**Phil. 114 4/6/2016**

-William Rowe’s fawn, and the problem of animal pain

-neo-Cartesianism: Michael Murray, *Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering*, 2008

-full-on Trentism: Trent Dougherty, *The Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy For All Creatures Great And Small*, 2014

-reviewed by John Schneider here: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/54898-the-problem-of-animal-pain-a-theodicy-for-all-creatures-great-and-small/

-I’m hoping for something in between!

-From “Why Take a Stance on God?” [http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/why-take-a-stance-on-god/]:

**G.G.**: How about an argument against God’s existence?

**K.D.**: I’m going to have to be conventional here and go with the usual suspect: the argument from evil. Without getting into any details, you can feel the force of the argument by choosing a suitably horrific example (the Holocaust, children dying of cancer) that leads you to say, “There’s no way a perfectly good God would have allowed that!” There is a huge, often fascinating, discussion that tries to refute such arguments. But I find this intuitively powerful case does stand up to scrutiny, at the very least to the extent that someone could reasonably accept it at the end of the day. I suspect that even God thinks there is something wrong with you if you are not at least tempted by such an argument from evil.

-for more on sensitivity, and particularly the “SCA”: “Subjunctive Conditionals Account” of why it seems to us we don’t know some propositions, see sects. 5-8 (pp. 17-27) of my “Solving the Skeptical Problem” [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2186011]. I employ the “flipping” strategy (not using that term for it) at pp. 24-5, concluding: “Again and again, SCA posits a certain block to our judging that we know, and the changes that would clear the way for our judging that we know also remove this block. This makes it difficult not to believe that SCA is at least roughly correct.”

**Phil. 114 4/4/2016 Wykstra – just reprininting for convenience**

-Rowe’s Main Argument (p.74.8):

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

3. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

-This is a “deductive” argument; the “inductive” or “evidential” element comes in at the defense of premise 1.

-Rowe: “there does not appear to be any outweighing good such that the prevention of the fawn’s suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse” (quoted by Wystra at p. 77.3)

-Wystra on Rowe’s use of “does not appear”

-means “appears that not”, rather than “it’s not the case that it appears” (see p. 82.9-83.1), so Rowe is not giving an “argument from ignorance”

-using it in the “epistemic sense”: pp. 80.0-.9

-the “seems so, is so” presumption (83.2) can be applied to it

-Wykstra’s response: the evidence of the evils in question does not even weakly support atheism (& does not even weakly disconfirm theism), where weak vs. strong is used as at the bottom of p. 77, because Rowe is not entitled to his “does not appear” claim, because that claim runs afoul of:

-CORNEA:

On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim “It appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. (85.2)

-Wykstra’s examples supporting CORNEA (p. 84.7), and some helpful additions to them

-Wykstra’s application of CORNEA to Rowe’s claim (87.8-89.6):

-applies to appearance claims about particular instances of suffering

-claim that Rowe’s appearance claim violates CORNEA based on the great disparity between the “vision and wisdom” of God vs. us. What are the chances that we would discern the God-justifying purpose for the evil if there were one? Not great, Wykstra claims.

-But Wykstra’s application can be questioned.

-Rowe responds that Wystra’s application is based on an expansion of standard theism, that includes claims to the effect that the God-justifying goods will occur later. Without that, it’s reasonable to suppose that if the God-justifying goods had already occurred, we’d have noticed.

-Perhaps more important: If Rowe uses an appearance claim directly about premise 1, rather than by focusing on a particular evil [or perhaps also by applying it to a particular evil in a different way?], he can make a good case for his claim passing the CORNEA test, for he can claim that it’s reasonable to suppose that if there were God-justifiers for all evils, there wouldn’t be so many really awful ones.

Müller-Lyer illusion:

