

Hume, EHU sect. 4:

All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect* (p. 16.5). . . . I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *a priori*; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. (p. 17.3)

Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, sect. 30:

Hence, if the pure concepts of the understanding try to go beyond objects of experience and be referred to things in themselves (*noumena*), they have no meaning whatever. They serve, as it were, only to spell out appearances, so that we may be able to read them as experience. . . . This complete solution of the Humean problem rescues the *a priori* origin of the pure concepts of the understanding and the validity of the general laws of nature as laws of the understanding, in such a way that their use is limited only to experience, because their possibility has its ground merely in the relation of the understanding to experience, however, not in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them, a completely reversed kind of connection which never occurred to Hume.