“Making the ‘Hard’ Problem of Moral Normativity Easier”
In Errol Lord and Barry Maguire, Weighing Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
“Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay” (on T. M. Scanlon’s The Difficulty of Tolerance)
Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2006): 193-214. 116 (2006): 263-284.
“The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will”
Ethics 116 (2006): 263-284.
“Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint”
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2004): 43-60.
“Desires, Reasons, and Causes” (symposium on Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 436-443.
“Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value”
Ethics 113 (2003): 468-489.
“Normativity and Projection in Hobbes’s Leviathan”
The Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 313-347.
“Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 28 (1999): 139-164.
“Learning From Frankena: A Philosophical Remembrance”
Ethics 107 (1997): 685-705.
“Motive and Obligation in Hume’s Ethics”
Nous 27 (1993): 415-448.
Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-174.
“Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends” (with Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton)
The Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 115-189.
“Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals”
Nous 24 (1990): 257-268.
Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89.
“Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out”
Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 291-319.
“Kantian Practical Reason Defended”
Ethics 96 (1985): 89-99.
Ethics 88 (1977): 36-49.
“A Defense of the Kantian Interpretation”
Ethics 86 (1976): 164-170.
“Nagel’s Argument for Altruism”
Philosophical Studies 25 (1974): 125-136.