

Kenya protocols

KENYA GAME PROTOCOLS

Protocol: Sessions A2 and B2

Game parameters

Endowment per voter: 500

Paid in taxes per voter: 250

Total treasury: 1250

Available for expropriation: 375

Politician's choices for expropriation: 0, 75, 150, 250, 300, 375

Vote payment: 50

Reelection bonus: Between 0 and 50

Transition fee: 25

Politician's salary (with reelection): 500

Politician's salary (without reelection): 250

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Preparations

Preparation before participants arrive

General preparations in computer room

- Place a consent form on each table, label it with SubjectID
- Place a note paper on each desk (1 sheet), and an explanatory handout on each desk
- Place a pen on each desk on the right hand side

Preparation once participants are in the waiting room

At the gate

- Tell respondent to stick to their placecard

In the waiting room

- Bring participants into the waiting room, ask them to sit on the chairs labelled with the number on the place card they were given at the gate.
- Explain the task:

Hello everyone! A warm welcome to the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics. I see all participants are present, thank your willingness to participate. You are about to start a study that investigates your behavior as a voter. You will get paid 50 KSH if you showed up on time, and in addition, you can earn at least 150 Ksh from the game, and possibly more. This money will be transferred to your MPESA account. We will use the phone number that you registered with this afternoon. Now, please ensure that your phones are switched off completely. We do this so that you can focus on the task. It is also important that you refrain from communicating with other participants. This also helps you to concentrate. If you talk to other people, we will have to send you home and you can't get paid.

Additionally, only touch the computers once you are instructed to do so.

If you are chewing gum, be so kind to take it out now.

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Furthermore, please use the bathroom now if you need to. You will be able to step out during the session, but it will minimize interruptions if anyone who needs to uses the bathroom now.
[Allow time.]

If you have any questions during the session, please raise your hand and one of the researchers will come and talk to you.

Are everyone's phones off? We will now go to the computer room, where I will give you more information about the study. Please find the computer with the number of your placecard, and sit down. Again remember that you are not allowed to speak to each other from now on, and please wait with touching the computers until we instruct you to do so.

In the computer room

- Make participants aware of the consent form that's on their desk. "I'd now like to ask you to turn over the Declaration of Consent in front of you, read through it and sign it if you agree. If you have questions, please ask me. When you are finished, please raise your hand so that I can collect it."

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At the computer

In waiting room	Welcome Explain the task (general)	Time 6 min
In the lab	Get consent 1 Test Mouse 2 Stage 1: Dictator Game 3 Stage 2: Trust Game 4 Stage 3: Group dynamics 5 Stage 3: Test comprehension 6 Stage 4: Voter endowment and taxation 7 Stage 4: Test comprehension 8 Stage 5: Politician salary and expropriation 9 Stage 5: Test comprehension 10 Stage 6: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds 11 Stage 6: Test comprehension 12 Stage 7: Reelection process 13 Stage 7: Test comprehension 14 Stage 8: Payoffs after reelection 15 Stage 8: Test comprehension 16 Stage 9: Reelection process 17 Stage 9: Game Questions Part 1 18 Stage 10A/10B: Vote payment/gift 19 Stage 10A/10B: Test comprehension 20 Stage 11: Game Questions Part 2 21 Stage 12: Questionnaire	
		min

Get consent**Stage 1 -- Dictator Game:**

This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

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There is only **one active role** in the task: the **offerer role**. There is also **one passive role**: the **receiver role**, and you will play each role once. The computer will randomly choose one of the tasks during this study session to base your payment on. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the offerer you will be given another KSH 100 in addition to your show-up fee. You will then be asked to choose how to share this additional KSH 100 with the receiver. **That is, you can choose any amount between zero and KSH 100 to give to the receiver.** The receiver will automatically accept whatever you offer them -- **they cannot reject your offer.** For example, if the offerer offers KSH 50 each person will get KSH 50, and if the offerer offers KSH 10 the offerer will keep KSH 90 while the receiver gets KSH 10. The receiver will also obtain a show-up fee of KSH 100.

Stage 1.1-- Offerer Decision -

Suppose you are the **Offerer**.

You have an additional KSH 100 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero and KSH 100 to the receiver. **They cannot reject your offer.** Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

Stage 1.2 Average Offer-

What is your best guess of the amount other participants will choose to send?

Please choose the amount you think most participants will send by selecting an option. You will be paid 50 KSH if you guess correctly the accuracy of answer.

Stage 2. Trust Game

This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There are two roles in the task: **the sender role** and **the receiver role**, and you will play each role once. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

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When you are the sender you will be given KSH 40 and you can choose whether to send all KSH40 or zero to the receiver. If you send all KSH 40 to the receiver, the computer will triple the payment so that the receiver will have a total of KSH 120. **If they receive KSH 120, the receiver can choose what amount KSH 0-120 to send back to the sender.**

2.1 Sender Actions

If you see on your screen that you are the sender, you have KSH 40 available to you.

You can choose to send all KSh 40 or zero to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

2.1.2 Sender Receive Back

If you sent the receiver KSH 40 how much do you expect the receiver will send back to you?

Please choose the amount you think the receiver would choose to return by selecting an option. You will be paid based on the accuracy of answer.

2.2 Receiver Role

If you see a screen that says you are the receiver, you have been randomly selected to be the receiver.

If he sender sent you KSH 40 you would have KSH 120 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero to KSH 120 back to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option.

Stage 3: Group Dynamics

In this game, you will be grouped with five other players in a group of six. You will not know who else is in your group; the assignment is anonymous. Each group of six will consist of five voters, and one politician. Voters and politicians have different roles in this game, and different decisions to make.

*However, you will not know while you play the game whether you are the voter or the politician. Instead, you will be asked questions about what you would do as a voter **and** what you will do as a politician. At the end of the game, we will randomly choose one person in*

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each group to be the politician, while the other people will be voters. The decisions that you previously made in the role that is ultimately assigned to you will be used to determine the game outcome. Any one of your decisions might affect your ultimate payoff. Thus you should make all of your decisions carefully.

Stage 3 Comprehension Questions

- 1) How many voters are in a group? Answer: 5
- 2) How many politicians are in a group? Answer: 1
- 3) When will you find out if you are the voter or politician? *At the end of the game / At the beginning of the game*

Stage 4: Voter endowment and taxation

Each player who is a voter receives an endowment of 500 Ksh. However, they have to pay part of their endowment in taxes. Each player will pay half of their endowment, or 250 Ksh, into the game treasury as taxes. Politicians do not receive this endowment or pay taxes.

Because there are five voters and each pays 250 Ksh into the treasury, there is a total of 1250 Ksh in the treasury.

Voter 1 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 2 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 3 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 4 Endowment	250 Ksh
<u>Voter 5 Endowment</u>	<u>250 Ksh</u>
TOTAL ENDOWMENT	1250 Ksh

Stage 4 Comprehension Questions

- 1) How much is the voter's endowment? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 2) How much do they pay in taxes? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 3) Do politicians pay taxes? Answer: No
- 4) How much money total is available in the treasury? Answer: 1250 Ksh

Stage 5: Politician salary and expropriation

The player who is the politician does not receive the endowment or pay taxes. Instead, he receives a salary of 500 Ksh. He does not pay taxes.

In addition, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate part of the treasury. Recall that there is 1250 Ksh in the treasury. 875 Ksh, or 70%, is protected. The politician does not have access to it, and s/he cannot expropriate it. However, the politician does have access to the remaining 375 Ksh. S/he can choose to expropriate 0 Ksh, 75 Ksh, 150 Ksh, 250 Ksh, 300 Ksh or 375 Ksh. In other words, s/he can take none of the treasury, part of it, or all of it.

Stage 5 Comprehension Questions:

- 1) How much is the politician's salary? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 2) How much is in the treasury total? Answer: 1250 Ksh
- 3) How much does the politician have access to, to expropriate? Answer: 375 Ksh
- 4) Can the politician expropriate none of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 5) Can the politician expropriate part of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 6) Can the politician expropriate all of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 7)

Stage 6: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds

As already mentioned, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate up to 375 Ksh from the treasury. Whatever he expropriates is subtracted from the total treasury of 1250 Ksh, and that is how much remains in the treasury at the game.

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- If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 0 = \mathbf{1250}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 75 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 75 = \mathbf{1175}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 150 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 150 = \mathbf{1100}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 250 = \mathbf{1000}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 300 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 300 = \mathbf{950}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 375 = \mathbf{875}$.

What remains in the treasury is then divided evenly among the 5 voters, and returned to them at the end of the game.

- If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1250 / 5 = 250}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 75 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1175 / 5 = 235}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 150 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1100 / 5 = 220}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1000 / 5 = 200}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 300 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{950 / 5 = 190}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{875 / 5 = 175}$.

The explanatory handout you have been given shows a table that lists how much the voter will receive back from the treasury, depending on how much the politician chooses to expropriate. You can refer to this table throughout the game in considering your decision.

Stage 6: Comprehension questions

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- 1) At the end of the game, how many people is the treasury divided between? Answer: 5
- 2) If the politician expropriates 0 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 3) If the politician expropriates 250 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 200 Ksh
- 4) If the politician expropriates 375 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 175 Ksh

Stage 7: Reelection process

As you already know, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate some funds from the common treasury. When they do so, voters lose funds that would otherwise have been returned to them. Voters can decide whether or not they would reelect a politician who has chosen to expropriate. I will describe what happens if a politician is **not** reelected below.

For now, let's discuss how the reelection process works. *Remember, the politician will not be chosen until the end of the game.* Importantly, you will not know what decision the politician has made about expropriation until the end of the game. Instead, you will answer six hypothetical questions.

- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 0 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 75 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 150 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 250 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 300 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 375 Ksh?

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At the end of the game, you will learn how much the politician chose to reelect, and what the reelection outcome was. Let's discuss an example. The politician chose to expropriate 76 Ksh. The voters answered as follows: would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 76 Ksh?

Voter 1	No
Voter 2	No
Voter 3	Yes
Voter 4	No
Voter 5	Yes

In all, three people voted not to reelect, and 2 voters voted to reelect. The politician who expropriated 100 Ksh is **NOT** reelected. At least 3 out of 5 "Yes" votes are required for reelection.

Remember, you do not need **every** voter to vote "Yes" in order to be reelected. Voting is done by majority. If 3 voters, 4 voters or 5 voters vote to reelect, the politician is reelected. If only less than 3 voters vote to reelect, s/he is **not** reelected. Just 3 voters voting to reelect is enough!

Stage 7: Comprehension questions

- 1) Who decides whether or not politicians are reelected? Answer: Voters
- 2) Is a politician reelected if he receives 1 vote for reelection? Answer: No
- 3) Is a politician reelected if he receives 2 votes for reelection? Answer: No
- 4) Is a politician reelected if he receives 3 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 5) Is a politician reelected if he receives 4 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes

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- 6) Is a politician reelected if he receives 5 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 7) Will you know how much the politician actually expropriated when you answer questions about reelection? Answer: No. You will answer questions about whether or not you would reelect a politician who expropriated varying amounts.

Stage 8: Payoffs after reelection

Just as in the real world, politicians benefit from being reelected. How do they benefit? First, they are able to keep their entire salary, which was 500 Ksh. Second, they will receive a small reelection bonus. The reelection bonus is between 0 and 50 Ksh.

On the other hand, if the voters prefer not to reelect the politician, they can choose not to reelect. If the politician loses reelections, he faces two consequences. First, he loses half his salary as a fine. The salary that he walks out with is now only 250 Ksh, rather than 500 Ksh. Second, he does not receive the reelection bonus.

What happens to the voter if they do not reelect? They do not face any major penalties, but must pay 25 Ksh each as a transition fee because changing government administrations is costly. Every voter pays the transition fee.

Stage 8: Comprehension Questions

- 1) Do politicians receive a positive cash bonus if they are reelected? Answer: Yes
- 2) Does the politician receive the bonus if he is not reelected? Answer: No
- 3) How much salary does the politician receive if he is reelected? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 4) How much salary does he receive if he is **not** reelected? Answer: 200 Ksh
- 5) How much is the transition fee? Answer: 25 Ksh
- 6) Do voters pay it when they choose to reelect the politician, or when they choose not to reelect the politician? Answer: When they do not reelect
- 7) Does every voter pay the transition fee? Answer: Yes

Stage 9: Game Questions Part 1

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Now that you have learned about how this election process works, we will now ask you to make a choice acting as a voter, and a choice acting as a politician. Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

Remember again that as a voter you have been endowed with 500 Ksh, of which half, or 250 Ksh must be paid into the treasury. There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of 1250 ksh. 875 Ksh of the tax revenue is protected and will be redistributed to voters at the end of the game, but 375 of the tax revenue is not protected. It can potentially be expropriated by the politician. If the politician expropriates this revenue, voters will not receive it back.

As a voter, you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of 500 Ksh, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and 50 Ksh. If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose 250 Ksh of his/her salary, and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of 25 Ksh incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this session could be chosen for payment. You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Please run the treatment, neutral_nopayment.

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*[Note to research assistants, not to be read aloud: The preceding part of the experimental session is always identical. It is extremely important that there be no discussion of or references to voter payments, **prior** to this point in the session.]*

For the second part of the game session, there are two alternate protocols (A and B). Half the experimental sessions will use protocol A, and half the experimental sessions will use protocol B. Please be careful to follow the instructions for your assigned protocol.]

Stage 10A: Vote payments

Now, we are going to introduce something new into the electoral process. Four out of five voters are going to receive payments of 50 Ksh in exchange for their votes. These payments do not come from the treasury; they are separate.

The payments are not public; no one knows who has received a payment. In addition, the choice by the voter of whether or not to reelect will always remain secret. No one can observe the vote.

Just like you will not find out whether you are the voter or the politician until the end of the game, you will not find out whether or not you have received a vote payment until the end of the game. If you do receive a payment, it will be added to your overall game earnings. In the meantime, we will ask you about how you would choose to reelect the politician if you **did** receive a vote payment, and if you **did not** receive a vote payment.

Stage 10B: Vote gifts

Now, we are going to introduce something new into the electoral process. Four out of five voters are going to receive gifts of 50 Ksh in exchange for their votes. These gifts do not come from the treasury; they are separate.

The gifts are not public; no one knows who has received a gift. In addition, the choice by the voter of whether or not to reelect will always remain secret. No one can observe the vote.

Just like you will not find out whether you are the voter or the politician until the end of the game, you will not find out whether or not you have received a gift until the end of the game. If you do receive a gift, it will be added to your overall game earnings. In the meantime, we will ask you about how you would choose to reelect the politician if you **did** receive a gift, and if you **did not** receive a gift.

Stage 10A: Comprehension questions

- 1) How many voters will receive a payment? Answer: 4
- 2) Will you find out whether you received a payment before the end of the game?
Answer: No
- 3) Will other voters know you received a payment? Answer: No
- 4) Does the payment come from the treasury? Answer: No
- 5) How much is the payment? Answer: 50 Ksh
- 6) Can others observe your vote if you receive a payment? Answer: No. The vote is always secret.
- 7) Can others observe your vote if you do not receive a payment? Answer: No. The vote is always secret.

Stage 10B: Comprehension questions

- 1) How many voters will receive a gift? Answer: 4
- 2) Will you find out whether you received a gift before the end of the game? Answer: No
- 3) Will other voters know you received a gift? Answer: No
- 4) Does the gift come from the treasury? Answer: No
- 5) How much is the gift? Answer: 50 Ksh
- 6) Can others observe your vote if you receive a gift? Answer: No. The vote is always secret.
- 7) Can others observe your vote if you do not receive a gift? Answer: No. The vote is always secret.

Stage 11A:

Please run the treatment neutral_nopayment.

Stage 11B:

Please run the treatment gift_decisionquestions.

Stage 12: Questionnaire

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Exit interview:

Please conduct brief exit interviews with 4 participants in each session. The exit interviews should not take more than 5 minutes, and you can summarize each person's responses on the exit interview form.

The questions for the exit interview are as follows:

- 1) How did you decide how much to allow the politician to expropriate?
- 2) Did receiving an extra payment/gift change your decision about how much to allow the politician to expropriate? Why did it change your decision?
- 3) When you were the politician, how did you decide how much you wanted to expropriate?

Protocol: Sessions C2 and D2

Game parameters

Endowment per voter: 500

Paid in taxes per voter: 250

Total treasury: 1250

Available for expropriation: 375

Politician's choices for expropriation: 0, 75, 150, 250, 300, 375

Vote payment: 50

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Reelection bonus: Between 0 and 50

Transition fee: 25

Politician's salary (with reelection): 500

Politician's salary (without reelection): 250

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Preparations

Preparation before participants arrive

General preparations in computer room

- Place a consent form on each table, label it with SubjectID
- Place a note paper on each desk (1 sheet), and an explanatory handout on each desk
- Place a pen on each desk on the right hand side

Preparation once participants are in the waiting room

At the gate

- Tell respondent to stick to their placecard

In the waiting room

- Bring participants into the waiting room, ask them to sit on the chairs labelled with the number on the place card they were given at the gate.
- Explain the task:

Hello everyone! A warm welcome to the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics. I see all participants are present, thank your willingness to participate. You are about to start a study that investigates your behavior as a voter. You will get paid 50 KSH if you showed up on time, and in addition, you can earn at least 150 Ksh from the game, and possibly more. This money will be transferred to your MPESA account. We will use the phone number that you registered with this afternoon. Now, please ensure that your phones are switched off completely. We do this so that you can focus on the task. It is also important that you refrain from communicating with other participants. This also helps you to concentrate. If you talk to other people, we will have to send you home and you can't get paid.

Additionally, only touch the computers once you are instructed to do so.

If you are chewing gum, be so kind to take it out now.

Furthermore, please use the bathroom now if you need to. You will be able to step out during the session, but it will minimize interruptions if anyone who needs to uses the bathroom now. [Allow time.]

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If you have any questions during the session, please raise your hand and one of the researchers will come and talk to you.

Are everyone's phones off? We will now go to the computer room, where I will give you more information about the study. Please find the computer with the number of your placecard, and sit down. Again remember that you are not allowed to speak to each other from now on, and please wait with touching the computers until we instruct you to do so.

In the computer room

- Make participants aware of the consent form that's on their desk. "I'd now like to ask you to turn over the Declaration of Consent in front of you, read through it and sign it if you agree. If you have questions, please ask me. When you are finished, please raise your hand so that I can collect it."

At the computer

In waiting room	Welcome Explain the task (general)	Time 6 min
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		min

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Get consent

Stage 1 -- Dictator Game:

This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There is only **one active role** in the task: the **offerer role**. There is also **one passive role**: the **receiver role**, and you will play each role once. The computer will randomly choose one of the tasks during this study session to base your payment on. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the offerer you will be given another KSH 100 in addition to your show-up fee. You will then be asked to choose how to share this additional KSH 100 with the receiver. **That is, you can choose any amount between zero and KSH 100 to give to the receiver.** The receiver will automatically accept whatever you offer them -- **they cannot reject your offer.** For example, if the offerer offers KSH 50 each person will get KSH 50, and if the offerer offers KSH 10 the offerer will keep KSH 90 while the receiver gets KSH 10. The receiver will also obtain a show-up fee of KSH 100.

Stage 1.1-- Offerer Decision -

Suppose you are the **Offerer**.

You have an additional KSH 100 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero and KSH 100 to the receiver. **They cannot reject your offer.** Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

Stage 1.2 Average Offer-

What is your best guess of the amount other participants will choose to send?

Please choose the amount you think most participants will send by selecting an option. You will be paid 50 KSH if you guess correctly the accuracy of answer.

Stage 2. Trust Game

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This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There are two roles in the task: **the sender role** and **the receiver role**, and you will play each role once. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the sender you will be given KSH 40 and you can choose whether to send all KSH40 or zero to the receiver. If you send all KSH 40 to the receiver, the computer will triple the payment so that the receiver will have a total of KSH 120. **If they receive KSH 120, the receiver can choose what amount KSH 0-120 to send back to the sender.**

2.2 Sender Actions

If you see on your screen that you are the sender, you have KSH 40 available to you.

You can choose to send all KSh 40 or zero to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

2.2.2 Sender Receive Back

If you sent the receiver KSH 40 how much do you expect the receiver will send back to you?

Please choose the amount you think the receiver would choose to return by selecting an option. You will be paid based on the accuracy of answer.

2.3 Receiver Role

If you see a screen that says you are the receiver, you have been randomly selected to be the receiver.

If the sender sent you KSH 40 you would have KSH 120 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero to KSH 120 back to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option.

Stage 3: Ultimatum Game

Stage 4: Group Dynamics

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In this game, you will be grouped with five other players in a group of six. You will not know who else is in your group; the assignment is anonymous. Each group of six will consist of five voters, and one politician. Voters and politicians have different roles in this game, and different decisions to make.

*However, you will not know while you play the game whether you are the voter or the politician. Instead, you will be asked questions about what you would do as a voter **and** what you will do as a politician. At the end of the game, we will randomly choose one person in each group to be the politician, while the other people will be voters. The decisions that you previously made in the role that is ultimately assigned to you will be used to determine the game outcome. Any one of your decisions might affect your ultimate payoff. Thus you should make all of your decisions carefully.*

Stage 4 Comprehension Questions

- 4) How many voters are in a group? Answer: 5
- 5) How many politicians are in a group? Answer: 1
- 6) When will you find out if you are the voter or politician? *At the end of the game / At the beginning of the game*

Stage 5: Voter endowment and taxation

Each player who is a voter receives an endowment of 500 Ksh. However, they have to pay part of their endowment in taxes. Each player will pay half of their endowment, or 250 Ksh, into the game treasury as taxes. Politicians do not receive this endowment or pay taxes.

Because there are five voters and each pays 250 Ksh into the treasury, there is a total of 1250 Ksh in the treasury.

Voter 1 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 2 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 3 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 4 Endowment	250 Ksh
<u>Voter 5 Endowment</u>	<u>250 Ksh</u>
TOTAL ENDOWMENT	1250 Ksh

Stage 5 Comprehension Questions

- 5) How much is the voter's endowment? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 6) How much do they pay in taxes? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 7) Do politicians pay taxes? Answer: No
- 8) How much money total is available in the treasury? Answer: 1250 Ksh

Stage 6: Politician salary and expropriation

The player who is the politician does not receive the endowment or pay taxes. Instead, he receives a salary of 500 Ksh. He does not pay taxes.

In addition, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate part of the treasury. Recall that there is 1250 Ksh in the treasury. 875 Ksh, or 30%, is protected. The politician does not have access to it, and s/he cannot expropriate it. However, the politician does have access to the remaining 375 Ksh. S/he can choose to expropriate 0 Ksh, 75 Ksh, 150 Ksh, 250 Ksh, 300 Ksh or 375 Ksh. In other words, s/he can take none of the treasury, part of it, or all of it.

Stage 6 Comprehension Questions:

- 8) How much is the politician's salary? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 9) How much is in the treasury total? Answer: 1250 Ksh
- 10) How much does the politician have access to, to expropriate? Answer: 375 Ksh
- 11) Can the politician expropriate none of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 12) Can the politician expropriate part of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 13) Can the politician expropriate all of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 14)

Stage 7: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds

As already mentioned, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate up to 375 Ksh from the treasury. Whatever he expropriates is subtracted from the total treasury of 1250 Ksh, and that is how much remains in the treasury at the game.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 0 = \mathbf{1250}$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 75 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 75 = \mathbf{1175}$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 150 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 150 = \mathbf{1100}$.

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-If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 250 = 1000$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 300 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 300 = 950$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 375 = 875$.

What remains in the treasury is then divided evenly among the 5 voters, and returned to them at the end of the game.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, each voter receives back $1250 / 5 = 250$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 75 Ksh, each voter receives back $1175 / 5 = 235$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 150 Ksh, each voter receives back $1100 / 5 = 220$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, each voter receives back $1000 / 5 = 200$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 300 Ksh, each voter receives back $950 / 5 = 190$.

-If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, each voter receives back $875 / 5 = 175$.

The explanatory handout you have been given shows a table that lists how much the voter will receive back from the treasury, depending on how much the politician chooses to expropriate. You can refer to this table throughout the game in considering your decision.

Stage 7: Comprehension questions

- 5) At the end of the game, how many people is the treasury divided between? Answer: 5
- 6) If the politician expropriates 0 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 7) If the politician expropriates 250 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 200 Ksh
- 8) If the politician expropriates 375 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 175 Ksh

Stage 8: Reelection process

As you already know, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate some funds from the common treasury. When they do so, voters lose funds that would otherwise have been returned to them. Voters can decide whether or not they would reelect a politician who has chosen to expropriate. I will describe what happens if a politician is **not** reelected below.

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For now, let's discuss how the reelection process works. *Remember, the politician will not be chosen until the end of the game.* Importantly, you will not know what decision the politician has made about expropriation until the end of the game. Instead, you will answer six hypothetical questions.

- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 0 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 75 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 150 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 250 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 300 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 375 Ksh?

At the end of the game, you will learn how much the politician chose to reelect, and what the reelection outcome was. Let's discuss an example. The politician chose to expropriate 76 Ksh. The voters answered as follows: would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 76 Ksh?

Voter 1	No
Voter 2	No
Voter 3	Yes
Voter 4	No
Voter 5	Yes

In all, three people voted not to reelect, and 2 voters voted to reelect. The politician who expropriated 100 Ksh is **NOT** reelected. At least 3 out of 5 "Yes" votes are required for reelection.

Remember, you do not need **every** voter to vote "Yes" in order to be reelected. Voting is done by majority. If 3 voters, 4 voters or 5 voters vote to reelect, the politician is reelected. If only less than 3 voters vote to reelect, s/he is **not** reelected. Just 3 voters voting to reelect is enough!

Stage 8: Comprehension questions

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- 8) Who decides whether or not politicians are reelected? Answer: Voters
- 9) Is a politician reelected if he receives 1 vote for reelection? Answer: No
- 10) Is a politician reelected if he receives 2 votes for reelection? Answer: No
- 11) Is a politician reelected if he receives 3 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 12) Is a politician reelected if he receives 4 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 13) Is a politician reelected if he receives 5 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 14) Will you know how much the politician actually expropriated when you answer questions about reelection? Answer: No. You will answer questions about whether or not you would reelect a politician who expropriated varying amounts.

Stage 9: Payoffs after reelection

Just as in the real world, politicians benefit from being reelected. How do they benefit? First, they are able to keep their entire salary, which was 500 Ksh. Second, they will receive a small reelection bonus. The reelection bonus is between 0 and 50 Ksh.

On the other hand, if the voters prefer not to reelect the politician, they can choose not to reelect. If the politician loses reelections, he faces two consequences. First, he loses half his salary as a fine. The salary that he walks out with is now only 250 Ksh, rather than 500 Ksh. Second, he does not receive the reelection bonus.

What happens to the voter if they do not reelect? They do not face any major penalties, but must pay 25 Ksh each as a transition fee because changing government administrations is costly. Every voter pays the transition fee.

Stage 9: Comprehension Questions

- 8) Do politicians receive a positive cash bonus if they are reelected? Answer: Yes
- 9) Does the politician receive the bonus if he is not reelected? Answer: No
- 10) How much salary does the politician receive if he is reelected? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 11) How much salary does he receive if he is **not** reelected? Answer: 200 Ksh
- 12) How much is the transition fee? Answer: 25 Ksh
- 13) Do voters pay it when they choose to reelect the politician, or when they choose not to reelect the politician? Answer: When they do not reelect
- 14) Does every voter pay the transition fee? Answer: Yes

Stage 10: Game Questions

Now that you have learned about how this election process works, we will now ask you to make a choice acting as a voter, and a choice acting as a politician. Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

Remember again that as a voter you have been endowed with 500 Ksh, of which half, or 250 Ksh must be paid into the treasury. There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of 1250 ksh. 875 Ksh of the tax revenue is protected and will be redistributed to voters at the end of the game, but 375 of the tax revenue is not protected. It can potentially be expropriated by the politician. If the politician expropriates this revenue, voters will not receive it back.

As a voter, you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of 500 Ksh, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and 50 Ksh. If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose 250 Ksh of his/her salary, and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of 25 Ksh incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this session could be chosen for payment. You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Please run the treatment, neutral_nopayment.

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*[Note to research assistants, not to be read aloud: The preceding part of the experimental session is always identical. It is extremely important that there be no discussion of or references to voter payments, **prior** to this point in the session.]*

For the second part of the game session, there are two alternate protocols (A and B). Half the experimental sessions will use protocol A, and half the experimental sessions will use protocol B. Please be careful to follow the instructions for your assigned protocol.]

Stage 11: Vote payments

Now, we are going to introduce something new into the electoral process. Some voters may receive payments in exchange for their votes. These payments do not come from the treasury; they are separate.

In addition, the choice by the voter of whether or not to reelect will always remain secret. No one can observe the vote.

Just like you will not find out whether you are the voter or the politician until the end of the game, you will not find out whether or not you have received a vote payment until the end of the game. If you do receive a payment, it will be added to your overall game earnings.

Stage 11: Comprehension questions

8) Will you find out whether you received a payment before the end of the game?

Answer: No

9) Does the payment come from the treasury?

Answer: No

10) Can others observe your vote if you receive a payment?

Answer: No. The vote is always secret.

11) Can others observe your vote if you do not receive a payment?

Answer: No. The vote is always secret.

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Stage 12A:

Please run the treatment neutral_payment_choicefirst.

Stage 12B:

Please run the treatment neutral_payment_thresholdfirst

Stage 13: Questionnaire

Exit interview:

Please conduct brief exit interviews with 4 participants in each session. The exit interviews should not take more than 5 minutes, and you can summarize each person's responses on the exit interview form.

The questions for the exit interview are as follows:

- 4) How did you decide how much to allow the politician to expropriate?
- 5) Did receiving an extra payment change your decision about how much to allow the politician to expropriate? Why did it change your decision?
- 6) When you were the politician, how did you decide how much you wanted to expropriate?

Protocol: Session E

Game parameters

Endowment per voter: 500

Paid in taxes per voter: 250

Total treasury: 1250

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Available for expropriation: 625

Politician's choices for expropriation: 0, 125, 250, 375, 500, 625

Vote payment: 50

Reelection bonus: Between 0 and 50

Transition fee: 25

Politician's salary (with reelection): 500

Politician's salary (without reelection): 250

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Preparations

Preparation before participants arrive

General preparations in computer room

- Place a consent form on each table, label it with SubjectID
- Place a note paper on each desk (1 sheet), and an explanatory handout on each desk
- Place a pen on each desk on the right hand side

Preparation once participants are in the waiting room

At the gate

- Tell respondent to stick to their placecard

In the waiting room

- Bring participants into the waiting room, ask them to sit on the chairs labelled with the number on the place card they were given at the gate.
- Explain the task:

Hello everyone! A warm welcome to the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics. I see all participants are present, thank your willingness to participate. You are about to start a study that investigates your behavior as a voter. You will get paid 50 KSH if you showed up on time, and in addition, you can earn at least 150 Ksh from the game, and possibly more. This money will be transferred to your MPESA account. We will use the phone number that you registered with this afternoon. Now, please ensure that your phones are switched off completely. We do this so that you can focus on the task. It is also important that you refrain from communicating with other participants. This also helps you to concentrate. If you talk to other people, we will have to send you home and you can't get paid.

Additionally, only touch the computers once you are instructed to do so.

If you are chewing gum, be so kind to take it out now.

Furthermore, please use the bathroom now if you need to. You will be able to step out during the session, but it will minimize interruptions if anyone who needs to uses the bathroom now. [Allow time.]

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If you have any questions during the session, please raise your hand and one of the researchers will come and talk to you.

Are everyone's phones off? We will now go to the computer room, where I will give you more information about the study. Please find the computer with the number of your placecard, and sit down. Again remember that you are not allowed to speak to each other from now on, and please wait with touching the computers until we instruct you to do so.

In the computer room

- Make participants aware of the consent form that's on their desk. "I'd now like to ask you to turn over the Declaration of Consent in front of you, read through it and sign it if you agree. If you have questions, please ask me. When you are finished, please raise your hand so that I can collect it."

At the computer

In waiting room	Welcome Explain the task (general)	Time 6 min
In the lab	Get consent 1 Test Mouse 2 Stage 1: Dictator Game 3 Stage 2: Trust Game 4 Stage 3: Ultimatum Game 5 Stage 4: Group dynamics 6 Stage 4: Test comprehension 7 Stage 5: Voter endowment and taxation 8 Stage 5: Test comprehension 9 Stage 6: Politician salary and expropriation 10 Stage 6: Test comprehension 11 Stage 7: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds 12 Stage 7: Test comprehension 13 Stage 8: Reelection process 14 Stage 8: Test comprehension 15 Stage 9: Payoffs after reelection 16 Stage 9: Test comprehension 17 Stage 10: Reelection process 18 Stage 10: Game Questions Part 1 19 Stage 11: Vote payment 20 Stage 11: Test comprehension 21 Stage 12: Game Questions Part 2 Stage 13: Questionnaire	
		min

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Get consent

Stage 1 -- Dictator Game:

This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There is only **one active role** in the task: the **offerer role**. There is also **one passive role**: the **receiver role**, and you will play each role once. The computer will randomly choose one of the tasks during this study session to base your payment on. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the offerer you will be given another KSH 100 in addition to your show-up fee. You will then be asked to choose how to share this additional KSH 100 with the receiver. **That is, you can choose any amount between zero and KSH 100 to give to the receiver.** The receiver will automatically accept whatever you offer them -- **they cannot reject your offer.** For example, if the offerer offers KSH 50 each person will get KSH 50, and if the offerer offers KSH 10 the offerer will keep KSH 90 while the receiver gets KSH 10. The receiver will also obtain a show-up fee of KSH 100.

Stage 1.1-- Offerer Decision -

Suppose you are the **Offerer**.

You have an additional KSH 100 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero and KSH 100 to the receiver. **They cannot reject your offer.** Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

Stage 1.2 Average Offer-

What is your best guess of the amount other participants will choose to send?

Please choose the amount you think most participants will send by selecting an option. You will be paid 50 KSH if you guess correctly the accuracy of answer.

Stage 2. Trust Game

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This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There are two roles in the task: **the sender role** and **the receiver role**, and you will play each role once. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the sender you will be given KSH 40 and you can choose whether to send all KSH40 or zero to the receiver. If you send all KSH 40 to the receiver, the computer will triple the payment so that the receiver will have a total of KSH 120. **If they receive KSH 120, the receiver can choose what amount KSH 0-120 to send back to the sender.**

2.3 Sender Actions

If you see on your screen that you are the sender, you have KSH 40 available to you.

You can choose to send all KSh 40 or zero to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

2.3.2 Sender Receive Back

If you sent the receiver KSH 40 how much do you expect the receiver will send back to you?

Please choose the amount you think the receiver would choose to return by selecting an option. You will be paid based on the accuracy of answer.

2.4 Receiver Role

If you see a screen that says you are the receiver, you have been randomly selected to be the receiver.

If the sender sent you KSH 40 you would have KSH 120 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero to KSH 120 back to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option.

Stage 3: Ultimatum Game

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This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There are two roles in the task: **the proposer role** and **the recipient role**, and you will play each role once. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the proposer you will be given KSH 120 and you can choose whether to send all (KSH120), half (KSH60) or zero(KSH0) to the recipient. The recipient then chooses whether to accept or reject the offer. **If the recipient rejects the offer**, both players will receive zero (KSH0).

3.1 Proposer Actions

If you see on your screen that you are the proposer, you have KSH 120 available to you.

You can choose to send all (KSH120), half (KSH60) or zero (KSH0) to the recipient. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

3.1.2 Recipient Acceptance

What do you think is the minimum acceptable offer the recipient would choose to accept?

Please choose the minimum amount you think the receiver would choose to accept by selecting an option. You will be paid based on the accuracy of answer.

3.2 Recipient Actions

If you see a screen that says you are the recipient, you have been randomly selected to be the recipient. If you reject the offer of the proposer, both you and the proposer will receive zero KSH0.

What is the minimum acceptable offer from the proposer that you would choose to accept?

Please choose the minimum acceptable amount you would accept by selecting an option.

Stage 4: Group Dynamics

In this game, you will be grouped with five other players in a group of six. You will not know who else is in your group; the assignment is anonymous. Each group of six will consist

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of five voters, and one politician. Voters and politicians have different roles in this game, and different decisions to make.

*However, you will not know while you play the game whether you are the voter or the politician. Instead, you will be asked questions about what you would do as a voter **and** what you will do as a politician. At the end of the game, we will randomly choose one person in each group to be the politician, while the other people will be voters. The decisions that you previously made in the role that is ultimately assigned to you will be used to determine the game outcome. Any one of your decisions might affect your ultimate payoff. Thus you should make all of your decisions carefully.*

Please run the treatment, intro_1_unequal endowments.

Stage 4 Comprehension Questions

- 7) How many voters are in a group? Answer: 5
- 8) How many politicians are in a group? Answer: 1
- 9) When will you find out if you are the voter or politician? *At the end of the game / At the beginning of the game*

Stage 5: Voter endowment and taxation

Each player who is a voter receives an endowment of 500 Ksh. However, they have to pay part of their endowment in taxes. Each player will pay half of their endowment, or 250 Ksh, into the game treasury as taxes. Politicians do not receive this endowment or pay taxes.

Because there are five voters and each pays 250 Ksh into the treasury, there is a total of 1250 Ksh in the treasury.

Voter 1 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 2 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 3 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 4 Endowment	250 Ksh

<u>Voter 5 Endowment</u>	<u>250 Ksh</u>
TOTAL ENDOWMENT	1250 Ksh

Stage 5 Comprehension Questions

- 9) How much is the voter's endowment? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 10) How much do they pay in taxes? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 11) Do politicians pay taxes? Answer: No
- 12) How much money total is available in the treasury? Answer: 1250 Ksh

Stage 6: Politician salary and expropriation

The player who is the politician does not receive the endowment or pay taxes. Instead, he receives a salary of 500 Ksh. He does not pay taxes.

In addition, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate part of the treasury. Recall that there is 1250 Ksh in the treasury. 625 Ksh, or 50%, is protected. The politician does not have access to it, and s/he cannot expropriate it. However, the politician does have access to the remaining 625 Ksh. S/he can choose to expropriate 0 Ksh, 125 Ksh, 250 Ksh, 375 Ksh, 500 Ksh or 625 Ksh. In other words, s/he can take none of the treasury, part of it, or all of it.

Stage 6 Comprehension Questions:

- 15) How much is the politician's salary? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 16) How much is in the treasury total? Answer: 1250 Ksh
- 17) How much does the politician have access to, to expropriate? Answer: 625 Ksh
- 18) Can the politician expropriate none of the 625 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 19) Can the politician expropriate part of the 625 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 20) Can the politician expropriate all of the 625 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes

Stage 7: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds

As already mentioned, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate up to 625 Ksh from the treasury. Whatever he expropriates is subtracted from the total treasury of 1250 Ksh, and that is how much remains in the treasury at the game.

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- If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 0 = \mathbf{1250}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 125 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 125 = \mathbf{1125}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 250 = \mathbf{1000}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 375 = \mathbf{875}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 500 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 500 = \mathbf{750}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 625 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 625 = \mathbf{625}$.

What remains in the treasury is then divided evenly among the 5 voters, and returned to them at the end of the game.

- If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1250 / 5 = 250}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 125 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1125 / 5 = 225}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1000 / 5 = 200}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{875 / 5 = 175}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 500 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{750 / 5 = 150}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 625 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{625 / 5 = 125}$.

The explanatory handout you have been given shows a table that lists how much the voter will receive back from the treasury, depending on how much the politician chooses to expropriate. You can refer to this table throughout the game in considering your decision.

Stage 7: Comprehension questions

- 9) At the end of the game, how many people is the treasury divided between? Answer: 5
- 10) If the politician expropriates 0 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 11) If the politician expropriates 250 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 200 Ksh
- 12) If the politician expropriates 625 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 125 Ksh

Stage 8: Reelection process

As you already know, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate some funds from the common treasury. When they do so, voters lose funds that would otherwise have been

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returned to them. Voters can decide whether or not they would reelect a politician who has chosen to expropriate. I will describe what happens if a politician is **not** reelected below.

For now, let's discuss how the reelection process works. *Remember, the politician will not be chosen until the end of the game.* Importantly, you will not know what decision the politician has made about expropriation until the end of the game. Instead, you will answer six hypothetical questions.

- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 0 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 125 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 250 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 375 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 500 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 625 Ksh?

At the end of the game, you will learn how much the politician chose to reelect, and what the reelection outcome was. Let's discuss an example. The politician chose to expropriate 125 Ksh. The voters answered as follows: would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 125 Ksh?

Voter 1	No
Voter 2	No
Voter 3	Yes
Voter 4	No
Voter 5	Yes

In all, three people voted not to reelect, and 2 voters voted to reelect. The politician who expropriated 125 Ksh is **NOT** reelected. At least 3 out of 5 "Yes" votes are required for reelection.

Remember, you do not need **every** voter to vote "Yes" in order to be reelected. Voting is done by majority. If 3 voters, 4 voters or 5 voters vote to reelect, the politician is

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reelected. If only less than 3 voters vote to reelect, s/he is **not** reelected. Just 3 voters voting to reelect is enough!

Stage 8: Comprehension questions

- 15) Who decides whether or not politicians are reelected? Answer: Voters
- 16) Is a politician reelected if he receives 1 vote for reelection? Answer: No
- 17) Is a politician reelected if he receives 2 votes for reelection? Answer: No
- 18) Is a politician reelected if he receives 3 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 19) Is a politician reelected if he receives 4 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 20) Is a politician reelected if he receives 5 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 21) Will you know how much the politician actually expropriated when you answer questions about reelection? Answer: No. You will answer questions about whether or not you would reelect a politician who expropriated varying amounts.

Stage 9: Payoffs after reelection

Just as in the real world, politicians benefit from being reelected. How do they benefit? First, they are able to keep their entire salary, which was 500 Ksh. Second, they will receive a small reelection bonus. The reelection bonus is between 0 and 50 Ksh.

On the other hand, if the voters prefer not to reelect the politician, they can choose not to reelect. If the politician loses reelections, he faces two consequences. First, he loses half his salary as a fine. The salary that he walks out with is now only 250 Ksh, rather than 500 Ksh. Second, he does not receive the reelection bonus.

What happens to the voter if they do not reelect? They do not face any major penalties, but must pay 25 Ksh each as a transition fee because changing government administrations is costly. Every voter pays the transition fee.

Stage 9: Comprehension Questions

- 15) Do politicians receive a positive cash bonus if they are reelected? Answer: Yes
- 16) Does the politician receive the bonus if he is not reelected? Answer: No
- 17) How much salary does the politician receive if he is reelected? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 18) How much salary does he receive if he is **not** reelected? Answer: 200 Ksh

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- 19) How much is the transition fee? Answer: 25 Ksh
- 20) Do voters pay it when they choose to reelect the politician, or when they choose not to reelect the politician? Answer: When they do not reelect
- 21) Does every voter pay the transition fee? Answer: Yes

Stage 10: Game Questions

Now that you have learned about how this election process works, we will now ask you to make a choice acting as a voter, and a choice acting as a politician. Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

Remember again that as a voter you have been endowed with 500 Ksh, of which half, or 250 Ksh must be paid into the treasury. There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of 1250 ksh. 625 Ksh of the tax revenue is protected and will be redistributed to voters at the end of the game, but 625 of the tax revenue is not protected. It can potentially be expropriated by the politician. If the politician expropriates this revenue, voters will not receive it back.

As a voter, you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of 500 Ksh, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and 50 Ksh. If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose 250 Ksh of his/her salary, and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of 25 Ksh incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this session could be chosen for payment. You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Please run the treatment, neutral_nopayment_bigpot.

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*[Note to research assistants, not to be read aloud: The preceding part of the experimental session is always identical. It is extremely important that there be no discussion of or references to voter payments, **prior** to this point in the session.]*

For the second part of the game session, there are two alternate protocols (A and B). Half the experimental sessions will use protocol A, and half the experimental sessions will use protocol B. Please be careful to follow the instructions for your assigned protocol.]

Stage 11: Vote payments

Now, we are going to introduce something new into the electoral process. All voters receive payments of 50 Ksh in exchange for their votes. These payments do not come from the treasury; they are separate.

In addition, the choice by the voter of whether or not to reelect will always remain secret. No one can observe the vote. If you are a voter, the payment will be added to your overall game earnings.

Stage 11: Comprehension questions

12) Does the payment come from the treasury?

Answer: No

13) Do all voters receive a payment?

Answer: Yes

14) Can others observe your vote?

Answer: No. The vote is always secret.

Stage 12:

Please run the treatment neutral_nopayment_bigpot.

Stage 13: Questionnaire

Exit interview:

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Please conduct brief exit interviews with 4 participants in each session. The exit interviews should not take more than 5 minutes, and you can summarize each person's responses on the exit interview form.

The questions for the exit interview are as follows:

- 7) How did you decide how much to allow the politician to expropriate?
- 8) Did receiving an extra payment change your decision about how much to allow the politician to expropriate? Why did it change your decision?
- 9) When you were the politician, how did you decide how much you wanted to expropriate?

Protocol: Session F1

Game parameters

Endowment per voter: 500 for one voter, 550 for four voters

Paid in taxes per voter: 250

Total treasury: 1250

Available for expropriation: 375

Politician's choices for expropriation: 0, 75, 150, 250, 300, 375

Vote payment: 50

Reelection bonus: Between 0 and 50

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Transition fee: 25

Politician's salary (with reelection): 500

Politician's salary (without reelection): 250

Kenya protocols

Preparations

Preparation before participants arrive

General preparations in computer room

- Place a consent form on each table, label it with SubjectID
- Place a note paper on each desk (1 sheet), and an explanatory handout on each desk
- Place a pen on each desk on the right hand side

Preparation once participants are in the waiting room

At the gate

- Tell respondent to stick to their placecard

In the waiting room

- Bring participants into the waiting room, ask them to sit on the chairs labelled with the number on the place card they were given at the gate.
- Explain the task:

Hello everyone! A warm welcome to the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics. I see all participants are present, thank your willingness to participate. You are about to start a study that investigates your behavior as a voter. You will get paid 50 KSH if you showed up on time, and in addition, you can earn at least 150 Ksh from the game, and possibly more. This money will be transferred to your MPESA account. We will use the phone number that you registered with this afternoon. Now, please ensure that your phones are switched off completely. We do this so that you can focus on the task. It is also important that you refrain from communicating with other participants. This also helps you to concentrate. If you talk to other people, we will have to send you home and you can't get paid.

Additionally, only touch the computers once you are instructed to do so.

If you are chewing gum, be so kind to take it out now.

Furthermore, please use the bathroom now if you need to. You will be able to step out during the session, but it will minimize interruptions if anyone who needs to uses the bathroom now. [Allow time.]

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If you have any questions during the session, please raise your hand and one of the researchers will come and talk to you.

Are everyone's phones off? We will now go to the computer room, where I will give you more information about the study. Please find the computer with the number of your placecard, and sit down. Again remember that you are not allowed to speak to each other from now on, and please wait with touching the computers until we instruct you to do so.

In the computer room

- Make participants aware of the consent form that's on their desk. "I'd now like to ask you to turn over the Declaration of Consent in front of you, read through it and sign it if you agree. If you have questions, please ask me. When you are finished, please raise your hand so that I can collect it."

At the computer

In waiting room	Welcome Explain the task (general)	Time 6 min
In the lab	Get consent 1 Test Mouse 2 Stage 1: Dictator Game 3 Stage 2: Trust Game 4 Stage 3: Ultimatum Game 5 Stage 4: Group dynamics 6 Stage 4: Test comprehension 7 Stage 5: Voter endowment and taxation 8 Stage 5: Test comprehension 9 Stage 6: Politician salary and expropriation 10 Stage 6: Test comprehension 11 Stage 7: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds 12 Stage 7: Test comprehension 13 Stage 8: Reelection process 14 Stage 8: Test comprehension 15 Stage 9: Payoffs after reelection 16 Stage 9: Test comprehension 17 Stage 10: Reelection process 18 Stage 10: Game Questions Part 1 19 Stage 11: Vote payment 20 Stage 11: Test comprehension 21 Stage 12: Game Questions Part 2 Stage 13: Questionnaire	
		min

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Get consent

Stage 1 -- Dictator Game:

This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There is only **one active role** in the task: the **offerer role**. There is also **one passive role**: the **receiver role**, and you will play each role once. The computer will randomly choose one of the tasks during this study session to base your payment on. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the offerer you will be given another KSH 100 in addition to your show-up fee. You will then be asked to choose how to share this additional KSH 100 with the receiver. **That is, you can choose any amount between zero and KSH 100 to give to the receiver.** The receiver will automatically accept whatever you offer them -- **they cannot reject your offer.** For example, if the offerer offers KSH 50 each person will get KSH 50, and if the offerer offers KSH 10 the offerer will keep KSH 90 while the receiver gets KSH 10. The receiver will also obtain a show-up fee of KSH 100.

Stage 1.1-- Offerer Decision -

Suppose you are the **Offerer**.

You have an additional KSH 100 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero and KSH 100 to the receiver. **They cannot reject your offer.** Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

Stage 1.2 Average Offer-

What is your best guess of the amount other participants will choose to send?

Please choose the amount you think most participants will send by selecting an option. You will be paid 50 KSH if you guess correctly the accuracy of answer.

Stage 2. Trust Game

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This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There are two roles in the task: **the sender role** and **the receiver role**, and you will play each role once. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the sender you will be given KSH 40 and you can choose whether to send all KSH40 or zero to the receiver. If you send all KSH 40 to the receiver, the computer will triple the payment so that the receiver will have a total of KSH 120. **If they receive KSH 120, the receiver can choose what amount KSH 0-120 to send back to the sender.**

2.4 Sender Actions

If you see on your screen that you are the sender, you have KSH 40 available to you.

You can choose to send all KSh 40 or zero to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

2.4.2 Sender Receive Back

If you sent the receiver KSH 40 how much do you expect the receiver will send back to you?

Please choose the amount you think the receiver would choose to return by selecting an option. You will be paid based on the accuracy of answer.

2.5 Receiver Role

If you see a screen that says you are the receiver, you have been randomly selected to be the receiver.

If the sender sent you KSH 40 you would have KSH 120 available to you.

You can choose to send any amount between zero to KSH 120 back to the receiver. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option.

Stage 3: Ultimatum Game

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This task involves decision making and interacting with another participant. However, the identity of the other participant will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. **In addition, you will not interact with the same partner more than once.**

There are two roles in the task: **the proposer role** and **the recipient role**, and you will play each role once. **It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.**

When you are the proposer you will be given KSH 120 and you can choose whether to send all (KSH120), half (KSH60) or zero(KSH0) to the recipient. The recipient then chooses whether to accept or reject the offer. **If the recipient rejects the offer**, both players will receive zero (KSH0).

3.1 Proposer Actions

If you see on your screen that you are the proposer, you have KSH 120 available to you.

You can choose to send all (KSH120), half (KSH60) or zero (KSH0) to the recipient. Please choose the amount you would like to send by selecting an option:

3.1.2 Recipient Acceptance

What do you think is the minimum acceptable offer the recipient would choose to accept?

Please choose the minimum amount you think the receiver would choose to accept by selecting an option. You will be paid based on the accuracy of answer.

3.2 Recipient Actions

If you see a screen that says you are the recipient, you have been randomly selected to be the recipient. If you reject the offer of the proposer, both you and the proposer will receive zero KSH0.

What is the minimum acceptable offer from the proposer that you would choose to accept?

Please choose the minimum acceptable amount you would accept by selecting an option.

Stage 4: Group Dynamics

In this game, you will be grouped with five other players in a group of six. You will not know who else is in your group; the assignment is anonymous. Each group of six will consist

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of five voters, and one politician. Voters and politicians have different roles in this game, and different decisions to make.

*However, you will not know while you play the game whether you are the voter or the politician. Instead, you will be asked questions about what you would do as a voter **and** what you will do as a politician. At the end of the game, we will randomly choose one person in each group to be the politician, while the other people will be voters. The decisions that you previously made in the role that is ultimately assigned to you will be used to determine the game outcome. Any one of your decisions might affect your ultimate payoff. Thus you should make all of your decisions carefully.*

Please run the treatment, intro_1_unequal endowments.

Stage 4 Comprehension Questions

- 10) How many voters are in a group? Answer: 5
- 11) How many politicians are in a group? Answer: 1
- 12) When will you find out if you are the voter or politician? *At the end of the game / At the beginning of the game*

Stage 5: Voter endowment and taxation

Four of the players who are voters receive an endowment of 550 Ksh, and one player who is a voter receives 500 Ksh. However, they all have to pay part of their endowment in taxes. Each player will pay 250 Ksh into the game treasury as taxes. Politicians do not receive this endowment or pay taxes.

Because there are five voters and each pays 250 Ksh into the treasury, there is a total of 1250 Ksh in the treasury.

Voter 1 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 2 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 3 Endowment	250 Ksh
Voter 4 Endowment	250 Ksh

<u>Voter 5 Endowment</u>	<u>250 Ksh</u>
TOTAL ENDOWMENT	1250 Ksh

Stage 5 Comprehension Questions

- 13) How many voters receive a payment of 550 Ksh? Answer: 4
- 14) How many voters receive a payment of 500 Ksh? Answer: 1
- 15) How much do all voters pay in taxes? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 16) Do politicians pay taxes? Answer: No
- 17) How much money total is available in the treasury? Answer: 1250 Ksh

Stage 6: Politician salary and expropriation

The player who is the politician does not receive the endowment or pay taxes. Instead, he receives a salary of 500 Ksh. He does not pay taxes.

In addition, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate part of the treasury. Recall that there is 1250 Ksh in the treasury. 875 Ksh, or 70%, is protected. The politician does not have access to it, and s/he cannot expropriate it. However, the politician does have access to the remaining 375 Ksh. S/he can choose to expropriate 0 Ksh, 75 Ksh, 150 Ksh, 250 Ksh, 300 Ksh or 375 Ksh. In other words, s/he can take none of the treasury, part of it, or all of it.

Stage 6 Comprehension Questions:

- 21) How much is the politician's salary? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 22) How much is in the treasury total? Answer: 1250 Ksh
- 23) How much does the politician have access to, to expropriate? Answer: 375 Ksh
- 24) Can the politician expropriate none of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 25) Can the politician expropriate part of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes
- 26) Can the politician expropriate all of the 375 Ksh, if s/he chooses to? Answer: Yes

Stage 7: Voter reimbursement of remaining funds

As already mentioned, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate up to 375 Ksh from the treasury. Whatever he expropriates is subtracted from the total treasury of 1250 Ksh, and that is how much remains in the treasury at the game.

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- If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 0 = \mathbf{1250}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 75 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 75 = \mathbf{1175}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 150 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 150 = \mathbf{1100}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 250 = \mathbf{1000}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 300 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 300 = \mathbf{950}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, what remains is $1250 - 375 = \mathbf{875}$.

What remains in the treasury is then divided evenly among the 5 voters, and returned to them at the end of the game.

- If the politician chooses to expropriate 0 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1250 / 5 = 250}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 75 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1175 / 5 = 235}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 150 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1100 / 5 = 220}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 250 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{1000 / 5 = 200}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 300 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{950 / 5 = 190}$.
- If the politician chooses to expropriate 375 Ksh, each voter receives back $\mathbf{875 / 5 = 175}$.

The explanatory handout you have been given shows a table that lists how much the voter will receive back from the treasury, depending on how much the politician chooses to expropriate. You can refer to this table throughout the game in considering your decision.

Stage 7: Comprehension questions

- 13) At the end of the game, how many people is the treasury divided between? Answer: 5
- 14) If the politician expropriates 0 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 250 Ksh
- 15) If the politician expropriates 250 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 200 Ksh
- 16) If the politician expropriates 375 Ksh, how much does each voter receive back? Consult the table in your handout to find the answer? Answer: 175 Ksh

Stage 8: Reelection process

As you already know, the politician has the opportunity to expropriate some funds from the common treasury. When they do so, voters lose funds that would otherwise have been

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returned to them. Voters can decide whether or not they would reelect a politician who has chosen to expropriate. I will describe what happens if a politician is **not** reelected below.

For now, let's discuss how the reelection process works. *Remember, the politician will not be chosen until the end of the game.* Importantly, you will not know what decision the politician has made about expropriation until the end of the game. Instead, you will answer six hypothetical questions.

- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 0 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 75 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 150 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 250 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 300 Ksh?
- Would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 375 Ksh?

At the end of the game, you will learn how much the politician chose to reelect, and what the reelection outcome was. Let's discuss an example. The politician chose to expropriate 76 Ksh. The voters answered as follows: would you vote to reelect a politician who expropriated 765 Ksh?

Voter 1	No
Voter 2	No
Voter 3	Yes
Voter 4	No
Voter 5	Yes

In all, three people voted not to reelect, and 2 voters voted to reelect. The politician who expropriated 100 Ksh is **NOT** reelected. At least 3 out of 5 "Yes" votes are required for reelection.

Remember, you do not need **every** voter to vote "Yes" in order to be reelected. Voting is done by majority. If 3 voters, 4 voters or 5 voters vote to reelect, the politician is

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reelected. If only less than 3 voters vote to reelect, s/he is **not** reelected. Just 3 voters voting to reelect is enough!

Stage 8: Comprehension questions

- 22) Who decides whether or not politicians are reelected? Answer: Voters
- 23) Is a politician reelected if he receives 1 vote for reelection? Answer: No
- 24) Is a politician reelected if he receives 2 votes for reelection? Answer: No
- 25) Is a politician reelected if he receives 3 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 26) Is a politician reelected if he receives 4 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 27) Is a politician reelected if he receives 5 votes for reelection? Answer: Yes
- 28) Will you know how much the politician actually expropriated when you answer questions about reelection? Answer: No. You will answer questions about whether or not you would reelect a politician who expropriated varying amounts.

Stage 9: Payoffs after reelection

Just as in the real world, politicians benefit from being reelected. How do they benefit? First, they are able to keep their entire salary, which was 500 Ksh. Second, they will receive a small reelection bonus. The reelection bonus is between 0 and 50 Ksh.

On the other hand, if the voters prefer not to reelect the politician, they can choose not to reelect. If the politician loses reelections, he faces two consequences. First, he loses half his salary as a fine. The salary that he walks out with is now only 250 Ksh, rather than 500 Ksh. Second, he does not receive the reelection bonus.

What happens to the voter if they do not reelect? They do not face any major penalties, but must pay 25 Ksh each as a transition fee because changing government administrations is costly. Every voter pays the transition fee.

Stage 9: Comprehension Questions

- 22) Do politicians receive a positive cash bonus if they are reelected? Answer: Yes
- 23) Does the politician receive the bonus if he is not reelected? Answer: No
- 24) How much salary does the politician receive if he is reelected? Answer: 500 Ksh
- 25) How much salary does he receive if he is **not** reelected? Answer: 200 Ksh

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26) How much is the transition fee? Answer: 25 Ksh

27) Do voters pay it when they choose to reelect the politician, or when they choose not to reelect the politician? Answer: When they do not reelect

28) Does every voter pay the transition fee? Answer: Yes

Stage 10: Game Questions

Now that you have learned about how this election process works, we will now ask you to make a choice acting as a voter, and a choice acting as a politician. Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

Remember again that four voters have been endowed with 550 Ksh, and one voter has been endowed with 500Ksh. 250 Ksh must be paid into the treasury. There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of 1250 ksh. 875 Ksh of the tax revenue is protected and will be redistributed to voters at the end of the game, but 375 of the tax revenue is not protected. It can potentially be expropriated by the politician. If the politician expropriates this revenue, voters will not receive it back.

As a voter, you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of 500 Ksh, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and 50 Ksh. If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose 250 Ksh of his/her salary, and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of 25 Ksh incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this session could be chosen for payment. You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Please run the treatment, neutral_nopayment_unequal endowments.

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*[Note to research assistants, not to be read aloud: The preceding part of the experimental session is always identical. It is extremely important that there be no discussion of or references to voter payments, **prior** to this point in the session.]*

For the second part of the game session, there are two alternate protocols (A and B). Half the experimental sessions will use protocol A, and half the experimental sessions will use protocol B. Please be careful to follow the instructions for your assigned protocol.]

Stage 11: Vote payments

Please run treatment, intro_2_unequal endowments

Now, we are going to introduce something new into the electoral process. Now, all voters have the same equal endowment of 500 Ksh. All voters receive payments in exchange for their votes. The amount of the payment is public and known to everyone. These payments do not come from the treasury; they are separate.

In addition, the choice by the voter of whether or not to reelect will always remain secret. No one can observe the vote. If you are a voter, the payment will be added to your overall game earnings.

Stage 11: Comprehension questions

15) Do all voters have an equal endowment of 500 Ksh?

Answer: Yes

16) Does the payment come from the treasury?

Answer: No

17) Do all voters receive a payment?

Answer: Yes

18) Can others observe your vote?

Answer: No. The vote is always secret.

Stage 12:

Please run the treatment all_payment.

Stage 13: Questionnaire

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Exit interview:

Please conduct brief exit interviews with 4 participants in each session. The exit interviews should not take more than 5 minutes, and you can summarize each person's responses on the exit interview form.

The questions for the exit interview are as follows:

- 10) How did you decide how much to allow the politician to expropriate?
- 11) Did receiving an extra payment change your decision about how much to allow the politician to expropriate? Why did it change your decision?
- 12) When you were the politician, how did you decide how much you wanted to expropriate?

U.S. GAME PROTOCOLS

Protocol: Session A1

Instructions

Before we move on to the first set of decision tasks, I want to review some of the key points from this game. You should understand that you will be asked to perform a number of decision tasks. You will be asked about decisions you would make as a voter, and decisions you would make as a politician. You will also be asked about decisions in a number of different election scenarios.

At the end of the game, we will select one of the scenarios that you previously answered questions about, and we will randomly choose one of you to be the politician. Everyone will then be paid based on their decisions in that scenario. Any one of your decisions could ultimately affect your payout in this game; thus you should make all your decisions carefully.

Now, let's understand the decisions that voters and politicians make. Voters have an endowment of \$20, of which \$10 is paid as taxes into the treasury. Since there are five voters, there is \$50 in the treasury, and politicians can expropriate up to \$15. Whatever is not expropriated is returned in equal amounts to the voters at the end of the game. Voters also have to pay a \$1 transition fee if they choose not to reelect the politician.

Politicians receive a \$20 salary, and can expropriate up to \$15. But, voters can punish the politician who expropriates too much by failing to reelect him/her. If the politician is **not** reelected, he loses half his salary (\$10) as a fine. If the politician is reelected, he receives a bonus between 0 and \$2.

How does the reelection process work? Each voter names a threshold of expropriation above which they would **not** reelect the politician. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would not reelect a politician who expropriated more than $x-1$, that politician loses reelection. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would reelect a politician who expropriated x , that politician wins reelection.

Consider the example shown on this slide. Three voters set their reelection threshold at 8, and 2 voters at 12. The politician expropriated \$10. Thus three voters chose **not** to reelect, because the politician expropriated too much. The politician loses!

The next slide shows the payoffs. Each voter receives the \$10 endowment, and \$8 is returned from the treasury; they lose \$1 in a transition fee, and walk out with \$17. The politician had a salary of \$20, paid \$10 in fines, and expropriated \$10. He or she walks out with \$20.

Consider what would have happened if voter 3 changed his threshold to \$12. In this case, the politician would have been reelected. The voters would have similarly received \$18, but the politician would have received \$30. Notice that one voter's choice can have a large impact on the politician's payout, and thus what the politician will choose to do.

Game round one

This part of the study consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician.

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Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50% or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

As a voter you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of \$20 and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter**.

You have been endowed with \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

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You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$10 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Game round two

This next part of the study again consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician. However, in this voting game 1 out of 5 voters will receive a payment in exchange for their vote. You will be asked for your voting decision in both cases: (i) if you receive a payment, (ii) if you do not receive a payment but know that another voter will.

Again, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician, regardless of whether you receive a payment.

The set-up is very similar to the last decision that you made. As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50%, or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

Separate to their endowment, one voter will receive a payment of \$2 in exchange for their vote. This payment does not come from the treasury.

All voters will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

Again, the politician receives a salary of \$20, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

U.S. Protocols

Press "OK when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter** and that you have received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

This payment is separate to your endowment which is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have received a \$2 payment.

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press OK when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are a **voter** but you have not received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

Your endowment is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have not received a \$2 payment but another voter has:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$15 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Game round three

U.S. Protocols

This next part of the study again consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician. However, in this voting game 4 out of 5 voters will receive a payment in exchange for their vote. You will be asked for your voting decision in both cases: (i) if you receive a payment, (ii) if you do not receive a payment but know that another voter will.

Again, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician, regardless of whether you receive a payment.

The set-up is very similar to the last decision that you made. As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50%, or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

Separate to their endowment, four voters will receive a payment of \$2 in exchange for their vote. This payment does not come from the treasury.

All voters will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

Again, the politician receives a salary of \$20, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter** and that you have received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

This payment is separate to your endowment which is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

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Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have received a \$2 payment.

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press OK when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are a **voter** but you have not received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

Your endowment is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have not received a \$2 payment but another voter has:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$15 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Protocol: Session B1

Instructions

Before we move on to the first set of decision tasks, I want to review some of the key points from this game. You should understand that you will be asked to perform a number of decision tasks. You will be asked about decisions you would make as a voter, and decisions you would make as a politician. You will also be asked about decisions in a number of different election scenarios.

At the end of the game, we will select one of the scenarios that you previously answered questions about, and we will randomly choose one of you to be the politician. Everyone will then be paid

based on their decisions in that scenario. Any one of your decisions could ultimately affect your payout in this game; thus you should make all your decisions carefully.

Now, let's understand the decisions that voters and politicians make. Voters have an endowment of \$20, of which \$10 is paid as taxes into the treasury. Since there are five voters, there is \$50 in the treasury, and politicians can expropriate up to \$15. Whatever is not expropriated is returned in equal amounts to the voters at the end of the game. Voters also have to pay a \$1 transition fee if they choose not to reelect the politician.

Politicians receive a \$20 salary, and can expropriate up to \$15. But, voters can punish the politician who expropriates too much by failing to reelect him/her. If the politician is **not** reelected, he loses half his salary (\$10) as a fine. If the politician is reelected, he receives a bonus between 0 and \$2.

How does the reelection process work? Each voter names a threshold of expropriation above which they would **not** reelect the politician. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would not reelect a politician who expropriated more than $x-1$, that politician loses reelection. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would reelect a politician who expropriated x , that politician wins reelection.

Consider the example shown on this slide. Three voters set their reelection threshold at 8, and 2 voters at 12. The politician expropriated \$10. Thus three voters chose **not** to reelect, because the politician expropriated too much. The politician loses!

The next slide shows the payoffs. Each voter receives the \$10 endowment, and \$8 is returned from the treasury; they lose \$1 in a transition fee, and walk out with \$17. The politician had a salary of \$20, paid \$10 in fines, and expropriated \$10. He or she walks out with \$20.

Consider what would have happened if voter 3 changed his threshold to \$12. In this case, the politician would have been reelected. The voters would have similarly received \$18, but the politician would have received \$30. Notice that one voter's choice can have a large impact on the politician's payout, and thus what the politician will choose to do.

Game round one

This part of the study consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician

Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50% or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

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As a voter you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of \$20 and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter**.

You have been endowed with \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$10 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Game round two

This next part of the study again consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician. However, in this voting game 1 out of 5 voters will receive a gift in exchange

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for their vote. You will be asked for your voting decision in both cases: (i) if you receive a gift, (ii) if you do not receive a gift but know that another voter will.

Again, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician, regardless of whether you receive a gift.

The set-up is very similar to the last decision that you made. As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50%, or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

Separate to their endowment, one voter will receive a gift of \$2 in exchange for their vote. This gift does not come from the treasury.

All voters will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

Again, the politician receives a salary of \$20, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter** and that you have received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

This gift is separate to your endowment which is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have received a \$2 gift.

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(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press OK when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are a **voter** but you have not received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

Your endowment is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have not received a \$2 gift but another voter has:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$15 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Game round three

This next part of the study again consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician. However, in this voting game 4 out of 5 voters will receive a gift in exchange for their vote. You will be asked for your voting decision in both cases: (i) if you receive a gift, (ii) if you do not receive a gift but know that another voter will.

Again, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician, regardless of whether you receive a gift.

The set-up is very similar to the last decision that you made. As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50%, or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

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Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

Separate to their endowment, four voters will receive a gift of \$2 in exchange for their vote. This gift does not come from the treasury.

All voters will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

Again, the politician receives a salary of \$20, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter** and that you have received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

This gift is separate to your endowment which is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have received a \$2 gift.

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press OK when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are a **voter** but you have not received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

Your endowment is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

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Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have not received a \$2 gift but another voter has:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$15 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Protocol: Session C1

Instructions

Before we move on to the first set of decision tasks, I want to review some of the key points from this game. You should understand that you will be asked to perform a number of decision tasks. You will be asked about decisions you would make as a voter, and decisions you would make as a politician. You will also be asked about decisions in a number of different election scenarios.

At the end of the game, we will select one of the scenarios that you previously answered questions about, and we will randomly choose one of you to be the politician. Everyone will then be paid based on their decisions in that scenario. Any one of your decisions could ultimately affect your payout in this game; thus you should make all your decisions carefully.

Now, let's understand the decisions that voters and politicians make. Voters have an endowment of \$20, of which \$10 is paid as taxes into the treasury. Since there are five voters, there is \$50 in the treasury, and politicians can expropriate up to \$15. Whatever is not expropriated is returned in equal amounts to the voters at the end of the game. Voters also have to pay a \$1 transition fee if they choose not to reelect the politician.

Politicians receive a \$20 salary, and can expropriate up to \$15. But, voters can punish the politician who expropriates too much by failing to reelect him/her. If the politician is **not** reelected, he loses half his salary (\$10) as a fine. If the politician is reelected, he receives a bonus between 0 and \$2.

How does the reelection process work? Each voter names a threshold of expropriation above which they would **not** reelect the politician. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the

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5 voters stated they would not reelect a politician who expropriated more than $x-1$, that politician loses reelection. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would reelect a politician who expropriated x , that politician wins reelection.

Consider the example shown on this slide. Three voters set their reelection threshold at 8, and 2 voters at 12. The politician expropriated \$10. Thus three voters chose **not** to reelect, because the politician expropriated too much. The politician loses!

The next slide shows the payoffs. Each voter receives the \$10 endowment, and \$8 is returned from the treasury; they lose \$1 in a transition fee, and walk out with \$17. The politician had a salary of \$20, paid \$10 in fines, and expropriated \$10. He or she walks out with \$20.

Consider what would have happened if voter 3 changed his threshold to \$12. In this case, the politician would have been reelected. The voters would have similarly received \$18, but the politician would have received \$30. Notice that one voter's choice can have a large impact on the politician's payout, and thus what the politician will choose to do.

Game round one

This part of the study consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician

Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50% or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

As a voter you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of \$20 and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

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Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter**.

You have been endowed with \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$10 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Game round two

This next part of the study again consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician.

Again, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician, regardless of whether you receive a payment.

The set-up is very similar to the last decision that you made. As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50%, or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

Separate to their endowment, some voters may receive payments in exchange for their votes. These payments do not come from the treasury.

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All voters will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

Again, the politician receives a salary of \$20, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter**. The politician has decided to send you \$2 in exchange for your vote. The other voters do not know about this payment.

This payment is separate to your endowment which is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

[NOTE: IN 50% OF SESSIONS, THE ORDER OF THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS (REELECTION THRESHOLD CONDITIONAL ON PAYMENT AND UNCONDITIONAL ON PAYMENT) WAS REVERSED.]

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have received a \$2 payment.

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press OK when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you can choose whether to accept or reject the \$2 the politician sent you. Would you like to accept the payment?

Suppose you are a **voter** but you have not received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

Your endowment is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

U.S. Protocols

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have not received a \$2 payment but another voter has:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$15 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Game round three

This next part of the study again consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician. However, in this voting game all voters will receive a payment in exchange for their vote.

Again, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician, regardless of whether you receive a payment.

The set-up is very similar to the last decision that you made. As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50%, or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

Separate to their endowment, each voter will receive a payment of \$2 in exchange for their vote. This payment does not come from the treasury.

All voters will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

Again, the politician receives a salary of \$20, and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

U.S. Protocols

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter** and that you and the other voters have received \$2 in exchange for your vote.

This payment is separate to your endowment which is still \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her, given that you have received a \$2 payment.

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press OK when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$15 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician:

(Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.)

Do you think you will be reelected?

Protocol: Session D1

Instructions

U.S. Protocols

Before we move on to the first set of decision tasks, I want to review some of the key points from this game. You should understand that you will be asked to perform a number of decision tasks. You will be asked about decisions you would make as a voter, and decisions you would make as a politician. You will also be asked about decisions in a number of different election scenarios.

At the end of the game, we will select one of the scenarios that you previously answered questions about, and we will randomly choose one of you to be the politician. Everyone will then be paid based on their decisions in that scenario. Any one of your decisions could ultimately affect your payout in this game; thus you should make all your decisions carefully.

Now, let's understand the decisions that voters and politicians make. Voters have an endowment of \$20, of which \$10 is paid as taxes into the treasury. Since there are five voters, there is \$50 in the treasury, and politicians can expropriate up to \$15. Whatever is not expropriated is returned in equal amounts to the voters at the end of the game. Voters also have to pay a \$1 transition fee if they choose not to reelect the politician.

Politicians receive a \$20 salary, and can expropriate up to \$15. But, voters can punish the politician who expropriates too much by failing to reelect him/her. If the politician is **not** reelected, he loses half his salary (\$10) as a fine. If the politician is reelected, he receives a bonus between 0 and \$2.

How does the reelection process work? Each voter names a threshold of expropriation above which they would **not** reelect the politician. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would not reelect a politician who expropriated more than $x-1$, that politician loses reelection. If the politician expropriates x , and at least 3 out of the 5 voters stated they would reelect a politician who expropriated x , that politician wins reelection.

Consider the example shown on this slide. Three voters set their reelection threshold at 8, and 2 voters at 12. The politician expropriated \$10. Thus three voters chose **not** to reelect, because the politician expropriated too much. The politician loses!

The next slide shows the payoffs. Each voter receives the \$10 endowment, and \$8 is returned from the treasury; they lose \$1 in a transition fee, and walk out with \$17. The politician had a salary of \$20, paid \$10 in fines, and expropriated \$10. He or she walks out with \$20.

Consider what would have happened if voter 3 changed his threshold to \$12. In this case, the politician would have been reelected. The voters would have similarly received \$18, but the politician would have received \$30. Notice that one voter's choice can have a large impact on the politician's payout, and thus what the politician will choose to do.

Game round one

This part of the study consists of a single voting decision that you make, and a choice you make as a politician

Thus, this task involves decision making and interacting with other participants. However, the identity of the other participants will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. Similarly, how you choose to vote will be kept secret from other voters and the politician.

As a voter you have been endowed with \$20, of which 50% or \$10 must be paid in taxes to the treasury.

U.S. Protocols

There are 5 voters in total, and so the treasury consists of \$50, \$10 from each voter. \$35 of the tax revenue is protected and will be used for services that benefit each voter equally, but \$15 of the tax revenue cannot be protected, and can potentially be expropriated by the politician.

Thus \$35 is protected and will be re-distributed to voters at the end of the game, while \$15 in the treasury is open to expropriation.

As a voter you will choose whether or not to re-elect the politician based on how much s/he expropriates.

The politician receives a salary of \$20 and has the option to expropriate funds from the treasury. If the politician is reelected, he obtains a reelection bonus between 0 and \$2.

If the politician is not reelected because a majority of the voters chose not to reelect him/her based on the amount s/he expropriated, the politician will lose \$10 of their salary and s/he will not get the reelection bonus. There also will be a transition fee of \$2 incurred by each of the voters.

In the next few screens we will ask for your voting decision and your choice as a politician. It is important that you think very carefully about your choices, since any of your decisions during this study session could be chosen for payment.}

You will only find out about the behavior of the politician and the election outcome at the end of the experiment.

Press "OK" when you are ready to continue, or raise your hand if you have any questions.

Suppose you are a **voter**.

You have been endowed with \$20, of which \$10 must be paid as taxes to the treasury.

As there are 5 voters there is \$50 in the treasury, of which \$35 is protected from expropriation. The other \$15 is open to expropriation by the politician. There will be a transition fee of \$2 for each voter if the politician is not reelected.

Please enter the maximum amount you would allow the politician to expropriate and still re-elect him/her:

Enter the amount (to the nearest integer), and then press "OK" when you are ready to continue.

Do you think the politician will expropriate more or less than this amount?

Do you think the politician will be reelected?

Suppose you are the **politician**.

You have a salary of \$20, and you can expropriate up to \$10 from the treasury. If you are not reelected because a majority of the voters choose not to reelect you based on the amount you expropriate, you will lose \$10 of your salary and you will not get the reelection bonus, worth between 0 and \$2.

Please choose the amount you would expropriate as the politician: