**Phil. 114 3/30/2016** – after the class: what was on the board

The Threat: Our choices are all just completely the result/upshot of unthinking/stupid little physical events, whether deterministic or not, over which we have no control

Possible Responses:

Nihilism: incompatibilism (of scientiphicalism and freedom/meaning) + scientiphicalism (so, no freedom/meaning

Compatibilism (of S & f/m)

Libertarianism: incompatibilism (of S & f/m) + fm (so a denial of S)

Eliminative Physicalism: there are no mental things & events

Reductive Physicalism: mental things & events are [reducible to / nothing over and above] physical things and events

Eliminative Idealism: there are no physical things & events

Reductive Idealism: physical things & events are [reducible to / nothing over and above] physical things and events

**Phil. 114 4/4/2016 Wykstra**

-Rowe’s Main Argument (p.74.8):

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

3. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

-This is a “deductive” argument; the “inductive” or “evidential” element comes in at the defense of premise 1.

-Rowe: “there does not appear to be any outweighing good such that the prevention of the fawn’s suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse” (quoted by Wystra at p. 77.3)

-Wystra on Rowe’s use of “does not appear”

-means “appears that not”, rather than “it’s not the case that it appears” (see p. 82.9-83.1), so Rowe is not giving an “argument from ignorance”

-using it in the “epistemic sense”: pp. 80.0-.9

-the “seems so, is so” presumption (83.2) can be applied to it

-Wykstra’s response: the evidence of the evils in question does not even weakly support atheism (& does not even weakly disconfirm theism), where weak vs. strong is used as at the bottom of p. 77, because Rowe is not entitled to his “does not appear” claim, because that claim runs afoul of:

-CORNEA:

On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim “It appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. (85.2)

-Wykstra’s examples supporting CORNEA (p. 84.7), and some helpful additions to them

-Wykstra’s application of CORNEA to Rowe’s claim (87.8-89.6):

-applies to appearance claims about particular instances of suffering

-claim that Rowe’s appearance claim violates CORNEA based on the great disparity between the “vision and wisdom” of God vs. us. What are the chances that we would discern the God-justifying purpose for the evil if there were one? Not great, Wykstra claims.

-But Wykstra’s application can be questioned.

-Rowe responds that Wystra’s application is based on an expansion of standard theism, that includes claims to the effect that the God-justifying goods will occur later. Without that, it’s reasonable to suppose that if the God-justifying goods had already occurred, we’d have noticed.

-Perhaps more important: If Rowe uses an appearance claim directly about premise 1, rather than by focusing on a particular evil [or perhaps also by applying it to a particular evil in a different way?], he can make a good case for his claim passing the CORNEA test, for he can claim that it’s reasonable to suppose that if there were God-justifiers for all evils, there wouldn’t be so many really awful ones.

Müller-Lyer illusion:

