

Thomas Reid 2 (expanded version) and Huemer**3. The Epistemology of Perception**

- a. Innocent-Until-Proven-Guilty Epistemology & Reid's Initial Reply to Skepticism: 23.2-23.3
 -the approach seems to be: One is justified in holding a natural belief—one that is the natural output of a natural faculty—unless one has reason for thinking it is, or may well be false. Key terms: “natural” “may well be”: can't let the latter get too weak
- b. Reid's Response to the “Thorough and Consistent Sceptic”: 16.4, 3.9-4.1, 23.6
 -best understood as defined by their initial stance: “I will / you should accept no belief unless you have good reason for thinking it's true / the faculty that produces it is reliable. And what counts as a ‘good reason’? Nothing that is not antecedently acceptable by the above criterion.”
 -But here the initial stance obvious guarantees where you end up: nowhere. If you treat all your beliefs/faculties as guilty-until-proven-innocent, you will not only start out, but also end up, taking them all to be guilty, since there can be no “proving” of anything with no allowable starting points for your proofs.
 -“nothing to say” except: 1. Psychologically impossible; 2. Self-referentially incoherent: accepting it is unjustified by its own lights; so, 3. Can't have anything to (coherently) say against non-skeptics
- c. Reid's Response to the “Semi-Sceptic” (16.4, 23.3, 23.6) and his “Addition to the Sceptical System” (16.2-16.3)
 -initial stance: accept some faculties (in the case of the “ideal philosophers,” Reason and Reflection) as i-u-pg; all others are g-u-p-i: not justified in accepting their deliverances without good reasons (presumably coming from the favored i-u-p-g faculties)
 -Reid's main charge here is arbitrary partiality
 -but also psychological impossibility: may not apply if we're only talking about philosophical acceptance
- d. Putting it together: 3 options on our initial stance
- e. Reid's Influence on Late 20th Century Religious Epistemology

4. Response to Hume on Induction - omitted**Huemer****1. “Phenomenal Conservatism”: Huemer's and the Real Thing**

- Huemer's: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. (p. 30.5)
- A “more thorough-going” PC: appearances are where all our justification comes from: see 3H, bottom paragraph of p. 25, and see n. 31, on the bottoms of pp. 25-26 for remarks on Huemer's relation to this more exciting PC

2. The Nature of Seemings/Appearances

- H: “I take statements of the form ‘it seems to S that p’ or ‘it appears to S that p’ to describe a kind of propositional attitude, different from belief, of which sensory experience, apparent memory, intuition, and apparent introspective awareness are species. This type of mental state may be termed an ‘appearance’.” (p. 30.7)
 -another important appearance verb: looks
- H: Appearances are not beliefs: CPC 30.9-31.2; nor dispositions or inclinations to form beliefs: CPC 31.3-31.8
- But see 3H, first paragraph of n. 36 (on p. 28) for a response to Huemer's argument
- And see 3H, p. 27 thru the top paragraph of p. 29 (including n. 36, and especially that note's last sentence) for a view on which appearance claims do report inclinations to belief