 199-208.
  • “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 297-325.
  • “Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 919-925.
  • “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 213-236.
  • “Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility” in J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 97-130.
  • with T. Warfield, “No Help for the Coherentist,” Analysis 56 (1996): 118-121.
• John Koethe, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
  • Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning, Cornell UP, 2005.
  • “Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How,” Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 325-328.
• Keith Korcz, University Louisiana at Lafayette
  • “The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 525-550.
  • “Recent Work on the Basing Relation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 171-191.
• Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  • “Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (de Gruyter, forthcoming).
  • “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 126-134.
  • Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Oxford UP, 2002.
    • “Prècis” (pp. 399-402) and “Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott” (pp. 427-441), Symposium on H. Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005).
  • ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell, 2001.
  • “Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism,” in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford UP, 2001): 231-248.
  • “The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 24-32.
  • “The Impurity of Reason,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 67-89.
  • “Distrusting Reason” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 181-196.
  • “Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 327-346.
  • “In Defence of a Naturalised Epistemology,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 158-169.
  • with D. Christensen, “Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 1-20.
  • “Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics,” Philosophical Topics, 23 (1995): 237-255.
• Martin Kusch, University of Cambridge
  • Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2002.
  • ed., The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge, Kluwer, 2000.
• Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Baylor University.  Blog (administrator and the main contributor): Certain Doubts.
  • “Sensitivity and the Value Problem,” forthcoming in T. Black, K. Becker, eds., New Essays on Sensitivity.
  • “Norms of Assertion,” forthcoming in J. Brown, H. Cappelen, eds., Assertion, Oxford UP, forthcoming 2010.
  • “Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument,” forthcoming in J. Turri, P. Klein, eds., Infinitism.
  • “The Value of Understanding,” in A. Haddock, A. Millar, D. Pritchard, ed., Epistemic Value, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2009.
  • “Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope,” in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on Knowability, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2009.
  • “Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries,” in D. Pritchard, P. Greenough, ed., Williamson and His Critics (Oxford UP, 2009), pp. 140-60.
  • “Contrastivism and Closure,” Social Epistemology 22 (2008): 247-56.
  • “Pointless Truth,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (2008): 199-212.
  • “Propositionalism and Narrow Content,” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 165-78.
  • “Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat,” in D. Baker, ed., Alvin Plantinga: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, Cambridge UP, 2007, pp. 107-124.
  • “Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge,” in T. Crisp, M. Davidson, D. van der Laan, eds., Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga (Springer, 2006), pp. 193-214.
  • “Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 131-140.
  • The Knowability Paradox, Oxford UP, 2006.
  • “On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars’ Problem: A Defense of Propositionalism,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 173-190.
  • “Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 285-296.
  • “Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 201-218.
  • “Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification ,” American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2003): 3-18.
  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge UP, 2003.
  • “Justification and Proper Basing ,” in E. Olsson, ed., The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co., 2003).
  • “Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 27-42.
  • “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?”, Monist 81 (1998): 426-451.
  • “In Defense of Coherentism,” Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 299-306.
  • ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
  • “Plantinga’s Proper Function Account of Warrant,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 281-303.
  • “The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism ,” Noûs 29 (1996): 481-500.
  • “Coherentists’ Distractions,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 257-75.
  • “Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension,” Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1995): 159-68.
• Igal Kvart, Hebrew University
  • “A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 1-43
• Jennifer Lackey, Northwestern University
  • Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2008.
  • “What Should We Do When We Disagree?” forthcoming, Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
  • “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” forthcoming in A. Haddock, A. Millar, D. Pritchard, eds., Social Epistemology (Oxford UP).
  • “Knowledge and Credit,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “What Luck Is Not,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 255-67.
  • “Norms of Assertion,” Noûs 41 (2007): 594-626.
  • “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know,” Synthese 158 (2007): 345-61.
  • “Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 209-19.
  • “Learning from Words,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 77-101.
  • ed. with E. Sosa, The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford UP, 2006.
  • “It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” in Lackey, Sosa, ed., The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford UP, 2006): 160-89.
  • “The Nature of Testimony,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 177-197.
  • “Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 636-658.
  • “Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection,” Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 163-190.
  • “A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” Noûs 37 (2003): 706-723.
  • “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission,”  The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471-490.
• Markus Lammenranta, University of Helsinki
  • “Reliabilism and Circularity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 111-124.
• Charles Landesman, CUNY
  • “Moore’s Proof of an External World and the Problem of Skepticism,” Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (1999): 21-36.
• Harold Langsam, University of Virginia
  • “Externalism, Self-knowledge, and Inner Observation,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 42-61.
• Mark Lange, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • “Would ‘Direct Realism’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?”, Noûs 38 (2004): 197-232.
  • “Okasha on Inductive Scepticism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 226-232.
  • “Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization”, Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 294-324.
  • “Inductive Confirmation, Counterfactual Conditionals, and Laws of Nature,” Philosophical Studies 85 (1997): 1-36.
• William S. Larkin, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • “Brute Error With Respect to Content,” Philosophical Studies 94 (1999): 159-171.
• Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Oxford University
  • with J. Hawthorne, “Knowledge and objective chance,” forthcoming in P. Greenough, D. Prichard, eds., Williamson On Knowledge, Oxford UP.
  • “Single-premise deduction and risk,” Philosophical Studies 141 (2008): 157-173.
  • “Why the externalist is better off without free logic: A reply to McKinsey,” Dialectica 62 (2008): 535-540.
  • “Externalism and a priori knowledge of the word: Why privileged access is not the issue,” Dialectica 60 (2006): 433-445.
• Andrew Latus, St. Francis Xavier University
  • “Our Epistemic Goal,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 28-39.
• Krista Lawlor, Stanford University
  • “Knowing What One Wants,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Enough is Enough: Pretense and Invariance in the Semantics of ‘Knows that’,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 211-236.
  • “Reason and the Past: The Role of Rationality in Diachronic Self-Knowledge,” Synthese 145 (2005): 467-495.
  • “Living Without Closure,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 93-117.
  • “Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority,” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 549-564.
• Pierre Le Morvan, The College of New Jersey
  • “A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism,” forthcoming (2005), Metaphilosophy.
  • “Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief,” forthcoming (2004), Erkenntnis.
  • “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them,” The American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 221-234.
  • “Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?”, Erkenntnis 56 (2002): 151-168.
• Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona
  • with A. Habib, “Sosa on Circularity and Coherence,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 106-111.
  • “Discursive Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 637-653.
  • “Sensitivity, Indiscerbility and Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 33-37.
  • “Knowledge, Scepticism and Coherence,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 131-139.
  • “Rationality,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 206-219.
  • “Justification, Coherence and Knowledge,” Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 243-258.
  • Self Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy (Oxford, 1997).
    • “Précis” (pp. 1039-1041) and “Replies” (pp. 1065-1074), Symposium on K. Lehrer Self-Trust, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999).
  • “Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 25-45.
• Adam Leite, Indiana University, Bloomington
  • “Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • Believing One’s Reasons are Good,” Synthese 161 (2008): 419-441.
  • “How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose’s ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Context’,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 111-129.
  • “Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 505-533.
  • “Some Worries for Would-Be Wammers,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 101-125.
  • “On Williamson’s Arguments that Knowledge Is a Mental State,” Ratio 18 (2005): 165-175.
  • “A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 395-421.
  • “Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle Is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2004): 335-350.
  • “On Justifying and Being Justified,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 219-253.
  • “Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?” The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 232–251.
• Jarrett Leplin, University of North Carolina, Greensborough
  • “In Defense of Reliabilism” (pp. 31-42) and “Reply to Christensen” (pp. 51-52), Philosophical Studies 134 (2007).
• Isaac Levi, Columbia University
  • “Maximizing and Satisficing Evidential Support” in D. Malament, ed., Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science and Mathematics (Open Court, 2002).
  • The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought, Cambridge UP, 1997.
  • “Caution and Nonmonotonic Inference” in M. Sintonen, ed., Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on Jaakko Hintikka’s Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).
• Michael Levin, City College, City University of New York
  • “Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 397-410.
  • with J. Adler, “Is the Generality Problem too General?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 87-97.
  • “Demons, Possibility, and Evidence,” Noûs 34 (2000): 422-440.
  • “You Can Always Count on Reliabilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 607-617
  • “Plantinga on Functions and the Theory of Evolution,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 83-98
• David Lewis, died Oct. 14, 2001; had taught at Princeton University
  • “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-567.  Reprinted in Skepticism (DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
• Clayton Littlejohn, University of Texas at San Antonio; blog: Think Tonk.
  • “Must We Act Only on What We Know?,” forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy.
  • “Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms,” forthcoming, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  • “Reasons and the Justification of Belief,” forthcoming in A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen, ed., Reasons for Belief, Synthese Library.
  • “The Externalist’s Demon,” forthcoming, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  • “From E = K to Scepticism?,” The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 679-84.
• Louis Loeb, University of Michigan
  • Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise (Oxford UP, 2002).
  • “Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 279-303.
  • “Hume’s Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs,” Philosophical Quarterly 51(2001): 145-164.
  • “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic States,” Noûs 32 (1998): 205-230.
  • “Causal Inference, Associationism, and Skepticism in Part III of Book I of Hume’s ‘Treatise’,” in P. Easton, ed., Logic and the Workings of the Mind (Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1997).
  • “Hume on Stability, Justification, and Unphilosophical Probability,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995): 101-132.
  • “Instability and Uneasiness in Hume’s Theories of Belief and Justification,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 301-327
• Helen Longino, University of Minnesota
  • “Toward an Epistemology for Biological Pluralism.” in J. Creath and J. Maienschein, ed., Biology and Epistemology (Cambridge UP, 1999).
  • “Feminist Epistemology,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 328-353.
  • “Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement (1997).
• Peter Ludlow, Northwestern University
  • “Cheap Contextualism,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 104-129.
  • “What was I Thinking? Social Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Shifting Memory Targets,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (Berlin: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
  • “Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn In Epistemology,” in G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 11-50.
  • ed., with N. Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998).
  • “On the Relevance of Slow Switching” Analysis 57 (1997): 285-286.
  • “Social Externalism and Memory: A Problem?,” Acta Analytica 1995: 69-76.
  • “Social Externalism, Self- Knowledge, and Memory,” Analysis 55 (1995): 157-159.
  • “Externalism, Self- Knowledge, and the Prevalence of Slow Switching,” Analysis 55 (1995): 45-49.
• Steven Luper, Trinity University
  • “Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • “Dretske on Knowledge Closure,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2006): 379-394.
  • “Epistemic Relativism,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 271-295.
  • ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Publishing, 2003.
  • “Indiscernability Skepticism,” in Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays.
  • “Skepticism and the Sociology of Knowledge,” Facta Philosophica 3 (2001) 197-210.
• William Lycan, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • “Moore’s Antiskeptical Strategies,” in S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, eds., Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics (Oxford UP, 2007).
  • “On the Gettier Problem Problem,” in Stephen Hetherington, ed., Epistemology Futures (Oxford UP, 2006), pp. 148-68.
  • “Dretske’s Ways of Introspecting,” in B. Gertler, ed., Privileged Access and First Person Authority (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 15-29.
  • “Moore Against the New Skeptics,” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 35-53.
  • “Dretske on the Mind‘s Awareness of Itself,” Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 125-133.
  • “Bealer on the the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 143-50; reprinted in A. Casullo, ed., A Priori Knowledge (1999).
  • “Plantinga and Coherentisms,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 3-23.
•  Michael P. Lynch, Connecticut College
  • “Beyond the Walls of Reason,” Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 529-536.
  • “Hume and the Limits of Reason,” Hume Studies 22 (1996): 89-104.
• Jack C. Lyons, University of Arkansas
  • “Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 237-56.
  • “General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies 27 (2001): 247-277.
  • “Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 163-178.
• John MacFarlane, University of California, Berkeley
  • “Relativism and Disagreement,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 17-31.
  • “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 197-233.
  • “Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism,” Analysis 65 (2005): 132-138.
• Penelope Maddy, University of California, Irvine
  • “Naturalism and the A Priori,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 92-116.
• P.D. Magnus, University of California, San Diego
  • with J. Cohen, “Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation,” Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 37-52
• Stephen Maitzen, Acadia University
  • with Andrew Graham, “CORNEA and Closure,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007): 83–86.
  • “The Impossibility of Local Skepticism,” Philosophia 34 (2006): 453–464.
  • “The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure,” Synthese 114 (1998): 337–354.
  • “Our Errant Epistemic Aim,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 869–876.
  • “Two Views of Religious Certitude,” Religious Studies 28 (1992): 65–74.
• Brad Majors, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • with S. Sawyer, “The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 257-280.
• Anna-Sara Malmgren, New York University
  • “Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?,” Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 199-241.
• Pat A. Manfredi, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
  • “The Compatibility of A Priori Knowledge and Empirical Defeasibility: A Defense of a Modest A Priori,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 159-177.
• Peter J. Markie, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • “Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief,” Noûs 40 (2006): 118-142.
  • “The Mystery of Perceptual Justification,” Philosophical Studies. 126 (2005): 347-373.
  • “Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 406-416.
  • “Nondosxastic Perceptual Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 530-553.
  • “Modest A Priori Knowledge and Justification,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 179-189.
  • “In Defense of One Form of Traditional Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 85 (1997): 37-55.
  • “Degrees of Warrant,” in J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 221-238.
  • “Goldman’s New Reliabilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 799-817.
• Michael Martin, University College London
  • “The Transparency of Experience,” Mind and Language, 17 (2002).
  • “Episodic Memory as Retained Acquaintance,” in Hoerl, McCormack, ed., Time and Memory (Oxford UP, 2001).
• Noah Martin
  • ed., with P. Ludlow, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998).
• John McDowell, University of Pittsburgh
  • “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 97-105.
  • “Prècis” (pp. 365-368) and “Reply to Commentators” (pp. 403-431), Symposium on J. McDowell, Mind and World [Harvard UP, 1994], Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998).
  • “Knowledge and the Internal,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 877-893.
• Matthew McGrath, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • with Jeremy Fantl, “Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “Memory and Epistemic Conservatism,” Synthese 157 (2007): 1-24.
  • with Jeremy Fantl, “On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 558-589.
  • with Jeremy Fantl, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 67-94.
• Lydia McGrew, Kalamazoo, Michigan
  • with T. McGrew, “Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support,” Erkenntnis 68 (2008): 55-77.
  • with T. McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason, Routledge, 2007.
  • with Timothy McGrew, “What’s Wrong with Epistemic Circularity?,” Dialogue 39 (2000): 219-239.
  • with Timothy McGrew, “Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation,” Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000): 47-66.
  • with Timothy McGrew, “Psychology for Armchair Philosophers,” Idealistic Studies 28 (1998): 147-157.
  • with Timothy McGrew, “Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem,” Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 239-256.
  • with Timothy McGrew, “Level Connections in Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 85-94.
• Timothy McGrew, Western Michigan University
  • with L. McGrew, “Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support,” Erkenntnis 68 (2008): 55-77.
  • with L. McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason, Routledge, 2007.
  • “Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?,” Philosophia Christi 6 (2004): 7-26.
  • “Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003): 553-567.
  • “Direct Inference and the Problem of Induction,” Monist 84 (2001): 153-178.
  • with Lydia McGrew, “What’s Wrong with Epistemic Circularity?,” Dialogue 39 (2000): 219-239.
  • with Lydia McGrew, “Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation,” Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000): 47-66.
  • “How Foundationalists Do Crossword Puzzles,” Philosophical Studies 96 (1999): 329-346.
  • “A Defense of Classical Foundationalism,” in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth, 1998).
  • with Lydia McGrew, “Psychology for Armchair Philosophers,” Idealistic Studies 28 (1998): 147-157.
  • with Lydia McGrew, “Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem,” Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 239-256.
  • with Lydia McGrew, “Level Connections in Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 85-94.
  • The Foundations of Knowledge (Littlefield Adams, 1995).
• Brian McLaughlin, Rutgers University
  • with M. Tye, “The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency,” in Ludlow and Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (1998).
  • with M. Tye, “Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge,” in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1998).
  • with M. Tye, “Is Content Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 349-380.
• Christopher J.G. Meacham, Rutgers University
  • “Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chancehttp://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cmeacham/
• Kevin Meeker, University of South Alabama
  • “Was Hume a Proper Functionalist?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 120-136.
  • “Justification and the Social Nature of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 156-172.
  • “Truth, Justification, and the Epistemic Way,” Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003): 287-309.
  • “Is Hume’s Epistemology Internalist or Externalist?”, Dialogue 40 (2001): 125-146.
  • “Hume’s Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000): 221-238.
  • “Knowledge from Gossip?”, Philosophia 27 (1999): 537-539.
  • “Chisholming Away at Plantinga’s Critique of Epistemic Deontology,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 90-96.
  • “Hume: Radical Sceptic or Naturalized Epistemologist?”, Hume Studies 24 (1998): 31-52.
  • “Should We Abandon Epistemic Justification?”, Southwest Philosophy Review13 (1997): 129-136.
• Joseph Mendola, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
  • “Knowledge and Evidence,” The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 157-160.
• Alan Millar, University of Stirling
  • “Travis’s Sense of Occasion,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 337-342.
  • “The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge,” Philosophy 75 (2000): 73-88.
• Richard Miller, Cornell University
  • “Externalist Self-Knowledge and the Scope of the A Priori,” Analysis 57 (1997): 67-75.
  • “The Norms of Reason,” The Philosophical Review 104 (1995).
• Nenad Miscevic, University of Maribor
  • “Intuition as a Second Window,”  The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 87-112.
• Richard Moran, Harvard University
  • Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton UP, 2001.
    • “Prècis” (pp. 423-426) and “Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear” (pp. 455-472), Symposium on R. Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004).
  • “Interpretation Theory and the First Person,” The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 154-173.
• Adam Morton, University of Alberta
  • “Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity,” Noûs 38 (2004): 481-502.
  • with A. Karjalainen, “Contrastive Knowledge, ” Philosophical Explorations 6 (2003): 74-89
  • “If You’re So Smart Why Are You Ignorant: Causal Epistemic Paradoxes,”Analysis 62 (2002): 110-115.
• Paul K. Moser, Loyola University of Chicago
  • “Skepticism Undone?” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 135-144.
  • “Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 209-217.
  • “Realism, Objectivity and Scepticism,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 70-91.
  • with D.H. Mulder and J.D. Trout, The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction, Oxford UP, 1998.
  • “Epistemological Fission: On Unity and Diversity in Epistemology,” The Monist 81 (1998): 353-70.
  • with D. Yandell, “Against Naturalizing Rationality,” Protosociology 8 (1996): 81-96.
• Carlos J. Moya, Universitat de Valencia
  • (with Tobies Grimaltos) “Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 386-394.
• Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis
  • “Rewriting the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction,” forthcoming, Journal of Philosophical Research.
  • with Tim Black, “In Defense of Sensitivity,” Synthese 154 (2007): 53-71
  • “A Strategy for Asssessing Closure,”Erkenntnis 65 (2006): 365-383
  • “Reliability Connections Between Conceivability and Inconceivability,” Dialectica 60 (2006): 195-205.
  • “Closure Failures for Safety,” Philosophia 33 (2005): 331-334.
  • “A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism,” Dialogue 44 (2005): 693-706.
  • with Tim Black, “Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 165-182.
• Jennifer Nagel, University of Toronto
  • “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error,” forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly.
  • “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 279-294.
  • “Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 792–819.
  • “Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Problem of Mind-Independence,” forthcoming, Proceedings of the X International Kant Congress (Berlin: Walter DeGruyter 2007).
  • “Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2005): 465-497.
  • “The Empiricist Conception of Experience,” Philosophy 75 (2000): 345-376.
• N.M.L. Nathan, University of Liverpool (retired)
  • “Stoics and Sceptics: A Reply to Brueckner,” Analysis 64 (2004): 264-268.
  • The Price of Doubt, London: Routledge, 2001.
  • “Naturalism and Self-Defeat: Plantinga’s Version,” Religious Studies 33 (1997), 135-42.
• Dana Nelkin, University of California, San Diego
  • “Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002): 384-406.
  • “The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality,” Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 373-409.
• Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • “An Empiricist Approach to Understanding Experience,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “What Evidence Do You Have?”, forthcoming, British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
  • “Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error,” forthcoming, Philosophical Issues.
  • “The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access,” forthcoming in A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford UP).
  • “Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility,” forthcoming in P. Greenough, D. Pritchard, eds., Williamson on Knowledge (Oxford UP).
  • “Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans,” forthcoming in S. Nuccetelli, G. Seay, eds., Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics (Oxford UP).
  • with D. Pritchard, “McDowell and the New Evil Genius,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Undermining the Case for Contrastivism,” forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
  • “How to Naturalize Epistemology,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  • with A. Hiller, “Safety and Epistemic Luck,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • “Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing” (pp. 53-63) and “Reply to Gallimore” (pp. 71-72), Philosophical Studies 134 (2007).
  • “Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology,” Synthese 150 (2006): 247–280.
  • “A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” forthcoming, Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 63–85.
  • with G. Rohrbaugh, “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004): 396-406.
  • “Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 296-325.
  • “Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 199-214.
  • “Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 396-411.
  • “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 1-31.
  • “S Knows that P,” Noûs 36 (2002): 663-681
  • “Stroud and Moore on Skepticism,” Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1997): 83-89.
• Shaun Nichols, University of Utah
  • with S. Stich, J. Weinberg, “Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology,” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247.
  • with J. Weinberg, S. Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.
• Ilkka Niiniluoto, University of Helsinki
  • “Is It Rational to Be Rational?” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 115-122.
• Nikolaj Nottelmann, University of Copenhagen
  • “The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 559-582.
• Robert Nozick, died Jan. 23, 2002; had been teaching at Harvard University
• Susana Nuccetelli, Washington and Lee University
  • “What Anti-Individualists Cannot Know A Priori,” Analysis 59 (1999): 48-51.
• Tim Oakley, La Trobe University
  • “A Skeptic’s Reply to Lewisian Contextualism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2001): 309-332.
  • “The Invalidation of Induction: A Reply to Pargetter and Bigelow,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 452-463.
• Samir Okasha, University of Bristol
  • “Scepticism and its Sources,” Philosophy and Phenomonelogical Research 67 (2003): 610-632.
• Doris Olin, York University
  • “A Case Against Closure,” Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 235-248.
• Erik J. Olsson, Lund University
  • “Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 98-126.
  • “Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency,” Synthese 135 (2003): 119-140.
  • with L. Bovens, “Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions,” Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 137-150.
  • “What Is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?”, Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 246-272.
  • “Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 273-288.
  • “Corroborating Testimony and Ignorance: A Reply to Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 565-572.
  • “Why Coherence Is Not Truth-Conducive,” Analysis 61 (2001): 236-241.
  • with L. Bovens, “Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks,” Mind 109 (2000): 685-719.
  • with S. Hansson, “Providing Foundations for Coherentism,” Erkenntnis 51 (1999): 243-265.
  • “Cohering With,” Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 273-291.
  • “Doxastic Decision Theory, Voluntarism and the Primacy of Practical Reason” in A. Meigers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999).
  • “Competing for Acceptance: Lehrer’s Rule and the Paradoxes of Justification,” Theoria 64 (1998): 34-54.
  • “Making Beliefs Coherent,” Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (1998): 143-163.
  • “A Coherence Interpretation of Semi-Revision,” Theoria 63 (1997): 105-134.
  • “Coherence and the Modularity of Mind,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 404-411.
• Iris Oved, Rutgers University
  • with J. Pollock, “Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 309-351.
• David Owens, University of Sheffield
  • “Descartes’s Use of Doubt,” forthcoming in Broughton, Carrierox, eds., Blackwell Companion to Descartes.
  • “Testimony and Assertion,” Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 105-129.
  • “Does Belief Have an Aim?,” Philosophical Studies 115 (2003): 283-305.
  • “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” Dialogue 42 (2003): 791-798.
  • “Epistemic Akrasia,” The Monist 85 (2002): 381-397.
  • Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity (Routledge, 2000).
  • “Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (2000) Supp: 119-142.
  • “The Authority of Memory,” European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1999): 312-329.
• David Papineau, King’s College London
  • The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution and Probability, Oxford UP, 2003.
  • “Evidentialism Reconsidered” Nous 35 (2001): 239-259.
  • “The Evolution of Knowledge” in P. Carruthers, ed., Evolution and the Human Mind, Cambridge UP, 2000.
  • “Normativity and Judgement” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1999): 17-43.
• George Pappas, Ohio State University
  • “Berkeley and Scepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 133-149.
  • “Experts, Knowledge, and Perception,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 239-250.
  • “Epistemology in the Empiricists,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1998): 285-302.
• Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado, Boulder
  • “Who Needs an Answer to Skepticism?” American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 421-32.
  • “William Heytesbury on Knowledge: Epistemology Without Necessary and Sufficient Conditions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (1995): 347-66.
• Christopher Peacocke, Columbia University
  • The Realm of Reason, Oxford UP, 2004.
    • “Summary” (pp. 99-102) and “Entitlement, Reasons and Externalism [Replies to Dancy and De Gaynesford,]” (pp. 120-128), Symposium on The Realm of Reason, Philosophical Books 47 (2006).
  • “Explaining Perceptual Entitlement,” in Schantz, ed., The ‘Challenge’ of Externalism, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004.
  • “Three Principles of Rationalism,” European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 375-397.
  • edited, with P. Boghossian, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford UP, 2000.
  • “Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 255-285.
  • Being Known, Oxford UP, 1999.
  • “Conscious Attitudes, Attention and Self-Knowledge”, in McDonald, Smith, Wright, ed., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, Oxford UP, 1998.
  • “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality,” Philosophical Issues 9 (1998).
  • “First-Person Reference , Representational Independence, and Self-Knowledge”, in Kunne, Newen, Anduschus, ed., Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, CSLI Publications, Stanford , 1997.
  • “Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 117-158.
• Michael Pendlebury, University of the Witwatersrand
  • “Perception and Objective Knowledge,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 29-38.
• Alvin Plantinga, Notre Dame
  • “On ‘Proper Basicality’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 612-621.
  • “Probability and Defeaters,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 291-298.
  • Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford UP, 1999.
    • “Reply [to Wykstra, Zagzebski, and Sudduth],” pp. 124-135, Symposium on Warranted Christian Belief, Philosophical Books 43 (2002).
  • “Warrant and Accidentally True Belief,” Analysis 57 (1997): 140-145.
  • “Respondeo” (responses to a slew of critics), in J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 307-378.
  • “What’s the Question?”, Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 19-43.
• John L. Pollock, University of Arizona
  • with I. Oved, “Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 309-351.
  • with Joseph Cruz, “The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
  • Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edition (coauthored with Joseph Cruz), Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
  • “Procedural Epistemology – At the Interface of Philosophy and AI,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 383-414.
• Ted Poston, University of South Alabama
  • with T. Dougherty, “Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief,” Religious Studies 43 (2007): 183-198.
  • “Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007), 331-346.
• Josep L. Prades, Universitatde Girona
  • “Scepticism, Contextualism, and Closure,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 121-131.
• Duncan Pritchard, University of Edinburgh
  • What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?, forthcoming, Routledge.
  • ed., with P. Greenough, Williamson on Knowledge, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  • “Wittgenstein on Scepticism,” in M. McGinn, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  • “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology,” in J. Greco, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  • “How to be a Neo-Moorean,” in S. Goldberg, ed., Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  • “Anti-Luck Epistemology,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • “Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism,” forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
  • “Moral and Epistemic Luck,” forthcoming, Metaphilosophy.
  • ed., with V. Hendricks, New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  • “Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  • Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • with M. Blaauw, Epistemology A-Z, Edinburgh UP/Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
  • “Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 185-205.
  • “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism,” in D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, ed., Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work, Oxford UP, 2005.
  • “Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge,” Philosophical Explorations (2005): 229-243.
  • “Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (2005): 20-43.
  • with C. van Putten, “Greco on Scepticism,” forthcoming, Erkenntnis (2005).
  • with M. Brady, “Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 161-171.
  • “The Structure of Sceptical Arguments,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 37-52.
  • “The Epistemology of Testimony,” Philosophical Issues 11 (2004): 326-48.
  • “Epistemic Deflationism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004): 1-32.
  • “Epistemic Luck,” Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 193-22.
  • with J. Kallestrup, “An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism,” Philosophia 31 (2004).
  • “Some Recent Work in Epistemology,” The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 605-13.
  • ed., with M.S. Brady, Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Basil Blackwell, 2003.
  • “McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism,” European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 273-94.
  • “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 106-30.
  • “Reforming Reformed Epistemology,” International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003): 43-66; reprinted in R. Rood and R. van Woudenberg, ed., The Epistemology of Basic Belief, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004.
  • “Recent Work on Radical Skepticism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002): 215-57.
  • “McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments,” Synthese 130 (2002): 279-302.
  • “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to Scepticism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002): 283-307.
  • “Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure,” Theoria 69 (2002): 129-61.
  • “Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002): 19-55.
  • “Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical Theories,” Facta Philosophica 3 (2001): 101-26.
  • “The Opacity of Knowledge,” in H.B. Shaeffer, ed., Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 2: The Internalism/Externalism Debate in Epistemology (Humboldt UP, 2001): 1-10.
  • “A Puzzle About Warrant,” Philosophical Inquiry 23 (2001).
  • “Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the ‘Metaepistemological’ Challenge,” Principia – Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 5 (December, 2001).
  • “Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Hinge Propositions,” Wittgenstein-Studien (December, 2001).
  • “Scepticism and Dreaming,” Philosophia 28 (March, 2000).
  • “Closure and Context,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 275-80.
  • “Wittgenstein, ‘Hinge’ Propositions, and On Certainty,” in B. Brogaard, B. Smith, ed., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg, Austria: Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, 2000): 84-90.
  • “Is ‘God Exists’ a ‘Hinge’ Proposition of Religious Belief?,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000): 129-40.
  • “Understanding Scepticism,” Sats – The Nordic Journal of Philosophy2 (2000): 107-23.
  • “Charity and Context: Davidson and Wittgenstein on the Priority of Semantics over Epistemology,” Philosophical Writings 7 (1998): 43-61.
• James Pryor, New York University
  • “When Warrant Transmits,” forthcoming in A. Coliva, ed., Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (Oxford UP).
  • “Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning,” in S. Goldberg, ed., Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2007).
  • “Hyper-Reliability and Apriority,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2006).
  • “What’s So Bad about Living in the Matrix?,” in C. Grau, ed., Philosophers Explore the Matrix (Oxford UP, 2005).
  • “There Is Immediate Justification,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 181-202.
  • “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 349-378.
  • “Highlights of Recent Epistemology,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2001): 95-124.
  • “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Noûs 34 (2000): 517-549.
  • “Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Philosophical Topics 26 (1999).
• Joel Pust, University of Deleware
  • “Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation,” The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 269-289.
  • “Kitcher on Tradition-Independent A Priori Warrant,” The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 373-376.
  • “Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions,” Philosophical Studies.106 (2001): 227-258.
  • “Warrant and Analysis,” Analysis 60 (2000): 51-57.
  • with Alvin Goldman, “Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence,” in W. Ramsey and M. DePaul, ed., Rethinking Intuition, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
• Hilary Putnam, Harvard University (emeritus)
• Peter Railton, University of Michigan
  • “A Priori Rules: Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 170-196.
• Baron Reed, Northwestern University
  • “A Defense of Stable Invariantism,” forthcoming, Noûs.
  • “A New Argument for Skepticism,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  • “Self-Knowledge and Rationality,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “The Long Road to Skepticism,” The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 236-262.
  • “Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 186-97.
  • “Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless,” Synthese 148 (2006): 303-8.
  • “Accidentally Factive Mental States,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 134-42.
  • “How to Think about Fallibilism,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 143-157.
  • “Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001): 507-526.
  • “Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification,” Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 57-67
• Steven Reynolds, Arizona State University
  • “The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 146-154.
  • “Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals,” Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 139-161.
  • “The Argument from Illusion,” Noûs 34 (2000): 604-621
  • “Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998) 529-558.
• Mark Richard, Tufts University
  • “Contextualism and Relativism,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 215-242.
• Steven Rieber, Georgia State University
  • “Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation,” Noûs 32 (1998): 189 -204.
• Wayne Riggs, University of Oklahoma
  • “Balancing our Epistemic Goals,” forthcoming, Noûs.
  • “Reliability and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 79-96
  • “Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That p,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 87-108
  • “What Are the ‘Chances’ of Being Justified?” The Monist 81 (1998): 452-472.
  • “The Weakness of Strong Justification,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 179-189.
  • “Truth, Justification, and Epistemic Value,” and “Author’s Replies” [to commentaries by Michael Huemer and Ben Fischer], The Journal of the Association for Systematic Philosophy 2 (1996): 1-9, 12-15.
• Robert C. Roberts, Baylor University
  • with J. Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2007.
  • with J. Wood, “Proper Function, Emotion, and the Virtues of the Intellect,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 3-24.
  • with J. Wood, “Humility and Epistemic Goods,” in M. DePaul, L. Zagzebski, ed., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2003.
• Tom Rockmore, Dusquesne University
  • “Knowledge as Historical,” forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 123-132.
  • On Hegel’s Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy (Humanities Press, 1996).
• Alex Rosenberg, Duke University
  • “Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative Materialists,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 335-358.
• Jay F. Rosenberg, died Feb. 21, 2008; had been teaching at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  • “Still Mythic After All Those Years: On Alston’s Latest Defense of the Given,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 157-173.
  • Thinking About Knowing, Oxford UP, 2002
  • Three Conversations About Knowing, Hackett Publishing, 2000
  • “Scrutinizing a Trade,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 58-66.
  • “Descartes’ Skeptical Argument”, Logical analysis and History of philosophy 1 (1998): pp. 209-32.
• Sherrilyn Roush, University of California, Berkeley
  • Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
• Patrick Rysiew, University of Victoria
  • with T. Dougherty, “Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Speaking of Knowing,” forthcoming, Noûs 41 (2007): 627-662.
  • with T. Dougherty, “Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2006): 259-280.
  • “Reidian Evidence,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2005): 107-121.
  • “Contesting Contextualism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 51-70.
  • “Reid and Epistemic Naturalism”, Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 437-456.
  • “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Noûs 35 (2001): 477-514.
  • “Testimony, Simulation, and the Limits of Inductivism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 269-274.
• Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin
  • “Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 191-200.
  • “Easy Possibilities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 907-919.
• Joe Salerno, St. Louis University
  • ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  • “Knowability Noir: 1945-1963,” forthcoming in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox (Oxford UP).
  • with B. Brogaard, “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” forthcoming, American Philosophical Quarterly.
  • “Truth-tracking and the Problem of Reflective Knowledge,” forthcoming in J. Keim-Campbell and M. O’Rourke, eds., Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 5: Knowledge and Skepticism (MIT Press).
  • with B. Brogaard, “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” forthcoming in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., New Waves in Epistemology, Ashgate.
  • with B. Brogaard, “Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant,” Analysis 62 (2002): 143-150.
• Sarah Sawyer, University of Nebraska
  • with B. Majors, “The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 257-280.
  • “Conceptual Errors and Social Externalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 265-273.
  • “My Language Disquotes,” Analysis (1999): 206-11.
  • “An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 358-78.
  • “Privileged Access to the World,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 523-33.
• Jonathan Schaffer, Australian National University
  • “Contextualism for Taste Claims and Epistemic Modals,” forthcoming in Egan, Weatherson, eds., Epistemic Modality (Oxford UP).
  • “Knowledge in the Image of Assertion,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008), 1-19.
  • “The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions,” Social Epistemology 22 (2008), 235-45.
  • “Knowing the Answer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007), 383-403.
  • “Closure, Contrast, and Answer,” Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 233-255.
  • “Contrastive Knowledge,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 235-271.
  • “From Contextualism to Contrastivism,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 73-103.
  • “Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 138-155.
  • “Perceptual Knowledge Derailed,” Philosophical Studies 112 (2003): 31-45.
  • “Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues,” Analysis 61 (2001): 202-208.
• Stephen Schiffer, New York University
  • “Interest-Relative Invariantism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 188-195.
  • “A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports,” Noûs 40 (2006): 361-368
  • “Paradox and the A Priori,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 1 (2005).
  • “Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 161-184.
  • “Knowledge of Meaning,” in A. Barber, ed., Epistemology of Language (Oxford UP, 2003): 303-324.
  • “Amazing Knowledge” (discussion of Stanley and Williamson’s “Knowing How”), Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 200-202.
  • “The Epistemic Theory of Vagueness,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 481-503.
  • “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 317-333.
• Frederick Schmitt, Indiana University
  • “Social Epistemology,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 354-382.
  • “Socializing Epistemology,” pp. 1-27 and “The Justification of Group Beliefs,” p. 257-287, both in F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Epistemology (Rowman and Littlefield, 1995).
• Eric Schwitzgebel, University of California, Riverside.  Blog: The Splintered Mind.
  • “No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience — Contra Dennett?,” forthcoming, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
  • “Do Things Look Flat?,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “Difference Tone Training: A Demonstration Adapted from Titchener’s Experimental Psychology,” Psyche 11 (2005).
  • “Introspective Training: Reflections on Titchener’s Lab Manual,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004), no. 7-8: 58-76.
  • “How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2002), no. 5-6: 35-53.
  • “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief,” Noûs 36 (2002): 249-275.
  • “In-Between Believing,” Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 76-82.
  • with Michael S. Gordon, “How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation,” Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): 235-246.
• Thomas D. Senor, University of Arkansas
  • “The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 551-566.
  • “Harman, Negative Coherentism, and the Problem of Ongoing Justification,” Philosophia 24 (1995): 271-294.
• Stewart Shapiro, Ohio State University
  • “The Status of Logic,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 333-366.
• Tomoji Shogenji, Rhode Island College
  • “A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs,” Noûs 40 (2006): 331-346.
  • “Justification by Coherence from Scratch,” Philosophical Studies 125 (2005): 305-325
  • “The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 90-106.
  • “Is Coherence Truth Conducive?”, Analysis 60 (1999): 338-345.
• Nishi Shah, Amherst College
  • “A New Argument for Evidentialism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 481-498.
  • with Jeffrey Kasser, “The Ethics of Belief and the Metaethics of Belief,” Social Epistemology 20 (2006): 1–17.
  • with David Velleman, “Doxastic Deliberation,” Philosophical Review, 114 (2005): 497-534.
  • “How Truth Governs Belief,” Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 447-82.
  • “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism,” The Monist (2002): 436-45.
• Harvey Siegel, University of Miami
  • “Naturalism and Normativity: Hooker’s Ragged Reconciliation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29 (1998): 639-652.
  • “Instrumental Rationality and Naturalized Philosophy of Science,” Philosophy of Science 63, Supplement (PSA 1996 Proceedings): S116-S124.
  • “Naturalism, Instrumental Rationality, and the Normativity of Epistemology,” Protosoziologie 8/9 (1996): 97-110.
  • “On Some Recent Challenges to the Ideal Reason,” Inquiry 15 (1996): 2-16.
  • “Naturalized Epistemology and ‘First Philosophy’,” Metaphilosophy 26 (1995): 46-62.
  • “‘Radical’ Pedagogy Requires ‘Conservative’ Epistemology,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 29 (1995): 33-46.
  • “Knowledge and Certainty: Feminism, Postmodernism, and Multiculturalism,” in W. Kohli, ed., Critical Conversations in Philosophy of Education (New York: Routledge, 1995): 190-200.
  • “Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies” (co-authored with John Biro), in F. van Eemeren, et. al., eds., Analysis and Evaluation: Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Volume II (Amsterdam SICSAT, 1995): 286-299; reprinted with minor changes in Argumentation 11 (1997): 277-292.
• Nicholas Silins, Cornell University
  • “Transmission Failure Failure,” Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 71-102.
  • “Deception and Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 375-404.
• Joe Solerno, Australian National University and Saint Louis University.  Blog: Knowability.
  • “Truth-tracking and the Problem of Reflective Knowledge,” in J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke,eds., Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 5: Knowledge and Skepticism, MIT Press, 2008.
  • with B. Brogaard, “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., New Waves in Epistemology, forthcoming, Ashgate.
  • with B. Brogaard, “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006): 261-270.
• Miriam Solomon, Temple University
  • Social Empiricism (MIT Press, 2001).
• Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University
  • A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume One, Oxford UP, 2007.
  • Virtuous Circles: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume Two, Oxford UP, 2007.
  • ed. with J. Lackey, The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford UP, 2006.
  • “Replies,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell Publishing, 2004; pp. 275-325.
  • “Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 35-65.
  • with Laurence BonJour, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
    • “Précis” (pp. 677-678) and “Internal Foundations or External Virtues?” (pp. 761-773), Symposium on L. BonJour and E. Sosa’s Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues,  Philosophical Studies 131 (2006).
  • “The Place of Truth in Epistemology,” in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, ed., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002).
  • “Plantinga’s Evolutionary Meditations,” in J. Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated (Cornell UP, 2002): 91-103.
  • “Reliability and the A Priori,” in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, ed., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002): 369-385.
  • “Human Knowledge, Animal and Reflective,” Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 193-196.
  • ed. (with J. Kim), Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2000).
  • “Skepticism and Contextualism” (pp. 1-18) and “Replies [to Tomberlin, Kornblith, and Lehrer]” (pp. 38-41), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
  • “Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology: How Can We Know What is Possible and What Impossible?” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 1-16.
  • “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141-153.
  • “Skepticism and the Internal/External Divide,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 145-157.
  • “P.F. Strawson’s Epistemological Naturalism” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson (Open-Court, 1998).
  • “How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson from Descartes,” Philosophical Studies 85 (1997): 229-49.
  • “Mythology of the Given,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 275-286.
  • “Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles,” Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 410-30.
  • “Chisholm’s Epistemology and Epistemic Internalism” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, 1997.
  • “Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status,” Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 151-162.
  • “Plantinga on Epistemic Internalism” (pp. 73-83) and Postscript to “Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology” (pp. 271-280), in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
  • “Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour,” Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 221-234.
• Matthew Soteriou, University of Warwick
  • “The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 472-492/
  • “Mental Action and the Epistemology of Mind,” Noûs 39 (2005): 83-105.
• Jason Stanley, Rutgers University
  • “Knowing (How),” fothcoming, Noûs.
  • “Knowledge and Certainty,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 33-55.
  • with J. Hawthorne, “Knowledge and Action,” Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008): 571-590.
  • Knowledge and Practical Interests, Oxford UP, 2005.
    • “Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests” (pp. 168-172) and “Replies to Commentators” (pp. 196-210), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007).
  • “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” Analysis 65 (2005): 126-131.
  • “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 119-146.
  • with T. Williamson, “Knowing How,” Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-44.
  • “Understanding, Context-Relativity, and the Description Theory,” Analysis 59 (1999): 14-18.
• Vyachevslav Stepin, Moscow Institute of Philosophy
  • “Knowledge as Cultural and Historical System,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 133-138.
• Edward Stein, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University
  • “Can We Be Justified in Believing that Humans Are Irrational?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 545-565.
  • Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford UP, 1996.
• Christopher L. Stephens, University of Oklahoma
  • “When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument,” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 161-189.
• Robert Stern, University of Sheffield
  • “Coherence as a Test for Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 296-326.
  • Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism: Answering the Question of Justification, Oxford UP, 2000.
  • ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford UP, 1999.
  • “Hegel, Scepticism and Transcendental Arguments,” in R-P.Horstmann and H.Fulda, eds., Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels (Klett-Cotta, 1996).
• Matthias Steup, St. Cloud State University –> Purdue University
  • “Contextualism and Conceptual Disambiguation,” Acta Analytica 20 (2005): 3-15.
  • “Internalist Reliabilism,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2004): 404-425.
  • “Two Forms of Anti-Skepticism,” in S. Niccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003).
  • ed. with E. Sosa, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell, 2005.
  • ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (Oxford UP, 2001).
  • “Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality: A Reply to Alvin Goldman,” in Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (Oxford UP, 2001).
  • “Epistemic Duty and Doxastic (In)Voluntarism,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 25-56.
  • “A Defense of Internalism”, in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1998).
  • “Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Proper Functioning Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995).
• Stephen Stich , Rutgers University
  • with S. Nichols, Mindreading, Oxford UP, 2003.
  • with S. Nichols, J.M. Weinberg, “Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology,” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247.
  • with R. Samuels, M. Bishop, “Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes about Human Rationality Disappear,” in R. Elio, ed., Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 236-268.
  • with J. Weinberg, S. Nichols, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.
• Kevin L. Stoehr, Boston University
  • “The Virtues of Circular Reasoning,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 159-171.
• Jim Stone, University of New Orleans
  • “Contextualism and Warranted Assertion,” forthcoming, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
  • “Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 527-545.
• Barry Stroud, University of California, Berkeley
  • “Perceptual Knowledge and Epistemological Satisfaction,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 165-173.
  • “Unpurged Pyrrhonism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 411-416.
  • “Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 345-358.
  • “The Charm of Naturalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 70 (1996): 43-55.
  • “Hume’s Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection” in R. Popkin, ed., Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Pan-American Dialogue (Kluwer, 1996).
• Scott Sturgeon, Oxford University
  • “Apriorism about Modality,” forthcoming, Hale, et al, eds., Modal Content and Modal Knowledge, Oxford UP.
  • “Reason and the Grain of Belief,” Noûs 42 (2008): 139-165.
  • “Stalnaker on Sensuous Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 137 (2008): 183-203.
  • “Normative Judgement,” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (2007): 569-587.
  • “Conditional Belief and the Ramsey Test,” Philosophy 51 (2002, Supplement): 215-232.
• Jonathan Sutton, Auburn University
  • Without Justification, MIT Press, 2007.
  • “Stick to What You Know,” Noûs 39 (2005): 359-396.
  • “The Contingent A Priori and Implicit Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 251-277.
• Marshall Swain, Ohio State University
  • “Warrant versus Indefeasible Justification,” in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 131-146.
• Richard Swinburne, Oxford University (retired)
  • Epistemic Justification (Oxford UP, 2001)
  • “Many Kinds of Rational Theistic Belief,” in Bruntrup, Tacelli, ed., The Rationality of Theism (Kluwer, 1999)
• William Talbott, University of Washington, Seattle
  • “The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 199-206.
  • “Intentional Self-Deception in a Single, Coherent Self,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 27-74.
• William Throop, Green Mountain College
  • “Defeating the Skeptic,” Philosophia 26 (1998): 321-336.
• James E. Tomberlin, died Oct. 13, 2002; had taught at California State University, Northridge
  • “Skepticism, Tracking, and Warrant,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 19-23.
• Charles Travis, King’s College, London
  • “A Sense of Occasion,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 286-314.
• J.D. Trout, Loyola University (Chicago)
  • with M. Bishop, “The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology,” Noûs 39 (2005): 696-714.
  • with M. Bishop, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford UP, 2005.
  • with M. Bishop, “Epistemology’s Search for Significance,” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2003): 203-216.
  • with P. Moser and D. Mulder, The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction, Oxford UP, 1998.
• John Turri, Huron University
  • “Refutation by Elimination,” forthcoming, Analysis.
  • “Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists,” forthcoming, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  • “Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism,” forthcoming, The Philosophical Review.
  • “Contingent A Priori Knowledge,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons,” forthcoming, Noûs.
  • “On the General Argument Against Internalism,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • “On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • “An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification,” Dialectica 63 (2009): 209-218.
  • “On the Regress Argument for Infinitism,” Synthese 166:1 (Jan 2009): 157-163.
  • “Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston’s Perceiving God,” Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008): 290-299.
• Michael Tye, University of Texas, Austin
  • “Externalism and Memory I,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72 (1998): 77-94.
  • with B. McLaughlin, “The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency,” in Ludlow and Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (1998).
  • with B. McLaughlin, “Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge,” in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge(Oxford UP, 1998).
  • with B. McLaughlin, “Is Content Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 349-380.
• Peter Unger, New York University
• Hamid Vahid, Institute for studies in theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Tehran
  • “Triangulation, Content and Basing Relation,” forthcoming, Grazer Philosophische Studien.
  • “The Internalism/Externalism Debate,” in D. Pritchard, S. Bernecker, ed., Routledge Handbook of Epistemology, forthcoming.
  • “Rationalizing beliefs: Evidential vs. Pragmatic Reasons,” forthcoming, Synthese.
  • Hamid Vahid, 2009, The Epistemology of Belief, London: Palgrave, Macmillan.
  • “The Puzzle of Fallible Knowledge,” Metaphilosophy 39 (2008): 325-344.
  • “Radical Interpretation and Moore’s Paradox,” Theoria 74 (2008): 146-163.
  • “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Nondoxastic Justification,” Erkenntnis 69 (2008): 295-313.
  • “Alston on Belief and Acceptance in Religious Faith,” The Heythrop Journal 50 (2008): 23-30.
  • “Varieties of Easy Knowledge Inferences: A Resolution,” Acta Analytica 22 (2007): 223-237.
  • “Conceivability and Possibility: Chalmers on Modal Epistemology,” Philosophical Explorations 9 (2006): 243-261.
  • “Aiming at Truth: Doxastic Vs. Epistemic Goals,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 303-335.
  • Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
  • “Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism,” Synthese 141 (2004): 97-122.
  • “Doubts about Epistemic Supervenience,” Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 153-172.
  • “Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 370-388
  • “Content Externalism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate in Justification Theory,” European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 89-107
  • “The Nature and Significance of Transcendental Arguments,” Kant Studien 93 (2002): 273-290
  • “Skepticism and Varieties of Epistemic Universalizability,” Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (2001): 325-341
  • “Realism and the Epistemological Significance of Inference to the Best Explanation,” Dialogue 40 (2001): 487-507
  • “Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism,” Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 308-325
  • “Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck,” Dialectica 55 (2001): 351-362
  • “A Priori Knowledge, Experience and Defeasibility,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999): 173-188.
  • “Deontic vs. Nondeontic Conceptions of Epistemic Justification,” Erkenntnis 49 (1998): 285-301.
  • “The Internalism/Externalism Controversy: The Epistemization of an Older Debate,” Dialectica 52 (1998): 229-246.
  • “Deductive Closure, Scepticism and the Paradoxes of Confirmation,” Ratio 8 (1995): 70-86.
• Luis M. Vales-Villanueva, Universidad de Oviedo
  • “Contextualism and Levels of Scrutiny,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 72-79.
• James Van Cleve, University of Southern California
  • “Why Coherence Is not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 168-180.
  • “Is Knowledge Easy–or Impossible? Externalism As the Only Alternative to Skepticism,” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 45-59.
  • “Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 218-237.
  • “Epistemic Supervenience Revisited,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1999).
• Bas van Fraassen, Princeton University
  • “The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 253-280.
  • “The agnostic subtly probabilified,” Analysis 58 (1998): 212-220.
  • “Sola Experientia?–Feyerabend’s Refutation of Classical Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): S385-S395.
  • “Probabilite conditionelle et certitude,” Dialogue 36 (1997): 69-90.
  • “Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the Sirens,” Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 7-37.
  • “Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of belief,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995): 349-377.
  • “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” in Leonardi, Paolo, ed., On Quine: New Essays (Cambridge UP, 1995).
• Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame
  • “Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?,” in A. Chignell and A. Dole, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 131-149.
  • “Modal Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 67-84.
• J. David Velleman, New York University
  • with Nishi Shah, “Doxastic Deliberation,” Philosophical Review, 114 (2005): 497-534.
• John M. Vickers, Claremont Graduate University
  • “I Believe It, But Soon I‘ll Not Believe It Any More: Scepticism, Empiricism, And Reflection,”  Synthese 124 (2000): 155-174.
• Enrique Villanueva, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
  • “What Has Contextualism to Do with Skepticism?,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 67-71.
• Jonathan Vogel, Amherst College
  • “Subjunctivitis,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 73-88.
  • “Externalism Resisted,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 729-742.
  • “The Refutation of Skepticism,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 72-84.
  • “Skeptical Arguments,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 426-455.
  • “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 155-180.
  • “Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams,” Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 11-28.
• Ted A. Warfield, University of Notre Dame
  • “Tyler Burge’s Self-knowledge,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2005.
  • “Knowledge from Falsehood,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 405-416.
  • “When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson from the History of Epistemology,” Analysis 64 (2004): 35-41.
  • ed., with K. DeRose, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford UP, 1999).
  • “A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 127-147. Reprinted in Skepticism (ed., DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
  • “Externalism, Privileged Access, and the Irrelevance of Slow Switching,” Analysis 57 (1997): 282-84.  Reprinted in Ludlow and Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (1998).
  • with P. Klein, “No Help for the Coherentist,” Analysis 56 (1996): 118-121.
  • “Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 525-545.
• Brian Weatherson, Rutgers University;  blog: Thoughts Arguments and Rants.
  • with I. Maitra, “Assertion, Knowledge and Action”, Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
  • “Deontology and Descartes’ Demon,” Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008): 540-569.
  • “The Bayesian and the Dogmatist,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2007): 169-185.
  • “Questioning Contextualism,” in S. Hetherington, ed., Aspects of Knowing (Elsevier, 2006), pp. 133-47.
  • “Scepticism, Rationalism, and Externalism,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 311-331.
  • with Andy Egan and John Hawthorne, “Epistemic Modals in Context,” forthcoming in Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth (Oxford UP 2005), pp. 131-169.
  • “Can we Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 417-43.
  • “Luminous Margins,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2004): 373-83.
• Mark Webb, Texas Tech University
  • “Can Epistemology Help? The Problem of the Kentucky-fried Rat,” Social Epistemology 18 (2004): 51-58.
  • “Feminist Epistemology as Whipping-Girl,” in A. Cudd, A. Superson, ed., Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Backlash Against Feminism (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 49-65.
  • “Social Epistemology and Political Critique,” Southwest Philosophical Studies, 1998, 92-98.
  • “A Suggestion for Doxastic Practice Epistemology,” Southwest Philosophical Studies 1996, 150-160.
  • “Fallibilism Is Not a Thesis,” Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1996): 45-51.
  • “Feminist Epistemology and the Extent of the Social,” Hypatia 10 (1995): 85-98.
• Ralph Wedgwood, Oxford University
  • “Contextualism about Justified Belief,” forthcoming, Philosophers’ Imprint.
  • “The Aim of Belief”, Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002): 267-297.
  • “Internalism Explained,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 349-369.
  • “The A Priori Rules of Rationality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 113-131.
• Jonathan Weinberg, Indiana University, Bloomington
  • with S. Nichols, S. Stich, “Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology,” in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247.
  • with S. Nichols, S. Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.
• Matthew Weiner, University of Vermont.  Blog: Opiniatrety.
  • “Must We Know What We Say?,” Philosophical Review 114 (2005): 227-251.
  • “Why Does Justification Matter?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 422-444.
  • “Accepting Testimony,” Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 256-264.
• Bernhard Weiss, University of Wales
  • “Generalizing Brains in Vats,” Analysis 60 (2000): 112-123.
• Leora Weitzman
  • “What Makes a Causal Theory of Content Anti-Skeptical?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 299-318.
• Merold Westphal, Fordham University
  • “Hermeneutics as Epistemology,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 415-435.
• Dennis Whitcomb, Western Washington University
  • “Curiosity was framed,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • with D. Fallis, “Epistemic values and information management,” The Information Society 25 (2009): 175-189.
  • “Williamson on justification,” Philosophical Studies 138 (2008): 161-168.
  • “Factivity without safety,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 143-149.
• Roger White, MIT
  • “Problems for Dogmatism,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 525-557.
  • “Epistemic Permissiveness,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 281-307.
  • “Why Favour Simplicity?,” Analysis 65 (2005): 205-210.
  • “Explanation as a Guide to Induction,” Philosophers’ Imprint 5 (2005): 1-29.
  • “The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction Over Accommodation,” Mind 112 (2003): 654-683.
• Ron Wilburn, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • “Is the Skeptic’s Reasoning Our Own? Epistemological Realism As an Intuitive Doctrine,” Dialogos 36 (2001): 55-73.
  • “Metaphysical Realism As Less Than a Dogma,” Dialogos 35 (2000): 85-95.
  • “Objectivity, Triangulation and the Skeptic,” Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1999): 17-26.
  • “Skepticism, Objectivity and the Aspirations of Immanence,” Dialectica 52 (1998): 291-318.
  • “Knowledge, Content, and the Wellsprings of Objectivity,” Protosociology 11 (1998): 120-148.
  • “Epistemological Realism as the Skeptic’s Heart of Darkness,” Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 165-217.
  • “Posits and Positing,” Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1997): 91-102.
• Michael Williams, Johns Hopkins University
  • “Science and Sensibility: McDowell and Sellars on Perceptual Experience,” European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2006): 302-325.
  • “Doing without Imeediate Justification,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 202-216.
  • “The Unity of Hume’s Philosophical Project,” Hume Studies 30 (2004): 265-296.
  • “Knowledge, Reflections and Sceptical Hypotheses,” Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 315-343.
  • “Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 456-475.
  • “The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Pyrrhonian Skepticism (Oxford UP, 2004), pp. 121-145.
  • “Rorty on Knowledge and Truth,” in C. Guignon, ed., Richard Rorty (Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 61-80.
  • Problems of Knowledge: a Critical Introduction to Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2001.
  • “Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards,” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 1-23.
  • “Are There Two Grades of Knowledge? Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2003, Supplemental 77, pp. 91-112; and in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 174-189.
  • “Rorty on Knowledge and Truth,” in C. Guignon, ed., Richard Rorty, Cambridge UP, 2003; pp. 61-80.
  • “Nozick on Knowledge and Skepticism,” in D. Schmidtz, ed., Robert Nozick (Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 131-154.
  • “Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards,” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 1-23.
  • “Is Contextualism Stable?,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 80-85.
  • “Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 607-612.
  • “Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature,” in Brandom, ed., Rorty and His Critics (Cambridge UP, 2000).
  • “Scepticism,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 35-69.
  • “Fogelin’s Neo-Pyrrhonism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999): 141-158.
  • “Still Unnatural: A Reply to Vogel and Rorty,” Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 29-39.
  • “Understanding Human Knowledge Philosophically,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 359-378.
• Timothy Williamson, Oxford University
  • “Replies to critics,” in P. Greenough, D. Pritchard, eds., Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2009: 279-384.
  • “Knowledge of counterfactuals,” in A. O’Hear, ed., Epistemology, Cambridge UP, 2009: 45-64.
  • “Why epistemology can’t be operationalized,” in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford UP, 2008: 277-300.
  • “Knowledge within the margin for error,” Mind 116 (2007): 723-726.
  • “On being justified in one’s head,” in M. Timmons, J. Greco, A. Mele, eds., Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi (Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 106-122.
  • “Philosophical knowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (2007): 89-123.
  • with I. Douven, “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 755-779.
  • “Knowledge, Context and the Agent’s Point of View,” in G. Preyer and G. Peter, Contextualism in Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 91-114.
  • “Knowledge and Scepticism,” forthcoming in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 681-700.
  • “Probabilistic Anti-Luminosity,” forthcoming in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays (Oxford UP).
  • “Can Cognition Be Factorised into Internal and External Components?,” forthcoming in R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Oxford: Blackwell).
  • “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 213-235.
  • “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement,” Dialectica 58 (2004): 109-153.
  • “Sosa on Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004): 263-271.
  • “Some Computational Constraints in Epistemic Logic,” in D. Gabbay, S. Rahman, J. M. Torres and J. P. van Bendegem, eds., Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science (Hermes, 2004): 437-456.
  • “Computational Limits and Epistemic Logic,” in W. Löffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief: Wissen und Glauben (Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna: ÖBV-HPT, 2004): 126-140.
  • “Understanding and Inference,” The Aristotelian Society, Sup. vol. 77 (2003): 249-293.
  • with Jason Stanley, “Knowing How,” Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-444.
  • “Comments on Michael Williams ‘Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards’,” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 25-33.
  • Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford UP, 2000.
    • “Précis of Knowledge and its Limits,” pp. 431-435 and “Replies to Commentators,” pp. 468-491, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005).
    • “Summary of Knowledge and its Limits,” pp. 283-284; and “Replies to commentators,” pp. 313-323, Philosophical Books 45 (2004).
  • “Scepticism, Semantic Externalism and Keith’s Mom,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 149-158.
  • “Scepticism and Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 613-628.
  • “Schiffer on the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 505-517.
  • “Conditionalizing on Knowledge,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(1998): 89-121.
  • “The Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations”, Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998).
  • “Knowledge as Evidence,” Mind 106 (1997): 717-741.
  • “Knowing and Asserting,” Philosophical Review105 (1996): 489-523.
  • “Cognitive Homelessness,” Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 554-573.
  • “‘Self-knowledge and embedded operators,” Analysis 56 (1996): 202-209.
  • “Is Knowing a State of Mind?”, Mind 104 (1995): 533-565.
  • “Does Assertibility Satisfy the “S4″ Axiom?,” Critica 1995; 27(1995): 3-25.
• Nicholas Wolterstorff, Yale University (emeritus)
  • “Obligation, Entitlement, and Rationality,” in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 326-338.
  • Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge UP, 2001).
  • “Epistemology of Religion,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 303-324.
  • “Obligations of Belief: Two Concepts,” in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, 1997.
  • John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge UP, 1996).
• Jay Wood, Wheaton College
  • with R. Roberts, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2007.
  • “Intellectual Virtues and the Prospects of a Christian Epistemology,” in M. Cherry, ed., The Death of Metaphysics; The Death of Culture: Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Morality (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 38-66.
  • with R. Roberts, “Proper Function, Emotion, and the Virtues of the Intellect,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 3-24.
  • with R. Roberts, “Humility and Epistemic Goods,” in M. DePaul, L. Zagzebski, ed., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2003.
  • “On the Uses and Advantages of An Epistemology for Life,” in M. Westphal, ed., Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought, Indiana UP, 1999.
  • Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous, InterVarsity Press, 1998.
• Crispin Wright, New York University and University of St. Andrews.
  • “The Perils of Dogmatism,” forthcoming in S. Nuccetelli, G. Seay, ed., Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford UP.
  • “New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence,” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 262-283.
  • “Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 236-262.
  • “Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws,” Dialectica 58 (2004): 155-175.
  • “On Epistemic Entitlement: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?,” Aristotelian Society Supplement 78 (2004): 167-212.
  • “Facts and Certainty” in T.R. Baldwin, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2004.
  • “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 330-348.
  • with Bob Hale, “Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited,” European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 101-129.
  • “On Basic Logical Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 41-85.
  • “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof” (pp. 140-163) and “Replies [to Garcia Suarez, Hale, and Sainsbury]” (pp. 201-219), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
  • with B. Hale, “Implicit Definition and the A Priori,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 286-319.
• Stephen Yablo, MIT
  • “Apriority and Existence,” in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 197-228.
  • “Self-Knowledge and Semantic Luck,” Philosophical Issues 9 (1998).
• Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma
  • “Epistemic Value Monism,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 190-198.
  • ed., with M. DePaul, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2003.
  • “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good,” Metaphilosophy, 2003; to be reprinted in D. Pritchard and M. Brady, ed., Moral and Epistemic Virtues.
  • “Emotion and Moral Judgment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003.
  • “Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief and the Aquinas/Calvin Model,” (symposium paper), Philosophical Books, 2002.
  • ed., with A. Fairweather, Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford UP, 2001.
  • “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 173-179.
  • “What is Knowledge?” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 92-116.
  • “Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (Supp., 1997): 1-17.
  • Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into The Nature Of Virtue And The Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge UP, 1996).
    • “Précis” (pp. 169-177) and “Responses” (pp. 207-219), Symposium on L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
• José Zalabardo, University College London
  • “Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 34-58.
  • “Wright on Moore,” forthcoming in A. Coliva, ed., Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (Oxford UP).
  • “BonJour, Externalism and the Regress Problem,” Synthese 148 (2006): 135-169.
  • “Externalism, Skepticism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophical Review 114 (2005): 33-61.

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4. Other Epistemology sites:

• Certain Doubts: a blog hopelessly devoted to epistemology
• Keith Korcz’s EpistemologicalResearch.html.
• Episteme Links’ Epistemology Topics Page.