

Accountability and Inclusion in Customary Institutions

Online Appendices

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1 Appendix A: Historical Background on Village Heads in Zimbabwe

In this appendix, we provide historical background on the position of village heads (referred to as village chiefs for clarity in the paper). Village heads are the lowest level of traditional authority in Zimbabwe, with more than 24,000 village heads estimated to exist across Zimbabwe at the time of this study (Zamchiya 2011, 1103). As the lowest level of the traditional hierarchy, they typically fall within the jurisdiction of both a headman and a chief, of which there are considerably fewer; at the time of this study, there were 271 chiefs and approximately 400 headmen across Zimbabwe (Zamchiya 2011, 1103). We review state policy toward traditional leaders more broadly, but give particular attention to the position of village heads over time, focusing especially on village heads in Shona areas.

The power of traditional leaders was dramatically changed during the colonial period in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Settlement patterns were violently disrupted following the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which allocated only 30 percent of land to Africans. Traditional leaders had their powers reduced, but were simultaneously expected to mediate between the colonial administration and populations they ruled via indirect rule. Village heads played an important role in colonial taxing and policing, in addition to continuing to allocate land to household heads who settled in the village and settle disputes among villagers (Kriger 1992, 65).

In the late colonial period, the colonial administration attempted to reduce the role of traditional leaders vis-a-vis the colonial bureaucracy; one example was the short-lived Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. In 1965, the white-minority government of Ian Smith issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain. This administration returned to a strategy of trying to cooperate with chiefs, headmen and village heads (Spierenburg 2004, 103-104).

At the same time, two competing nationalist movements – the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) – formed armed wings to fight an independence war against the white-minority government. The interactions between traditional authorities and guerrillas during the independence war has been an area of active academic debate. A few chiefs and headmen were “conspicuous collaborators” of the Smith administration, undermining their legitimacy (Alexander 1996, 149). A significant number of chiefs and headmen were killed by guerrillas (Ranger 1985, 203). At the

village level, traditional power structures were more frequently disrupted in subtle ways; Kriger describes how women and youth, who typically had limited power in traditional village governance structures, gained new status as a result of playing supporting roles for the armed struggle as cooks and messengers (Kriger 1992). Traditional leaders did not, in general, suffer insurmountable decreases in legitimacy during the war (Bourdillon 1987, Alexander 1996). At the village level, male village heads and elders tended to reestablish their power at the end of the war (Lan 1985, 212-213; Kriger 1992).

Following independence in 1980, the ZANU-led government took steps to try to reduce the power of traditional chiefs. Authority over communal land was vested in the president, and the government tried to reduce the judicial influence of chief's and headmen's courts by setting up alternative courts. These initiatives had limited success; for example, traditional leaders were often elected to run the new courts (Alexander 1996, 146).

In the early 1980s, the Zimbabwean government also tried to reduce the influence of village-level traditional leaders. It set up 6-member elected village-level development committees – VIDCOs – which were intended to reduce the power of village heads, and push forward legal and agricultural reforms. Two of the six members of VIDCOs were supposed to be chosen by civil society organizations to represent women and youths (Munro 1998, 243). However, in most rural communities, the government proved unable to reduce the power of village heads (Alexander 1996, 187). The report of the Rukuni Commission on land tenure, published in 1994, concluded that village heads remained much more powerful than VIDCOs and continued to perform wide-ranging functions (Ncube 2011, 94). Another study from this time period noted that where VIDCOs were successful, it was because they served as advisers to, rather than rivals, to the village head (Munro 1998, 270).

Traditional chiefs in Zimbabwe enjoyed a resurgence in their power after 1990. In 1992, civil jurisdiction was restored to chiefs on all matters except land issues. The Traditional Leaders Act (1998) further strengthened traditional chiefs. For example, the act gave chiefs new responsibility over the appointment of village heads in resettlement villages, which had been ruled by village chairmen – elected by ZANU-PF members in some villages, but by all adults in the village in others – in the 1980s and 1990s (Kinsey 2004, 135). The act also put village heads in charge of VIDCOs.

Similarly, since the mid-1990s, the government has recognized the critical role that village heads con-

tinue to play in village governance. Village heads have official recognition and receive small salaries of \$25 per month from the state. They have official duties per Zimbabwean law, including collecting levies and taxes, maintaining an up-to-date population register, allocating land and settling disputes. There are regulations regarding the procedures by which they are supposed to make decisions and how they treat villagers. However, village heads continue to have much more de facto power than they do under the law, and they frequently do not follow regulated procedures. Indeed, many village heads have retained a measure of independence from both formal legal regulations and informal partisan pressures to support Zimbabwe's ruling party, ZANU-PF; village heads are much more divided in their political loyalties than higher level traditional leaders, who have been more thoroughly co-opted by state patronage.¹

2 Appendix B: Comparing Village Chiefs in Zimbabwe and Neighboring Countries

Our study is confined to one region of rural Zimbabwe and a proper test of the external validity of our findings awaits future research. In this section, we compare the position of village heads in our sample to those of community-level leaders in rural Zambia, rural Malawi, and urban Malawi using data collected and shared by the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) at the University of Gothenburg.² We show similarities in the selection, governance and authority of community-level leaders across these four samples, and we demonstrate the importance of advisory councils across all four settings, suggesting *the possibility of making governance more inclusive through diversification of advisers.*

¹An underground pro-democracy organization in Zimbabwe, Sokwanele, attempted to collect comprehensive information on the political affiliations of traditional leaders in three constituencies in Manicaland that experienced violence during the 2008 elections. In their sample, 89 percent of higher level traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) were ZANU-PF supporters, 0 percent were MDC supporters, with the remaining 11 percent considered politically "neutral"; in contrast, 69 percent of village heads were ZANU-PF supporters and 31 percent were MDC supporters. See Sokwanele (2011). When we asked the village heads in our survey an open-ended question about whether they felt close to any "masangano", a Shona term for organization that connotes both political and non-political organizations, 44 percent of village heads in our sample said that they felt close to ZANU-PF, 13 percent said that they felt close to an opposition party and 43 percent did not offer a political response, either because they did not feel politically affiliated or because they self-censored in response to the question.

²We are grateful to Ellen Lust for sharing this data with us. The statistics presented in this appendix are not part of our replication files.

The GLD survey of community authorities was conducted in 2019 and 2020 in Zambia and Malawi. The rural samples are concentrated along the border between Malawi and Zambia, also extending along the countries' northern borders with Tanzania; in these samples, the survey interviewed village-level leaders. The urban sample in Malawi is based around Lilongwe and interviewed neighborhood leaders. These surveys provide the most comparable data to our own survey of village heads in Zimbabwe of which we are aware.

We provide statistics on the community leaders and their relationships to advisers in Table B.1. As in our study, the community heads in Zambia and Malawi tended to be men. On average, these leaders had ruled for more than a decade. In all samples, the vast majority had inherited their position from within the ruling family of the village/neighborhood, with a smaller number appointed by (higher level) traditional chiefs. Only very rarely were these leaders chosen in elections with open nominations in which the entire community could participate. In Zimbabwe and Malawi, a significant portion of these community-level leaders receive allowances from the government, but the monetary value of these allowances is very small in both countries; in Zambia, village-level leaders are not entitled to allowances.³

Across all four samples, most community-level leaders have advisory councils. In Zimbabwe and Malawi, the vast majority of community-level leaders have advisory councils. In the Zambian sample, only 60 percent of village-level chiefs have advisory councils, which reflects the very small size of some of the Zambian communities; *all* Zambian villages of 100 households or more have an advisory council. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, advisory councils have an average of 7 members; they are considerably smaller in Malawi, with an average of 3 members. In all samples, the councils that exist are active; the vast majority meet at least monthly, with the frequency of meetings particularly high in Zimbabwe and rural Malawi.

Across the four samples, there are also striking similarities in the power of the community-level chiefs. Our study particularly emphasized outcomes related to dispute management and the distribution of relief assistance, and our survey confirms these are two of village heads most important roles in Zimbabwe. In the first column in Table B.2, we show the results from questions that asked village heads whether they had engaged in various activities in the past 12 months. The vast majority of village heads were actively involved

³In Zimbabwe, stipends were set at \$ 25/month for village heads at the time of our survey. In Malawi, stipends for village chiefs are set at less than \$ 5/month.

Table B.1: Comparing Community-Level Traditional Institutions in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rural Malawi and Urban Malawi

	(1) Zimbabwe	(2) Zambia	(3) Rural Malawi	(4) Urban Malawi
Median Community Size	129	34	66	62
Female Leader	0.069	0.102	0.131	0.116
Years in Power	14.1	12.1	14.1	13.1
Inherited Position	0.858	0.820	0.928	0.926
Appointed by Chief	0.105	0.078	0.033	0.033
Elected by Community	0.036	0.102	0.039	0.041
Receive Allowance (Govt)	0.684	0.073	0.547	0.504
Advisory Council	0.943	0.609	0.914	0.802
Av. Size of Council	6.81	7.46	3.21	2.95
Meet Every Month	0.946	0.705	0.860	0.804

Table presents averages from our surveys of Zimbabwean village heads as compared to surveys of village heads in Zambia, Rural Malawi and Urban Malawi conducted by GLD. The surveys asked very comparable questions about each variable included above.

in dispute resolution, the distribution of assistance/relief, and the organization of communal labor for public goods. A smaller proportion of village heads were involved in land distribution/adjudication during this time period.

The GLD survey did not collect comparable data, but did ask community-level leaders to indicate their three most important roles in the community. In Table B.2, we indicate the proportion that indicated that a particular activity was one of their most important roles, as well as providing the aggregate rank ordering of activities for each sample. In all three GLD samples, the vast majority of leaders indicate dispute resolution as one of their most important roles. There was greater variation in the importance of relief distribution; it was the second most frequently mentioned role in rural Malawi, but only the fifth most frequently mentioned role in Zambia (behind dispute resolution, land allocation, organizing communal labor and communicating community needs to the government).

Table B.2: Comparing Powers of Village Heads in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rural Malawi and Urban Malawi

	(1) Zimbabwe	(2) Zambia	(3) Rural Malawi	(4) Urban Malawi
Dispute Resolution	0.745	0.828 (1)	0.797 (1)	0.789 (1)
Land Allocation	0.373	0.219 (2)	0.192 (6)	0.102 (7)
Assistance/Relief	0.802	0.148 (5)	0.317 (2)	0.240 (4)
Communal Labor	0.858	0.203 (3)	0.219 (4)	0.331 (3)

The data from the survey of village chiefs (heads) in Zimbabwe indicates whether the village chief reported doing an activity in the past year. The data from other settings indicate whether an activity is considered among the 3 most important roles the community head plays. As a result, the proportions in column (1) are not comparable to the proportions in subsequent columns. Columns (2)-(4) show aggregate rankings of activities' importance in parentheses.

3 Appendix C: Dimensions of Bias in Traditional Decision-Making

In Table C.1, we draw on data from our household survey to provide further evidence on the dimensions of bias in representation in traditional political institutions. In Table 1 in the paper, we show that traditional advisers have demographic attributes that suggest their interests are more aligned with village chiefs than other civil society leaders' interests are. In particular, traditional advisers are more likely to be male, to have families who lived in the village at the time they were born and to have ZANU-PF signs than other civil society leaders. In Table C.1, we draw on our household survey data, in which some respondents self-reported that they were members of the village traditional council. Table C.1 shows that men, respondents whose families lived in the village at the time of their birth, and respondents with similar political views to the village chief are also over-represented on village councils using this data. We also find evidence of over-representation of the village chief's family (a pattern that was not as evident in Table 1).

Having established a *deficit in representation in village-level traditional councils* for women, more recent migrants to the village, respondents who are unrelated to the village chief and adults whose political views differ from the village chief, we next turn to examining whether these biases result in these four groups being *disadvantaged in decision-making outcomes* within the village. Specifically, within our control vil-

lages, we consider whether these four groups receive less food aid, believe less of the village chief’s court’s decisions to be fair, and say they are less likely to take disputes to the village chief’s court in Table C.2. We find no evidence that women are disadvantaged on these metrics (in fact, they are more likely to report receiving food aid than men), and we do not observe substantively large or statistically significant differences in outcomes between respondents who were born in the village and those who were not. Respondents who are not from the same family as the village head are significantly less likely to view their decisions as fair. But the largest gaps in outcomes are between respondents who share the same political views as the village chief and respondents who have different political views from the village chief. This is consistent with ethnographic studies emphasizing the salience of political divisions in Zimbabwean villages (Ncube 2011, Mutopo 2014). Together with the results of Table 1 in the main paper, this motivates our focus on the reduction of bias on this dimension in our main analysis.

Table C.1: Comparing Self-Reported Traditional Council Members to Other Adults

	Traditional Council Member (1)	Other Adults (2)
Female	0.235 (0.426)	0.531 (0.499)
Age (Years)	52.74 (16.41)	42.04 (17.36)
Finished Primary Education	0.784 (0.413)	0.813 (0.390)
Cattle Wealth	2.007 (2.014)	1.815 (2.739)
Born Village	0.664 (0.474)	0.464 (0.499)
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief	0.371 (0.486)	0.333 (0.472)
Related to Village Chief	0.688 (0.466)	0.512 (0.500)
Different Political View from Village Chief	0.219 (0.417)	0.306 (0.461)

Notes: Table reports means with standard deviations below in parentheses. The mean in column 1 aggregates data from 116 traditional court members and the means in column 2 aggregate data from 969 other household members in the control villages.

Table C.2: Dimensions of Bias in Traditional Political Institutions

<i>Panel A.</i>	Different Political View from VC	Same Political View as VC	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.420 (0.024)	0.466 (0.036)	0.046 (0.043)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.439 (0.023)	0.634 (0.036)	0.196 (0.043)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.396 (0.025)	0.472 (0.032)	0.076 (0.042)
<i>Panel B.</i>	Not born in village	Born in village	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.360 (0.021)	0.393 (0.020)	0.033 (0.030)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.595 (0.021)	0.607 (0.021)	0.012 (0.030)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.431 (0.022)	0.477 (0.022)	0.046 (0.031)
<i>Panel C.</i>	Non-related	Related	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.360 (0.021)	0.385 (0.022)	0.025 (0.030)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.550 (0.021)	0.643 (0.023)	0.093 (0.031)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.431 (0.022)	0.470 (0.022)	0.039 (0.031)
<i>Panel D.</i>	Female	Male	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.405 (0.021)	0.346 (0.021)	-0.059 (0.030)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.602 (0.021)	0.602 (0.021)	0.000 (0.030)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.441 (0.021)	0.469 (0.023)	0.028 (0.031)

Notes: The first two columns report means with standard errors below in parentheses. The third column reports the differences between column two and column three, with the standard error of the difference reported in parentheses below. Only control villages are included in the calculations.

4 Appendix D: Civil Society Leaders in Rural Zimbabwe and Neighboring Counties

We conceive of *civil society* as associations among citizens that are wider than family units and that are not explicitly part of government; in the context of this study, this means that they are associations that are not explicitly affiliated with either traditional institutions or political parties. As Posner notes, in developing countries, these associations often look more like service providers than watchdogs, and both types of associations can serve the purpose of building trust and bonds between individuals (Posner 2004). Although civil society in rural Africa is sometimes characterized as weak, Zimbabwean villages encompass a wide range of community groups organized around service provision.

For the purposes of our study, we consider *civil society leaders* as individuals with influence within villages by virtue of their position in this type of community group and/or their leadership of this type of communal activity. We argue that the inclusion of these leaders in deliberations with the village chief can broaden the social groups considered in village-level decision-making insofar as (a) these leaders are from social groups who are underrepresented among existing advisers *or* (b) these leaders' service-provision activities tie their interests to social groups who are underrepresented among existing advisers.

For our study, we developed a list of civil society leaders who met the criteria above and who were likely to exist in large numbers of study villages. We did this in conjunction with the two NGOs who were implementing the study, listing the following types of civil society leaders as eligible for inclusion in the training: religious leaders, farmers' group leaders, village health workers, care group leaders or other development group leader. We emphasize that this is a context-specific list and we would likely have developed a different list in a different context. Leaders of party organizations were excluded, and individuals who were already advisers to the village chief were also supposed to be excluded. Not all of these leaders existed in all villages, and – if more than one existed – the village chief had leeway to choose which one to invite.

In this appendix, we describe how the activities of these civil society leaders within their communities put them in potential positions to represent the interests and opinions of different social groups. We also show that the list of leaders we developed compares well to the list of influential people named in a survey of

villagers conducted by the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) in neighboring Zambia and Malawi. In the subsequent appendix, we provide details on the demographics of these leaders and how their descriptive attributes give representation to new social groups.

Religious leaders: The vast majority of our study villages had a religious group leader residing in the village (almost 95 %). Most commonly these religious leaders were associated with an Apostolic church, with almost half of adult respondents in our study identifying as Apostolic. Apostolic church leaders frequently have tense relationships with traditional leaders, sometimes refusing to acknowledge their authority. Methodist, Anglican and Pentecostal group leaders were also well represented in the study areas. More than two thirds of the religious leaders in the study area were male, with under-representation of female leaders concentrated in Apostolic churches. Religious leaders typically provide a wide range of counseling to their congregations and are well-informed of their congregants' situations.

Village health workers: The vast majority of villages also had village health workers residing in them (almost 95 %). In this setting, village health workers are *volunteers* chosen in a village meeting to lead educational and advocacy efforts related to health, including making referrals to health facilities. It is volunteer, rather than a salaried, position that is held by women in a majority of villages (Gore et al. 2015). As volunteer service providers, village health workers have a broad sense of the health needs of the village, and they frequently organize community meetings as part of their work. They provide particular support for social groups with higher health care needs, for example younger women in need of pre- and post-natal care.

Leaders of caregiver groups: Many villages also had volunteer caregivers (more than 80 %). Caregiver groups support households with members who require palliative care (or, in some instances, child care), providing counseling, nursing and support with household chores. The vast majority of these caregivers are women, sometimes organized through a church, sometimes through another association. The activities of these leaders provides them with intimate knowledge of the situation of the community's most vulnerable members.

Farmers' group leaders: Many villages had farmers' groups leaders residing in them (more than 80 %). Farmers groups provide opportunities for members to exchange information and, in some instances, get access to agricultural extension support through the group. Farmers' groups typically include both men and women, including at leadership levels. Almost all of the households in the study rely in part for farming for their income, making the agricultural situation a near universal concern.

Leaders of other development groups: Leaders of other development groups were less commonly part of our study. Some villages included parent-teacher associations or other groups associated with particular development projects.

The set of civil society leaders that exist in rural Zimbabwe are specific to this setting, but they suggest that individuals who lead volunteer service provision groups can have significant influence within civil society in weak states. Indeed, the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) took a more decentralized approach to creating a list of local leaders within villages in Malawi and Zambia, asking household members to indicate (up to 5) "influential people" living in their village. We categorize the listed leaders in Table D.1, showing that leaders of service provision groups were frequently mentioned in both rural Malawi and rural Zambia.⁴

The most frequently mentioned leaders in both settings were traditional leaders. Some of the remaining leaders were also part of "political society" rather than "civil society", including government representatives, party leaders and traditional advisers. Among leaders belonging to "civil society", the sets of leaders mentioned are broadly similar to those identified in rural Zimbabwe – religious leaders, leaders of farming groups, and then leaders of other service-related groups, whether in the field of education, health, security, caregiving or funerals/burial. The data from the GLD surveys suggest that rural Zimbabwe is not unique in having an active group of civil society leaders who could bring new information and opinions into traditional decision-making.

⁴We thank Ellen Lust for sharing this data. This table is not included in our replication files.

Table D.1: Influential People in Villages in Malawi and Zambia

	(1) Malawi	(2) Zambia
Government representatives	0.055	0.160
Party members	0.007	0.002
Traditional leaders	0.300	0.460
Traditional advisers	0.048	0.077
Business persons	0.084	0.018
Civil society leaders	0.506	0.283
Religious	0.204	0.101
Farming	0.158	0.056
Education	0.071	0.045
Health	0.032	0.049
Security	0.065	0.017
Caregiving	0.017	0.004
Women's Group	0.007	0.019
Funerals/Burial	0.005	0.002

Notes: The table presents proportions from the GLD HH survey conducted in Malawi and Zambia. The proportions represent the proportion of all named leaders (row 1-6) and all civil society leaders (row 7-14).

5 Appendix E: Selected Civil Society Leaders

In the first two columns of Table E.1, we compare attributes of the civil society leaders who were eligible to be selected for inclusion in the workshops (as determined from our random sample of civil society leaders across the study villages) and the civil society leaders who were selected for inclusion (measured using data collected during the workshops). As noted in the paper, almost one quarter of village chiefs did not comply with the instruction to bring a civil society leader who was not already an existing traditional adviser. They also rarely brought religious leaders, which we attribute to the fact that religious leaders and traditional chiefs compete for authority over *sacred matters* within villages, instead preferring leaders of development-focused groups. Other than the already noted propensity of chiefs to bring existing traditional advisers, we find no evidence that village chiefs selected civil society leaders to maintain existing demographic biases in traditional institutions. We find no evidence that civil society leaders were selected on the basis of gender. In addition, village chiefs *avoided* choosing members of their patrilinear family, selecting them to attend the workshops *less often* than we would expect by chance. We were not able to record the political leanings of the civil society leaders who attended the workshops, but the last two findings suggest that the intervention had success, on average, in diversifying the attributes of leaders interacting with the village chief and possibly advising them.

In the third and fourth columns of Table E1, we provide statistics on the gender and relationship of existing traditional advisers and household members in the study villages. Comparing column 1 and column 3, we see that the selected civil society leaders were more likely to be female and less likely to be related to the chief than existing traditional advisers.

Table E.1: Comparing Selected and Eligible Civil Society Leaders

	(1) Selected Leaders	(2) Eligible Leaders	(3) Existing Advisers	(4) Other Adults
Traditional Adviser	0.270	0.000	1.000	
Caregiver Group Leader	0.206	0.143	0.000	
Farmer's Group Leader	0.048	0.128	0.000	
Religious Leader	0.063	0.260	0.000	
Village Health Worker	0.301	0.250	0.000	
Other Leaders	0.112	0.219	0.000	
Female	0.540	0.582	0.344	0.540
Family Member (Patrilineal)	0.111	0.287	0.287	0.252

Notes: Column 1 presents proportions from data collected from the 63 CLs who actually attended the training. Column 2 presents proportions from our random sample of 196 CLs eligible to attend the training in these villages. Column 3 presents proportions from our sample of 61 traditional advisers. Column 4 presents proportions from our household survey.

6 Appendix F: Balance Statistics

Table F.1: Balance Statistics

Variable	Workshop (1)	No Workshop (2)	p-value (3)	VC & CL (4)	VC Only (5)	p-value (6)
<i>Panel A. Village Characteristics</i>						
Communal Land	0.706	0.712	0.917	0.691	0.719	0.742
No. HHs	162.647	171.279	0.608	180.750	147.938	0.185
No. Community Groups	4.466	4.081	0.076	4.593	4.355	0.429
<i>Panel B. VH Characteristics</i>						
Female VC	0.050	0.086	0.272	0.055	0.047	0.850
VC Finished Primary Ed.	0.655	0.717	0.304	0.655	0.656	0.985
Age of VC	64.697	63.512	0.557	64.164	65.156	0.735
Tenure of VC	14.768	13.496	0.461	15.545	14.145	0.592
VC Born Village	0.765	0.805	0.446	0.709	0.813	0.188
Cattle Wealth (Log) of VC	1.101	1.049	0.606	1.245	0.977	0.081
VC with ZANU-PF Sign	0.277	0.315	0.520	0.273	0.281	0.918
<i>Panel C. HH survey respondent characteristics</i>						
Female	0.513	0.500	0.074	0.504	0.521	0.129
Finished Primary Education	0.804	0.810	0.720	0.812	0.796	0.509
Age (Years)	42.592	43.188	0.493	41.545	43.580	0.116
Born Village	0.470	0.486	0.494	0.461	0.478	0.603
Wage Labor	0.306	0.302	0.870	0.309	0.304	0.879
Related to Village Chief	0.505	0.530	0.411	0.507	0.504	0.943
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief	0.339	0.337	0.947	0.340	0.338	0.945
Cattle Wealth (Log)	0.784	0.741	0.300	0.756	0.811	0.356
Different Political View from Village Chief	0.273	0.297	0.409	0.270	0.275	0.897

Notes: Table reports means in each group. p-values (two-sided) are calculated from OLS regressions of the variable on the treatment of interest, with standard errors clustered by village for household-level data.

7 Appendix G: Outcome Measurement and Empirical Specifications

Table G.1: Outcome Measure Construction

Index	Measurement	Scale	Data Source
Inclusive Decision-making Index	Standardized index measuring decision-making inclusiveness (consultation of resource management council, consultation of women's council, % women on court, no court fees, court records are public)	z-score (mean=0, s.d. = 1)	VH Survey and CL Survey
Impartiality Index	Average of two dichotomous variables: Whether received food aid if had different political views from VC Whether perceived most court decisions to be fair if had different political views from VC	0-1 0/1 0/1	HH Survey
Legitimacy Index	Standardized index measuring evaluations of VH (trustworthiness, relationship quality) and compliance with VH (perceptions of disposition to obey within village, compliance with VH's court)	z-score (mean=0, s.d.=1)	HH Survey
Problem Management Index	Average of two dichotomous variables Whether respondents' food needs met (i.e. could meet needs with crops grown or received aid) Whether respondents' land and livestock/crop problems managed (i.e. no disputes or disputes resolved satisfactorily)	0-1 0/1 0/1	HH Survey

The precise wording of the questions used to construct these measures is indicated below:

- Village Chief Survey

- D18B: Now I would like to know what institutions exist in this village to help the village head with your governing: Council of Women? Does it exist? (Yes/No) How many times per month do you consult with it? (Number) Recoded 0/1 based on whether consulted at least once per month or not, with 0 indicating either that the council did not exist or that it existed but was not consulted at least once per month.
- D18C: Now I would like to know what institutions exist in this village to help the village head with your governing: Resource Management Committees? Does it exist? (Yes/No) How many times per month do you consult with it? (Number) Recoded 0/1 based on whether consulted at least once per month or not, with 0 indicating either that the committee did not exist or that it existed but was not consulted at least once per month.
- D19: How many men and how many women are on your dare? (Number) Recoded to proportion women on dare.
- D23: What is the fee for bringing a case before the village dare? (Number). Recoded 0/1 to whether charge a fee or not.
- D24: Are written records of the decisions made by the dare publicly available? (Yes/No)

- Household Survey

- C15: Do you think most, some or none of the outcomes from taking disputes to the village head are fair? (Most, some, none) Recoded to most vs. some/none, as specified in PAP.
- D23A: In the past 12 months, have you received assistance: Maize food aid (Yes/No)
- C1: # of times you or someone in your household has experienced a boundary dispute in the past 12 months? (Number). Was the issue resolved to your satisfaction? (Yes/No/Pending). Recoded to whether any dispute not satisfactorily resolved or still pending.
- C2: # of times you or someone in your household has experienced a dispute about crop destruction by livestock in the past 12 months? (Number) Was the issue resolved to your satisfaction?

- (Yes/No/Pending). Recoded to whether any dispute not satisfactorily resolved or still pending.
- A21: In the last twelve months, did you harvest enough food to feed your family without buying food on the market? (Yes/No) Recoded 0/1 to whether or not had enough food to feed family after harvest. The measure of *food security* indicates proportion of people who had enough food to feed family via harvest OR food aid receipt (see D23A above).
 - D9: For the following people, can you trust them to do the right thing always, sometimes, rarely or never? (Always, sometimes, rarely, never)
 - D18: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is very good and 0 is very bad, how good is the village head's relationship with you? (0-10)
 - D20: Most people in this village are influenced by the village head's opinions. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
 - C2B: If you could not resolve this problem a dispute about crop destruction by livestock by yourselves, who did you take it to first? [If you were to experience this dispute who would you take it to first?] (Friends, Family member, Village head, Headman, Chief, Magistrate's Court, Police, Church, Local Councilor, Other) Recoded 0/1 as whether said they would take it to the VH first or not.
 - D20new. My own political views are very similar to those of my village head. (Strong agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). Recoded 0/1, taking a value of 1 if they disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.

8 Appendix H: Tabular Presentation of Results

Table H.1: Effects on Village Chief’s Decision-Making Processes

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.000 (1.000)	0.106 (0.157)	0.581 (0.168)	0.475 (0.194)	247

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table H.2: Effects on Village Chief’s Decision-Making Outcomes

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
Impartiality Index	0.426 (0.333)	0.013 (0.044)	0.132 (0.049)	0.120 (0.059)	366
Problem Management Index	0.689 (0.317)	0.032 (0.020)	0.033 (0.018)	0.000 (0.022)	2,151
Legitimacy Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.070 (0.061)	0.048 (0.057)	0.118 (0.067)	2,154

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table H.3: Effects on Decision-Making Outcomes By Issue Area

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
Impartiality Index	0.426 (0.333)	0.013 (0.044)	0.132 (0.049)	0.120 (0.059)	366
Received Food Aid	0.420 (0.495)	0.011 (0.065)	0.145 (0.078)	0.134 (0.089)	363
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.439 (0.498)	0.009 (0.071)	0.114 (0.060)	0.105 (0.076)	360
Problem Management Index	0.689 (0.317)	0.032 (0.020)	0.033 (0.018)	0.000 (0.022)	2,151
Food Secure	0.480 (0.500)	0.071 (0.033)	0.047 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.038)	2,136
No Disputes Unresolved	0.947 (0.224)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.017 (0.011)	0.032 (0.014)	1,913

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table H.4: Effects on Village Chief's Decision-Making Outcomes

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
<i>Panel A. VC Likely to Pick New Civil Society Leader</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.660 (0.235)	-0.009 (0.037)	0.090 (0.041)	0.099 (0.047)	204
VC's Attitudes Index	2.869 (0.398)	-0.035 (0.068)	0.041 (0.075)	0.076 (0.086)	205
Inclusive Decision-making Index	-0.025 (1.015)	0.035 (0.179)	0.690 (0.198)	0.654 (0.228)	205
Impartiality Index	0.443 (0.337)	-0.050 (0.050)	0.166 (0.058)	0.216 (0.066)	277
Legitimacy Index	0.016 (0.996)	-0.074 (0.076)	0.004 (0.072)	0.079 (0.091)	1,635
<i>Panel B. VC Likely to Pick Existing Adviser</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.690 (0.183)	0.011 (0.093)	0.017 (0.082)	0.006 (0.095)	39
VC's Attitudes Index	2.756 (0.427)	0.513 (0.262)	0.331 (0.211)	-0.182 (0.267)	40
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.257 (0.860)	0.587 (0.600)	0.076 (0.483)	-0.511 (0.611)	40
Impartiality Index	0.455 (0.305)	0.167 (0.094)	-0.168 (0.151)	-0.335 (0.178)	47
Legitimacy Index	0.061 (0.976)	-0.260 (0.206)	0.048 (0.242)	0.308 (0.219)	320

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

9 Appendix I: Robustness of Measurement Strategies

9.1 Alternative Measures of Inclusive Decision-Making

Table I.1: Effects on Village Chief’s Decision-Making Processes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.000 (1.000)	0.106 (0.157)	0.581 (0.168)	0.475 (0.194)	247
Proportion of Women on VC’s Council	0.262 (0.190)	0.025 (0.028)	0.053 (0.030)	0.028 (0.034)	236
Consultation of Women’s Council	0.226 (0.420)	-0.069 (0.066)	0.151 (0.072)	0.220 (0.082)	238
Consultation of Resource Management Committee	0.389 (0.489)	0.169 (0.077)	0.179 (0.082)	0.010 (0.095)	241
Transparency of Records	0.645 (0.480)	-0.102 (0.071)	0.006 (0.076)	0.108 (0.088)	239
Free Access/No Fees	0.336 (0.474)	0.058 (0.075)	0.160 (0.080)	0.102 (0.092)	233

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

In Table I1, we show the treatment effects on each component of our inclusive decision-making index. The table shows consistent positive effects of the second arm of the intervention on each component of the index (column 3). The differential effect of arm of the intervention that included a civil society leader is also consistently positive, with the largest differential effects on the consultation of the women’s council, the transparency of court records and the charging of fees (column 4). We note that changes in consultation with the women’s council and resource management committee typically involve (re)activating these institutions, rather than simply initiating consultation; in our control villages, there are no instances in which the village chief acknowledged the existence of a women’s council without also saying that they consulted it at least once per month, and there are only 3 instances (2 % of cases) in which the village chief noted the existence of a resource management committee without also saying that they consulted it at least once per month.

In Table I2, we show the results on our inclusive decision-making index constructed using responses to identical questions posed to village-level civil society leaders in our survey of them. Note that the inter-

viewed civil society leader is only very rarely the trained civil society leader (less than one fifth of cases in this treatment arm) and so this measure should *not* be subject to significant social desirability bias. In response to the suggestion of a reviewer, we also show that the results are similar if we use construct an alternative measure of consultation that focuses more specifically on the diversity of chiefs’ advisers: the village chief’s advisers based on the proportion of women on the chief’s court, the proportion of respondents not from the chief’s clan (totem in Zimbabwe) on the chief’s court⁵, the chief’s consultation of a women’s council and the chief’s consultation of a resource management committee. The second row of the table shows that we get very similar results using this measure of consultation.

Table I.2: Alternative Measures of Inclusive Decision-Making

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
Inclusive Decision-Making Index, CL Survey	0.000 (1.000)	-0.022 (0.156)	0.284 (0.156)	0.306 (0.182)	257
Diversity of Advisers’ Index	0.000 (1.000)	0.183 (0.155)	0.563 (0.165)	0.380 (0.191)	247

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

⁵This is the only component of the new index that is not part of our original index

9.2 Measurement of Legitimacy

Table I.3: Effects on Village Chief’s Legitimacy

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legitimacy Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.070 (0.061)	0.048 (0.057)	0.118 (0.067)	2,154
Trust in VC	3.547 (0.728)	-0.047 (0.042)	0.037 (0.043)	0.085 (0.049)	2,130
Relationship with VC	8.153 (2.127)	-0.288 (0.138)	-0.085 (0.122)	0.202 (0.152)	1,975
Perceptions of VC’s Influence	3.186 (0.817)	0.015 (0.046)	0.050 (0.044)	0.034 (0.051)	2,114
Whether Would Take Dispute to VC First	0.726 (0.446)	0.005 (0.029)	0.020 (0.025)	0.015 (0.032)	2,150

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

9.3 Measurement of Political Views

We identify the group of respondents with different political views from the village chief using a survey question on our (endline) household survey. At the time of our study, partisan affiliations in Zimbabwe were a highly salient identity, with strong cleavages between supporters of the long-ruling governing party, ZANU-PF, and its challenger, the MDC. The previous national election in 2008 had been fiercely and violently contested, entrenching strong partisan divisions within society and ultimately forcing the creation of a unity government. Individuals’ partisan identities were generally well-known within villages (only 6 % of respondents did not know how similar their political views were to their village chiefs), and we expect they were durable over the course of our study. As a result, we think it implausible that the treatment could have changed responses to this question.

In Table I4, we provide empirical support for this claim. In the first model, we include only the village chief treatment and the civil society leader treatment. Neither treatment affects the likelihood of respondents reporting different political views from their village chief, and an F-test shows we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two effects are jointly equal to 0. In the second model, we interact the village chief treatment and

the civil society leader treatment with a list of fixed demographic characteristics of respondents and their households. (The demographic characteristics were also included in the model but are excluded from the table for reasons of space.) Neither the straight treatment effects nor any of their interactions are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, and an F-test indicates we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effects and their interactions are jointly equal to 0.

Table I.4: Whether Respondents Report Different Political Views From VC

	Dependent Variable: Different Political View from Village Chief	
	(1)	(2)
Effect of Workshop on VC	-0.021 (0.032)	-0.211 (0.182)
Effect of CL	-0.005 (0.041)	0.179 (0.207)
Female × VC		0.128 (0.067)
Female × CL		-0.086 (0.089)
Finished Primary Education × VC		0.053 (0.098)
Finished Primary Education × CL		-0.144 (0.116)
Born Village × VC		-0.016 (0.071)
Born Village × CL		0.047 (0.090)
Wage Labor × VC		0.025 (0.076)
Wage Labor × CL		0.108 (0.092)
Related to Village Chief × VC		0.037 (0.063)
Related to Village Chief × CL		-0.025 (0.076)
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief × VC		-0.046 (0.077)
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief × CL		0.009 (0.082)
Age (Years) × VC		0.002 (0.002)
Age (Years) × CL		-0.003 (0.003)
Cattle Wealth (Log) × VC		0.005 (0.048)
Cattle Wealth (Log) × CL		0.091 (0.063)
Observations	1285	994
P-value from F-test	0.343	0.252

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models. Standard errors in parentheses below.

10 Appendix J: Model of Village Chief’s Propensity to Bring a New Civil Society Leader

In our subgroup analysis, we examine whether the effects of civil society leader inclusion are larger for the types of village chiefs who have a propensity to bring a new civil society leader with them to the training (rather than an existing adviser). We do not know what type of civil society leader the village chief would have invited in cases in which the village chief was not assigned to this arm of the treatment. Instead, we developed a logit model to predict the village chief’s selection of an existing adviser (vs. a new civil society leader, as instructed). We began by choosing theoretically motivated explanatory variables – indicators of wealth, education and parochialism – modeling the effect of these variables on the likelihood of village chiefs assigned to the civil society leader treatment arm bringing an existing leader. As demonstrated in Table J1, this simple model correctly classifies 93 percent of cases assigned to the civil society leader arm of the treatment. We then used this model to predict whether village chiefs would have selected an existing adviser or a new leader if assigned to this arm of the treatment, and use these predicted outcomes to distinguish between village chiefs predicted to select existing advisers and village chiefs predicted to select new civil society leaders.

Table J.1: Village Chief’s Likelihood of Selecting An Existing Adviser

	Dependent Variable: Existing Adviser
	(1)
VC’s No. Vehicles	3.908 (1.540)
VC’s Income from Non-farm Sources	2.660 (1.382)
VC Finished Primary Ed.	-3.833 (1.742)
VC Born in Village	3.062 (1.120)
Constant	-7.609 (2.483)
Observations	55
PCC (0.35 cutoff)	92.727

Notes: Coefficients from logit model. Standard errors in parentheses below.

We subsequently compared the variables in this model to those selected from a longer list of demographic and community-level variables using the cross-validated lasso method, and we found that the same four variables were selected. (The variables that were not selected were the age and gender of the village chief, the village chief’s cattle wealth, the number of years the village chief had been in power and the number of civil society groups in the village.)

11 Appendix K: Auxiliary Evidence on Mechanism

Our theory of how civil society leaders can influence traditional governance through consultation and deliberation in advisory councils differs from many existing treatments of civil society leaders' role in creating accountability. One set of theories views civil society leaders as serving as "fire alarms" that activate top-down punishment (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984); another set of theories views them as organizers of the broader citizenry, activating bottom-up pressure (Popkin 1979). In contrast, we emphasize the importance of direct deliberation between civil society leaders and traditional chiefs. In this appendix, we draw on auxiliary quantitative data to show that the changes in the behavior of village chiefs were unlikely to be caused by top-down or bottom-up pressure.

In the top panel of Table K1, we consider whether top-down pressure on village chiefs increased as a result of training civil society leaders, drawing on evidence from the village chief survey. We find no evidence that village chiefs said they were more constrained by higher level government as a result of the training of a civil society leader. In the middle panel of the table, we consider whether bottom-up pressure on village chiefs increased as a result of training civil society leaders, drawing on evidence from the household survey. We find no evidence that citizens' expectations of the village chief changed, as measured by their knowledge of laws regulating open and inclusive governance. We also find no evidence that citizens were better able to contact the village chief to raise issues as a result of trained civil society leaders. Together, these panels cast conventional monitoring explanations into doubt. In contrast, the bottom panel suggests that civil society leaders in the study villages became more knowledgeable of village governance and more likely to exchange information with the village chief as a result of the civil society arm, consistent with the deliberation mechanism. Importantly, these effects are estimated across all civil society leaders in the study village, suggesting that the civil society arm expanded village chief's consultation beyond the civil society leader invited to the training.

Table K.1: Effects on Village Chief’s Decision-Making Outcomes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. Top Down Pressure (VH Survey)</i>					
VC’s Belief about Independence from Govt Officials	2.448 (0.996)	0.037 (0.149)	0.081 (0.159)	0.044 (0.182)	244
<i>Panel B. Bottom Up Pressure (HH Survey)</i>					
HH Knowledge Index	0.597 (0.228)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)	0.006 (0.016)	2,151
HH Raised Issue with VC	0.419 (0.494)	0.025 (0.025)	0.001 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.030)	2,154
<i>Panel C. Deliberation with Civil Society Leaders (CL Survey)</i>					
CL Knowledge Index	0.693 (0.214)	-0.018 (0.038)	0.064 (0.039)	0.082 (0.044)	196
CL Exchanged Info with CL (log)	0.836 (0.570)	-0.070 (0.102)	0.145 (0.105)	0.215 (0.118)	189

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

In Table K.2 we test an observable implication of an alternative mechanism that emphasizes changes in the village chief’s capacity to implement governance changes. If this were the case, we would expect especially large effects among low capacity village chiefs. Using the village chief’s education as a proxy for capacity, Table K.2 suggests this is not the case.

Table K.2: Effects by Village Chief’s Initial Capacity

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
<i>Panel A. VC Less Than Primary Education</i>					
VC’s Knowledge Index	0.633 (0.271)	-0.028 (0.075)	0.053 (0.076)	0.081 (0.081)	76
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.132 (1.054)	0.216 (0.362)	-0.160 (0.364)	-0.376 (0.392)	77
Impartiality Index	0.400 (0.339)	0.082 (0.116)	0.162 (0.114)	0.080 (0.147)	87
Legitimacy Index	-0.025 (0.950)	0.000 (0.101)	0.187 (0.118)	0.187 (0.123)	614
<i>Panel B. VC More Than Primary Education</i>					
VC’s Knowledge Index	0.675 (0.212)	-0.021 (0.041)	0.061 (0.045)	0.082 (0.051)	168
Inclusive Decision-making Index	-0.040 (0.979)	0.088 (0.197)	0.907 (0.216)	0.820 (0.247)	169
Impartiality Index	0.466 (0.328)	-0.033 (0.058)	0.153 (0.067)	0.186 (0.081)	239
Legitimacy Index	0.040 (1.011)	-0.084 (0.082)	-0.027 (0.088)	0.058 (0.104)	1,348

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

We have hypothesized that traditional chiefs are frequently bound by long-standing norms of consultation; as a result, the diversity of their advisers is critical for inclusive traditional governance. In Table K.3, we consider whether the effects of the experimental arms are particularly large in places with “stronger” traditional political institutions in the sense that the the village chief is related to the chief of the area.⁶ We find stronger effects in villages where decision-making is more traditional in this sense.

⁶Shona chiefs historically allowed headmen of non-chiefly lineages to found villages within their chiefdoms, and in these villages, the village chief would pass within the founding lineage of the village, not the chiefdom. (Bourdillon 1976, 75-76, 123-124.)

Table K.3: Effects by Village Chief’s Relationship to Chief

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. VC Related to Chief</i>					
VC’s Knowledge Index	0.651 (0.237)	-0.042 (0.043)	0.095 (0.046)	0.137 (0.052)	157
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.010 (0.973)	0.077 (0.187)	0.919 (0.202)	0.842 (0.231)	159
Impartiality Index	0.442 (0.339)	-0.008 (0.050)	0.165 (0.068)	0.173 (0.076)	251
Legitimacy Index	0.013 (1.019)	-0.104 (0.082)	0.086 (0.084)	0.190 (0.096)	1,268
<i>Panel B. VC Not Related to Chief</i>					
VC’s Knowledge Index	0.678 (0.221)	0.019 (0.062)	0.045 (0.070)	0.026 (0.083)	87
Inclusive Decision-making Index	-0.018 (1.056)	0.184 (0.324)	-0.048 (0.368)	-0.232 (0.434)	87
Impartiality Index	0.451 (0.312)	0.049 (0.128)	0.026 (0.106)	-0.022 (0.167)	72
Legitimacy Index	0.034 (0.943)	-0.015 (0.105)	-0.000 (0.100)	0.015 (0.125)	695

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Finally, we present the additional effect of civil society leaders on households’ views of the village chief’s legitimacy by whether respondents share the village chief’s political views in Table K.4. The effects are slightly larger for respondents who are politically aligned with the village chief, but the confidence intervals overlap.

Table K.4: Effects by HH's Differences in Views from Village Chief

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
<i>Panel A. HH Different Views from VC</i>					
Impartiality Index	0.426 (0.333)	0.013 (0.044)	0.132 (0.049)	0.120 (0.059)	366
Legitimacy Index	-0.560 (1.102)	-0.072 (0.134)	0.099 (0.148)	0.170 (0.167)	366
<i>Panel B. HH Same Views as VC</i>					
Impartiality Index	0.541 (0.358)	0.005 (0.033)	0.019 (0.031)	0.015 (0.038)	918
Legitimacy Index	0.189 (0.873)	-0.165 (0.082)	0.102 (0.075)	0.267 (0.089)	919

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

12 Appendix L: Comparisons to Pre-Analysis Plan

This paper closely follows the pre-analysis we registered with EGAP prior to receiving the data (“Pre-Analysis Plan for Supporting Traditional Leaders to Mitigate Community-Level Conflict in Zimbabwe”). This plan was based on intensive discussions with the implementing partner about the outcomes they expected their programming to achieve on governance by village chiefs and conflict management. The program was hoped to improve governance by village chiefs, with the hope that this would subsequently result in further benefits (less community division, and maybe even higher levels of political participation). In this paper, we test the PAP’s primary hypothesis: that the different variants of the workshops would improve “good governance” by the village chiefs (H1). In the paper itself, we focus particularly on the effects of the experiment on the registered *household-level measures of decision-making outcomes*. (We present the outcomes measured through surveys of the village chiefs in our discussions of mechanisms, but place less weight on them, as we view the household-level outcomes as better measures of improvements in governance). As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we are interested mainly in the village chief’s decision making in two areas – reducing food insecurity and dispute resolution. For both areas, we look at both (a) the amount of bias in the village chief’s decision-making in the area and (b) the effectiveness of the village chief in managing problems.

We have made a few adjustments to our measurement of the registered outcomes in cases where we felt the registered measurements suffered from conceptual problems or were not consistent with the measurement strategies employed by other scholars conducting research in this area. We provide a table exhaustively listing all adjustments to our original analysis plan below. *Note that some of the changes listed were based on rules specified in the pre-analysis plan based on the variation observed in the data and, as such, are not departures from the pre-analysis plan.* We have been motivated by conceptual consistency and measurement quality in placing greater emphasis on some findings than others, and the reader will note that some results consistent with our theory (i.e. row G, row J) are not emphasized in the main paper for these reasons. The full results of all pre-specified analyses are included below, using the original specifications.

We also note the following slight departures in the specifications in the main paper for reasons of interpretation and best practice. Although we initially proposed standardizing all measures before combining

them into indices, in cases where the variables to be combined are on the same scale, we have instead sought ways to combine them that are more easily interpretable (i.e. rather than standardizing and then summing and restandardizing variables on the same scale, we have preferred to average or sum them as described in the text). In cases where the variables to be combined are on different scales, we use the originally proposed method. In the main paper, we employ strata fixed effects for the blocks over which the original randomization was done, as it is best practice.

Table L.1: Comparisons to Pre-Analysis Plan

Outcome	Measurement	Registered	Paper Status	CL (p<0.10)	Justification
A. Knowledge Index	VC Survey	Yes (+)	Mechanisms	Yes	
B. Attitudes Index	VC Survey	Yes (+)	Mechanisms	No	
C. Inclusive Decision-making Index	VC & CL Survey	No (+)	Mechanisms	Yes	Measure of mechanism
Impartiality of Decision-making					
D. Know of politically biased food aid	List experiment	Yes (-)	No	No	Noisy measurement*
E. Perceive court decisions fair (diff view)	HH Survey	Partial (+)	Main Results	Yes	PAP language inconsistent for this measure**
F. Received food aid (diff view)	HH Survey	Yes (+)	Main Results	Yes	
G. Received any assistance (diff view)	HH Survey	Yes (+)	No	Yes	PAP emphasized food aid in particular
H. Received food aid (diff family)	HH Survey	Yes (+)	No	No	Limited bias by family (appendix C)
I. Received any assistance (diff family)	HH Survey	Yes (+)	No	No	Limited bias by family (appendix C)
Effectiveness of Decision-making					
J. Effect of wealth on receipt of assistance	HH Survey	Yes (-)	No	Yes	Noisy measure
K. Food insecure households after assistance	HH Survey	No (+)	Main Results	No	Better measure of J
L. Unresolved conflict	HH Survey	Partial (+)	Main Results	Yes	Measure of efficacy in conflict reduction***
Legitimacy of VC					
M. Legitimacy of VC	HH Survey	Yes (+)	Main Results	Yes	
N. Legitimacy of VC	VC Survey	Yes (+)	No	No	Dropped b/c $r < 0.4$ w/ HH measure (per PAP)

Notes: For each outcome, this table indicates the data source, whether the measure was pre-registered (and expected direction of effect), whether it is included in the paper, whether the CL effect is statistically significant (two-sided p-values, with strata fixed effects) and justifications for inclusion or exclusion in the main paper.

*This question was a list experiment, and the reference period was five years, making it unlikely to detect changes caused by the workshops.

**The PAP language around this measure was inconsistent with the language used for the other measures of impartiality.

***The PAP discussed measurement of the amount of conflict in the community as part of a section testing second-order hypotheses.

Table L.2: Effects on All Pre-Specified Outcomes (VC Survey)

Dependent variable	Control Mean (1)	Effect of Workshop for VC (2)	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL (3)	CL Effect (4)	Observations (5)
A. Knowledge Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.040 (0.147)	0.331 (0.155)	0.371 (0.176)	245
B. Attitudes Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.036 (0.146)	0.030 (0.154)	0.065 (0.175)	247
N. Legitimacy of VC	0.000 (1.000)	-0.068 (0.153)	-0.263 (0.161)	-0.195 (0.184)	247

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table L.3: Effects on All Pre-Specified Outcomes (HH Survey)

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
D. Prop. HHs report food aid bias	0.467 (0.636)	0.055 (0.093)	-0.025 (0.095)	-0.080 (0.109)	270
E. Perceive most court decisions fair	0.601 (0.490)	-0.008 (0.031)	0.003 (0.032)	0.011 (0.037)	2,079
F. Received food aid (diff view)	0.420 (0.495)	0.030 (0.068)	0.127 (0.079)	0.097 (0.088)	363
G. Received any assistance (diff view)	0.640 (0.481)	0.052 (0.066)	0.169 (0.057)	0.117 (0.066)	364
H. Received food aid (diff family)	0.360 (0.480)	0.074 (0.048)	0.032 (0.046)	-0.041 (0.055)	1,005
I. Received any assistance (diff family)	0.638 (0.481)	0.083 (0.045)	0.003 (0.043)	-0.080 (0.050)	1,005
M. Legitimacy of VC	0.000 (1.000)	-0.069 (0.065)	0.058 (0.064)	0.127 (0.072)	2,154

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table L4: Effects of Wealth on HH Assistance Receipt

	(1)
	J. Received Assistance
Livestock Wealth (Log)	-0.002 (0.021)
Livestock Wealth (Log) X VC	0.042 (0.030)
Livestock Wealth (Log) X VC & CL	-0.018 (0.037)
Livestock Wealth (Log) X CL	-0.060 (0.037)
N	2135

Notes: Table reports (linear combinations) of coefficients and standard errors from OLS regression.

13 Appendix M: Workshop Invitations

The village chiefs were invited to attend a workshop entitled “Capacity Building Training for Traditional Leaders and Local Structures.” In the arm of the intervention in which a civil society leader was also invited, the village chief was instructed to bring a local community leader, not currently included in either their traditional council or in elected government structures, alongside them. To help clarify the concept of civil society leaders within villages, they were provided with a list of eligible leaders (i.e. pastors, village health workers, farmer’s group leaders) and ineligible leaders (i.e. village secretaries, extension workers).

14 References

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