**Phil. 270/570, 3/26: Conservatism, Part 4: Siegel Meets Pluralism about Epistemic Justification**

1. Broad Dogmatism

We’re not yet interested in Narrow Dogmatism, which involves an answer to the question “How do we know that we’re not BIVs (or more generally: that global skeptical hypotheses are false)?

We’ll understand Broad Dogmatism as at the bottom of C3, adding a couple of things to Siegel’s description at S, p. 208t. In basic terms, it ascribes immediate justification to perceptual beliefs about the external world, and it holds that this immediate justification is not defeated in normal circumstances by such weak thoughts as that one might be in skeptical scenario.

Dogmatism is widely considered an “internalist” view

2. Pluralism about Epistemic Justification

This is the view suggested by the Srinivasan passage that was attached to C1

3. The Nature of Siegel’s “attack on [broad] dogmatism”

See esp. section 5, starting at S, p. 219. The “challenge” she presents affects many views. For all we can tell here, Siegel may herself favor [broad] dogmatism, thinking it can meet the challenge.

4. How the Pluralist views the attempt to meet the challenge, as that appears at S, p. 220b

Well, basically as a “false choice” as in C2. With that in mind we look at….

5. Siegel’s treatment of “Angry-looking Jack”

One thing to note: Since we’re stipulating that Jill held an unjustified belief that Jack was angry before the experience in question, it looks like there is plenty of room for the conservative/broad dogmatist to hold that this is in some good ways a non-innocent belief (to use the Wolterstorff-like terminology), and so in some good senses, Jill’s belief is not “elevated.”

[A look ahead to Narrow Dogmatism?]