**Phil. 270/570, 2/28: Conservatism, Part 2: Conservatism, Justification, and False Choices**

1. Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.

The real thing: 3H, p. 25, incl. fn. 30

2. The nature of seemings/appearances (3H, pp. 27-28, including the note)

3. Scope of the presumption: Reid and the natural, the non-inferred?, Wolterstorff and the really innocent, non-culpably-revised? Huemer and the carefully considered (pp. 36-37). Or how about limiting it to judgments based on/arrived at by “acquaintance” (see H, p. 44)?

3. False choices! (look at pages from Amia)

Well, some choices here can be downright wrong (like that last one), I suppose, from the conservative’s pov

4. The Real Enemy: Evidentialism

Conservatism vs. evidentialism on how we know we’re not BIVs

The nature of the battle, from different angles

5. The propositionality of evidence (look at pages from Tim):

all fundamental evidence is propositional (Compare: the fundamental relata in causation are events)

6. Getting to the bottom of things: regress argument