

1. Pre-Established Harmony between Mind & Body [A, D33, M78-81]: Why?
 - materialism inconceivable [M17—the “mill argument”]
 - interaction inconceivable [D33, A]
 - interactionism and esp. occasionalism ugly; p-eh “the most beautiful and the most worthy” way [A]
2. Idealism
 - simple substances: how we know there are such things (M2), and 3 consequences of their simplicity: not physical objects (3), come into and pass out of existence only by creation/annihilation (4-6), don’t interact with one another (7)
 - Why simple substances are mind-like monads, not bodies [M1-14, esp. 1-3, 12-14, C]
 - types of monads: souls vs. “bare monads” [M19, M24 and between; D34-35]: souls have distinct perceptions accompanied by memory, bare monads in a state of “stupor”
3. Status of Bodies
 - “result from” monads and are “well-founded phenomena” [B, C]
 - picture
 - represent the physical universe by representing one’s own body [M62, D33]
 - real bodies, common bodies [D14 (2nd par.), G]
4. Pre-Established Harmony among Monads [D13-14, M56-57]
 - Why? In M1-11 (esp. 1, 7, 11), it seems to be concluded from their simplicity
 - Why?: From PCP, D8
 - Why? Speculation: Hard to understand minds interacting w/o going through bodies, and m/b interaction has been ruled out
5. God and the “Best of all Possible Worlds” – “most perfect world” [D-F, D6 (esp. last par.)]
 - Since God is perfect, this is the best of all possible worlds [D1-3]
 - In what ways best?
 - metaphysical perfection and moral perfection [E]
 - happiness of minds [D5: end of 2nd par.]
 - world “at the same time simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena” [D6: last par.; cf. D]
 - Really?!! [D3:1st par, D5:1st par., F]
6. Freedom & Necessity: Leibniz’s Compatibilism
 - Compatibilism of freedom and determinism: Key Question: Is one’s acting freely compatible with one’s being causally determined to act as one does by things over which one has no control? Yes: Compatibilism; No: Incompatibilism
 - Incompatibilism + sometimes we act freely -> Libertarianism, the view that fuels the typical Free Will Defense from the Problem of Evil: in short: Not even an omnipotent being can determine another agent to freely do something; so, to get the great goods of created agents freely doing good (esp. where their doing so is very consequential), even God must take a risk that they will go wrong. Evil results in cases where this risk is does not pay off.

--But Leibniz, being a compatibilist, needs another defense, and is the father of “the best of all possible worlds defense”: in short: God is allowed to create the BPW; but the BPW contains evils; so God is allowed to allow evils.

--important to his defense of the BPW defense is an account of how evils can be “defeated” to use a 20th Century term for this Leibnizian idea that sometimes a bad part can be integrated into a larger good state of affairs in such a way that that larger state of affairs is better than it would have been if it had not contained that evil part. (Marilyn McCord Adams use of that idea). I think “defeat-based” replies to the problem of evil (of which the BPW defense is just one instance) can be seen as one of the two great types of defense in Western theism (the other being the FWD)

--Leibniz’s account of freedom as consisting in:

1. Intelligence: understanding your options
2. Spontaneity: the source of the action comes from within the agent, who is not influenced by another creature [D30: 3rd sentence] (Note the difference here between what is within oneself vs. what one has no control over)
3. Contingency: Your course of action is not absolutely necessary (necessary in itself), though it can be hypothetically necessary. (Hypothetical upon what?)

Other courses of action are possible (in what sense?) in themselves:

D13: 4th par.: Your doing what you do is hypothetical on God freely (though it was certain They would do this) choosing to create this, the BPW; and it is possible that other actions should have been taken (if not by you, then by some close counterpart) in that in other possible worlds that were among God’s options, other actions are taken

--Key to Leibniz’s defense of his account is the distinction between certainty and necessity, and his Edwards-like appeal to the idea that “everyone” has to agree that what we do is certain [D13, 1st par.: “Everyone grants...”]

7. Super-Essentialism?

--“otherwise it would not be this man” [D30:3rd par.] suggests some strong form of essentialism. (Relevance to the problem of evil

--some passages suggest that not all properties are essential: G, H

--an attractive reading: Perceptual Essentialism: Each monad’s complete history of perceptions is essential to it.

8. Skepticism about whether bodies are Real: L relies on God’s goodness [H, toward end], but his reply to the problem of evil [D3: 1st par., F] causes trouble here.

Chisholm's mind/body cartoons for Phil. 126

INTERACTIONISM

Descartes
Locke
Reid



MATERIALISM

Hobbes




IDEALISM

Berkeley
Leibniz



OCCASIONALISM

Malbranche



PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY

Leibniz



RMC