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Keith DeRose

Yale University
Dept. of Philosophy
P.O. Box 208306
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8306
 

Personal:
Born, April 24, 1962; married; two grown children

Areas of Spec.:
Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Areas of Comp.:
History of Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Academic Positions:

  • Yale University
    • April 2005-present: Allison Foundation Professor of Philosophy
    • July 2000-present: Professor of Philosophy
    • July 1998-June 2000: Associate Professor of Philosophy
  • Rice University
    • July 1996-June 1998: Associate Professor of Philosophy
    • July 1993-June 1996: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
  • New York Univesity: Sept. 1990-June 1993: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
  • UCLA: Sept. 1985-June 1990: Teaching Assistant, Associate, Fellow

Education:

  • UCLA, 1984-1990: M.A., Philosophy, 1986; Ph.D., Philosophy, 1990
    • Dissertation: “Knowledge, Epistemic Possibility, and Scepticism”; Advisor: Rogers Albritton
    • Awards: Carnap Essay Prize, 1990; Griffin Fellowship, 1990; Carnap Essay Prize (co-winner), 1989;  Robert M. Yost Prize for Excellence in Teaching, 1988
  • Calvin College, 1980-1984: B.A., with honors, Philosophy major, 1984

Courses Taught at Yale, Rice, NYU, UCLA:

Graduate: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics (all multiple times), Teaching College Philosophy (taught to first-time TA’s at UCLA)

Upper Division: History of Modern Philosophy (Descartes to Kant survey course, topics courses, single figure courses); Philosophy of Religion; Theory of Knowledge; Topics in Metaphysics and Epistemology; Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics (all multiple times)

Lower Division: Introduction to Philosophy; Philosophy track of DS (Yale’s Directed Studies program for freshman); Symbolic Logic; Skepticism and Rationality; Contemporary Moral and Legal Issues; (all multiple times); Humanities Core Course (Rice); Free Will, God and Evil; Critical Reasoning

Graduate Advising: Since coming to Yale I have been on the dissertation committees of and/or (usually and) written letters of recommendation for the following graduate students. I was the chair of the committees for the students marked with an asterisk.  (I have only recently begun to include this, and haven’t been able to check records carefully, so I am probably missing some students, especially from early in my time at Yale.  Apologies to all I may have forgotten.)

  • C.P. Ragland — now tenured at St. Louis University
  • Sukjae Lee — now tenured at Seoul National University, having been previously tenured at the Ohio State University
  • Todd Buras* — now tenured at Baylor University
  • Desmond Hogan — now tenured at Princeton University
  • Andrew Dole — currently tenured at the Religious Studies dept. at Amherst College
  • Andrew Chignell — now tenured at Cornell University
  • Samuel Newlands — currently tenured at Notre Dame University
  • Larry Jorgensen — currently tenured at Skidmore College
  • Geoffrey Pynn* — currently tenured at Northern Illinois University
  • Elliot Paul — currently tenure-track at Columbia/Barnard
  • Nick Kroll — currently tenure-track at Franklin and Marshall College
  • Matthew Benton (Rutgers PhD: I was an outside member of the committee) — currently tenure-track at Seattle Pacific University
  • John Pittard* — currently tenure-track at Yale Divinity School
  • Justin Khoo — currently tenure-track at MIT
  • Aaron Norby — currently working outside of philosophy
  • Julianne Chung* — currently tenure-track at University of Louisville
  • Alexander Worsnip* — currently tenure-track at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Publications: Papers and Books (many of these papers are available on-line here)

  • “Précis” (1,239 words) and “Replies to Commentators” (17,125 words), forthcoming in a Symposium on The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Vol. 2, which will comprise Volume 10, Issue 1 of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
  • “Delusions of Knowledge concerning God’s Existence: A Skeptical Look at Religious Experience,” in M. Benton, J. Hawthorne, D. Rabinowitz, eds., Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2018), pp. 288-301.
  • The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Volume 2; Oxford UP, 2017.
  • “Précis” (pp. 675-677), “Reply to Nagel” (pp. 703-708), “Reply to Ludlow” (pp. 708-711), “Fantl and McGrath: Loose Use” (pp. 711-717), and “Reply to Fantl and McGrath” (pp. 717-721), all in a Symposium on The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012): 675-721.
  • “Conditionals, Literal Content, and ‘DeRose’s Thesis’: A Reply to Barnett,” Mind 121 (2012): 443-455.
  • “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys,” Philosophical Studies 156 (2011): 81-110.
  • “Questioning Evidentialism,” in T. Dougherty, ed., Evidentialism and Its Discontents (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 137-146.
  • “Insensitivity Is Back, Baby!,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 161-187.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” Mind 119 (2010): 1-42.
  • The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Volume I, Oxford UP, 2009.
  • “Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 141-160.
  • “‘Bamboozled by Our Own Words’: Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 316-338.
  • “Direct Warrant Realism,” in A. Dole and A. Chignell, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 150-172.
  • “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 172-198.
  • “Single Scoreboard Semantics,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 1-21.
  • “Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 22-41.
  • “The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 346-350.
  • “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 167-203.
    • Republished in The Philosopher’s Annual, vol. 26.
    • Republished in Asa Kasher, ed., Pragmatics: Critical Concepts II, Routledge, forthcoming, 2010.
  • “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
  • “Now You Know It, Now You Don’t,” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 91-106.
  • “Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 697-706.
  • “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 385-413
  • “Conditional Assertions and ‘Bisquit’ Conditionals” (with Richard E. Grandy), Noûs 33 (1999): 405-420.
  • “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 187-205.
  • Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, edited with T. Warfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
  • “Responding to Skepticism,” in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (1999), pp. 1-24.
  • “Simple Might’s, Indicative Possibilities, and the Open Future,” The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 67-82.
  • “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 568-580.
  • “Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): pp. 193-197.
  • “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 1-52.
    • Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, vol. 18 (Atascardero, CA: Rigeview Publishing Company, 1997).
    • Reprinted in E. Sosa, J. Kim, ed., Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
    • Reprinted in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 183-219.
  • “Lewis on ‘Might’ and ‘Would’ Counterfactual Conditionals,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994): pp. 413-418.
  • “Descartes, Epistemic Principles, Epistemic Circularity, and Scientia,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992): pp. 220-238.
  • “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): pp. 913-929.
    • Reprinted in M. Huemer, ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002)
    • Reprinted in L. Alcoff, ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998).
  • “Deterrent Threats: What Can Matter,” Philosophical Studies 67 (1992): pp. 241-260.
  • “Epistemic Possibilities,” Philosophical Review 100 (1991): pp. 581-605.
  • “Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): pp. 497-512.
  • “Reid’s Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism,” Philosophical Review 98 (1989): pp. 313-348.

Publications: Reviews, Encyclopedia Articles, Interview:

  • “Contextualism and Fallibilism,” in J. Ichikawa, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism (Routledge, 2017), pp. 145-155.
  • “Why Take a Stance on God?”, interview of KDR by Gary Gutting in The Stone, the New York Times philosophy blog, 18 September 2014; reprinted with slight revisions as “Religion and Knowledge,” in Gary Gutting, Talking God: Philosophers on Belief (New York: W.W. Norton, 2017), pp. 172-186.
  • Review of Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, Mind 116 (2007): 486-489.
  • Review of Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 573-577.
  • Review of Avrum Stroll, Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 238-241.
  • “Contextualism,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996).
  • “Relevant Alternatives,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996).
  • Review of William L. Rowe, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): 945-949.
  • Review of Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 604-607..

Presentations (philosophy department colloquia except where otherwise specified):

  • “The Goodness of God and the Problem of Hell,” presented via Zoom to Debates in Contemporary Kalām, episode 46; May 18, 2021.
  • “The Limits of the Free Will Defense,” Arizona State University; Oct. 26, 2019.
  • “The Limits of the Free Will Defense,” University of Oklahoma; Oct. 12, 2018.
  • “Marilyn Adams and the defeat of Horrendous Evils,” Special Memorial Session: Marilyn McCord Adams; Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association; March 29, 2018.
  • “The Limits of the Free Will Defense,” University of South Carolina; March 23, 2018.
  • “How Do We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?,” New York University, Mind and Language Seminar (run by Stephen Schiffer and Crispin Wright); March 21, 2017.
  • “Free Will and Universalism,” delivered in two sessions on June 23, 2016 at the St. Thomas Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology; University of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, Minnesota.
  • “Acceptance in Philosophy and in Religion,” Third Annual William P. Alston Lecture; Syracuse University; Sept. 5, 2015.
  • “How to Appear to Know that God Exists,” International Conference on New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology; St. Anne’s College, Oxford University; June 24, 2015.
  • “Descartes’s Real Distinction between Mind and Body and His Wild Account of God’s Power,” Augustana College; March 9, 2015.
  • “Free Will Defenses, Evil, and Hell,” Conference in honor of Marilyn McCord Adams, sponsored by the Center for Medieval Philosophy and Dept. of Philosophy; Georgetown University; March 13, 2014.
  • “On Knowing Whether You’ve Lost the Lottery,” keynote address at the 7th Annual Western Michigan University Graduate Philosophy Conference; Dec. 7, 2013.
  • “On Knowing Whether God Exists,” public lecture at Western Michigan University, hosted by the WMU philosophy dept.; Dec. 5, 2013.
  • “How Can We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?: Three Answers,” keynote talk at the Talbot Philosophical Society Graduate Philosophy Conference; Biola University; March 23, 2013.
  • “Counterexamples: The Case of Insensitivity Accounts of Appearances of No-Knowledge,” Baylor University; Aug. 30, 2012.
  • “Relationships, Value, and the Atonement,” Philosophy of Religion series, Baylor University; Aug. 29, 2012.
  • “Counterexamples: The Case of Insensitivity Accounts of No-Knowledge,” keynote address, 5th Annaul Midwest Regional Graduate Philosophy Conference, Northern Illinois University; Oct. 21, 2011.
  • “Against the Loose Use Maneuver,” Kline Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Epistemology; University of Missouri; Oct. 13, 2011.
  • “Knowledge and Conditionals: Theories, Pictures, and Explanations,” Conference on Saul Kripke’s Philosophical Troubles, The Saul Kripke Center, CUNY Graduate Center; Sept. 15, 2011.
  • “Middle Knowledge, Foreknowledge, and Open Theism,” 6th Annual Baylor Philosophy of Religion Texas, held at the University of Texas, Austin; Nov. 5, 2010.
  • “Knowledge, Explanations, and Confidence,” Conference on the Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation, Chambers Philosophy Conference Series, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Oct. 2, 2010.
  • “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys,” presented at a meeting of the Metro Experimental Research Group (MERG) at New York University; June 18, 2010.
  • “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys,” Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium; May 9, 2010.
  • “Accommodation and Epistemic Impossibilities that Nobody Knows to be False,” Epistemic Modals Conference, Chambers Philosophy Conference Series, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; April 17, 2010.
  • “Bold and Timid Skepticisms,” Indiana University, Bloomington; Jan. 22, 2010.
  • “Universalism and Open Theism,” Aquinas College, Grand Rapids, MI; Nov. 24, 2009.
  • “Knowledge and Some Evaluations of Actions,” Northwestern University; Oct. 10, 2008.
  • “Knowledge and Some Evaluations of Actions,” University of Maryland, College Park; Oct. 1, 2008.
  • “Knowledge and Some Evaluations of Actions,” University at Buffalo — SUNY; February 29, 2008.
  • “Knowledge and Some Evaluations of Actions,” Saint Louis University; September 21, 2007.
  • “Christian Belief for the Experientially Challenged,” Baylor University Philosophy of Religion Conference; Feb. 22, 2007.
  • “Middle Knowledge and the Conditionals of Deliberation,” University of Missouri Annual Philosophy of Religion Conference; January 28, 2006.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” Princeton University, Sept. 23, 2005.
  • “‘Bamboozled by Our Own Words’: Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism,” Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 6, 2005.
  • “Universalism, Open Theism, and Calvinism,” Calvin College, March 9, 2005.
  • “Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments against Contextualism,” Cornell University, September 10, 2004.
  • “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism,” “Epistemological Contextualism” conference, University of Stirling, March 20, 2004.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” University of Dundee, March 17, 2004.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” University of Glasgow, March 16, 2004.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” University of Texas, Austin; March 8, 2004.
  • Commentator, along with Steven Pinker, for Richard Dawkins’s Tanner Lectures; Harvard University; Nov. 19-21, 2003.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Oct. 31, 2003
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” University of Arizona; Oct. 24, 2003
  • “Externalism and Skepticism,” University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Colloquium; Oct. 11, 2003
  • “Single Scoreboard Semantics,” “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond” conference; UMass, Amherst; Oct. 11, 2002.  With comments by Richard Feldman.
  • “The Conditionals of Deliberation,” University of Michigan; September 27, 2002.
  • “Reidian Epistemology,” at the “God and the Ethics of Belief” Conference in Honor of Nick Wolterstorff, Yale University, April 20, 2002.
  • “Single Scoreboard Semantics,” April 4, 2002, and “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” April 5, 2002, University of Miami.
  • “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” Keynote address at the Rocky Mountain Student Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder, Feb. 22, 2002
  • “The Warranted Assertability Objection,” Brown University; March 17, 2001
  • “Elusive Skepticism,” New York University; December 1, 2000
  • “Assertability in Context,” University of Notre Dame; May 8, 2000
  • “Voodoo Epistemology“, comments on Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief; Society of Christian Philosophers group meeting at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association; Boston; December 29, 1999
  • “How Not Be a Hero in Responding to Skepticism,” CUNY Graduate Center Colloquium; November 10, 1999
  • “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?”, at the 1999 Spindel Conference; University of Memphis; October 2, 1999.  With comments by Timothy Williamson.
  • Comments on Richard Feldman’s paper, “The Ethics of Belief”; Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, New Jersey; April 23, 1999
  • “Knowledge, Assertion, and Context,” at the Fifth Annual Franklin & Marshall College Symposium in Metaphysics and Epistemology; April 10, 1999
  • “Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?“, comments on Alvin Plantinga’s paper, “Warranted Christian Belief”; Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association; Washington, D.C.; December 28, 1998
  • “Now You Know It, Now You Don’t,” at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy; Boston, Massachusetts; August 13, 1998
  • “Does God Know What We Would Freely Do?”, Southern Methodist University; March 26, 1998
  • “Context, Knowledge, and Assertion,” University of Vermont; November 7, 1997
  • “Contextualism, Knowledge, and Assertion,” at the 1997 International Colloquium on Cognitive Science; San Sebastian, Spain; May 8, 1997
  • “Contextualism, Knowledge, and Assertion,” Rutgers University, March 13, 1997
  • “Contextualism, Knowledge, and Assertion,” Yale University, March 4, 1997
  • “Descartes and Modality,” Notre Dame University, January 31, 1997
  • “Knowledge and Warranted Assertability,” Syracuse University; February 22, 1996
  • “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” Rice University; Sept. 21, 1994
  • “Solving the Skeptical Puzzle,” Rice University, February 11, 1993
  • “Solving the Skeptical Puzzle,” University of Virginia, Charlottesville, January 18, 1993
  • “The Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 15, 1992
  • “The Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism,” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, January 8, 1992
  • “Wittgenstein’s Suspicion and the Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism,” Fordham University, December 5, 1991
  • “Bold Skeptics and Airplane Spotters,” C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center, March 27, 1991
  • “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” UCLA; University of Connecticut, Storrs; Temple University; Tulane University; Winter, 1989-90

Professional Organizations, lifetime memberships:
American Philosophical Association
Society of Christian Philosophers

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