**Philosophy 450/650 / EP&E 478: The Problem of Evil**  Nov. 14

Plantinga, “Self-Profile”, pp. 33-55 (added to course files on Canvas): 41, 50 on the intuitive (not Plantinga’s term) “free will defense”

MMA

298.7 (e.g.): compossibility

301.9: can’t find the Plantinga

302.1: “'love of individual created persons”. Well, alright, but all of them?

303.8: give up on “each and every person”?

Love vs. “insure an overwhelmingly good life to”: My impression is that there is a pronounced trend in recent apologetics to divide these, and go universalist on the former but not the latter. And it is the former that seems the better candidate for being an “essential commitment” of the faith

304.0: answer: makes life a “bad bet”

305: “the inaccessibility of reasons-why”; “our inability even to conceive of plausible candidate reasons” (rest of the page puts this on “type (iii)” steroids. The question at .4: does this “make belief in such a God positively irrational?”

305-6: negative answer defended: reassurance

307.2: “engulfing” horrors may be enough? – “engulf” seems to mean: overbalance by a lot (see around 299.6)

Despite MMA’s eschewing of *why*s, I think that the reason an account of how God might defeat horrors is more satisfying/helpful than an account of how God might overbalance, or even engulf, them is that the former speaks more directly to part of the *why* of it all. *How-overbalance* immediately opens itself up to: “Well, then, why not just skip right to the good stuff?!” *How-defeat* cuts that off.

Update: But even how-overbalance to some extent speaks to the *why* of it. This is a matter of degree.