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Heidegger's *Being and Time*

Seminar Notes

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1. Introduction

In this seminar I shall be concerned with Heidegger's *Being and Time*. I shall refer to other works by Heidegger, but the discussion will center on *Being and Time*. In reading the book, some of you, especially those with a reading knowledge of German, may find the lectures of the twenties helpful, which have appeared now as volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Many of these have by now been translated. I am thinking especially of


GA 20 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (1925); *History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985)


But I do not expect most of you to read any of these. *Being and Time* is quite enough. I am not recommending any secondary literature, at least not initially. If you want an overview of Heidegger's development, I recommend Rüdiger Safranski’s *Ein Meister aus Deutschland*, translated as *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*. Walter Biemel's
Martin Heidegger, translated into English as Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study is helpful. I prefer Otto Pöggeler’s Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking. I cannot really recommend any of the commentaries on Being and Time. I considered ordering Stephen Munhall’s recently revised commentary\(^1\) and making you write a review. It is clear and responsible, but it does not dig very deeply. So I gave up on that idea. You do better to concentrate on the text. Genuinely helpful is Theodore Kisiel’s Genesis of Being and Time. But more important than consulting the secondary literature would be turning to the sources of Heidegger’s thinking, above all to Aristotle, but also to Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and, of course, Husserl.

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In approaching Being and Time it is helpful to keep in mind that the book, as we have it, contains only the first two sections of part one, that is to say roughly one third of the envisioned work.

That the book we have is only a fragment of the work envisioned at the time is made clear in paragraph 8, which presents us with a sketch of the “Design of the Treatise” (SZ 39-40)\(^2\) — with its rushed publication Heidegger responded to pressure by the dean of the philosophical faculty at Marburg, which had chosen him to succeed Nicolai Hartmann, but was informed by the ministry in Berlin that a major publication was needed (GA14, 99)\(^3\). That “Design” tells us that the book we now have contains only the first two sections of Part One, that is to say roughly one third of the envisioned two part work. As Heidegger explains the overall design:

If we are to arrive at the basic concept of ‘Being’ and to outline the ontological conceptions which it requires and the variations which it necessarily undergoes, we need a clue which is concrete. We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by way of an Interpretation of a

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certain special entity, Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it; the universality of the concept of Being is not belied by the relatively ‘special’ characteristic of our investigation. But this very entity, Dasein, is in itself ‘historical’, so its ownmost ontological elucidation necessarily becomes an ‘historiological’ (‘historischen’) Interpretation.” (SZ 39)

This tells us that the projected third section of Part One would have returned to the task of determining the concept of Being, after an analysis of the temporality of Dasein had provided the necessary horizon. Heidegger’s “design” also suggests that such a determination could still only have been provisional in that an adequate determination of the concept of Being is said to call for the three step destruction of the history of philosophy that Part Two of *Being and Time* was supposed to accomplish, a destruction that would have led the reader back to the origin of Greek ontology and thus to the limit of philosophy as we know it, and with it to a more original understanding of both time and Being than allowed for by the phenomenological-transcendental approach adopted in *Being and Time*. Such a “destruction” has to call into question the phenomenological method for which Heidegger thanks his mentor Edmund Husserl in a footnote (SZ 39), a method that remains rooted in the tradition to be “destroyed.”

Already here then we get a premonition of the collision between the claim of phenomenology to lay firm foundations and an ever growing awareness of the historical embeddedness of thought, a collision that, as we shall see, dooms any attempt to arrive at an adequate determination of the concept of Being. That impossibility becomes explicit in subsequent works: there is indeed tension already in the very expression “concept of Being” in that Being resists being assigned its place in logical or linguistic space.

Much of the destruction of the history of philosophy promised for the projected Part Two is now available in one form or another, both in Heidegger’s lectures and in his published essays. But what about the third section of Part One of *Being and Time*? Paragraph 8 gives only its title, “Time and Being.” What strikes the reader immediately is the reversal that has taken place: instead of journeying from Being to time we now are to return from time to Being, raising the question of whether the much discussed *Kehre* in Heidegger’s path of thinking, supposed to have taken place several years after the
publication of *Being and Time*, had in fact already been anticipated in the original projection of the work.

3

It has become customary to contrast *Being and Time* and the immediately following published works, *The Essence of Reasons, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *What is Metaphysics?* — and we can now add to these *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and other lectures — with the later works, beginning with the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and *The Origin of the Work of Art* (1935). Pöggeler and von Herrmann have celebrated the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936 - 38), *Contributions to Philosophy*, published posthumously some years ago as GA 65, as Heidegger's second main work, which makes the turn from a Dasein-centered explication of the problem of time as horizon of the question of Being to a restatement of this question in terms of the history of Being (Cf. von Herrmann's essay in *Martin Heidegger, Politics, Art, and Technology*). But such talk of the famous Kehre or turning is misleading in at least two ways:

1. The later works should not be lumped together. As Pöggeler points out in the *Concluding Discussion* in *Politics, Art, and Technology*, there are at least two important breaks in Heidegger's development, one comes in 1929/30, the second in 1938. Pöggeler is right to point out that 1933 does not represent an important turn in Heidegger's philosophical development, although I would question his claim that therefore there is no deep connection between Heidegger's political engagement and his philosophical development. It is possible to argue that it was precisely Heidegger's need to confront, not just National Socialism, but also his own involvement with it, that called for the move to the third stage. In this sense the *Rektoratsrede* does hold a central place in that stage which lasts from 1929/30 to 1938. I treated this in some detail in my seminar on Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art,” which now has appeared as a book with

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5 *Politics, Art, and Technology*, p. 247.
The chapter dealing with the Rectorial Address has also appeared in a French
translation by Christian Sommer.7

2. More importantly, Being and Time is not Heidegger's first work. Anyone who
wants to have an adequate understanding of Heidegger's development should be familiar
with his dissertation of 1914, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus and the
Habilitationsschrift of 1916, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (GA
1), should also be aware of his difficult movement away from Catholicism, first to a free
Protestantism and finally beyond Christianity altogether. I recommend Hugo Ott's
"Heidegger's Catholic Origins" in Politics, Art, and Technology8 and especially his
Martin Heidegger.9 And, as more and more volumes of the GA have appeared and still
continue to appear, the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger's appropriation of Husserl's
phenomenological project has become ever more apparent. But here I shall focus on
Being and Time.

Still, by way of an introduction let me briefly and very roughly and therefore
misleadingly sketch Heidegger’s development and the place of Being and Time in that
development. I want to do so by drawing a parallel between Heidegger’s development
and that of Wittgenstein. I would like to mark the latter with some quotations:

Tractatus 4.003. Language disguises the thought: so that from the
external forms of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they
clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite
another object than to let the form of the body be recognized.10

On this view language hides its essential structure, just as the body hides the spirit.

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6 Karsten Harries, Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger’s The Origin of the
7 “Le Discours de rectorat et le ‘national-socialisme privé’ de Heidegger,” Études
Philosophiques, 2010 - N° 2 Presses Universitaires de France - PUF; (26 mai 2010)
8 Hugo Ott, "Heidegger's Catholic Origins", Politics, Art, and Technology, ed. Karsten
Harries and Christoph Jamme (New Yirk: Holmes and Meier, 1994, pp. 18-33.
9 Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie (Frankfurt am Main:
Campus, 1988).
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London:
3. 324 Thus there easily arise the most fundamental confusions (of which the whole of philosophy is full).
To avoid such confusions we have to develop an artificial language that does not obscure the essence of language. The sign language of the *Tractatus* answers to this demand.

My second quote is from the *Philosophische Bemerkungen or Philosophical Remarks* of 1930:

3. How strange if logic were to concern itself with an 'ideal' language and not with *ours*. For what should this ideal language express? Presumably what we are expressing in our ordinary language; but then logic must investigate it. Or something else: but how then am I to know what that is. The logical analysis is the analysis of something that we have, not of something that we do not have. It is therefore an analysis of propositions as they are. (It would be strange if human society had spoken until now without succeeding in uttering a single correct proposition.)

My last quotation is from the *Philosophical Investigations*.

23. It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language (including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*).

Heidegger's thought underwent a similar development. The early Heidegger demands that logic be freed from grammar, appealing in this connection to Emil Lask, *Die Lehre vom Urteil*. (GA 1, 178, especially note) This demand for an emancipation of logic from grammar is explicitly rejected and indeed reversed in *Being and Time*:

The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic *a priori* structure of discourse in general as an existentiale. It is not a task that can be carried through later on by improving and rounding out what has been handed down. Bearing this in mind, we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance with

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significations; and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences. (SZ 165-166)

We shall return to this passage later, in its proper context. But let us ask in a preliminary fashion: how is the *apriorische Grundstruktur von Rede* to be understood? Traditionally the assertion has been understood as paradigmatic speech. In his dissertation, *Die Lehre vom Urteil*, Heidegger had given the example: "the cover of the book before me is yellow."

Why the focus on an assertion? In *Being and Time* Heidegger will link this focus to an *Ontologie des Vorhandenen*, to an ontology of the present-at-hand. We shall return to this later, but we see already how the philosophy of language and ontology intertwine. The question of Being intertwines in turn with the question: what constitutes proper access to beings? To understand Being as presence-at-hand is to transform the experiencing human subject into first of all a subject standing before a world of objects. The world is transformed into a picture. It is understood as the totality of what is the case. But perhaps we should stick to the term "object": that such an understanding rests on a reduction of everyday experience is apparent.

What is the relationship of language to these facts? Consider Heidegger's example: "the cover of the book before me is yellow." The predicate expresses something that is said to be valid of the subject. The copula "is" claims such validity. The proposition communicates a content that remains what it is regardless of what as a matter of fact is the case.

Consider another judgment: the sky is blue" and imagine it made in different circumstances, by a gardener perhaps, or by a child, or by a lover. Do we have the same judgment in each case? In the dissertation Heidegger had argued that despite possible differences in connotation the content remains the same. It is this content which he there calls *Sinn* (*meaning*). It is this *Sinn*, not what happens to be its linguistic expression, that is said to concern the logician. And it is as a logician that the young Heidegger understands himself; it is through logic that he enters philosophy. And, with frequent references to both Aristotle and Husserl, the word "logic" was to continue to figure prominently in the lecture courses of the twenties:

*GA 21: Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (1925/26)
GA 26: _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik_ (1928)

In his dissertation Heidegger understood logic as the theory of *Sinn*. He divides that theory into three parts:

1. The doctrine of the elements of meaning— _Lehre vom Begriff_, the doctrine of the concept.
2. The doctrine of the structures of meaning— _Lehre vom Urteil_, the doctrine of judgment.
3. The doctrine of meaning — _Lehre von der Wissenschaft_, the doctrine of science.

Rather like Wittgenstein in the _Tractatus_ Heidegger calls the sphere of *Sinn* a *logischer Bereich*, a logical realm. Meanings fall into different groupings. These are provided by the categories of meaning, the _Bedeutungskategorien_, the fundamental principles constitutive of classes of meaning. The investigation into these categories of meaning was the point of the speculative grammar of Thomas of Erfurt, then still confused with Duns Scotus, which Heidegger is discussing in the second part of his _Habilitationsschrift_: _Nomen, pronomen, verbum, adverbium, participium, conjunctio, praepositoio, and interjectio_, are such categories of meaning. But our investigations need not remain that general. We can, for example, investigate the grammar of "red."

Heidegger, too, understands the proposition as determining a "logical place." The similarity with the _Tractatus_ is apparent:

3.4. The proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is assured by the existence of its constituent parts, by the existence of the meaningful sentence (_des sinnvollen Satzes_).

One might also want to speak, thinking of Husserl, of an eidetic space.

All important, given this picture, is the separation of the **ontic** from the **logical**, the distinction between the realm of facts and the realm of meanings. The latter offers room not only to this world, but to all possible worlds. It offers a structure into which all these worlds must fall. Logic is transcendental.

If meaning essentially transcends facts, all attempts to ground meaning in fact must be mistaken, rest on a category mistake. Logic thus cannot be grounded in psychology. And Heidegger never was to leave this distinction altogether behind. It reappears, transformed as the _ontologische Differenz_, as the distinction between beings
and their Being. In *Being and Time* he will thus insist that “Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is ‘transcendental’ for every entity (SZ 208). What he does call into question in *Being and Time* is the privileging of assertion, just as Wittgenstein does in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In both cases transcendental philosophy is brought down to earth. But is this not perhaps a confusion? Was the emphasis on logic as the transcendental presupposition of experience, an emphasis that dominated philosophy in the time before the First World War, really mistaken? Did that war have anything to do with the shift in the philosophical climate?

5

But let me return to the quote from *Being and Time*: what does Heidegger mean by an existentiale?

Let us get some terms straight: we have already discussed the distinction between the logical or transcendental and the ontic. The distinction between ontological and ontic is related: ontology is the inquiry into the structures constitutive of entities. Its object is the exhibition of categories. Kant is thus an ontologist in Heidegger’s sense when he tries to exhibit the categories. But Kant was not willing to put the presupposed understanding of experience into question. And yet, as the other two Critiques demonstrate, the presupposed notion of experience rests on a reduction. A more fundamental questioning of experience is therefore needed: what are the structures constitutive of human being-in-the-world? The inquiry into these structures Heidegger terms fundamental ontology. The structures are called existentialia. Existential: existentiell = ontological : ontic. The paragraph thus makes clear that Heidegger wants to challenge his earlier effort by showing that it uncritically based itself on a particular interpretation of experience and, inseparable from it, on a particular uncritically adopted understanding of Being. That understanding has ruled the progress of philosophy. By raising the question of Being Heidegger calls that progress in its entirety into question. That is why the second part of *Being and Time* called for a destruction of the history of ontology.

Just in passing I would like to mention here a certain parallel between Heidegger and Descartes: Descartes recognized that his metaphysics of nature, his interpretation of the being of the objects of science as *res extensa*, needed for its foundation a metaphysics
Heidegger’s *Being and Time* of the soul, an analysis of the being of human being as *res cogitans*. That "fundamental ontology" was to secure that access to beings provided by clear and distinct thinking. That "fundamental ontology" in turn was recognized to be in need of a further foundation. Descartes’ philosophical theology addresses that need. Heidegger of course would have us question Descartes’ attempt as insufficiently fundamental. The Being of entities cannot be grounded in a being, not even in the most perfect being, i.e. God.

I have drawn a parallel between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, but the paragraph that I quoted also points to a decisive difference. Heidegger seems more traditional in *Being and Time* by clinging to the distinction between ontological and ontic, a version of the traditional distinction between essence and fact. It is a distinction Wittgenstein subjects to criticism in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Do we need a notion of essence? We shall return to this point.

But let me here point to another decisive difference between the two thinkers: Heidegger will insist on distinguishing **authenticity** from **inauthenticity**. Everyday language in its entirety he understands as a phenomenon of inauthenticity. Heidegger is thus unwilling to accept ordinary language as something like a Grund, a ground. Thus while at first one may be struck by parallels that link Wittgenstein and Heidegger, by the time we get to Part 2 of *Being and Time*, there are deep differences that will become ever more important.

Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger leads philosophy in *Being and Time* to a point where the philosophic enterprise in its entirety is called into question. He does so by showing that philosophy is a discipline without adequate foundation or ground. This opposes the Cartesian understanding of philosophy as a kind of conceptual architecture that first lays and then builds on firm foundations. Heidegger would seem to do just the opposite: today we might say he is in the business of deconstruction rather than in that of construction, that is to say, he forces us to recognize that there is no such ground. In this respect Heidegger is more radical than Wittgenstein who only denies that philosophy can establish such a ground, but does claim for himself to be revealing or laying bare just such a ground: “Wir legen den Grund der Sprache frei.” (*Investigations* 118) Ordinary language is that ground. Heidegger calls that ground, too, into question.
According to Wittgenstein philosophy has its origin in losing one's way. Again and again philosophy has attempted to reorient us, to tell us where we are and where we should be going. In this sense all philosophy may be understood as a determination of how we should stand in the world, of our proper place, our ethos. Fundamentally all philosophy so understood is ethical reflection. Considered in this light the path Heidegger's thinking traces is likely to appear as a Holzweg, to use one of his favorite metaphors, which gave the title to one of his volumes of collected essays. Perhaps all he has written can be gathered under that title. But what is a Holzweg?

In the very beginning of Holzwege Heidegger gives us his answer:

Holz lautet ein alter Name für Wald. Im Holz sind Wege, die meist verwachsen jäh im Unbegangenen aufhören, Sie heißen Holzwege.


Holzmacher und Waldhüter kennen die Wege. Sie wissen, was es heißt, auf einem Holzweg zu sein.

Holz is an old name for a wood. In such a wood are paths that suddenly stop in the untrodden.

They are called Holzwege (woodpaths).

Everyone takes its separate course, but in the same wood. Often it seems as if one were the same as another. But it only seems that way.

Wood cutters and foresters know these paths. They know what it means to be on a Holzweg.

1. The German word Holzweg stands for a path that is cut into the forest to enable loggers to bring out the trees they have cut. This original meaning should be kept in mind.

2. A Holzweg is thus a path that does not lead where people are likely to want to go. It leads nowhere and suddenly stops. Because Holzwege are not commonly used they tend to be overgrown and difficult to walk.
3. A *Holzweg* leads to an open place in the forest where the trees have been cut down, i.e. into a clearing. But clearing, *Lichtung*, is one of the metaphors Heidegger uses to describe human being, where this choice of metaphor, which joins light and distance, provides a good example of the point of Heidegger's metaphorical speaking. (Consider in this connection Descartes’ understanding of the distance that separates subject and object and of the need for *a lumen naturale*.) Leading us into a clearing, a *Holzweg* thus leads us to our own essence, even as it leads nowhere.

4. Why does Heidegger say, *jeder läuft gesondert*? The suggestion is that there is not one such path, but that each one of us has to find his or her own.

5. The expression, *auf einem Holzweg sein*, is used in German to suggest that we have lost our way, to suggest precisely that condition Wittgenstein took to describe the form of a philosophical problem. Greek philosophy spoke of *aporia*. To be on a *Holzweg* usually means that you have taken a wrong turn. And travelling with Heidegger you may well find yourself disappointed. Important questions will go unanswered. In an important sense Heidegger’s path leads nowhere. And yet leading nowhere it leads us back to ourselves.

6. One last observation: a *Holzweg* begins in a familiar landscape, as Heidegger’s path of thinking begins in the to many philosophers still familiar landscapes of Neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology, only to end in the bewildering and unfamiliar.

8

In his “Design” for the projected two volume work Heidegger states that its goal is to arrive “at the basic concept of ‘Being.’” But what is at stake? Why is it important to raise once more the question of Being? Next time let me begin with this question. I would like you to read paragraphs 1 - 8, but to focus on the first 4, especially paragraph 3.
2. Heidegger's Introduction

Let me return to our first session: *Being and Time* I suggested does not make things easy for the reader. A number of factors help to account for this:

1. The book is a torso; what we have is no more than two third of the first volume of what was envisioned as a two volume work, i.e. a third of the whole work as initially conceived. Heidegger was rushed into publication. This was probably a good thing.

2. There is tension between style and content: with its style the work belongs to a tradition — Heidegger himself invokes phenomenology — which its content calls into question.

3. The first part of the book we have is only provisional. What makes it provisional is the fact that the problem of authenticity is not raised until the second part. The analyses of the second part thus call into question and demand a reconsideration of the analyses of the first part.

In approaching the book we should keep in mind the place it has in Heidegger's development. I tried to sketch that development last time. But let me very briefly rehearse it once more:

The young Heidegger seeks the essence of language in logic in a way that invites comparison with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Assertion is given primacy.

*Being and Time* reverses such emphasis. If in the dissertation Heidegger called for a liberation of logic from grammar, in *Being and Time* Heidegger calls for a liberation of grammar from logic. Assertion is now understood as a derivative form of discourse. The essence of language is to be sought by turning to language as it presents itself to us in everyday life.

If there are obvious similarities between Heidegger's development from his dissertation to *Being and Time* and Wittgenstein's development from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, a crucial distinction is that Heidegger insists on distinguishing authenticity from inauthenticity, *Rede* from *Gerede*, i.e. authentic discourse from inauthentic talk.

One can describe Heidegger's development also as a movement from *ontology* to *fundamental ontology*: the primacy of assertion and a particular ontology — Heidegger speaks of the ontology of the present-at-hand — go together. But this ontology unduly
privileges a particular mode of being in the world, marked by disengagement, detachment. Does this mode deserve to be thus privileged? We need to rethink the foundations of traditional ontology.

Traditional ontology thus calls for fundamental ontology, an inquiry into the structures constitutive of human being-in-the-world. These structures are the *existentials*.

2

Heidegger begins with a quote from Plato's *Sophist*. This beginning recapitulates material worked out in much greater detail in his 1924/25 Marburg lecture on Plato's *Sophist* (GA 19), perhaps the central text for anyone who wants to explore Heidegger's relationship to Plato and Aristotle. The Stranger from Elea had pointed out that "Parmenides and everyone else who has set out to determine how many real things there are and what they are like, have discoursed to us in a rather offhand manner." They failed to explain what they mean by terms like "being" (*to on*) (243 D 3). Heidegger suggests that we still have no good understanding of that meaning. The task is to raise the question once more: what do we mean by the word "being"?

But why is this necessary: the question does not seem to be a particularly urgent one. Our logicians thus do no seem to be particularly bothered by it. They use the existential quantifier without seeming to have to give the matter much thought. There is a question about the question: What is at stake when we ask that question? If the book as a whole seeks to "work out the question of the meaning of Being," the introduction addresses the second question: Why is it necessary to raise once more the question of the meaning of Being?

Is the question really meaningful? Is it perhaps an example of language idling in Wittgenstein's sense? Is Heidegger manufacturing a problem that really is no problem at all? Consider the examples he offers on p. 4:

*Der Himmel ist blau* — The sky is blue

*Ich bin froh* — I am merry

Consider Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* 3. 323:

In the language of everyday life it very often happens that the same word signifies in two different ways — and therefore belongs to two different symbols — or that two words, which signify in different ways,
are apparently applied in the same way in the proposition. Thus the word "is" appears as the copula, as the sign of equality, and as the expression of existence.

Does not Heidegger throw these meanings together? Heidegger suggests that there is a connection between these different usages that points to an important problem. These different usages lead us to the question of Being and Heidegger is surely right when he suggests that the question and its significance remain unclear, that the meaning of the question needs clarification, where we should not dismiss the possibility that such clarification might itself take the form of a dismissal of the question.

Par. 1

In par. 1 Heidegger discusses some of the prejudices that stand in the way of raising the question of Being, which since the days when Plato and Aristotle wrestled with it has become trivialized:

a. **Being as the most universal concept.**

Being is here is understood as a property, but as the most general of all. But such an understanding of being as the most general predicate fails to consider the way in which “being” does not behave like other predicates. Aristotle already recognized this. Heidegger calls attention to the fact that Aristotle gives the same status to being and unity: "These are the most universal of all." (Met. B 4 1001 a 21) Cf, also Aristotle, Met B 3, 998 b 22:

It is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things: for the differentiae of any genus must each of them have being and be one.

Being is thus a *transcendens*. Aristotle knows of the different senses in which things are said to be. The unity of what is called most universal is to be understood as the unity of analogy: cf. Met. V, 6 and 7, especially IV, 2. Being would seem to be one by analogy. The analogical nature of being is developed in Met V, 7:

The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication (i.e. the categories): for the senses of being are just as many as these figures. Since then some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity
and passivity, others its "where," others its "when," "being" has a meaning answering to each of them.

The categories thus name kinds of essential being: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection.

Whatever is apprehended in some way has being: Consider Thomas, *STh* II-1, qu. 94 a 2:

For that which first falls under apprehension is being, the understanding of which is included in all beings whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaphysics IV. (Thomas goes on to say that good is the first thing to fall under practical reason.)

In *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, *On the Way to Language*, in the dialogue with a Japanese, Heidegger writes that the question of Being struck him first, when he was still a student in the Gymnasium, in the form of the dissertation of Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seins nach Aristoteles*.

But how much light is cast on the matter by pointing to the analogical character of being? Heidegger glances briefly at subsequent thinkers, including Hegel, only to conclude that to call being the most general concept is not to say that it therefore does not stand in need of further explanation.

b. "**Being**" is indefinable.

"Being" is indefinable because definition presupposes a higher genus. Such a genus cannot be found. To the line:

We can infer only that "Being" cannot have the character of an entity.

Heidegger added later the footnote:

*nein! sondern: über das Seyn kann nicht mit Hilfe solcher Begrifflichkeit entschieden werden.*

No! But: with the help of such a conceptual framework we cannot decide about Being (*Seyn*).

The line itself recalls the Kantian claim that existence is not a real predicate. But the indefinability of being does not make its meaning unworthy of questioning.
c. "Being" is self-evident.

Heidegger suggests that this appeal to the self-evidence of the concept of Being points to a problem in that it leaves the meaning of Being veiled in darkness. Our task is to uncover what is covered up by such an everyday understanding.

But why is this a task? Why is it necessary to repeat the old question? Presupposed is a demand for light (in opposition to Dunkel, dark).

But on the whole this paragraph casts little light on the matter under discussion. One can only concur with the lines that concludes it:

By considering these prejudices, however, we have made plain not only that the question of being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is obscure and without direction. So, if it is to be revived, this means that we must first work out an adequate way of formulating it. (SZ 4)

Par. 2

The second paragraph approaches the question of the meaning of being by inquiring into the nature of questioning. Every question is a seeking. (Cf. GA 19, 447) As such, it has three moments:

a. Fragen nach ... Gefragtes (that which is asked about): Sein, being.

b. Anfragen bei ... Befragtes (that which is being interrogated, investigated): Seiendes, what is, entities.

c. Intendieren ... Erfragtes (that in which questioning comes to its goal: the articulation of what is called Sinn des Seins, the meaning of being. The Erfragte determines the Gefragte and captures it in appropriate concepts.

The Gefragte is being. Some understanding of being is presupposed by the very question: what is being? **To ask for the meaning of being is to ask for what determines beings as beings.** Note the language of constitution here suggested.

Where then is the questioning directed? To entities presumably? But what entities are to be chosen? And how are they to be approached?

Intended is the meaning of being:

Hence Being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own, essentially different from the way entities are discovered.

Accordingly, what is to be found out by the asking — the meaning of
Being — also demands that it be conceived in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification. (SZ 6)

Is there then a particular being that deserves to be privileged, which is exemplarisch, exemplary? Heidegger suggests that there is:

If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it in line with the elucidation we have given requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for our example, and to work out the genuine way of access to it — all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity — the inquirer — transparent in his own Being. (SZ 7)

Playing on the root Spiel, “play” in Beispiel, Heidegger later adds the fn: Dasein ist exemplarisch as the Bei-spiel: because by its essence Da-sein das Sein als solches zu- und bei-spielt (GA 2, 9). It would seem that Dasein can engage being only playfully, where the metaphor Spiel demands our attention.

“Dasein” here refers to a human being, but also the being of such a being, to human being in that sense, where Heidegger takes care to warn us not to think of subject and subjectivity in the traditional sense. We shall have to return to the question of the relationship of Dasein to the "subject" of philosophy. The term Dasein straddles the ontic-ontological divide. As a preparation for raising the question of being, Dasein, the questioner, is to be made transparent in his being. But have we not fallen here into a circle? Heidegger's answer is twofold:

1. All such arguments are said to be sterile. Formal objections of this sort are disparagingly opposed to concrete ways of investigating.

2. There is no circle: philosophers have long tried to exhibit the being of, say, nature (Descartes), without having been in possession of an adequate understanding of being. Circularity can be charged when we are presented with a deduction. Heidegger's
procedure is more like recollection. Heidegger thus distinguishes an *ableitende Begründung* (deduction) from an *aufweisende Grund-Freilegung* (echibiting and laying bare the ground). Note the way Heidegger here appeals to *Grund* in a quite traditional way.

**Par. 3**

What such questioning is supposed to achieve and what is at stake is left rather obscure. Only par. 3 gives us a clearer understanding of just what Heidegger is after. The fundamental point is one Heidegger was to return to over and over. (Cf. "Wissenschaft und Besinnung," VA, 1953)

Heidegger speaks in this par. of science. How does Heidegger understand science? Let me clarify his understanding by turning to a picture Wittgenstein offers us in the *Tractatus*:

6. 341 Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots. We now say: Whatever kind of picture these make, I can always get as near as I like to its description, if I cover the surface with a sufficiently fine square network and now say of every square that it is white or black. In this way I shall have brought the description of the surface to a unified form. This form is arbitrary, because I could have applied with equal success a net with a triangular or a hexagonal mesh. It can happen that the description would have been simpler with the aid of a triangular, and coarser, than with a finer square mesh. or vice versa, and so on. To the different networks correspond different systems of describing the world. Mechanics determine a form of description by saying: All propositions in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a number of given propositions — the mechanical axioms. It thus provides the bricks for building the edifice of science, and says: Whatever building thou wouldst erect, thou shalt construct it in some manner with these bricks and with these alone. Mechanics determines a form of description. Such a form of description is implicit in what Heidegger terms *Ausarbeitung des Gebietes in seinen Grundstrukturen,* a working
out of the basic structures of a field of inquiry (9). Such a working out involves the exhibition of certain Grundbegriffe, basic concepts.

Being is always the Being of an entity. The totality of entities can, in accordance with various domains, become a field for laying bare and delimiting certain definite areas of subject matter. These areas, on their part (for instance, history, nature, space, life, Dasein, language, and the like), can serve as objects which corresponding scientific investigations may take as their respective themes. Scientific research accomplishes roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our prescientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined. The ‘basic concepts’ which thus arise remain our proximal clues for disclosing the area concretely for the first time. And although research may always lean towards this positive approach, its real progress comes not so much from collecting results and sorting them away in ‘manuals’ as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted [Grundverfassungen] — an inquiry to which we have been driven mostly by reacting against just such an increase in information. (SZ 9)

The rank of a science is determined, according to Heidegger, by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis of its basic concepts.

The real ‘movement’ of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship

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13 One of the students in the class, Samuel Loncar, pointed out to me after class that the translation omitted an important nicht in the German original he was using: the correct translation should be: “revision which is not transparent to itself.” The “nicht” is indeed found in the Gesamtausgabe edition of Sein und Zeit; the postscript of the editor Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann explains: “Aus diesem Exemplar [Heideggers Handexemplar] wurden außerdem einge von ihm im Laufe der Jahrzehnte eingetragene kleine, der Verdeutlichung dienende textlich Korrekturen übernommen, die auf seine
between positively investigative inquiry and those things that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. Among the various disciplines everywhere today there are freshly awakened tendencies to put research on new foundations. (SZ 9)

Implicit is the conviction that the Grundbegriffe, the basic concepts, furnish no real ground. Using Wittgenstein's picture we can say: not only the grid, but also the way the spots present themselves presupposes a certain language. That is true also of the immediate level of experience that is to provide support for the descriptions of science. (Cf. appeals to sense data, the plane of perception, etc.)

Heidegger now generalizes: today there are Grundlagenkrisen in mathematics, physics, biology, history, theology. Mathematics is named first, but closest to his own concerns would seem to be the last:

Mathematics, which is seemingly the most rigorous and most firmly constructed of the sciences, has reached a crisis in its ‘foundations.’ In the controversy between the formalists and the intuitionists, the issue is one of obtaining and securing the primary way of access to what supposedly are the objects of this science.” (SZ 9-10)

What sort of entities are numbers? What is their being? And a similar question has arisen in physics:

The relativity theory of physics arises from the tendency to exhibit the interconnectedness of Nature as it is ‘in itself’. As a theory of the conditions under which we have access to Nature itself, it seeks to preserve the changelessness of the laws of motion by ascertaining all relativities, and thus comes up against the question of the structure of its own given area of study — the problem of matter. (SZ 10)

In this connection it is of interest to learn that Werner Heisenberg contributed to the Festschrift for Heidegger’s 70th birthday an essay that bore the title “Grundlegende Voraussetzungen in der Physik der Elemetarteilchen.”

In biology there is an awakening tendency to inquire beyond the definitions which mechanism and vitalism have given for “life” and “organism”, and to define anew the kind of being which belongs to the living as such.

Significant in this connection is Heidegger’s lecture course of the winter semester 1929/30, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (GA 29/30), especially par. 45b, pp. 277-283.

In those humane sciences which are historiological in character the urge towards historical actuality itself has been strengthened in the course of time by tradition and by the way tradition has been presented and handed down: the history of literature is to become the history of problems.

Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man’s Being towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther’s insight that the ‘foundation’ on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this ‘foundation’ not only is inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and distorts it. (SZ 10)

Every science rests on ontological interpretation, presupposes an understanding of the being of whatever entities it is investigating.

Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. Only after the area itself has been explored beforehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and ‘grounded’. But since every such area is itself obtained from the

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domain of entities themselves, this preliminary research, from which the basic concepts are drawn, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of these entities with respect to their basic state of being. Such research must run ahead of the positive sciences, and it can. (SZ 10)

In this light we may want to consider Descartes' ontology of nature as such a productive logic, which first determines the being of the entities to be investigated. Every science, we can say, presupposes a metaphysics.

Similarly the positive outcome of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* lies in what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a ‘theory’ of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an *a priori* logic for the subject matter of that area of Being called “Nature”. (SZ 10-11)

All sciences presuppose ontologies.

But not only do sciences presuppose some specific understanding of being. So do all our encounters with persons or things. In each case a being is interpreted in a particular fashion and thus made available. A particular understanding of being provides a particular mode of access to beings. Science here only provides a perspicuous example for something that has a much more far reaching significance. Our way of life thus brings with it such an understanding, which does not at all require theoretical articulation. If we link ontology to theory, we may want to call such an understanding pre-ontological.

The question Heidegger wants to raise is: how are such ontologies possible? What is the soil in which metaphysics is rooted? The inquiry into the meaning of being searches for this soil. This is made clearer in *Was ist Metaphysik?: “Die Wahrheit des Seins als Grund in dem die Metaphysik wurzelt,” “the truth of being as the ground in which metaphysics has its roots.” How we are to think this ground, i.e. the truth of being remains a question.

**Par. 4**

If par. 3 is said to establish the ontological priority of the question of being, par. 4 inquires into its ontical priority. The par. begins with a reflection that invites us to understand science not as a systematic whole of true propositions, but as a way in which Dasein is, as a way of being. Science is one way of relating to beings.
At the heart of this paragraph is the determination of *Dasein as Existenz*. In *What is Metaphysics* Heidegger writes that *Existenz* is “a mode of being that is open to the openness of beings.” What does this mean? *Dasein* is open to beings; it is the place where beings present themselves, the clearing of beings. That clearing has room not only for what as a matter of fact presents itself, but also for whatever can present itself. But beings never simply present themselves. They present themselves in a certain way. Their presencing is governed by what, helpfully but misleadingly, we can call a certain perspective. This, too, presents itself; not only do beings present themselves, but their mode of presencing also presents itself. Using traditional language we can perhaps speak of a twofold distance: a distance from things, and a distance from being in the world. The human being is not just in the world and as such open to things, but is open to this being-in-the-world. You may want to think of Kierkegaard's understanding of man as the relation that relates itself to itself.

*Dasein* is not just another entity

*Dasein* is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of *Dasein’s* Being, and this implies that *Dasein*, in its Being, has a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which *Dasein* understands itself in its Being, and that it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of *Dasein’s* Being. *Dasein* is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological. (SZ 12)

*Dasein*’s own being is an issue, a task:

That kind of being towards which *Dasein* can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call “existence” [*Existenz*]. And because we cannot define *Dasein*’s essence by citing a “what” of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter [*eines sachhaltigen Was*], and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have chosen to designate this
entity as “Dasein”, a term which is purely an expression of its Being [als reiner Seinsausdruck] (SZ 12)

That Dasein faces its own being as a task suggests already that it may fail to face up to that task:

Dasein always understand itself in terms of its existence — in terms of a possibility of itself: to be or not to be itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold of itself or by neglecting, The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call “existentiell”. (SZ 12)

It is possible to inquire into the structure of Existenz, into its constitution. Existenz is constituted by Existenzialität. To say that Existenz is the essence of Dasein, is to say that the structures constitutive of Existenz are possible modes of being. How it exists is decided by each Dasein. Dasein decides its existence.

Science is just one particular mode of approaching beings, a mode of Dasein's being. It stands here for a pursuit rather than for a finished product. All ontologies have their foundation in the ontic structure of consciousness.

So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic. (SZ 13)

Dasein is essentially ontological, i. e. not simply a being, but a being for whom being is an issue. Only this ontological nature of Dasein makes ontologies possible. Fundamental ontology therefore takes the form of an analytic of Dasein (SZ 13)

The paragraph and this first chapter conclude with remarks on the threefold priority of Dasein (SZ 13):

1. It has an ontic priority as the being whose being is determined by existence. That is to say, the human being is privileged in that is the being open to beings and thus also to their being. In this sense Heidegger can say: “But the roots of the existential analysis, on its part, are ultimatelty existentiell, that is ontical.” (SZ 13). All philosophy finally has its rots in the concrete way the philosopher stands in his or her world.
2. Implied is Dasein's ontological priority: Dasein, as essentially existing, is that being for whom its being is an issue.

3. But inseparable from Dasein is an understanding of beings other than Dasein. It is thus the ontic-ontological condition of the possibilities of all ontologies. All of this is said to have been recognized, sort of, by the tradition, as is shown by Heidegger with quotes from Aristotle and St. Thomas. Heidegger cites Aristotle's "in a certain way the soul is all things (De Anima Gamma, 8, 431 b 21; cf. ibid., 5, 430 a 14ff.) Aisthesis and noesis name ways of the soul's being. Similarly Thomas understands anima as ens quod natum est convenire cum omni ente. (Quaestiones de Veritate, q. I a I c; cf. De Natura Generis).

The inquiry into the meaning of Being thus begins as an inquiry into the being of Dasein, as the being that is open to the being of things.
3. Methodological Considerations

Last time we discussed the first chapter of the introduction. It seeks to exhibit the significance of the question of the meaning of Being. Much of our time was spent on par. 3, which tried to establish the ontological priority of the question of being. Heidegger there remarks that the real progress of science — or should we be more modest and speak just of change? — takes place when the accumulation of knowledge reaches a point where the map that guided the scientist is called into question: the scientist loses his way. This loss of way makes him philosophical: attempts are made to revise the basic concepts, to furnish a new map. Sciences rest on ontological foundations, that is to say, they rest on particular determinations of the being of those beings with which they are concerned. But such determinations, Heidegger suggests, remain themselves naive and lacking in transparency, as long as the meaning of being remains unquestioned. (SZ 11) Consider in this connection the current discussion going on in philosophy between dualists who insist that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical and physical monists.

Let me pause here and ask: what does science have to learn from such a clarification? Anything? And: what is the ethical significance of such clarification?

Par. 4 understands science as a way in which Dasein is: that is to say, in a very preliminary way it grounds science in the being of Dasein, Dasein is not just open to beings, but to the being of these beings. How this being is understood shapes the way these beings present themselves. Human beings face their inevitable being in the world as a task. How they seize this task will be bound up with a particular understanding of being. All ontologies thus have their foundation in inevitably concrete, historically conditioned ways of existing.

The most important section of the second chapter of the Introduction is par. 7, especially the second B section, in which Heidegger offers a first interpretation of logos. To have enough time for that discussion I will go over the preceding paragraphs a bit more quickly.

Par. 5
should present few difficulties. In the main it offers a sketch of the program that is to be carried out and of the method to be employed.

We have shown that Dasein is the entity that must serve as our primary object of investigation. Heidegger begins, accordingly, with a consideration of the human being as a being, who, although immediately present to himself, does not therefore possess an adequate understanding of his being:

Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us — even that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest. To be sure, its ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner. But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein’s own Being is thus interpreted pre-ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when one’s ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme. (SZ 15)

Dasein tends to misunderstand itself:

The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant — in terms of the ‘world’. In Dasein itself, and therefore in its own understanding of Being, the way the world is understood is, as we shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted. (SZ 15-16)

What kind of access then is appropriate? Heidegger warns against a reliance on inherited categories: we should take a look at Dasein that is unburdened by such preconceptions and derive the existential structures from it.

We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and for itself [an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her]. And this means that it is to be shown as it is proximally and for the most part — in its average everydayness. (SZ 16)
With this turn to everydayness the Heidegger of *Being and Time* invites comparison with the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit — not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by having regard for the basic state of Dasein’s everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion. ([SZ](#))

Heidegger here appears to be following a version of the transcendental method: When he is looking for the essential structures that every possible Dasein may possess, i.e. his existentialia, he is engaged in an inquiry that is analogous to Kant’s determination of the categories. The question has to arise, however, whether such an orientation may not be looking at Dasein in a way that may conceal essential structures. Heidegger thus emphasizes the **incomplete**, and more importantly, the only **provisional**, preparatory character of the offered analysis.

Our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance **provisional**. It merely brings out the Being of this entity, without Interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting being may be laid bare. Once we have arrived at the horizon, this preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically ontological basis. ([SZ](#))

That “authentically ontological basis” that calls for a repetition of the analysis will have been established once we have gained an understanding of temporality as the meaning of Dasein's being. This will prepare us for an investigation of the meaning of Being.

We shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light — and genuinely conceived — as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicaded primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being. This task as a whole requires that the
conception of time thus obtained shall be distinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. (SZ 17)

That time should function as the horizon for an understanding of being will hardly surprise anyone familiar with the history of philosophy: think of Plato and Aristotle. The Fact remains that time, in the sense of ‘being [sein] in time’, functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being. Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigate how time has come to have this distinctive ontological function, or with what right time functions as such a criterion; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is possible for it, gets expressed when “time” is used in so naively ontological a manner. “Time’ has acquired this ‘self-evident’ ontological function ‘of its own accord’, so to speak; indeed it has done so within the horizon of the way it is ordinarily understood, and it has maintained itself in this function to this day. (SZ 18)

Heidegger promises something different:

In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. (SZ 18)

The distinction between temporal and eternal being, familiar from the history of philosophy, is said to cover up the essential temporality of being.

If Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if, indeed, its various modes and derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself (and not merely entities, let us say as entities ‘in time’) is thus made visible in its ‘temporal’ character. But in that case, temporal’ can no longer mean simply ‘being in time’. Even the ‘non-temporal’ and the ‘supra-temporal’ are ‘temporal’ with regard to their Being, and not just privatively by contrast with something ‘temporal’ as an entity ‘in time’, but in a positive sense, though it is one which we must first explain. (SZ 18-19)

It is therefore to be expected that the Task of Destroying od Dismantling the History of Ontology should be part of Heidegger's project.
Par. 6
addresses this task and outlines the program for such a destruction. Heidegger speaks here of the historicity of Dasein. We shall return to it in a later chapter and pass over it here: the basic point is simple enough: we are caught up in a tradition that tends to determine the way we see and understand. More especially our ontological speculation is governed by such an inheritance, which should not be simply accepted or rejected, but needs to be questioned. Three stages are marked by Heidegger in this regressive questioning of the tradition:

1. Kant's discussion of time, where the schematism is given special importance. Kant is said to have failed to raise the question of being, secondly he is said to have failed to develop an adequate ontology of the subject, and finally is said to have remained too caught in the inherited conception of time. His failure to provide us with anything like an adequate ontology of Dasein is bound up with the way he remains within the orbit of Descartes.

2. How then does Descartes think the subject? With his thinking of the *cogito* Descartes is said to remain within the orbit of scholastic thinking of finite being as *ens creatum*. But this leads us back to the Greek origin of medieval thought.

3. The being of man is circumscribed by the expression *zoon lógon échon*. The problematic of Greek ontology, like that of any other, must take its clue from Dasein itself. In both ordinary and philosophical usage, Dasein, man’s Being, is ‘defined’ as the *zoon lógon échon* — as that living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse. *Légein* is the clue for arriving at those structures of Being which belong to the entities we encounter in addressing ourselves to anything or speaking about it. (Cf, Section 7 B) This is why the ancient ontology as developed by Plato turns into ‘dialectic’. As the ontological clue gets progressively worked out — namely, in the ‘hermeneutic’ of the *lógos* — it becomes increasingly possible to grasp the problem of Being in a more radical fashion. The ‘dialectic’, which has been a genuine philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous. That is why Aristotle ‘no longer has any understanding of it, for he has put it on a more radical footing, and
raised it to a new level \([\text{aufhob}^{16}]\). \text{Légein} itself, or rather \text{noein}, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand, which Parmenides has already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being — has the Temporal structure of a pure making-present’ of something. Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (\textit{ousia}) (SZ 25-26)

We should keep this passage in mind when we consider Heidegger’s discussion of truth in 7B, where he returns to the topic of \textit{noein}. Striking is how easily Heidegger here skips over the Middle Ages. I shall have to return to this point and only flag it here.

Together pars. 5 and 6 gives us something like a first outline of the projected work, where 6 gives us a summary of the projected and never written second part of \textit{Being and Time}: cf. the summary we are given on p. 40.

\textbf{Par. 7.}

clarifies the sense in which Heidegger’s method is \textit{phenomenological}. The word refers us of course to Husserl, to whom Heidegger dedicated the work, but Heidegger makes clear that he is not thinking of something technical.

The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a \textit{methodological conception}. This expression does not characterize the \textit{what} of the object of philosophical research as subject matter, but rather the \textit{how} of that research. The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves, and the farther is it removed from what we call “technical devices”, though there are many such devices even in theoretical disciplines. (SZ 27)

The phrase "\textit{zu den Sachen selbst}" has become a cliché that leaves one wondering just what things are meant and where they are to be found. Are they not everywhere?

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{aufhob} used in the Hegelian sense: preserved the essential and left it behind, cancelled it.
clarifies this: we are to return to the *phenomena*. And what are these? Heidegger appeals to the Greek use of the term:

The Greek expression *phainómenon*, to which the term ‘phenomenon’ goes back, is derived from the verb *phainesthai*, which signifies “to show itself”. Thus *phainómenon* means that which shows itself, the manifest [*das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare*]. *Phainesthai* itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from *phaino* — to bring to the light of day, to put in the light, *Phaino* comes form the stem *pha* — like *phos*, the light, that which is bright — in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies *that which shows itself in itself*, the manifest.

Accordingly the *phainómena* or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light — what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with *tā ónta* (entities). (SZ 28)

But things sometimes show themselves as what they are not. Things seem to be as they are not. We speak thus of *Schein*, illusion. But such *Schein* also rests on something showing itself, on phenomena in the first sense.

Heidegger opposes to both an understanding of phenomena as *Erscheinungen*, appearances. He gives the example of *Krankheitserscheinungen*, where what is present is a symptom that shows itself and announces something else. *Erscheinung* and *Schein* both presuppose phenomena. Think of Kant’s phenomena! In this connection it is interesting to note that the term phenomenology makes an early appearance in German rationalism, so with Johann Heinrich Lambert who understands the phenomena that present themselves to our senses as inescapably subject to certain perspectives and as such appearances, *Erscheinungen* of a reality that remains invisible, but open to scientific investigation.

But we don't need to enter too deeply into this thicket. Let us hold on to the concept of phenomenon: *das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende*, that which shows itself in itself.

1. As long as we leave open what entities we are talking about we have arrived only at what Heidegger considers the *formal concept* of phenomenon.
That concept leaves open whether what shows itself is a particular being or some essential or ontological character of that being.

2. The ordinary concept of phenomenon understands by it what is accessible through empirical intuition. But this Heidegger says is not the phenomenological concept.

3. To explain the phenomenological concept Heidegger turns once more to Kant: If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a “phenomenon” with reservations as to other differences, for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the “phenomenon” as ordinarily understood as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthetically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself (the ‘forms of intuition) will be the “phenomena” of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way — they must be able to become phenomena — if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori “inside-which” of an ordering. (SZ 31)

We should note that the phenomena of phenomenology are said by Heidegger to be more like Kant's forms of intuition than like entities such as trees or animals.

B

turns to the concept of Lógos. This is an important section, first of all because it gives us a preparatory understanding of Heidegger's theory of truth. It is also important as an anticipation of what is later said about language.

Heidegger begins with the traditional understanding of logos as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground. The guiding idea here is that of assertion, judgment:

If we say that the basic signification of lógos is “discourse”, then this word for word translation will not be validated until we have determined what is meant by “discourse” itself. The real signification of “discourse”, which is obvious enough, gets constantly covered up by the later history of the word lógos, and especially by the numerous and arbitrary Interpretations which
subsequent philosophy has provided. *Lógos* gets ‘translated’ (and this means that it is always being interpreted) as “reason”, “judgment”, “concept”, “definition”, “ground”, or “relationship”. But how can ‘discourse’ be so susceptible to modification that *lógos* can signify all the things we have listed, and in good scholarly usage? Even if *lógos* is understood in the sense of “assertion”, but of “assertion” as “judgment”, this seemingly legitimate translation may still miss the fundamental signification, especially if “judgment” is conceived in a sense taken over from some contemporary ‘theory of judgment’. (SZ 32)

But *lógos* does not first of all mean judgment:

1. *Die Grundbedeutung von lógos ist Rede* (SZ 32), The fundamental meaning of *logos* is discourse.

   *Lógos* as discourse means rather the same as *deloun*: to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as *apophainenesthai*. The *lógos* lets something be seen (*phainesthai*), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse lets something be seen *apó…*: that is, it lets us see something *from* the very thing the discourse is about. In discourse (*apóphansis*), so far as it is genuine, what is said [*was geredet ist*] is drawn *from* what the talk is abut, so that discursive communication, in what it says [*in ihren Gesagten*], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of *lógos* as *apóphantsis*. This mode of making manifest in the sense of letting something be seen by pointing it out, does not go with all kinds of ‘discourse’. Requesting (*euché*), for instance, also makes manifest, but in a different way. (SZ 32)

2. *Rede means so much as revealing what the discourse is about* (32). Aristotle explicates this function as *apóphainenesthai*. But this should not lead us to overlook that

3. *Not all discourse is apophantic.*
Consider for example: asking for something. This suggests the need for situating apophantic discourse in a broader understanding of discourse.

4. Discourse becomes concrete in speaking — *im konkreten Vollzug has das Reden den Charakter des Sprechens, der stimmlichen Verlautbarung* (SZ 32).

When fully concrete, discoursing (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking [*Sprechens*] — vocal proclamation in words. The *lógos* is *phoné*, and indeed *phoné metá phantasías* — an utterance in which something is sighted in each case. (SZ 32-33)

Can there be discourse without thus being concretely executed? I shall have to return to this question.

And only *because* the function of the *lógos* as *apóphansis* lies in letting-something-be-seen by pointing it out, can the *lógos* have the structural form of *súnthesis*. Here “synthesis” does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the ‘problem’ arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the *syn* has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness [*Beisammen*] with something — letting it be seen *as* something. (SZ 33)

5. Because logos as apophansis has as its function this pointing out of something that lets something be seen, it can have the structure of synthesis. This synthetic structure has its foundation in the apophantic nature of logos. The *kann* suggests that this is not necessary.

6. The synthetic character of apophantic logos in turn founds the possibility of the falsity and error of assertions

Furthermore, because the *lógos* is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of ‘agreement’. This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of *alétheia*. The ‘Being-true’ of the *logos* as *aletheúein* means that in *légein* as *apohainesthai* the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (*alethés*); that is, they must be discovered. Similarly, ‘Being false’
(pseúdesthai) amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up \[\text{verdecken}\]: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not. (SZ 33)

The being true of something means its being uncovering, the being false means a covering up. But precisely because of its synthetic character, this apophantic logos cannot be the primitive kind of logos. Nor can the sense in which assertions are true be the primary sense of truth.

7. Heidegger warns us **not to seek the essence of truth in correspondence.** This idea is said not to be primary (SZ 33).

But because ‘truth’ has this meaning and because the lógos is a definite mode of letting something be seen, the lógos is just not the kind of thing that can be considered the primary ‘locus of truth. (SZ 33)

The truth of propositions, just because of their synthetic character, must be grounded in some more fundamental truth. Something of that necessity is glimpsed, if inadequately, by those who, like Descartes (cf. *Rules*) or logical atomism, would ground the truth of propositions in intuitions of simple natures or logical atoms that one either grasps or fails to grasp, but which cannot be grasped falsely.

If, as has become quite customary nowadays, one defines “truth” as something that really pertains to judgment, and if one then invokes the support of Aristotle with this thesis, not only is this unjustified, but above all, the Greek conception of truth has been misunderstood. *Aísthesis*, the sheer sensory perception of something, is ‘true’ in the Greek sense, and indeed more primordially than the lógos which we have been discussing. Just as seeing aims at colors, any aísthesis aims at the idia (those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent this perception is always true. (33)

You either see what you see or you fail to see it. You do not see falsely. When you see something falsely you have already interpreted what you see; you see it as this or that. Your seeing already possesses that synthetic structure that finds expression in assertion. This means that seeing always discovers colors and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure noein is the perception of the simplest determinate
ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them. This *noein* is what is ‘true’ in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, *agnoein*, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access. (SZ 33)

Heidegger here both sketches an interpretation of Aristotle that challenges those who would claim him as championing the proposition as the most fundamental locus of truth and suggests that the eidetic intuition of phenomenology invites comparison with the Greek understanding of *noein* in its most primordial sense. But he also forces us to ask whether there really is a simple seeing of colors. Later he will explicitly challenge such a claim. And does that challenge also extend to phenomenology’s hope to ground knowledge in some pure *noein*? Is knowledge ever that pure? But this is not to call into question the claim that the assertion should not be considered the primary locus of truth.

When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering-up. The ‘truth of judgments’, however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, *with more than one kind of foundation*. (SZ 34)

C

brings these themes together. Phenomenology **should** let that which shows itself show itself as it is. That is to say, it should remove what first of all and most of the time conceals phenomena: the taken for granted. **Systematic thinking is the opposite of phenomenology** thus understood. Heidegger’s suspicion of system is indeed a key characteristic of his thinking. Heidegger understands phenomenology as a return to what is already sort of known. In this sense it is rather like Platonic recollection. Phenomenology in Heidegger's sense is thus ontology: it frees the ground on which we stand. What it discloses is transcendental truth.
The paragraph concludes with an expression of indebtedness to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and with a remark on the Härte, roughness or harshness, of the style. The adjective *hart* stands in opposition to *glatt*; the opposition between a *harter* and a *glatter* *Stil* had just been made popular by Norbert von Hellingrath in his essays on Hölderlin's sublime style, in opposition to the beautiful style of Eichendorff and Goethe. Heidegger here claims for *Being and Time* a sublime style.

**par. 8**

concludes with an outline of the whole. Since we have already discussed this outline, we can skip over it now.
4. Being-in-the-World

Last time we discussed the second chapter of the introduction. We spent most of the time on par. 7, especially on section B, where Heidegger analyzes the concept of *lógos* with reference to Aristotle. Let me repeat briefly some of the main points:

1. Die Grundbedeutung von lógos ist Rede, the basic meaning of logos is discourse. (SZ 32)
2. *Rede* means so much as revealing what the discourse is about (SZ 32)
3. Discourse becomes concrete in speaking
4. Because *lógos* as *apóphansis* has as its function this pointing out of something that lets something be seen, it can have the structure of *synthesis*.
5. The synthetic character of apophantic logos in turn founds the possibility of the *truth* and *falsity* of assertions. The false logos presents something as what it is not.
6. Not all discourse is apophantic in this sense.
7. We need to situate apophantic discourse in a broader understanding.
8. Because this apophantic logos is a definite mode of letting things be seen, it cannot be the primary locus of truth.
9. More originally true for Aristotle are *aísthesis* and especially a pure *noesis*. Such *noesis* is the goal of phenomenology.
10. Important here is the stated need to found the truth of assertions in a more fundamental understanding of truth.

Part One. Chapter One.

Par. 9

Having established the priority of Dasein in the Introduction Heidegger begins his discussion by calling attention to the fact that the being of this being is always "my own," *je meines*. It is my own being that is to provide access to the meaning of being. Implicit in such consideration of my own being is a recognition of something like distance: to be for Dasein is to relate oneself to oneself. The word “apperception” gestures in the same direction.

Developing this understanding Heidegger arrives at a twofold characterization of Dasein.
1. The essence of Dasein lies in its Existen<\textsuperscript{z}\. Dasein is not just an entity, such as a rock or a blade of grass. To be sure, every Dasein is also a thing that can be located in a here and now. But that does not capture its essence. Nor do we do justice to this essence when we say that it is essentially for itself. To be thus for itself means also for Dasein to face its future being as a possibility it can just let happen or truly appropriate and make its own. Dasein faces not just facts but possibilities. Characteristics of Dasein refer thus to possible modes in which it can be, which raises the question: what does “possible” mean here? Not everything that is logically possible is possible for me. How then does existential relate to logical possibility? We shall have to return to that question.

2. Dasein ist je meines

The manner in which Dasein is mine has always already been decided in some way or other (SZ 43). Dasein thus faces its own being as something for which it can assume responsibility or it can allow itself to be carried along by what one says and does. As Heidegger puts it, because Dasein faces its own being as its ownmost possibility it can gain or lose itself.

And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic — that is, something of its own — can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (the expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in the fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity. (SZ 42-43)

The word choice is puzzling: Heidegger immediately insists that inauthenticity should not be understood here to imply a lower or lesser level of being; but must he not invite such misunderstanding by opposing authenticity to inauthenticity. The first would seem to carry a normative connotation: is it not in some sense better to be authentic rather than inauthentic? The cited passage would seem to discourage such a reading. But if so, why
choose these words? Authenticity, as we shall see, does carry, despite the above remark, even with Heidegger, a normative charge.

If Dasein exists always as having seized a particular possibility, this raises the question of where should we look. **What will offer the most adequate access to Dasein?** We may be tempted to answer that this should not matter: since we are interested in the structures constitutive of Dasein, any particular Dasein should do. Could we then begin by examining the being of a scientist, e.g.? Or that of an artist? Or would looking at these forms of life invite misunderstanding? Heidegger at any rate insists on the indifferent first of all and most of the time. He invokes everydayness, *Alltäglichkeit* (SZ 43), in a way that invites comparison with Wittgenstein’s inquiries in the *Philosophical Investigations*. But this turn to everydayness re-raises the question: where should we look? In a way that looks back to Aristotle, Heidegger tends to privilege the craftsmen. But why focus on him? And how does he encounter things?

The paragraph concludes by returning to the already touched on distinction between categories and existentials (SZ 44) and a suggestion that the analytic of Dasein is hardly less important than the inquiry into the meaning of being. Many readers have indeed felt that this is what gives the book as we have it its importance. *Being and Time* thus invites the reader to understand it as providing the foundation for a philosophical anthropology, which in turn would be foundational for such diverse disciplines as psychology and theology.

**Par. 10**

This rather sketchy paragraph picks up on the concluding sentences of the preceding paragraph. Heidegger now distinguishes fundamental ontology, i.e. the analytic of Dasein, from anthropology, psychology, and biology. The distinction should pose no difficulty. It parallels that between ontological and ontic.

The paragraph begins with a look at some philosophical efforts that might be thought to parallel Heidegger’s:

1. Descartes is said by Heidegger to have left the meaning of the *sum* in *cogito ergo sum* obscure. Being, he insists, should not be understood as *subjectum*. 
2. Heidegger goes on to hint at both the justification and limitation of the philosophy of life, where he is thinking especially of Wilhelm Dilthey. How important Dilthey was to Heidegger will become clearer in Part II.

3. A discussion of Husserl and especially Scheler follows: here the person is no longer thought of as a substance or thing. Scheler speaks of Die unmittelbar miterlebte Einheit des Erlebens (SZ 47), the immediately co-experienced unity of our experiencing. All objectification is taken to imply depersonalization. The person is understood by Scheler as the performer of acts: Akte werden vollzogen. Person ist Aktvollzieher. But the ontological meaning of this vollziehen remains obscure, as does that of the co-experienced unity of our experiencing, and thus of the person.

Heidegger suggests that the ontology of the person is weighed down by the Christian-Platonic conception. Even when efforts are made to think beyond it, such efforts nevertheless remain tied to it. What then is this conception? In it a Greek and a Christian strand come together: Man is understood as

1. zoon lógon échon (SZ 48)
2. created in God's image (SZ 48)

Both formulations are not so much false, as opaque. Both recognize something important, the first by making lógos constitutive of human being. But this leaves the question: what mode of being are we to attribute to this logos? In this connection it would be helpful to spend some time on Plato's Phaedo.

The second formulation recognizes that human being is constituted by transcendence. But how is this to be understood? Heidegger will give us an answer in the course of Being and Time. But that answer will raise the question: does Heidegger do justice to the Christian understanding of this transcendence? We shall have to return to this question. But consider already

The idea of transcendence, according to which man is more than a mere something endowed with intelligence, has worked itself out with different variations. The following quotations will illustrate how these have originated; ‘His præclaris dotibus excelluit prima hominis conditio, ut ratio, intelligencia, prudential, judicium non modo ad terrenae vitae gubernationem suppeterent, sed quibus transcenderet usque ad Deum et aeternam felieicitatem.’ [Man’s first condition was excellent because of
Heidegger’s Being and Time

these outstanding endowments: that reason, intelligence, prudence, judgment should suffice not only for the government of this earthly life, but that by them he might ascend beyond even unto God and to eternal felicity] Denn dass der mensch sin ufsehen hat uf Gott und sin wort, zeigt er klarlich an, dass er nach siner natur etwas Gott näher anerborn, etwas mee nachschlägt, etwas zuzugs zu jm hat, das alles on zwyfel darus flüsst, dass er nach dem bildnus Gottes geschaffen ist [Because man looks up to God and his Word, he indicates clearly that in his very Nature he is born somewhat closer to God, is something more after his stamp, that he has something that draws him to God — all this comes beyond a doubt from his having been created in God’s image.] — (SZ 49)

Heidegger quotes Calvin and Zwingli to give us a first understanding of the way human being transcends itself. **Created in the image of God man transcends himself.** How is this self-transcendence to be understood? How does it relate to the temporality of the human situation. Will Heidegger’s existential understanding of transcendence, which, as we shall see, emphasizes time, do justice to what here finds expression? Heidegger’s temporal, horizontal understanding of transcendence can thus be contrasted with the Christian vertical understanding, which would have the human being look up to God and eternity. The question is related to my earlier question: does Heidegger make it too easy for himself with his overleaping of the Middle Ages? At issue is another question: can Heidegger do justice to the way an infinite God has figured in the formation of our modern world, which presupposes the Middle Ages.17

For Heidegger, both, the Greek and the Christian approach remain caught up in the ontology of the present-at-hand. Greek and Christian themes thus intertwine in the Cartesian understanding of the human being as res cogitans, which has given modern anthropology its point of departure (SZ 49). But what is the ontological status of these cogitationes? It won’t help to try to integrate anthropology and psychology into a general biology. Life must rather be approached in terms of a fundamental analysis of Dasein (SZ 50).

Par. 11

has a similarly preparatory function. *Alltäglichkeit*, everydayness, Heidegger insists, must be distinguished from *primitiveness*. But doesn't human being offer itself in primitive societies in a way that is less weighed down and covered up by culture and civilization than our own being? Why not then turn to anthropology or ethnology for help? Or should our fundamental analysis perhaps be guided by studies of the learning processes of *children*. Can we arrive that way at a "natural concept"? Heidegger suggests that the way anthropology, ethnology, or child psychology consider and compare the material with which they are dealing already prevents a look at the phenomena as they are.

**Chapter Two**

**Par. 12**

With the second chapter Heidegger turns to an analysis of being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of Dasein. Heidegger distinguishes three moments:

1. What do we mean by "world"?
2. Who is that *being* that is in the world?
3. What is the meaning of this *being-in*?

First the question: how is the "in" to be understood? I am in this room. There are chairs in this room? What is the difference? The chair can be taken out of the room, but Dasein cannot be taken out of the world. Heidegger distinguishes thus a *categorial* from an *existential* interpretation of the “in” (SZ 54), a categorial from an existential spatiality (SZ 56). Existential space is *heterogeneous* (SZ 56). The modes of being-in-the-world have for their mode of being *Besorgen*, concern (tSZ 57), where Heidegger calls our attention to *deficient modes* of concern. In this connection Heidegger introduces and offers a first characterization of the being of Dasein as *Sorge, care*, a key concept in *Being and Time*:

The expression ‘concern’ will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an *existentielle*, and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. This term has been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent ‘practical’ and economic, but because the Being of Dasein is to be made visible as *care*. (SZ 57)
Why is this existential character of being-in-the-world usually overlooked and the world interpreted most of the time in terms of *Vorhandenheit*, presence-at-hand? Why is there this primacy of assertion? Why has the metaphor of sight come to be so important?

Both in Dasein and for it, this state of Being is always in some way familiar [bekannt]. Now if it is also to become known [erkannt], the knowing which such a task explicitly implies takes itself (as a knowing of the world [Welterkennen]) as the chief exemplification of the soul’s relationship to the world. Knowing the world (*noein*) — thus functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-the-world does not as such get conceived. But because this structure of Being remains ontologically inaccessible, yet is experienced ontically as a ‘relationship’ between one entity (the world) and another (the soul), and because one proximally understands Being by taking entities as entities within-the-world for one’s ontological foothold, one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities themselves and in the meaning of their Being — namely to conceive it as present-at-hand. (SZ 58-59)

Being-in-the-world comes to be understood as a relation of the soul to the world. Practical engagement in the world comes to be understood as *a-theoretical. i. e. as privative*. In this way our understanding is misled.

**Par. 13**

further develops this point. Heidegger begins with a discussion of the subject-object polarity. Heidegger remarks on the priority granted to the *erkennende In-der-Welt-sein* (SZ 60), to being-in-the-world that knows. Nature thus comes to be understood as what is known. *Natur: das was erkannt wird* (SZ 60), The being of the knower, however, must be different from what he knows, from nature. The body cannot account for this difference. It is too much part of the world. The being of the knower must therefore be sought *innen*, within: within the subject. The question then arises how the subject gets outside the sphere of consciousness. This raises the question of solipsism, of being trapped within the immanence of consciousness. Heidegger dismisses it by insisting that knowing is inevitably founded in an always already involved being in the world. The
supposed problem of how to get outside the sphere of subjectivity to the world is interpreted as the result of a reduction of a richer experience. The fundamental consideration here is not too different from the way Schopenhauer makes the transition from Book I to Book II of *The World as Will and Representation.*

When it knows, Dasein gains a new stance towards an inevitably already discovered world. An adequate account of what it means to know has to ground itself in a clarification of being-in-the-world.

**Chapter Three**

**Par. 14**

In the third chapter Heidegger interprets the *Weltlichkeit der Welt.* What is the meaning of world? Heidegger distinguishes four different senses:

1. World as the totality of what is, the totality of facts (ontic)
2. World used to describe the being of the beings in 1 (ontological)
3. World as that in which Dasein lives (existentiell)
4. World used to describe the being of 3 (existential)

Heidegger suggests that he will use the term in the third sense (SZ 65) This is followed by a brief point concerning the meaning of "nature," which is here understood first of all as Kant or natural science understands it: this "nature," Heidegger suggests, becomes ontologically transparent only given a developed analytic of Dasein. The same, he suggests, goes for the romantic understanding of nature. The distinction between these two will call for further discussion.

The problem of *Weltlichkeit,* of the being of “world” in the third sense is to be raised, in keeping with the decision to start with everyday Dasein, by considering the everyday *Umwelt,* a term associated with Jakob von Üxküll. The par. concludes with an outline of what is to follow.

**Par. 15**

What then is it that we meet with first of all in our *Umwelt? Things.* Some of these things have a value. Things seem then a bit like decorated sheds. Is this an adequate account? Once again Heidegger takes his cue from the Greeks:
The Greeks had an appropriate term for ‘Things’: prágmata — that is to say, that which one has to do with in one’s concernful dealings (práxis). But ontologically, the specifically ‘pragmatic’ character of the prágmata is just what the Greeks left in obscurity; they thought these ‘proximally’ as ‘mere Things’. We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern “equipment”. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of equipment — namely, its equipmentality. (SZ 68)

Here we have the key to Heidegger's "pragmatism" (cf. Mark Okrent, Richard Rorty. Hubert Dreyfus).

How then are we to understand the equipment's equipmentality?

Taken strictly, there “is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially ‘something in order-to…” [“etwas um-zu…”]. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. (SZ 68)

The relationship of equipment to that totality of equipment, in which it can be what it is, invites comparison with the relationship of a plant or animal to its Umwelt, as understood by Jakob von Úxküll.

Heidegger speaks of Zeug. A good example of such Zeug would be a tool, in German Werkzeug. Such a tool is essentially something to do something with, wesenhaft um zu.

The hammering itself uncovers the specific manipulability [“Handlichkeit” — “handiness” might be a better translation] of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses — in which it manifests itself in its own right — we call “readiness-to-hand” [Zuhandenheit]. (SZ 69)

Zuhandenheit names the being of equipment. Phenomenology, as we have seen, must overcome those tendencies that tend to cover up what offers itself first of all and most of the time. These tendencies are natural, especially in the case of Zuhandenheit: When a
piece of equipment is really to hand, say a hammer, we are hardly aware of it. Or think of the shoes you wear. The equipment withdraws itself. Our focus is on what is to be done:

That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that which we concern ourselves primarily with is the work — that which is produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality with which the equipment is encountered. (SZ 69-70)

Consider — facts: logical space = Zeug (equipment): Verweisungsganzheit (referential totality). Consider also the dissimilarity — the work to be produced provides for a certain organization, it assigns to things their proper places. The work itself has the status of Zeug, think of a pair of shoes, Schuhzeug. Material is used in making the work. This is one way in which nature gets discovered, not just as something present-at-hand.

Here, however, "Nature" is not to be understod as that which is just present-at-hand, or as the power of Nature. The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind 'wind in the sail'. As the ‘environment’ is discovered, the “Nature” thus discovered is encountered too. If its kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this ‘Nature’ itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But when this happens, the Nature which ‘stirs and strives’, which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remains hidden. The botanists plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow, the ‘source’ which the geographer establishes for as river is not the ‘springhead in the dale’. (70)

Heidegger here moves rather too quickly from one sense of “nature” to another that would seem to be quite different: Natur als was webt und strebt, Blumen am Rain, Quelle im Grund: What is their being? What is the point of Heidegger’s turning here to familiar poetic clichés? Is the category of the ready-to-hand appropriate? Heidegger seems to suggest that it is, but the examples chosen suggest otherwise. Earlier he had spoken of the need to found a “romantic” understanding of nature in a developed analytic of Dasein. (SZ 65) That remains a task. But it is not taken up here. As a result the matter is left unclear. I would suggest that both Vorhandenheit and Zuhandheit prove
inadequate: a third category is needed. But here Heidegger perhaps hints, but fails to
tackle such inadequacy. He will do so in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” The account
offered in Being and Time is in need of revision. And much more would seem to be
involved than just expanding the account we are given.

The work is zuhanden, to hand, in a public world. At the same time the
Umwelt natur is discovered.

Heidegger warns against an understanding of the ready-to-hand as the
subjectively colored present-at-hand.

But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking
them, as if we were talking such ‘aspects’ into the ‘entities’ which we
proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally
present-at-hand in itself were ‘given subjective colouring’ in this way. (SZ
71)

First of all and most of the time we encounter things as ready-to-hand. That can be
granted. But does this temporal priority entail an ontological priority? The following
passage invites questioning:

Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’
are defined ontologico-categorically. Yet only by reason of something
present-at-hand, ‘is there’ anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow,
however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand is
ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand. (71)

How are we to understand Heidegger’s claim that as Zeug the hammer shows itself as the
thing it really is ‘in itself’? Just how is the priority of Zuhandenheit over
Vorhandenheit to be understood? We can grant the former a certain temporal priority.
But on reflection, must we not agree that only by reason of something present-at-hand, ‘is
there’ anything ready-to-hand? And does this more reflective approach to things not
provide us with a more adequate access to their being? But what is the measure here of
adequacy?

Heidegger concludes this par. with a question that prepares for the following
discussion:

But even if, as our ontological Interpretation proceeds further, readiness-to-
hand should prove itself the kind of Being characteristic of these entities
which are proximally discovered within-the-world, and even if its primordiality as compared with pure presence-at-hand can be demonstrated, have all these explications been of the slightest help towards understanding the phenomenon of world ontologically? In interpreting these entities within-the-world, however, we have always ‘presupposed’ the world. Even if we join them together, we still do not get anything like the ‘world’ as their sum. If then, we start with the Being of these entities, is there any avenue that will lead us to exhibiting the phenomenon of the world? (SZ 72)
5. The World

Last time we turned to Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of Dasein. We asked how the "in" is to be understood. Heidegger distinguishes a categorial from an existential interpretation of the “in” (SZ 54), a categorial from an existential spatiality (SZ 56). The modes of being-in-the-world have for their mode of being Besorgen, concern. In this connection Heidegger introduces and offers a first characterization of the being of Dasein as Sorge, care.

Heidegger points out that this existential character of being-in-the-world is usually overlooked as the world is interpreted in terms of Vorhandenheit, presence-at-hand. Being-in-the-world comes to be understood as a relation of a knowing subject to a world of facts. The question arises how the subject gets outside the sphere of consciousness. Heidegger insists that the supposed problem of how to get outside the sphere of subjectivity to the world is the result of a reduction of a richer experience.

In the third chapter Heidegger turns to an examination of the Weltlichkeit der Welt. What is the meaning of world? Heidegger distinguishes four different uses and suggests that he will use the term in the third sense (SZ 65), world as that in which Dasein lives, the Umwelt? In that world we meet first of all with things like chairs and cups, things of use, equipment. Zuhandenheit, readiness-to-hand names the being of equipment. Phenomenology as we have seen must overcome those tendencies that tend to cover up what offers itself first of all and most of the time. These tendencies are natural, especially in the case of Zuhandenheit: When a piece of equipment is really to hand, say a hammer, it withdraws itself. What we focus on is what is to be done: the work provides for organization, assigns to things their proper places. The work to be done itself often has the status of Zeug, equipment, think of a pair of shoes, Schuhzeug. Material is used in making the work. This is one way in which nature gets discovered. Heidegger here, as we saw, moves rather too quickly to another sense of "nature."

In this connection I suggested that the categories Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit prove inadequate to the being of nature as it presents itself, e.g. in romantic poetry. In Being and Time Heidegger hints at, but fails to address such inadequacy. He will do so in “The Origin of the Work of Art.”
Heidegger's Being and Time

Heidegger points out that the work is to hand in a public world. I asked: how we are to understand Heidegger’s claim that as Zeug the hammer shows itself as the thing it really is. We should raise the question: just how is the priority of Zuhandenheit over Vorhandenheit to be understood? The temporal priority is readily granted, i.e. in the order of knowing Zuhandenheit precedes Vorhandenheit. But does this translate into ontological priority, i.e. does it also come first in the order of being. But what is the meaning of being? Until that has become clear, the answer must remain obscure.

Par. 16

To lead us to the world phenomenon Heidegger focuses on a particular type of Zeug: a tool that is broken, material that cannot be used. These are disturbances in the context of Zuhandenheit: Verweisungsstörungen. He discusses three such disturbances:

1. Conspicuousness (Auffälligkeit): I am trying to make something: an essential piece is missing. I now no longer know what to do with the materials that are now just lying around, conspicuous in their current uselessness. In a sense they lose their Zuhandenheit: they are zuhanden in a deficient mode. And the more desperately I look for the missing piece, the more aware I am of what now lies uselessly on the table. Die pure Vorhandenheit meldet sich am Zeug. Pure presence at hand announces itself in equipment.

2. Obtrusiveness (Aufdringlichkeit)

There is nothing to be done. I can't fix it now. I stand before it, not knowing what to do. The discussion of these deficient modes is of great significance in that it suggests the origin of the theoretical attitude. It arises in a ratloses Davorstehen (SZ 73), in losing one's way (cf. in this connection Wittgenstein’s remark that philosophical problems have the form, “I have lost my way” and Aristotle’s location of the origin of philosophy in wonder). What I thus confront, not knowing what to do, becomes obtrusive in its presence. Heidegger speaks of the Nur-noch-Vorhandensein eines Zuhandenen, the merely being present-at-hand of the ready-to-hand.

Heidegger adds a third kind of example:

3. Obstinacy (Aufsässigkeit)

Say, you are in a hurry and have to pass through a toll booth. The driver in the car in front of you is fumbling for coins as you impatiently wait. You have no time for this sort
of thing — as the minutes pass. This is the sort of thing Heidegger has in mind when he speaks of the obstinacy of things.

In all these cases Vorhandenheit makes an appearance, but it remains tied to the Zuhandeneit of Zeug. Zuhandenes loses in a certain way its Zuhandeneit. It become present in its current uselessness. This Störung der Verweisung, disturbance of the assignment or context of use, makes the Verweisung explicit. Dislocation has a revelatory function! The Zeugzusammenhang of exquipmental context discloses itself as a whole (SZ 74). With this the world announces itself, but how the world is to be understood remains obscure.

Par. 17

The world may be understood as something like the totality of these contexts, the context of such contexts. To clarify this further Heidegger turns to a particular kind of Zeug, one whose purpose it is to refer, to a sign.

We shall again take as our point of departure the Being of the ready-to-hand, but this time with the purpose of grasping the phenomenon of reference or assignment more precisely. We shall accordingly attempt an ontological analysis of a kind of equipment in which one may come across such ‘references’ in more senses than one. We come across ‘equipment’ in signs. The word “sign” designates many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for ‘characterizing’ any entity whatever. (SZ 77)

Take a traffic sign; Heidegger speaks of the turning signal of a car. Such signs offer orientation in a context. To this context belong the street, the cars, pedestrians, etc.:

A sign is not a Thing that stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself. In a symptom or a warning-signal ‘what is coming’ ‘indicates itself’, but not in the sense of something merely occurring, which comes as an addition to what is
already present-at-hand; ‘what is coming’ is the sort of thing which we are ready for, or which we ‘weren’t ready for’ if we have been attending to something else. In signs of something that has happened already, what has come to pass and run is course becomes circumspectively accessible. A sign to mark something indicates what one is ‘at’ at ay time. Signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives, where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something (SZ 80)

Signs may have been established by us. There are conventional signs. But there are also natural signs. Thus the south-wind may be a sign of rain; so understood it is not something present-at-hand: *Der Südwind zunächst nie vorhanden*. Once again Heidegger resists an interpretation that would give priority to *Vorhandenheit*. He also invites us to reflect on the ontological significance of reliance on the *zunächst*, the first of all.

But, one will protest, *that which* gets taken as a sign must first have become accessible in itself and apprehended before the sign gets established. Certainly it must in any case be such that in some way we can come across it. The question simply remains as to how entities are discovered in this previous encountering, whether as mere Things which occur, or rather as equipment which has not been understood — as something ready-to-hand with which we have hitherto not know ‘how to begin’, and which has accordingly kept itself veiled from the purview of circumspection. *And here again, when the equipmental characters of the ready-to-hand are still circumspectively undiscovered, they are not to be interpreted as bare Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just present-at-hand and no more.* (SZ 81)

Interesting is the note on the function of signs in *primitive cultures* — it raises the question: *in just what sense is Heidegger’s fundamental ontology "fundamental"?*

One might be tempted to cite the abundant use of ‘signs’ in primitive Dasein, as in fetishism and magic, to illustrate the remarkable role which they play in everyday concern when it comes to our understanding of the world. (SZ 81)
But Heidegger has already warned us not to look for support for his fundamental ontology to primitive cultures. But on closer inspection it becomes plain that to interpret fetishism and magic by taking our clue from the idea of signs in general is not enough to enable us to grasp the kind of ‘Being-ready to-hand’ which belongs to entities encountered in the primitive world. With regard to the sign-phenomenon, the following Interpretation may be given: for primitive man, the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute for what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always is what it indicates. (SZ 81-82)

The belief in the presence of Christ in the bread and wine of the sacrament might be an example of such a primitive understanding. But take something closer to our everyday: eating a piece of bread. Can we understand the bread as equipment, as ready-to-hand Zeug?

Important is the suggestion that the entire analysis of being as Zuhandenheit may be inadequate to an interpretation of primitive Dasein. (SZ 82) What does this tell us about Heidegger’s own enterprise? In what sense does Zuhandenheit provide us with anything like an ontological ground? Too many Heidegger interpreters have taken the priority of Zuhandenheit rather uncritically for granted. But what kind of priority belongs to it? How relative is it to his historical situation? And what does this have to do with the problem of truth?

Par. 18

The following paragraph poses some terminological difficulties, but its main points should be clear enough. Zuhandenes is constituted by Zuhandenheit, which has the Struktur der Verweisung. What is the ready-to-hand good for? What is its point? The ready-to-hand thus cannot be separated from world; it inevitably has its place in our world:

In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand is earlier than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils
and outlying lands. But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there is no further involvement: this “towards-which” is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of being, worldhood itself belongs. (SZ 84)

Take a hammer: to understand it is to know what it is good for, how it is to be used. But we can ask the question once more with respect to the practice that demanded use of the hammer: what is it good for? We are finally led to an understanding of Dasein's way of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger characterizes the being of the to-hand as *Bewandtnis*, translated as “involvement” (SZ 84). The hammer, e.g. refers us to the activity of hammering, to which it is suited in a specific way. Heidegger thus understands *Bewendenlassen* as letting something ready-to-hand be the thing it is. But suppose I see a stone as a tool for hammering, a ready-to-hand. Do I let it be the thing it is?

Interesting is the interpretation of "an sich" as always presupposing a particular understanding of the world, which brings with it a particular mode of access to things:

*Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves [in seinem An-sich].* (SZ 87)

The remarks on a possible inadequacy of the category of the ready-to-hand must be kept in mind here.

Heidegger summarizes what has been achieved:

Within our present field of investigations the following structures and dimensions of ontological problematics, as we have repeatedly emphasized, must be kept in principle distinct: 1. The Being of those entities within-the-world which we proximally encounter — readiness-to-hand; 2. the Being of those entities which we can come across and whose nature we can determine if we discover them in their own right by going through the entities proximally encountered — presence-at-hand; 3. The
Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all — the worldhood of the world. (SZ 88)

The worldhood of the world invites understanding as a web of relations, but Heidegger warns us that such an understanding does violence to what is to be understood in that it levels the phenomenon of the world to too great a degree.

B

In the B part of the chapter Heidegger turns to Descartes to provide what he terms negative support for the positive analysis he has provided. The section begins, as so often with Heidegger, with a prospective statement of what is to follow.

Par. 19

The par. examines the determination of the world as res extensa. Res extensa is distinguished from res cogitans. Heidegger notes he ambiguity of the term “substance,” which means sometimes a substance, sometimes substantiality. (We should note that it shares this ambiguity with “Dasein,” as Heidegger uses it.) Substance becomes accessible through attributes, such as the attribute extensa.

Thus what makes up the Being of the res corporea is the extensio: that which is omnimodo divisibile, figurabile et mobile (that which can change itself by being divided, shaped, or moved in any way), that which is capax mutationum — that which maintains itself (remanet) through all these changes. In any corporeal Thing the real entity is what is suited for thus remaining constant [ständigen Verbleib], so much so, indeed that this is how the substantiality of such a substance gets characterized. (SZ 91-92)

Substance is understood as the abiding. Note the tendency to think being in opposition to time. What truly is transcends time.

Par. 20

The notion of substantiality is investigated further: substance in the fullest sense does not need some other being to be (SZ 92). God, understood as ens perfectissimum is that substance. Every other being is ens creatum (SZ 92). An infinite gap separates God
from creatures. *Res cogitans* and *res extensa* are privileged, however, in that they depend on no finite substance (SZ 92).

Consider now the following propositions:

1. God is
2. I am
3. The table is
4. Extended substance is

How is the word "to be" used in each case? Univocally? We seem to be back with the problem of analogy. But in his understanding of being Descartes is said to remain behind the medievals:

In working out this problem ontologically, Descartes is always far behind the Schoolmen; indeed he evades the question, “… nulla eius <substantiae> nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quae Deo et creatures sit communis. This evasion is tantamount to his failing to discuss the meaning of Being which the idea of substantiality embraces, or the character of the ‘universality’ which belongs to this signification. (SZ 93)

Descartes says something similar about the word *causa*. We are not in possession of a clear and distinct understanding of the meaning of the term that would allow us to apply it to events here on earth and to the way God is said to be cause of the world or *causa sui*. He gives us an interesting analogy. The two uses of the word cause are related as an inscribed polygon is to the circle. (Letter to Chanut of June 16, 1647). And I would suggest that something similar must be said when we ascribe causality to ourselves as free responsible actors.

Descartes not only evades the ontological question of substantiality altogether; he also emphasizes explicitly that substance as such — that is to say substantiality — is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset [vorgängig]. “Verumtamen non potest substantia primum animadverti ex hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit…”

“Being’ itself does not affect us, and therefore cannot be perceived. ‘Being is not a real predicate,’ says Kant, who is merely repeating Descartes’ principle. (SZ 94)
The whole problem is not only not solved, but said to be insoluble, as the discussion moves uneasily between the ontic and the ontological.

Par. 21

Descartes, too, Heidegger insists, has to begin with the ready-to-hand.

The entity which Descartes is trying to grasp ontologically and in principle with his “extensio” is rather such as to become discoverable first of all by going through an entity within-the-world which is proximally ready-to-hand — Nature. (95)

But instead of exhibiting the phenomenon of world, Heidegger suggests, Descartes leaps over it.

The only genuine access to them [the things that make up nature] lies in knowing [Erkennen], intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are. Accordingly that which can be shown to have the character of something that constantly remains (as remanens capax mutationum), makes up the real Being of those entities of the world which get experienced. (SZ 95-96)

What kind of access does Descartes then offer us to nature? Presupposed is an understanding of being as enduring presence-at-hand; also a certain understanding of what it is to really know something. Knowing is comprehending, and the latter should be understood in terms of its root, like the German begreifen. What we can grasp is not the evanescent, but the permanent. Objectivity and comprehensibility become the measure of being. The theme of being against time that dominates traditional ontology has its foundation in this desire to grasp, to comprehend, hold on, which is of course much older than Descartes. In it human self-assertion, a will to power — a theologian might want to
Heidegger's *Being and Time*

speak of pride — find expression. By his ontology Descartes would render us the masters and possessors of nature. Traditional ontology and technology belong together. The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribed for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right — an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand. Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp. In this way Descartes explicitly switches over philosophically from the development of traditional ontology to modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations. (SZ 96)

The privilege accorded to *noein* is a corollary, which in turn calls for the **devaluation of aisthesis**.

Under the unbroken ascendance of the traditional ontology, the way to get a genuine grasp of what really is [*des eigentlichen Seienden*] has been decided in advance: it lies in *noein* — ‘beholding’ in the widest sense [*der “Anschaung” im weitesten Sinne*]; *dianoein* or ‘thinking’ is just a more fully achieved form of *noein* and is founded upon it. Sensation (*aesthesis*), as opposed to *intellectio*, still remains possible as a way of access to entities by a beholding which is perceptual in character; but Descartes presents his ‘critique’ of it because he is oriented ontologically by these principles. (SZ 96)

The discussion invites a reconsideration of the discussion of *logos* in 7 B.

Uncritically relying on the tradition, Descartes, Heidegger claims, has blocked a more adequate understanding of the being of the world. In a footnote, later added to the GA edition of SZ, Heidegger points out that the Descartes critique was included here as a veiled critique of Husserl's project.
By taking his basic ontological orientation from traditional sources and not subjecting it to positive criticism, he [Descartes] has made it impossible to lay bare any primordial ontological problematic of Dasein; this has inevitably obstructed his view of the phenomenon of the world, and has made it possible for the ontology of the world to be compressed into that of certain entities within-the-world. The foregoing discussion should have proved this. (SZ 98)

There is to be sure an obvious objection:

One might retort, however, that even if in point of fact both the problem of the world and the Being of the entities encountered environmentally as closest to us remain concealed, Descartes has still laid the basis for characterizing ontologically that entity within-the-world upon which, in its very Being, every other entity is founded — material Nature. This would be the fundamental stratum upon which all the other strata of actuality within-the-world are built up. The extended Thing as such would serve, in the first instance, as the ground for those definite characters which show themselves, to be sure, as qualities, but which ‘at bottom’ are quantitative modifications of the modes of the *extensio* itself. These qualities, which are themselves reducible, would provide the footing for such specific qualities as “beautiful”, “ugly”, ‘in keeping,” “not keeping,” “useful”, “useless”. If one is oriented primarily by Thinghood, these later qualities must be taken as non-quantifiable value-predicates by which what is in the first instance just a material Thing, gets stamped as something good. But with this stratification, we come to those entities which we have characterized ontologically as equipment ready-to-hand. The Cartesian analysis of the ‘world’ would thus enable us for the first time to build up securely the structure of what is proximally ready-to-hand; all it takes is to round out the Thing of nature until it becomes a full-fledged Thing of use, and this is easily done. (SZ 98-99)

To be sure, this admits that there is a sense in which equipment is closer to us than the objects that occupy natural science, but this proximity should not be confused with ontological priority. Indeed, to repeat the question, how is that priority to be established?
Particularly interesting are Heidegger’s remarks on value:

But even pre-phenomenological experience shows that in an entity which is supposedly a Thing, there is something that will not become fully intelligible through Thinghood alone. Thus the Being of Things has to be rounded out. What, then, does the Being of value or their ‘validity’ [“Geltung”] (which Lotze took as a mode of ‘affirmation’) really amount to ontologically? And what does it signify ontologically for Things to be ‘invested’ with values in this way? (99)

Note the connection between the problem of value and the problem of the thing-in-itself.

The four questions raised at the end of this par. point to what is at issue:

1. Why was the phenomenon of the world passed over at the beginning of the ontological tradition which has been decisive for us (explicitly in the case of Parmenides), and why has this passing over kept constantly recurring?
2. Why is it that, instead of the phenomenon thus passed over, entities within-the-world have intervened as an ontological theme?
3. Why are these entities found in the first instance in ‘Nature’?
4. Why has recourse been taken to the phenomenon of value when it has seemed necessary to round out such an ontology of the world?

(100)

These questions will have to be answered, if Heidegger’s challenge to the traditional ontology of the world is to be seen as justified.

C

The chapter's final part is given to an analysis of the spatiality of Dasein. The prospective summary that once again introduces the discussion need not detain us.

Par. 22

Given the preceding discussion, the following analysis in terms of place (Platz) and region (Gegend) is to be expected. Regions get their unity through activities: think of a
workshop, a kitchen, a village as regions. Things have their proper places or are out of place in such region.

Equipment has its place [Platz], or else it ‘lies around’; this must be distinguished in principle from just occurring at random in some spatial position. When equipment for something or other has its place, this place defines itself as the place of this equipment — as one place of a whole totality of places directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the context of equipment that is environmentally ready-to-hand. Such a place and such a multiplicity of places are not to be interpreted as the “where” of some random Being-present-at-hand of Things. In each case the place is the definite ‘there’ or ‘yonder’ [“Dort” und “Da”] of an item of equipment which belongs somewhere. (SZ 102)

This is not at all the homogeneous space of Euclid or Descartes. Space is experienced here as heterogeneous, in terms of places.

But in general the “whither” to which the totality of places for a context of equipment gets allotted, is the underlying condition which makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can be placed. This “whither”, which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in our concernful dealings, we call the “region”. (SZ 103)

Aristotle is closer to such a regional understanding of space than, say, Descartes or Newton. Similarly a medieval mappa mundi is closer to such a regional understanding of space than, say, a modern map. Modern cosmology and cartography presuppose a reduction of experience and with it a homogenization of space. But "reduction" here cannot mean simply "loss." There is also a significant gain.

Par. 23

The being that I am is in the world by dealing with it, using tools, etc. To deal with the world is to get in touch with it in some way or other. A tendency towards nearness is thus said to be constitutive of Dasein (SZ 105).

We use the expression “deseverance” [Ent-fernung] in a signification that is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein’s
being — a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factual mode. “De-severing” amounts to making the farness vanish — that is making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness. (SZ 105)

As old as humanity is this desire to being things close. Revolutions in transportation and communication have meant an ever progressing loss of both distance and proximity. Think of the way radio, television, and computers have brought things ever closer. Heidegger calls the consequences of this development noch nicht übersehbar (105): We are unable to foresee what brave new world is awaiting us. One thing deseverance would seem to entail is a loss of genuine intimacy.

The second term Heidegger uses to characterize the spatiality of Dasein is Ausrichtung, which suggests both orientation and directionality.

Out of this directionality arise the fixed directions of right and left. Dasein constantly takes these directions along with it, just as it does its deseverances. Dasein’s spatializtion in its ‘bodily nature’ is likewise marked out in accordance with these directions. (This ‘bodily nature’ hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here.) Thus things which are ready-to-hand and used for the body — like gloves, for example, which are to move with the hands — must be given directionality towards right and left. (SZ 108-109)

We may well wonder: **Why does the body not figure more prominently in Being and Time?** It seems to deserve a much more prominent pace in the discussion. And there is the question of how deseverance relates to this problematic of the body. Is there a sense in which the body has become less important to us moderns?

There is a related question: how relative to a particular culture is Heidegger’s analysis? Would it look different in the computer age?
6. The Being of the “I”

Again let me begin by reviewing last week's discussion. We spent most of our time on chapter 3, the "Worldhood of the World." On the whole this chapter poses few problems, once we accept Heidegger's decision to start with the world as it offers itself first of all and most of the time, in its everydayness. Key here is the turn to equipment, whose being is interpreted as Zuhandenheit.

Important here is the suggestion that the entire analysis of being as Zuhandenheit may be inadequate to an interpretation of primitive Dasein. This raises the question: what kind of priority belongs to it?

Every piece of equipment presents itself to us as good for something; it presupposes something like a context of use. In this connection Heidegger speaks of regions: the hammer has its proper place in some workshop. The world can be understood as the region of regions. As Heidegger here uses the term, it is close to the way we speak of the world of a baseball player or the world of the Middle Ages. World here names not so much a logical space, as a space of meanings. Their place in this world gives things their meaning.

In the B part of the chapter Heidegger turns to Descartes to provide what he terms negative support for the positive analysis he has provided. Instead of exhibiting the phenomenon of world, Heidegger suggests, Descartes leaps over it. Presupposed is an understanding of being as enduring presence-at-hand.

Presupposed also is a certain understanding of what it really is to know something. Knowing is understood as a kind of mental grasping and we can grasp only what has a certain hardness and is not evanescent, what is permanent. The theme of being against time that dominates traditional ontology has its foundation in this desire to grasp what is.

Particularly interesting is the suggested connection between the problem of value and the problem of the thing-in-itself. Both may be understood as supplements designed to make up for what is lost in the reduction of beings into the totality of objects (SZ 105).

Heidegger here characterizes the spatiality of Dasein in terms of de-severance, Ent-fernung and directionality, Ausrichtung. N E W S all have different weight, so do up
and down, left and right, front and back. We have here a key to what in my *Ethical Function of Architecture* I call the natural language of space.

The homogenization of space involves both as loss of distance and of proximity. Let me return once more to the way the loss of distance that is a result of the way the transportation (railroad, car, airplane) and communications revolution (radio, television, computers) has transformed our sense of distance relates to the problem of intimacy. Heidegger calls the consequences *noch nicht übersehbar*, not yet to be surveyed. I do see here a serious problem.

We did no get to par. 24.

**Par. 24**

The space disclosed with the worldliness of the world is obviously first of all not the Euclidean. There are to be sure activities that let the present-at-hand character of space, or objective space, appear. Consider a builder trying to determine whether the angles of some rectangle are really right angles or a surveyor surveying a field. The origin of geometry should probably be sought in such surveying. *Mit dieser noch vorwiegend umsichtigen Thematisierung der Umwelträumlichkeit kommt der Raum an ihm selbst schon in gewisser Weise in den Blick:*

Such thematization of the spatiality of the environment is still predominantly an act of circumspection by which space in itself already comes into view in a certain way. The space which thus shows itself can be studied purely by looking at it, if one gives up what was formerly the only possible access to it — circumspective calculation. When space is ‘intuited formally’, the pure possibilities of spatial relations are discovered. Here one may go through a series of stages in laying bare pure homogeneous space, passing from the pure morphology of spatial shapes to analysis situs and finally to the purely metrical science of space.

(SZ 112)

Heidegger speaks of a *Stufenfolge der Freilegung des reinen, homogenen Raumes*, of steps that progressively uncover pure, homogenous space,

(SZ 112)

Dasein, Heidegger insists, is not in space. It is itself spatial
And because Dasein is spatial in the way we have described, space shows itself as *a priori*. This term does not mean anything like previously belonging to a subject which is proximally still worldless and which emits a space out of itself. Here “*apriority*” means the previousness with which space has been encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered environmentally. (SZ 111)

**Chapter Four**

The fourth chapter inquires into who it is that exists in the world. We can pass over the introductory section and go on to

**Par. 25**

The par. begins by pointing back to par. 9, where a first characterization of the being of Dasein had been given. Dasein is the being that I myself am; its being is my own being. The who, then, is I myself, the tradition might have said, I — the subject: what remains the same in all my different situations, different activities, different thoughts. What is more obvious and undeniable than the givenness of this "I"?

But just what has been given?

The assertion that it is I who in each case Dasein is, is ontically obvious; but this must not mislead us into supposing that the route for an ontological Interpretation of what is ‘given’ in this way has thus been unmistakably prescribed. Indeed it remains questionable whether even the mere ontical content of the above assertion does proper justice to the stock of phenomena belonging to everyday Dasein. It could be that the “who” of everyday Dasein just is not the “I myself.” (SZ 115)

This seems to call for a phenomenology of consciousness. But just here Heidegger warns us:

If, in arriving at ontico-ontological assertions, one is to exhibit the phenomena in terms of the kind of Being which the entities themselves possess, and if this way of exhibiting them is to retain its priority over even the most usual and obvious of answers and over whatever ways of formulating problems may have been derived from those answers, then the
phenomenological analysis of Dasein must be defended against a perversion of our problematic when we come to the question we are about to formulate. (SZ 115)

But is the givenness of the I not evident. And should we not follow the path of Descartes and try to exhibit the being of what is thus given, disregarding the being of the world and of others?

Heidegger calls such an approach into question:

In this context of an existential analytic of factical Dasein, the question arises whether giving the “I” in the way we have mentioned discloses Dasein in its everydayness, if it discloses Dasein at all. Is it then obvious that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the “I” of actions? What if this kind of ‘giving-itself’ on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the Being of Dasein itself? Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says “I am this entity”, and in the long run says this loudest when it is ‘not’ this entity. (SZ 115)

Could the "I" turn out to be only a formal indicator of something that could turn out to be precisely "not-I"? Take the locution: I am not myself today. What am I saying? Does the determination of my being as thinking substance capture the being I am? Has it not lost sight of just that being?

It may well be that it is always ontically correct to say of this entity that ‘I’ am it. Yet the ontological analytic which makes use of such assertions must make certain reservations about them in principle. The word ‘I’ is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its opposite in some particular phenomenal context of Being. In that case, the ‘not-I’ is by no means tantamount to an entity which essentially lacks ‘I-hood’ [“Ichheit”], but is rather a definite kind of Being which the ‘I’ itself possesses, such as having lost itself [Selbstverlorenheit”]) (116)
The GA edition of SZ adds in a footnote: *Oder gerade auch echte Selbstitheit gegenüber der elenden Ichlichkeit*, “Or precisely also genuine selfhood as opposed to miserable ‘egoicity.’”

Heidegger insists that the "I" is never given without the world and others.

**Par. 26**

In this par. Heidegger tries to answer the question: "who am I?" once more by turning to the everyday. He returns once again to the analysis of equipment. The context in which tools are encountered is essentially a social context. It includes others. Wittgenstein's language games come to mind: they are not played by just one person. Dasein's being is essentially a being-with-others. These others are not those to whom I am opposed:

By ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me — those over against whom the “I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself — those among whom one is too. (*SZ* 118)

I am only one among others.

And even when Dasein explicitly addresses itself as “I here”, this locative personal designation must be understood in terms of Dasein’s existential spatiality. In interpreting this (See Section 23) we have already intimated that this “I-here” does not mean a certain privileged point — that of an I-Thing — but is to be understood as Being-in in terms of the “yonder” of the world that is ready-to-hand — the “yonder” which is the dwelling-place of Dasein as concern. (*SZ* 119)

Heidegger here refers us to Wilhelm von Humboldt, who discusses languages in which the "I" can be replaced by "here," "thou" by "there," “he” by “yonder.”

It is controversial whether indeed the primordial signification of locative expressions is adverbial or pronominal. But this dispute loses its basis if one notes that locative adverbs have a relationship to the “I” *qua* Dasein. The ‘here’ and the ‘there’ and the ‘yonder’ are primarily not mere ways of designating the location of entities present-at-hand within-the-world at
positions in space; they are rather characteristics of Dasein’s primordial spatiality. (SZ 119)

In this connection you might want to consider once more what was said in the preceding chapter about distance and intimacy.

Heidegger goes on to relate being-with-others to care, distinguishing two modes of care, Besorgen (concern) and Fürsorge (solicitude), distinguishing again between two kinds of Fürsorge, one that leaps in for the other (für ihn einspringende) and in this sense takes care of him, where care becomes a form of domination, and another (vorausspringende) that frees the individual. The ambiguity of the English, “I have taken care of him,” suggests the need to distinguish between two kinds of care. Cf. also two kinds of education. Rücksicht (considerateness) and Nachsicht (forbearance) are said by Heidegger to belong to Fürsorge. (SZ 122)

The fact that we are essentially with others does not mean that we therefore already know these others. Quite the opposite:

But because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least the Indifferent modes (in the indifference of passing one another by), the kind of knowing-one self which is essential and closest, demands that one become acquainted with oneself. And when, indeed, one’s knowing-one self gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or even to ‘see through them’ [“hinter sie” zu kommen.] (SZ 124)

This special effort to enter into the feelings of another is what is meant by empathy, but empathy presupposes being-with-others; it cannot be said to constitute it. Empathy “gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with.” (SZ 125)

But the fact that ‘empathy’ is not a primordial existential phenomenon, any more than is knowing in general, does not mean that there is nothing problematical about it. The special hermeneutic of empathy will have to show how Being-with-one-another and Dasein’s knowing of itself are led astray and obstructed by the various possibilities which Dasein itself possesses, so that a genuine ‘understanding’ gets suppressed, and Dasein takes refuge in substitutes; the possibility of understanding the stranger
correctly presupposes such a hermeneutic as its positive existential condition. (SZ 125)
The passage invites reflection. Of interest is the parallel drawn between ‘empathy’ and
‘knowing in general.’ The later especially demands further clarification. And what is it
to really know the other: to encounter the other as a thou? What is it for the other to
hide himself? To reveal himself? What exactly is there to be revealed? This invites
discussion of the questionable category of alienation.

Par. 27

To be with others is also to measure oneself by these others. We are uneasy about
what distinguishes us from them. This presupposes that we are to a considerable degree
ruled by them (Botmässigkeit der Anderen). (SZ 126) The normative meaning of normal
has its root in this dependence. Heidegger speaks of the dictatorship of the they:

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into
the kind of Being of ‘the Others’. In such a way, indeed, that the Others,
as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the
“they” is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man]
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see
and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink
back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The “they”, which is
nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the
Being of everydayness. (SZ 126-127)

There are no real mysteries, no real battles, no real decisions. Everything exceptional is
kept down.

Thus the “they” maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which
belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not,
and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this
averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it
keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore.
Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything
that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well
known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the leveling down [*Einebnung*] of all possibilities of Being. (SZ 127)

The "they" covers up reality, *Gibt das Verdeckte als das Bekannte aus*, (SZ 127), and it does so in a twofold sense: it covers up and it covers up the cover-up. This, however, would seem to pose a problem for the priority we have given the first of all and most of the time (or as this translation puts it, the “proximally and for the most part.”) Has this priority been rendered questionable by what has just been said? What about the questionable priority of *Zuhandenheit*? Consider this table: it is something I write on. But this understanding is subject to the dictatorship of the "they." And as such does it not cover up a more essential being? Let me restate this question in more general form as an argument:

1. Our analysis seeks to interpret Dasein in its everydayness (SZ 43, cf. SZ 50)
2. Using this as a guiding thread we claim priority for the category of *Zuhandenheit* (SZ 66)
3. *Zuhandenheit* is said to determine the being of things as they are "in themselves" (SZ 71) — *die ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmung von Seiendem wie es 'an sich' ist*.
4. Human being is essentially a being with others.
5. First of all and most of the time this means subjection to the "they" and thus a covering up of things.
6. It would seem therefore that our guiding thread lets us cover up the being of things.

But what then is authentic understanding?

The concluding remarks return us to the question with which the chapter began: how are we to understand the being If the “I”?

Important is the penultimate paragraph:

If the Being of everyday being-with-one-another is already different in principle from pure presence-at-hand — in spite of the fact that it is seemingly close to it ontologically — still less can the Being of the authentic Self be conceived as presence-at-hand. Authentic Being—
Heidegger's *Being and Time* 77

one’s-Self does not rest on an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the “they”; *it is rather an existentiell modification of the “they” — of the “they” as an essential existentielle.* (SZ 130)

**Chapter 5. Being-In as Such**

**Par. 28**

In this chapter Heidegger attempts to clarify further the meaning of **being-in.** Cf. par. 12. Let me recall once more the way this being-in is unlike the beetle's being in a box. Is being-in a relation? Consider the subject-object relation. Heidegger suggests it would be better to identify Dasein's being with the being of the "in between" represented here by the hyphen. Why? And if so, what is wrong with it?

S - O talk suggests that the object stands over against the subject, perhaps as a picture stands before a spectator. But is this adequate? Does it do justice to the way we know the world by engaging it, by using it?

The “yonder” belongs definitely to something encountered within-the-world. ‘Here’ and ‘yonder’ are possible only in a ‘there’ — that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of the ‘there’. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression ‘there’ we have in view this essential disclosedness, By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is ‘there’ for itself. (SZ 132)

Once again Heidegger returns to his understanding of Dasein as the clearing:

When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the *lumen naturale* in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its “there”. To say that it is ‘illuminated’ [“*erleuchtet*”] means that as Being-in-the—world it is cleared [*gelichtet {see a below}*] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* {see b below} itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-
hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its “there” along with it. If it lacks its “there”, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness. (SZ 133)

The GA edition adds these footnotes:
a. gelichtet: Aletheia — Offenheit — Lichtung, Licht, Leuchten
b. ist: aber nicht produziert

Dasein exists as the clearing of being, but this should not be taken to mean that it in any ways produces it. Dasein is open to things, and the same time open to its own openness to things. Consciousness means also self-consciousness, as a more traditional philosophizing insisted.

The rest of the par. gives an outline of what is to follow:

This chapter, in which we shall undertake the explication of Being-in as such (that is to say, of the Being of the “there”), breaks up into two parts: A the existential Constitution of the “there”), B. the everyday Being of the “there”, and the falling of Dasein.

In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the “there”; and these are equiprimordial. If these are to be analysed, some phenomenal confirmation is necessary; in both cases this will be attained by Interpreting some concrete mode which is important for the subsequent problematic. State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by discourse. (SZ 133)

I emphasize that the discussion of language is situated by Heidegger in a wider context.

Par. 29

turns to a discussion of Being-there as state of mind, Befindlichkeit. How adequate is the English translation? Befindlichkeit is said to be the ontological term corresponding to Stimmung, mood. Mood discloses how one stands or is situated in the world; the quality of one's life: wie einem ist und wird, how things are and are going. In this connection we may want to consider the Pythagorean understanding of the soul as a harmony dependent on a certain tuning (see also Plato’s Phaedo). Mood discloses how one stands in the world. But “state of mind” is misleading in that it invites a too subjective interpretation.
When I wrote a long overview of Heidegger’s thought before an English translation of Sein und Zeit had been published, I translated Befindlichkeit simply with situation.\textsuperscript{18}

Is Heidegger right to claim that there is no moodless understanding? Are there privileged moods? Is there perhaps a hierarchy?

The pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood [Ungestimmtheit], which is often persistent and which is not to be mistaken for a bad mood, is far from nothing at all. Rather, it is in this that Dasein becomes satiated with itself. Being has become manifest as a burden. What that should be, one does not know. And Dasein cannot know anything of the sort because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as “there”. Furthermore, a mood of elation can alleviate the manifest burden of Being; that such a mood is possible also discloses the burdensome character of Dasein, even while it alleviates the burden. A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’ [“wie einem ist und wird’]. In this ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being to its “there”. (SZ 134)

Heidegger here places special emphasis on the mood that reveals my life to be a burden, something I have to be and have not chosen. What sense can we make of this? How are we to understand this burden character of existence? I have not chosen this life, I have been cast into it. Heidegger speaks of Geworfenheit, a term that invites questioning, as it invites thoughts of Gnosticism. (cf. Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion)

Heidegger insists that what mood discloses should not be dismissed as something irrational: say I am terrified by what everyone else considers a harmless little dog:

Even if Dasein is ‘assured’ in its belief about its ‘whither’, or if, in rational enlightenment, it supposes itself to know about its “whence”, all this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal facts of the case: for the mood brings Dasein before the “that-it-is” of its “there”, which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma. From the existential-ontological point of view, there is not the slightest justification

for minimizing what is ‘evident’ in ‘states-of-mind, by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something which is purely present-at-hand. However the phenomena are no less falsified when they are banished to the sanctuary of the irrational. When irrationalism, as the counterplay of rationality, talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, it does so only with a squint. (SZ 136)

Heidegger of course recognizes that often we ought to master our moods; I can e.g. fight a feeling of the emptiness of my existence by work:

Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond the range of discourse. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods. Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first essential characteristic of states-of-mind that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and — proximally and for the most part — in the manner of an evasive turning away. (SZ 136)

But how is this to be understood on Heidegger’s terms? Heidegger speaks of a Gegenstimmung (SZ 136). We can cultivate one mood to escape another. How are we to understand this “we”? What mood are we in when we cultivate one mood to escape another? Does this mean we are finally master of our moods? But how can this be, if mood are primordial as Heidegger suggests?

Moods are said to come neither from within nor without, but to appear groundlessly as the mode of our being-in-the-world in its entirety. This mood opens up the world in a specific way, e.g. as meaningless or as threatening. Mood is what primarily discovers world. (SZ 138) This suggests that in Heidegger’s sense mood cannot finally be caused by events in the world. Yet surely something like that must often be admitted! — It was my friend's death that made me so sad, etc. Isn't there a fact here I can point to explain my mood. We shall return to this question in the next par.

Even the purest theory is said not to have left mood behind altogether:

By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand, though admittedly this uniformity comprises a new abundance of things which can be discovered by simply characterizing them. Yet even the purest *theoria* [theory] has not left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what is just present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless *theoria* lets it come towards us in a tranquil tarrying alongside…. (SZ 138)

Interesting is the reference to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which is said to have provided us with “the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another.” (SZ 138)
7. Understanding, Interpretation, Language

Last week we considered Chapter Four. In that chapter Heidegger raises the question of who it is that exists in the world. Heidegger here points out that the turn to the subject or a determination of the being of the self as thinking substance fails to capture the being I am. But who am I?

Once again Heidegger returns to the analysis of equipment. Equipment shows that our being is essentially a being with others. First of all I am one of them, speak as they speak, act as they act. To be with others is also to measure oneself by these others — Heidegger speaks of the dictatorship of the “they.” Here it is important to keep in mind that this dictatorship covers up reality. This, however, invites us to question the priority we have given to the first of all and most of the time. Does our guiding thread let us cover up the being of things?

In Chapter Five Heidegger clarifies further the meaning of being-in. He returns to his understanding of Dasein as the clearing of being. This clearing is never a simple openness; it has always already been tuned in a certain way. In this connection Heidegger discusses Being-there as Befindlichkeit, the ontological term corresponding to Stimmung, mood, translated a bit misleadingly as state-of-mind. In this connection I raised a number of questions, both about the adequacy of the English translation and about what Heidegger here is saying. Are there privileged moods? Is there perhaps a hierarchy? Heidegger places special emphasis on the mood that reveals my life to be a burden, something I have to be and have not chosen. Heidegger speaks in this connection of Dasein's Geworfenheit, Dasein’s thrownness, a term that with its gnostic overtones invites questioning. Heidegger insists that what mood discloses should not be dismissed as something irrational: say I am terrified by what everyone else considers a harmless little dog. But does reason not often or at least sometimes banish fear? Heidegger recognizes that often we ought to master our moods; I can e.g. fight a feeling of the emptiness of my existence by work. But how is this to be understood on his terms? Mood is said to appear groundlessly as the mode of our being-in-the-world in its entirety. But how then are we to understand the attempt to master some mood?
Mood is said to be what primarily discovers world. This may seem to suggest that in Heidegger’s sense mood cannot finally be caused by events in the world. Yet surely something like that must often be admitted! Often there does seem to be a fact I can point to explain my mood. How would Heidegger understand such phenomena? This calls for further discussion.

What is at issue is illustrated by Heidegger’s discussion of fear to which I now want to turn.

Par. 30

Choosing to focus on fear, Heidegger is looking ahead to the discussion of anxiety that will figure so centrally in the second part of Being and Time. What fear is afraid of is something particular in the world, some thing or person. What it is afraid for is its own being-in-the-world, even when it appears afraid for another. I am afraid for myself. And yet fear is of something specific. In this sense Heidegger can say that fear conceals our being-in-the-world, lets us be like a chicken with its head cut off. Fear is said to be not a product of the fearful, but the fearful presupposes fear. Once again this calls for further discussion: how are we to understand the arousal of fear?

Heidegger goes on to distinguish various modes of fear, Erschrecken (alarm), marked by the suddenness of the appearance of the threatening, Grauen (dread), marked by its unknown character, and Entsetzen, marked by its sudden appearance. Much later Heidegger will say that “He who is resolute knows no fear” (SZ 344). This belongs with the assertion that the authentic person “‘always has time’” (SZ 410). Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity, as we shall see, does indeed demand that he say both. It also raises questions about Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity.

On the whole this is not a particularly difficult paragraph.

Pars. 31-38 develop Heidegger’s theory of understanding and language, where special emphasis is placed once again on the indifferent and inauthentic everyday understanding, in keeping with Heidegger’s focus on the zunächst und zumeist.

Par. 31
Expected by now, but still of interest, is the way Heidegger ties understanding to the ability make something:

When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression ‘understanding something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a match for it’, ‘being competent to do something’. In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a “what” but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility.” (SZ 143)

As the understanding being, Dasein is first of all homo faber. But what does possibility mean here? How is it related to what is usually meant by it?

As a modal category of presence-at-hand possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand possibility as an existentiale is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically. As with existentiality in general, we can, in the first instance, only prepare for the problem of possibility. The phenomenal basis for seeing it at all is provided by the understanding as a disclosive potentiality-for-Being. (SZ 143-144)

The possibilities that we face are always already structured in some way; not everything is possible for us. Consider for example the claim that I saw the 14 saints dancing in Grove Street Cemetery as I was walking in this morning. In what sense could you take me seriously?

Possibility, as an existentiale, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae). In every case Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities. As the potentiality-for-Being which it is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly
waiving the possibilities of its Being, or else it seizes upon them and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasein is being–possible which has been delivered over to itself—*thrown possibility* through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality for Being. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees. (SZ 144)

This is to say that Dasein's being is always a **projecting**.

Projecting has nothing to do with comporting itself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and will always understand itself in terms of possibilities. Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects — that is to say possibilities (SZ 145).

Questions are raised by Heidegger’s appeal to "*become what you are*":

Only because the Being of the “there” receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively does not become) can it say to itself ‘Become what you are’ and say this with understanding. (SZ 145)

How would this usually be interpreted? Heidegger himself seems to have found the imperative questionable, i.e. worth questioning. The GA thus adds the fn:

*Aber wer bist 'du'? Der, als den du dich loswirfst — als welcher du wirst.* “But who are ‘you’? the one, as whom who you cast yourself forward — as the one you become.” Note the emptiness of this "elucidation." Clear is that the tension between ideal and actual has its foundation in the projective being of Dasein. I am my possibilities. But there is of course a sense in which they **are not**, not yet, and most of them will never become reality. If I am what I am to be, then what I am will only show itself in my decisions as I make them. I know my present being as a being underway, a being that transforms itself as it is being transformed.
Inseparably bound up with this projective being of Dasein is the distinction between **authenticity** and **inauthenticity**:

Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of the world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily into the “for the-sake-of-which”; that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either authentic, arising out of one’s own Self as such, or inauthentic. The ‘in’ of “inauthentic” does not mean that Dasein cuts itself off from itself and understands ‘only’ the world. The world belongs to Being-one’s Self as Being-in-the-world. On the other hand, authentic understanding, no less than that which is inauthentic, can be either genuine or not genuine. (SZ 146)

What does **genuine** (echt) mean here? What would be an example of an understanding that is inauthentic but genuine. (Cf. remark about fearing on p. 142: “Fearing- about does not lose its specific genuineness even if it is not ‘really’ afraid.” (E.g “You are afraid that some downhill skier whom you are watching on television will fall.) And what would be an example of an understanding that is authentic but not genuine?

What does Heidegger understand by *Durchsichtigkeit*, **transparency**?

In its projective character, understanding goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein’s “sight” [*Sicht*]. (SZ 146)

The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call “transparency” [*Durchsichtigkeit*]. We chose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the Self’ in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that there it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the “Self,” but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding. (SZ 146)

By linking understanding and "Sicht" so intimately to such terms as project, the traditional account of understanding or thought as a kind of seeing has lost its priority. Note the emphasis on the future in this understanding of "understanding."

Par. 32
In **interpretation** understanding does not become something different but itself. (Cf. *werde was du bist* — in interpretation understanding is to become what it is.) Interpretation can be understood as a working out (*Ausarbeitung*) of possibilities. Our understanding *bildet sich aus*, becomes more educated.

Consider a tool shed. I ready myself for work, put the hammer there. This would be interpretation in Heidegger’s sense. The usefulness of things now becomes explicit. To interpret something is to understand it as the thing it is, the hammer, e.g., as hammer, serving certain activities. Interpretation in this sense is not tied to the making of assertions, although assertions can serve and appear in particular interpretations.

… but what we have thus interpreted [*Ausgelegte*] need not necessarily be also taken apart [*auseinander zu legen*] by making an assertion which definitively characterizes it. Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets. But does not the absence of such an ‘as’ make up the mereness of any pure perception of something? Whenever we see with this kind of sight, we already do so understandingly and interpretatively. (SZ 149)

Consider Heidegger’s insistence of the fundamental role of seeing something as something. This should be compared with the discussion of logos in par. 7.

Important in this paragraph is Heidegger’s determination of the meaning of meaning:

*Meaning is the ‘upon-which” of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a forehaving, a foresight, and a fore-conception.*

*Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff strukturierte Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird.* (SZ 151)

This definition invites comparison with the young Heidegger's earlier understanding of meaning, as it appears, e.g., in the dissertation. We find there the following pointers:

1. The meaning of an object is what is true of it: an essential characteristic.

2. Meanings are rather like the eternal objects of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: they constitute facts. Such objects are like coordinates of logical space. These coordinates determine the **logical place** of the fact, its place in **logical space**. In the *Dissertation* Heidegger speaks only of logical place, not of logical space.
In *Being and Time* this logical space is replaced with a space constituted by Dasein's project: a **project space**. The understood is once again placed in a context, but the structure of this context is not provided by the eternal realm of logical meaning, but by Dasein's engaged, projective being-in-the-world.

The three terms *Vorhaben* (fore-having), *Vorsicht* (fore-sight), and *Vorgriff* (fore-conception) make clearer what Heidegger has in mind:

1. *Vorhaben* as a verb means to intend, *Vorhaben* as a noun is the intention (cf. Husserl), where *Vorhaben* can mean both the intending and the intended. The somewhat unusual *die Vorhabe* (which you will not find in the Duden or *Sprach-Brockhaus*) first of all dislocates us, lets us attend to the roots of the word; it also stresses the act. Our interpretations have their foundation in **what we are up to**.

2. What we are up to lets us look for something. *Eine Vorsicht*: Heidegger use of the indefinite article once again dislocates the familiar word, which means something like "care," making vor and Sicht speak more loudly. *Sei vorsichtig*, watch out.

3. *Vorgriff*, anticipation or fore-conception. We always already have anticipated what kind of thing the interpreted is going to be. This is presupposed even when we are surprised; indeed were it not for such anticipation we could never be surprised.

The idea of a neutral description thus becomes questionable. In this connection Heidegger speaks of the *Vor-Struktur* of Dasein. He thus offers a temporal interpretation of the being of Dasein, where special emphasis is placed on the future. The **circular structure** of Dasein, which is always in some sense underway towards itself is also implicit in what has been said.

**Par. 33**

interprets assertion as a **derivative mode of interpretation**. In this par. Heidegger once again discusses the reduction that underlies traditional ontology. This time the focus is on assertion. (Cf. par. 7) In obvious ways this discussion looks back to positions he himself once held, e.g. in the *Dissertation*.

1. Assertion is an *aufzeigen*, a pointing out; it lets something be seen in a certain way, as this or that. It focuses and limits our attention.

2. As predication it determines something, calling attention to specific properties.
3. As communication it presupposes a public space. I am always already liberated from the tyranny of the here and now by the logical or linguistic space presupposed by all communication, open to countless other possible positions.

Interesting is the aside on the supposed phenomenon of validity (Geltung), which played such a crucial role in Heidegger's dissertation. Heidegger had insisted there on the ideality, objectivity, and validity (Gültigkeit) of what has Geltung. Consider 2+2=4 (cf. Lotze). Geltung is now dismissed as a Wortgötze, an idol.

In a way that invites comparison with the Wittgenstein of the Investigations, Heidegger points out that what philosophers understand by assertion usually does not make its appearance in ordinary language.

Prior to all analysis, logic has already understood ‘logically’ what it takes as a theme under the heading of the “categorial statement” — for instance, ‘The hammer is heavy’. The unexplained presupposition is that the meaning of this sentence is to be taken as: “This thing — a hammer — has the property of heaviness”. In concernful circumspection there are no such assertions ‘at first’. But such circumspection has of course its specific ways of interpreting and these, as compared with ‘the theoretical judgment’ just mentioned, may take some such form as ‘The hammer is too heavy’, or rather just ‘Too heavy!’ “Hand me the other hammer!” Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern — laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without wasting words’. (SZ 159)

In assertion the with which is transformed into an about which. The hermeneutic-existential "as" yields to the apophantic "as." The thing talked about appears as bearer of certain properties. Par. 16 should help us to understand better the nature of this derivation, where we need to consider the importance of dislocation and its ambiguous significance.

**Par. 34**

In this key paragraph Heidegger turns to the problem of language. We should note the way Heidegger here still remains tied to traditional ontology: he still looks for
constitutive structures. Note how the distinction between ontic and ontological seems to reappear in the distinction between *Re*de and *Sprache*.

The existential-ontological foundation of language [*Sprache*] is discourse or talk [*Re*de] (SZ 160-161)

*Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state of mind and understanding.* (SZ 161)

This suggests that *Re*de names the essence of *Sprache*, that which makes language language — regardless of the particular language in question. This distinction evaporates in the later essays, as *Sprache* comes to dominate — a fact that deserves reflection. Can *Re*de be construed as a core to be recovered by eliminating from language all that is not essential?

The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world — an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind — *expresses itself* [*aussprechen*] as discourse. The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is put into words. To significations words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with significations,

The way in which discourse gets expressed [*hinaussprechen*] is language. Language is a totality of words — a totality in which discourse has a ‘worldly’ Being of its own; and as an entity within the world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. Language can be broken up into word Things which are present-at-hand. Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it articulates according to significations, has, a its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world — a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the ‘world’. (SZ 161)

The difference between *aussprechen* and *hinaussprechen* is lost in the translation, which uses "express" for both. The latter suggests a speaking that sends the spoken, as an entity among entities, into the world. *Die Rede ist existenzial Sprache*, “Discourse is existentially language.” What would it mean to deny this? Heidegger's immediately following explanation seems convincing. If Dasein is essentially a being in the world, with others, *Re*de would seem to be equally essentially *Sprache*. The essence of language is then to be *Sprache*. *Re*de should then not be construed as a core that could be reached
by eliminating from *Sprache* all that is not essential. Cf. the analogous claim: the human being is essentially body.

To say that *Die Rede ist existenzial Sprache* is also to keep in mind the communal character of discourse. Silence, listening, hearing, are all said to belong to language. Cf. once more:

The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic *a priori* structure of discourse in general as an *existentiale*. It is not a task that can be carried through later on by improving and rounding out what has been handed down. Bearing this in mind, we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance with significations; and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences. (SZ 165-166)

Heidegger here suggests how his fundamental ontology should be brought to bear on the philosophy of language.

**Par. 35**

opposes idle talk, *Gerade*, to authentic *Rede*. Here, as noted in the introductory session, an important difference between Wittgenstein and Heidegger makes its appearance.

But let us begin by looking at different types of *Gerade*: take the example of reading a newspaper — it is always the same old story. Consider the speed with which we read. We want to be informed. Had not Aristotle said: All men desire to know. Seeing and knowing are not subordinated here to some other project which they serve. There is a sense in which language and understanding here go on a holiday.

Wittgenstein invites us to understand philosophy in these terms, as an "idling" of language. Language, too, may be considered a kind of equipment, Heidegger had suggested, and in philosophical discourse that equipment is out of gear. The sphere of *Zuhandenheit* has been left behind. Why do we go on such holidays? Is it something that just happens to us or something we pursue, perhaps to escape the burden character of existence?
A second example: the chatter at some cocktail party. The power of idle talk stems from its power to let us feel at home in the world. We content ourselves with a *Weiter- und Nachreden*.

The Being-said, the dictum, the pronouncement [*Ausspruch*] — all these now stand surety for the genuineness of the discourse and of the understanding which belongs to it, and for its appropriateness to the facts. And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship of-Being-towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of *gossipping* and *passing the word along*. What is said-in-the-talk as such spreads in wider circles and taken on an authoritative character. (SZ 168-169)

How are we to tell when we hear or read something whether the words are idle talk or authentic discourse?

And indeed this idle talk is not confined to vocal gossip, but even spreads to what we write, where it takes the form of scribbling’ [*das „Geschreibe”*]. In this latter case the gossip is not based so much upon hearsay. It feeds upon superficial reading [*dem Angelesenen*]. The average understanding of the reader will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip. The average understanding, moreover will not want any such distinction and does not need it, because of course, it understands everything. (SZ 168-169)

Idle talk is thus understood as essentially groundless. But such groundlessness, it turns out, pervades understanding from the very beginning.

The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own. If this were done, idle talk would founder; and it already guards against such a danger. Idle talk is something anyone can rake up; it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed of any longer (SZ169)
First of all and most of the time we are all subject to idle talk.

This way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already established itself in Dasein. There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way, and there is not a little which never gets beyond such an average understanding. This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. (SZ 169)

Does all language then not become *Gerade?* Consider

Idle talk is the kind of Being that belongs to Being-with-one-another itself

Das Gerede die Seinsart des Miteinanderseins selbst. (SZ 177)

How then are we to think of authentic discourse? What might an authentic conversation be like? Heidegger fails to provide us here with examples of authentic discourse. Can there even be such examples?

**Par. 36**

Heidegger recognizes that part of our everyday being is a desire just to see, just to understand:

The basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency-of-Being which belongs to everydayness — the tendency towards ‘seeing’. We designate this tendency by the term “curiosity” [*Neugier*], which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception. (SZ 170)

Aristotle is said to have recognized this when he observed that all human beings by nature desire to know. Here we touch on the origin of philosophy. But Heidegger’s choice of the term “curiosity” casts this tendency, and with it the origin of philosophy, in a questionable light. That he cites Augustine in this connection is significant:

The remarkable priority of ‘seeing’ was noticed particularly by Augustine, in connection with his Interpretation of *concupiscentia.* “*Ad oculos enim videre proprie pertinet.*” (SZ 171)
The delight in seeing that gave birth to philosophy is here rendered questionable by being tied to *concupiscentia*, i.e. to sin. We find a similar tendency in Wittgenstein’s *Investigations*. Should curiosity be understood as a betrayal of the task set to us humans, a betrayal of what authenticity calls us to? Plato’s *Phaedo* comes to mind, where the inquiry of the natural scientist is presented as a similar betrayal. We are made to think also of Dante’s Ulysses. In this connection it is interesting to consider Hans Blumenberg’s defense of curiosity, and thus of the foundation of modernity, in the *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*.

**Par. 37**

The discussion of ambiguity should pose few problems. Given the analysis of idle talk, it is clear why ambiguity is inseparable from language. Reading or hearing someone, it is impossible to distinguish the authentically from the inauthentically spoken. And such ambiguity extends to all our relations with others.

**Par. 38**

too, poses few difficulties. Dasein is falling, *verfallend*, simply in so far as it is in the world, with others. First of all and most of the time we cannot help but speak and act as they speak and act. Ordinary language, as Wittgenstein understands it, is idle talk in Heidegger’s sense. What seems problematic at this point is the demand for more: for authentic speech or action. How are we to imagine it? Recall once more:

Idle talk is the kind of Being that belongs to Being-with-one-another itself
Das Gerede die Seinsart des Miteinanderseins selbst. (SZ 177)

We can understand why Heidegger insists that he does not want to suggest a negative connotation. And yet such a connotation is certainly suggested by the rhetoric, e.g. by the way Heidegger links inauthenticity to temptation.

But if Dasein itself, in idle talk and in the way things have been publicly interpreted, presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in the “they” and falling into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation towards falling. Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting [*versucherisch*] (SZ 177)
We should note Heidegger's attempt to distinguish his account from the Biblical understanding of human being as essentially fallen, which his choice of words so obviously recalls. First of all and most of the time human being would seem to be ruled by idle talk and thus shut off from authentic understanding. Authenticity is a task. And this task is hard to bear. This invites a flight away from authenticity back to inauthenticity, which now, however, because seeking to avoid authenticity, has lost its innocence. What appears here is the need to distinguish **what we can call everyday inauthenticity from a potentiated inauthenticity**.

Could one argue that there is a sense in which Heidegger inverts the Biblical account? As Heidegger uses the term, it is the world that tempts us. The claim to authenticity could be linked to what the tradition called pride. Is it not our freedom that presents us with a continuing temptation? Heidegger, to be sure, would resist such a formulation. He recognizes that freedom is hard to bear and precisely because of this we are tempted to rid ourselves of our freedom. I am reminded of one of Adolf Hitler’s pronouncements: “Providence has destined me to become the greatest liberator of humanity. I liberate human beings from the coercion of a spirit that has become its own end, from the dirty and demeaning self-tortures of a chimera called conscience and morality and from the demands of a freedom and a personal autonomy that only a very few can ever meet.”

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Chapter Six

In this last chapter of the first part of *Being and Time* the being of Dasein is analyzed as care. The paragraphs that will demand most of our time are 43 and 44. So let me pass rather more quickly over the preceding discussion.

Par. 39

So far the being of Dasein has been analyzed in a number of ways; we have, so to speak, obtained various elements. The question now is how to tie these elements together, how to join them into a whole. But in just what sense is Dasein a whole? How are we to understand the Ganzheit, the wholeness of Dasein? The idea of the whole will play an important part in effecting the transition from Part One to Part Two. The use Heidegger makes of this idea, especially the normative significance with which he endows it, demands attention and invites question.

Being-in-the-world is said to be a structure that is primordially and constantly whole.

But we may look at it more freely and our unified view of it may be held in readiness more securely if we now raise the question towards which we have been working in our preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein in general: “how is the totality of that structured whole which we have pointed out to be defined in an existential-ontological manner.” (SZ 180-181)

The question resembles an earlier and related question: how are we to understand the worldhood of the world? (Pars. 15 - 18). First of all and most of the time we have already scattered ourselves into different roles, different activities. These different projects in which we find ourselves engaged hide the unity of who we are. Suppose I were to answer: I am male, born in 1937 in Jena, Germany, now teaching at Yale? Suppose I were to extend the list? Would it capture my wholeness? How then are we to understand the wholeness of Dasein? Heidegger rejects the architectural metaphor:
To put it negatively, it is beyond question that the totality of the structural whole is not to be reached by building it up out of elements. For this we would need an architect’s plan. The Being of Dasein, upon which the structural whole as such is ontologically supported, becomes accessible to us when we look all the way through this whole to a single primordially unitary phenomenon which is already in this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item in its structural possibility. Thus we cannot interpret this ‘comprehensively’ by a process of gathering up what we have hitherto gained and taking it all together. (p. SZ 181)

I want to underscore: “when we look all the way through this whole to a single primordially unitary phenomenon.” What is this single phenomenon? In his dissertation Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten found in a poem’s theme the single phenomenon that makes it a structural whole. The analogy between the unity of a poem and the unity of a person derives further consideration. But how do we get hold of this unitary phenomenon?

Needed, Heidegger suggests, is a different kind of perspective. To return to an earlier discussion: how did Heidegger bring the worldhood of the world into view? First of all and most of the time the world is hidden from us by our concern for the things of the world. To gain access to the worldhood of the world Heidegger appealed to something like a hemorrhaging of the everyday world, he spoke of Verweisungsstörungen. Such a disturbance brought with it a changed perspective, allowed us to glimpse the worldhood of the world. Something similar is now needed: where in our everyday experience do we meet with such a seeing-through? Where, when, or how do we look through ourselves to what constitutes the core of our being?

Heidegger turns to the mood of anxiety. Its function is absolutely crucial. If there were not something like anxiety manifesting itself in the everyday world, Heidegger could never move to his authentic understanding. Then the idea of phenomenology as he understands it would also make no sense. Anxiety reveals the being of Dasein to be

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Care; i.e. the wholeness of Dasein as care is first of all disclosed by a mood. Once again we should note the analogy to interpreting the wholeness of a poem: what discloses it what Heidegger in his Briefwechsel mit Emil Staiger will call the poem’s Grundstimmung or fundamental mood.

The rest of the paragraph anticipates what is to follow and we can skip over it.

Par. 40

Who am I? What am I? First of all and most of the time Dasein is said to have fled into the world, to das Man. Why does Heidegger here speak of a flight, a Flucht? How does this show itself?

Dasein’s absorption the “they” and its absorption in the “world” of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself — of itself as an authentic potentiality—for-Being-its-Self. (SZ 184)

What are we fleeing from? From ourselves?

The mood that invites such a flight is anxiety. How is it related to fear? Can fear, having its focus in some particular entity, be considered a defense against anxiety? What is anxiety anxious about? Nothing?

To understand this talk about Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself in falling, we must recall that Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein. That in the face of which one has anxiety [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such. (SZ 186)

Consider

The obstinacy of the “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” means a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety. (SZ 186-187)

Die Aufsässigkeit des innerweltlichen Nichts und Nirgends: what does Aufsässigkeit mean? We have already encountered the word. Consider once more SZ 74. As already indicated, that earlier discussion invites comparison with the present one: A Verweisungsstörung was said to make the Verweisung explicit. A disturbance makes visible the context that gives things their significance. Hemorrhages in our concernful dealings with things dislocate us. Such dislocation makes visible.
How are anxiety and boredom related? Should we consider boredom the inauthentic aesthetic analogue to anxiety? Still oriented toward things, it seeks diversion by losing itself to these things.

Anxiety is said to reveal the world not to be my home:

“Being-familiar-with…” This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of the “they”, which brings tranquillized self-assurance — ‘Being-at-home’, with all its obviousness — into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world’. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the “not-at-home.” Nothing else is meant by our talk about uncanniness. (pp.188-189)

Unheimlichkeit, the fundamental homelessness of Dasein, is a theme characteristic of the period (cf. Gottfried Benn, Marxists). Could one claim that Dasein's being is essentially a being-at-home? Bachelard's critique of Heidegger deserves consideration in this connection. Consider also the later Heidegger’s emphasis on Wohnen, dwelling. Is there tension between, say, “Building Dwelling Thinking” and Being and Time? The possibility of a Marxist interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity as not constitutive of human being as such, but as a function of capitalism presents itself. How adequate would it be?

Note also the relationship between authenticity and the aesthetic category of the sublime.

I suggested already that anxiety is missing in Wittgenstein’s Investigations although in the Conversation with Waismann he professes to know very well what Heidegger means by Being and anxiety. We do run up against the limits of language, Wittgenstein insisted. What discloses itself when this happens, however, he thought, has to be consigned to silence.

Note also the parallel between the function of anxiety in Being and Time and Cartesian doubt. The cogito, too, may be said to be a core that emerges from a kind of anxiety.
Par. 41

I don't think this paragraph needs much attention. Not all meanings collapse in anxiety: I still care for myself. Caring for myself, I care for what and how I am to be. I run ahead, anticipate what is to come: what will I do? What will happen to me?

Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The phrase ‘is an issue’ has been made plain in the state of being of understanding — of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. In each case Dasein has already compared itself, its Being, with a possibility of itself. Being free for one’s ownmost potentiality for Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety. But ontologically, Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality for Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst vorweg] in its Being. (p. 191)

Anxiety reveals us to be free for either authenticity or inauthenticity. Because Dasein is essentially care, it is capable of concernful dealings with things (Besorgen) or persons (Fürsorge) (cf, par. 26). Heidegger discusses other such modifications of care: Wünschen, — quieted care, possibilities become unreal —, Drang, urge, Hang, inclination, where in the former case I let myself go, in the latter shut possibilities out. The distinctions are not very important for the central argument.

Par. 42

Heidegger supports his analysis with an interpretation of the cura fable from Hyginus’ Fabulae (probably not by him). The key elements of the fable would indeed seem to support Heidegger: man belongs to care as long as he is. Dasein has its foundation in care. And that he belongs to care has its foundation in the judgment of Saturn, time. The temporality of our being delivers us over to care: man is in such a way that his own being confronts him as a problem.

Is there anything problematic about Heidegger’s analysis? A certain de-emphasis of the role played by Jupiter or spirit should be noted. That is to say: a de-emphasis of
that in Dasein that traditionally has been said to transcend death. I would thus claim the fable as a pre-ontological witness not only for, but also against Heidegger.

Hans Blumenberg, in *Die Sorge geht über den Fluss, Care Crosses the River* raises the interesting question: why is care crossing the river when she sees a lump of clay? He interprets it as a gnostic myth. What explains her desire to create a human being is the image she sees reflected in the river: her own image. Did *Sorge* cross the river to mirror herself?

Compare *Sorge* and need or poverty in Plato’s *Symposium*.

**Par. 43**

Heidegger here focuses on the problem of reality. Much of this should by now be quite expected.

Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world. Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (*res*) which are present-at-hand.

“*Being*” acquires the meaning of “*Reality.*” *SZ* 201)

Much of what follows returns to issues already touched on in our discussion of Descartes. Heidegger’s discussion focuses on three points:

1. **The problem of the being and the reality of the world.** According to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein's being as essentially being-in-the-world, the question of the reality of the world must lack meaning.

   The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised by *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it? Furthermore, it is encumbered with a double signification. The world as the “wherein” [*das Werin*] of Being-in and the ‘world’ as entities within-the-world (that in which [*das Wobei*] one is concernfully absorbed) either have been confused or are not distinguished at all. But the world is disclosed essentially *along with the*
being of Dasein; with the disclosedness of the world, the ‘world’ has in each case been discovered too. (SZ 202-203)

The interesting problem is not the problem itself, but why there should be this tendency to see here a problem.

Our task is not to prove that an ‘external world is present-at-hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency to bury the ‘external world’ in nullity epistemologically before going on to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein’s falling and in the way in which the primary understanding of Being has been diverted to Being as presence-at-hand — a diversion which is motivated by that falling itself. If one formulates the question ‘critically’ with such an ontological orientation, then what one finds present-at-hand as proximally and solely certain, is something merely ‘inner’. After the primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world has been shattered, the isolated subject is all that remains, and this becomes the basis on which it gets joined together with a ‘world’. (SZ 206)

Once Dasein has understood itself as a thinking thing or as a brain in a vat, the question: how can it get outside itself into the world? must pose itself.

Heidegger concludes this section with a rather interesting remark about his relationship to idealism and realism. Realism, he suggests, is closer to the truth than an idealism that would found beings in a particular being. Yet idealism is right when it insists that Being cannot be explained in terms of beings. In that sense Aristotle is said to have been an idealist. (SZ 207-208)

2. Reality as an ontological problem

This section continues the discussion by focusing on attempts to prove the reality of the world by referring to the phenomenon of opposition, *Widerstand* (Dilthey). Related is the insistence that reality is only given to a *Trieb* or *Willen* (Scheler, cf. Fichte and Schopenhauer). Both views are confused according to Heidegger, although given the reduction of beings to objectivity such moves make sense: they point to the need for a wider framework than that allowed by objectivity and the reduction it involves. But a clarification of the terms shows that they already presuppose what is to be established,
the reality of the world. The meaning of Being has to be grasped through care. It is not simply presence, *Anwesen*, but presence in care and concern.

3. Reality and Care

The last section is important in that it helps us understand the way Heidegger tries to chart a way between realism and idealism.

In the order of the ways in which things are connected in their ontological foundations and in the order of any possible categorical and existential demonstration, Reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care. But the fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself it is.

Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Being. When Dasein does not exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. *In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But *now*, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities will still continue to be. (SZ 211-212)

This would seem to force us to think 'beings' as transcending "Being." But does this not also force us to think Being as transcending “Being”? And does thus not doom Heidegger’s project of arriving at an adequate answer to the question of Being?

Par. 44

The par. begins with a characterization of the traditional understanding of truth:

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There are three theses which characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been traditionally taken and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the ‘locus’ of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of the judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of “truth” as ‘agreement’. (SZ 214)

Heidegger points to a passage in Aristotle that has suggested the correspondence theory. Here is the passage in its entirety:

Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks are symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of — affections in the soul — are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of — actual things, are also the same....

Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false, while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation. Thus names and verbs themselves — for instance 'man' or 'white' when nothing further is added — are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false (De Int. 16 a 1 16)

What makes a judgment true on this account is that reality is indeed as it is presented to be in the judgment.

The passage provided a point of departure for subsequent discussions. The most famous of these, perhaps, is that of Thomas Aquinas. Note that the famous formulation

\textit{adaequatio intellectus et rei}

may be read in two ways:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{adaequatio intellectus ad rem}
\item \textit{adaequatio rei ad intellectum.}
\end{enumerate}

The speculative intellect is measured by things, according to Thomas, the practical intellect causes things and is their measure. For Thomas things are, as created beings,
measured by the divine understanding. So understood every being, as an \textit{ens creatum} is \textit{verum}. In thus sense we can speak of the truth of things as the measure of the truth of our propositions about these things.

Heidegger next calls attention to Kant, who is said to cling to the traditional understanding, \textit{adaequatio intellectus ad rem}, where the question is how we now are to understand this, given that we can no longer appeal to God to ground the truth of things. The appeal to Kant’s things in themselves is blocked by their essential unknowability. How can Kant hold on to the truth of things? Only, I would suggest, as a regulative ideal, as the idea of the object free of all perspectival distortion, the transcendental object.

But, back to Heidegger! The understanding of truth as \textit{adaequatio intellectus ad rem} has to be our point of departure, although it is attended by the other: \textit{adaequatio rei ad intellectum}.

Heidegger raises a number of questions about the traditional view: \textit{adaequatio} relates two things: what kind of a relation are we dealing with? (SZ 215) Does the metaphor of a picture help us here? With respect to what do \textit{intellectus} and \textit{res} agree?

In this connection Heidegger makes some interesting remarks directed at the logical interpretation to which he had himself once subscribed.

Must we, however, bring up here the ‘epistemological’ problematic as regards the subject-object relation, or can our analysis restrict itself to interpreting the ‘immanent consciousness of truth’, and thus remain ‘within the sphere’ of the subject? According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a \textit{Real} psychical process, and that which is judged as an \textit{ideal} content. It will be said of the latter that it is ‘true’. The real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the real thing as that which is judged about. (SZ 216)

This “about” has divorced the ideal content of the judgment from the act of judging: “this table is six feet long” — correspondence here is taken to be between an ideal being and something real and present at hand. But how does this ideal being relate to the real act of
judgment. There is a twofold problem of participation. Heidegger questions this account:

Or is the ontological meaning of the relation between Real and ideal (methexis) something about which we must not inquire? Yet the relation is to be one which subsists. What does such “subsisting” [Bestand] mean ontologically? (SZ 216)

In this connection Heidegger asks whether psychologism might not have been right when it resists such separation. (SZ 217) This of course means that Heidegger is also questioning the position he had defended in his dissertation.

To approach this problem Heidegger offers this example:

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that “the picture on the wall is hanging askew.’ This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration? What is the meaning of “confirming” [Bewährung] such an assertion? Do we, let us say, ascertain some agreement between our ‘knowledge’ or ‘what is known’ and the Thing on the wall? Yes and no, depending upon whether our interpretation of the expression ‘what is known’ is phenomenally appropriate. If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but ‘merely represents’ it to himself, to what is he related? To ‘representations’ shall we say? Certainly not, if “representation” is here supposed to signify representing as a psychical process. Nor is he related to “representations” in the sense of what is thus “represented,” if what we have in mind here is a ‘picture’ of that Real Thing which is on the wall. The asserting which ‘merely represents’ is related rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real picture and nothing else. Any Interpretation in which something else is here slipped in as what one supposedly has in mind in an assertion that merely represents, belies the phenomenal facts of the case as to that about which the assertion gets made. Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. (SZ 217-218)
To recognize this fit of perception and assertion is to be certain of its truth. The perception, we can say, fulfills the intention.

The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself, that is to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being —Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real Thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between ‘contents of consciousness’ among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered [Entdeckt-sein] of the entity itself — that entity in the 'how’ of its uncoveredness. (SZ 218)

What gets demonstrated is the being-uncovering of the assertion, i.e. its truth. This gives us a first understanding of truth: it is a being uncovering:

To say that an assertion “is true” signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (apophansis) in its uncoverness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering. Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of the one entity (the subject) to another (the Object). (SZ 261)

There are of course objections: How reliable are our perceptions? Are they not by their very nature partial? Do expectations and preconceptions not help to determine what we see? Thus we often "see" what we want to see, or perhaps fear to see. How are we to distinguish such a perhaps hopeful or fearful seeing from a seeing that discloses the entity "as it really is"? Such questions suggest that certainty is rarely absolute. Often it can be shaken by other evidence. This is recognized by Kant's definition of formal truth as the fit of knowledge with itself (Logik A 72). The necessity of such a fit may well lead us to question the reliability of perception.

But bracketing such questions for the time being: we can agree with Heidegger when he writes, "To say that an assertion 'is true' signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself," where "as it is in itself" invites questioning: How would Heidegger have us
understand it? Without an answer to that question, the whole discussion leaves us swimming.

B

The matter becomes quite different when we understand truthful assertion as disclosing and truth as disclosure. "Disclosing" already suggest a successful exhibition of the thing as it is. Unfortunately Heidegger often uses the term in a broader sense. For example:

To Dasein’s state of Being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs. (SZ 221)

Note that disguising and covering up are understood here also as modes of uncovering. But is this to say that if we are to understand the essence of truth we have to distinguish different modes of uncovering. Only some of these would seem to uncover what is as it is in itself. This returns us to the question: how are we to understand "the thing as it really is" or "the thing as it is in itself"? Must we not attend to the way it shows itself? Consider in this connection Johann Heinrich Lambert's understanding of phenomenology as "the theory of illusion (Schein) and its influence on the correctness and incorrectness of human knowledge."

Presence is always presence "for me," dependent on the makeup of my body, its location, dependent especially on the eyes; dependent also on language; dependent also on various prejudices. Consider in this connection what Heidegger has to say about the essential fallenness of Dasein:

Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. This term, like the expression ‘falling’, is here used ontologically. If we are to use it in an existential analysis, we must avoid giving it any ontically negative ‘evaluation’. To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein’s facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’. But only in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off. (SZ 222)

Heidegger’s distinction between truth in its full existential-ontological meaning and truth in its familiar everyday ontic sense raises the question whether the former can be
considered more than a perhaps necessary but hardly sufficient condition of the latter.

Buy if so, does it deserve to be called “truth” at all?

Implicit in the understanding of a perspective as a perspective, is the possibility of other perspectives, which may give me or someone else better access to what I see. When I make the assertion, "the picture is hanging askew,” I not only claim that it looks to me that way, but I claim it as a fact. How does this fact present itself? Do I see the fact that the picture is hanging askew? How does this fact disclose itself? The evidence that fulfills the intention demands more than a simple seeing, demands a particular appropriation of what is seen. Does authenticity here help us? The appropriation presupposes something like an interpretation of what I “see” as for everyone to “see.” Can this present itself to me? At this point the idea of presence begins to blur. Given an understanding of presence based on the paradigm of sight, is it not more plausible to say of facts that they are not present at all? That they are not so much "seen" as constituted or constructed from inevitably inadequate evidence? Inseparable from such constitution is a projection of what I see unto a background of other possible ways in which what I now see could be seen or experienced. Assertion of fact is never fulfilled just by what presents itself. It presupposes the power of transcending what appears towards what might possibly appear. Consider once more Kant's formal understanding of truth.

I hope enough has been said to establish this much: we cannot say that an assertion is true when it discloses. We can only say that it is true when it discloses what is as it is, where the meaning of the phrase "as it is" remains problematic.

This forces us to question the analysis of b):

“Being true” (“truth”) means Being-uncovering. (SZ 219)

Even if we admit that Dasein is essentially discovering, that does not allow us to claim that with the disclosedness of Dasein we have already penetrated to the primordial phenomenon of truth:

In its very structure care is ahead of itself — Being already in a world — as Being alongside entities within-the-world; and in this structure the disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden. With and through it is uncoveredness; hence only with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained. (SZ 220-221)
But once again we must remind ourselves: what has thus been attained is no more than a necessary condition of what we usually mean by “truth.” To merit talk of “truth, must this not be a discovering "in the right way"? — where the question of course is, how to understand this right way.

Heidegger unpacks his understanding of "Dasein is in the truth" with the following four concepts

1. *Erschlossenheit*
   “To Dasein’s state of Being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs.” (SZ 221)

2. *Geworfenheit*
   “To Dasein’s state of Being belongs thrownness.” (SZ 221)

3. *Entwurf*
   “To Dasein’s state of Being belongs projection.” (SZ 221)

4. *Verfallen*
   ‘To Dasein’s state of Being belongs falling.” (SZ 221)

Of special interest is Heidegger’s explanation of 3. To claim that “to Dasein’s state of Being belongs projection” is to suggest a need to distinguish between an authentic and an inauthentic mode of disclosure. The truth of existence is thus said to be not just *Erschlossenheit*, but *Die ursprünglichste und zwar eigentlichste Erschlossenheit*, not just disclosure, but the most primordial and more specifically the most authentic disclosure. This demands that we distinguish what here is called “The truth of existence” from what we ordinarily mean by truth.

4. insists once more on the way Dasein stands essentially also in untruth.

Heidegger follows this discussion with an account of the derivation of the traditional understanding of truth. (SZ 224-225) The B section concludes with remarks that invite us to compare the primacy that here has been accorded to disclosure with the Aristotelian account, remarks that invite us to understand the truth of assertion as an appropriation of truth understood as disclosure. The ontological condition for propositions being either true or false is said to be Dasein’s disclosedness. That can be granted, even while we may want to question that with this we come to truth in the most primordial sense. (SZ 226)
The C section returns us to the problem of realism and idealism:

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. There is truth only in so far as Dasein is and as long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. Newton’s laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatsoever — these are true only as long as Dasein is. Before there was any Dasein there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be. Before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’; it does not follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible. Just as little does this ‘restriction’ imply that the Being-true of ‘truths’ has in any way been diminished. (SZ 226-227)

Are their eternal truths? Heidegger claims that we would have to prove first that there always will be Dasein. Is this necessary? Once more the self-transcendence of Dasein will have to be considered. Is all truth relative to Dasein? And if so, how is his this to be understood? Does Heidegger do justice to the self-transcendence of Dasein?

Heidegger’s position is clear, even as it invites question:

Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s Being. (p. 227)

Absolute truth and the absolute subject are declared to be rests of Christian theology philosophy ought to leave behind:

The idea of a ‘pure “I”’ and of a ‘consciousness in general’ are so far from including the a priori character of actual subjectivity that the ontological characters of Dasein’s facticity and its state of Being are either passed over or not seen at all. Rejection of a ‘consciousness in general’ does not signify that the a priori is negated, any more than the positioning of an idealized subject guarantees that Dasein has an a priori character grounded upon fact.
Both the contention that there are ‘eternal truths’ and the jumbling together of Dasein’s phenomenally grounded ‘ideality’ with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded. (SZ 229)

Once again I would like to question Heidegger: The transcendental subject is not dismissed quite that easily.

Heidegger concludes the chapter with the question of whether Dasein has really been grasped in its entirety when it is grasped a care. The problem of the whole will continue to occupy us.
The Entirety of Dasein

Today we turn to Part Two of Being and Time.

Introduction

In this introduction to Part Two Heidegger returns to a point I have emphasized a number of times: the restriction of the preceding discussion which moves within the brackets of the “first of all and most of the time,” the zunächst und zumeist. Does this not mean that our analysis has focused on inauthentic Dasein?

And how about what we have had in advance in our hermeneutical Situation hitherto? How about its fore-having? When and how has our existential analysis received any assurance that by starting with everydayness, it has forced the whole of Dasein — this entity from its ‘beginning’ to its ‘end’ — into the phenomenological view which gives us our theme? We have indeed contended that care is the totality of the structural whole of Dasein’s constitution. But have we not at the very outset of our Interpretation renounced the possibility of bringing Dasein into view as whole? Everydayness is precisely that Being which is ‘between’ birth and death. And if existence is definitive for Dasein’s Being and if its essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such a potentiality, not yet be something. Any entity whose Essence is made up of existence, is essentially opposed to the possibility of our getting it in our grasp as an entity which is a whole. Not only has the hermeneutical Situation given us no assurance of ‘having’ the whole entity; one may even question whether “having” the whole entity is attainable at all, and whether a primordial ontological Interpretation of Dasein will not founder on the kind of Being which belongs to the very entity we have taken as our theme. (SZ 233)

Characteristic of everyday, inauthentic Dasein is precisely that it does not possess itself in its entirety. We should note how the concept "entirety" here functions. One could ask whether Heidegger here is not himself indebted, too indebted, to the Platonic-Christian
tradition. Such emphasis is in tension with the ecstatic character of Dasein, which seems to resist closure. Does Heidegger’s emphasis on entirety need to be justified?

Dasein is essentially between birth and death. By grasping itself in its entirety, Dasein grasps itself as limited and as having its end in death. Here we might ask: why the asymmetry of birth and death? Is Heidegger’s neglect of birth legitimate? Hannah Arendt later was to make a great deal of natality? Does this mean a significant correction of what one might take to be the one-sidedness of Heidegger’s account.

The paragraph concludes with an outline of the second part.

Chapter One
Par. 46

Introducing the chapter, this paragraph raises the question of the essential incompleteness of Dasein.

The inadequacy of the hermeneutical Situation from which the preceding analysis of Dasein has arisen, must be surmounted. It is necessary for us to bring the whole Dasein into our fore-having, We must accordingly ask whether this entity, as something existing, can ever become accessible in its Being-a-whole. In Dasein’s very state of Being, there are important reasons which seem to speak against the possibility of having it presented [Vorgabe] in the manner required. (SZ 235-236)

In which sense and how can Dasein grasp itself as a whole? Does to exist not mean to lack the whole. This is implied, e.g. by Plato, when he understands the human being as constituted by eros. And is the same not true of care?

The possibility of this entity’s Being-a-whole is manifestly inconsistent with the ontological meaning of care, and care is that which forms the totality of Dasein’s structural whole. Yet the primary item in care is the ‘ahead-of-itself, and this means that in every case Dasein exists for the sake of itself, ‘As long as it is’, right to its end, it comports itself towards its potentiality-for-Being. Even when it still exists but has nothing more ‘before it’ and has ‘settled [abgeschlossen] its account, its Being is still determined by the ‘ahead-of-itself’. (SZ 236)

The outline of the rest of the chapter need not detain us.
Part. 47

Heidegger seeks the key to the wholeness of Dasein in death. But how can that be? Does incompleteness not belong to the very being of Dasein? When death comes I am no longer. We cannot experience our own death. Can we make up for this lack by experiencing the death of others?

In this paragraph Heidegger argues that dying is the one thing that I cannot do for another:

Indisputably, the fact that one Dasein can be represented by another belongs to its possibilities of Being in Being-with-one-another in the world. In everyday concern, constant and manifold use is made of such representability. (SZ 239)

We can take another’s place in a line, we can even give up our life for the sake of another. But this does not mean that that other person no longer has to die. In this sense no one can die for another.

However, the possibility of representing breaks down completely if the issue is one of representing that possibility-of-Being which makes up Dasein’s coming to an end, and which, as such, gives to it its wholeness. No one can take the Other’s dying from him. Of course someone can ‘go to his death for another’. But that always means to sacrifice oneself for the Other ‘in some definite affair’. Such “dying for” can never signify that the Other has thus had his death taken away in even the slightest degree. (SZ 240)

But is death really unique in this way? Sartre rejects Heidegger’s analysis of the death phenomenon in Being and Nothingness — a possible paper topic. The coming to an end constitutes the entirety of Dasein. Death gathers all my possibilities into a whole. When death comes there will be no further possibilities for me.

Par. 48

The meaning of "end" and "whole" and "entirety" remain less than clear. We said that Dasein is essentially incomplete. Is it then, say, like a jigsaw puzzle that is missing some pieces? Like a not yet ripe food? Can the end of Dasein be understood like the end

The “ending” which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end [Sein zum Ende]. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes as soon as it is, “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.” (SZ 245)

The last is a quote from Johannes von Tepl’s *Der Ackermann aus Böhmen*. Death, as Heidegger here understands it, does not mean something that comes to Dasein and limits it from without, like some unfortunate accident, a pair of scissors, say, that cuts the thread of life. Heidegger rejects such an understanding. Being unto death means something like caring for oneself as a being that has to die and whose possibilities are therefore essentially limited. That gives everything I choose to do a special weight. To understand Heidegger’s remarks on death, we need to keep the specific being of Dasein in view.

**Par. 49**

Having established the need for an existential analysis of death Heidegger distinguishes such an analysis from others, be they oriented towards the natural sciences, or towards theology.

The ending of that which lives we have called ‘perishing’. Dasein too ‘has’ its death, of the kind appropriate to anything that lives; and it has it, not in ontical isolation, but as codetermined by its primordial kind of Being. In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though, on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this intermediate phenomenon as its “demise”. (SZ 247)

In the Bremen lectures Heidegger recognizes that circumstances can be such that they deny us the possibility of a genuine dying. In this connection he speaks of the holocaust.²²

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Of interest and questionable in this paragraph is Heidegger’s claim that his analysis leaves the matter of an after-life open: Does it?

On the other hand, in the ontological analysis of Being-towards-the-end there is no anticipation of our taking any existentiell stand toward death. If “death” is defined as the “end” of Dasein — that is to say, of Being-in-the-world — this does not imply any ontical decision whether ‘after death’ still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein ‘lives on’ or even ‘outlasts’ itself and is immortal. Nor is anything ontically decided about the other-worldly and its possibility, any more than about the ‘this-worldly; it is not as if forms and rules for comporting oneself towards death were to be presented for ‘edification’. But our analysis remains purely ‘this-worldly’ in so far as it Interprets that phenomenon merely in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being. Only when death is conceived in its full ontological essence can we have any methodological assurance in even asking what may be after death; only then can we do so with meaning and justification. Whether such a question is a possible theoretical question at all will not be decided here. The this-worldly ontological Interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation. (248)

The paragraph invites numerous questions. One question it raises is: **is authenticity possible for one who is convinced that death is not his or her end?**

**Par. 50**

discusses death as dissolving all our relationships to others.

If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relationships to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one. (SZ 250)

In being-unto-death we are said to grasp the care structure in the most primordial fashion. Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety in the face of oneself. First of all and most of the time we are, according to Heidegger, unto death in the mode of running away from it. This analysis invites questioning. Nietzsche might ask whether Heidegger by thus linking death to authenticity is running away from life? How would one position or the other be supported or refuted?

But if Being-towards-death belongs primordially and essentially to Dasein’s Being, then it must also be exhibitable in its everydayness, even if proximally in a way which is inauthentic. And if Being-towards-the-end should afford the existential possibility of an existentiell Being-a-whole for Dasein, then this would give phenomenal confirmation for the thesis that “care” is the ontological term for the totality of Dasein’s structural whole. If, however, we are able to provide a full phenomenal confirmation for this principle, a preliminary sketch of the connection between Being-towards-death and care is not sufficient. We must be able to see this function above all in the connection which lies closest to Dasein — its everydayness. (SZ 252)

Par. 51

addresses this issue. How does one deal with death? Mostly by trying to push it into the background, both for those dying and for ourselves. Are funerals defenses against death? And do monuments to the dead not have a similar function? Faced with death we flee to others.

But if we can really seize ourselves only by resolutely anticipating our death, can we in fact do so? Should we? Take the possibility of authentic self-sacrifice? Does it make sense on Heidegger's terms? In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger certainly considers it a possibility. But just how are we to think it? What kind of self-understanding is presupposed?

In setting forth Everyday Being-towards-death, however, we are at the same time enjoined to try to secure a full existential conception of Being-towards-the-end, by a more penetrating Interpretation in which falling Being-towards-death is taken as an evasion in the face of death. That in
the face of which one flees has been made visible in a way which is phenomenally adequate. Against this it must be possible to project phenomenologically the way in which evasive Dasein itself understands its death. (255)

Par. 52

develops the contrast between an authentic being unto death and the everyday encounter. To be sure, we all know that death will come some day. That we all will certainly die.

And what is the ground of everyday Being-certain? Manifestly it is not just mutual persuasion. Yet the ‘dying’ of Others is something that one experiences daily. Death is an undeniable fact of experience. (257)

But this certainty that I must die does not mean that death has been understood authentically, that it has become a truth for me.

Par. 53

is perhaps the key paragraph of what on the whole is not a particularly demanding chapter. It develops the meaning of what it is to exist authentically unto death:

How is the ontological possibility of an authentic Being-towards-death to be characterized ‘Objectively’. If, in the end, Dasein never comports itself authentically towards its end, or if, in accordance with its very meaning, this authentic Being must remain hidden from the Others? Is it not a fanciful undertaking, to project the existential possibility of so questionable an existentiell potentiality-for-Being? What is needed, if such a projection is to go beyond a merely fictitious arbitrary construction? Does Dasein itself give us any instructions for carrying it out? And can any grounds for its phenomenal legitimacy be taken from Dasein itself? Can our analysis of Dasein up to this point give us any prescriptions for the ontological task we have now set ourselves, so that what we have before us may be kept on a road of which we can be sure?

(SZ 260)
Death must be understood as always possible. And how often do we not think about our death, e.g. when we take out life insurance, when we go to the doctor, when we experience a bad accident, when a close relative dies. An illness may lead one to brood about one’s death.

Of course such brooding over death does not fully take away from it its character as a possibility. Indeed, it always gets brooded over as something that is coming; but in such brooding we weaken it by calculating how we are to have it at our disposal. As something possible, it is to show as little as possible of its possibility. On the other hand, if Being-towards-death has to disclose understandingly the possibility which we have characterized, and if it is to disclose it as a possibility, then in such Being-towards-death this possibility must not be weakened: it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it. (SZ 261)

“Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility.” (SZ 262) Seizing that possibility frees Dasein from its usual dispersal in the world, from the dictatorship of the “they,” When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one’s own death, one is liberated from one’s lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence one has achieved. (SZ 264)

Note in this connection the possibility of choosing to be no longer. This raises the question: Can there be authentic suicide?

We are brought face to face with death in anxiety, where fear of death may be understood as the inauthentic defense against anxiety.

How is it existentially possible for this constant threat to be genuinely disclosed? All understanding is accompanied by a state-of-mind. Dasein’s mood brings it face to face with the thrownness of its ‘that it is there.’ But
the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Daein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the “nothing.” (SZ 265/266)

Note Heidegger’s summary of authentic being-towards-death:

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but being itself, rather in an impassioned freedom towards death — a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the “they”, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious. (266)

With this we have some idea of what it would mean to exist authentically:

Therewith, however, the possibility of Dasein’s having an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole emerges, but only as an ontological possibility. (SZ 266)

But is this more than a fantastic construction? Heidegger himself raises this question? (SZ 267)

The chapter has sought to establish the possibility of an authentic being unto death, at least as a possibility. The question is whether Dasein ever actually seizes this possibility, perhaps demands this of itself. Chapter Two addresses these questions and with this second chapter we get a transformation, or at least the beginning of a transformation, of Heidegger's understanding of authenticity, which now comes to be endowed with something like a normative significance. Authenticity now describes a mode of existing that Dasein demands of itself.

Chapter Two
Par. 54

What then is it that in the everyday situation calls us to authenticity? Heidegger identifies what calls with the call of conscience. In conscience Dasein calls itself to return to itself, to assume itself in its finitude, its being-onto-death. What is it that the call of conscience gives us to understand? Dasein here is both caller and called. But it does not call us to a particular place. It has nothing to say. Its speech is silence. This
silent discourse would seem to be the only example of authentic discourse that we are given in *Being and Time*.

**Par. 55**

Conscience gives us something to understand. It is a mode of discourse (*Rede*). Discourse had been called in par. 34 an existential, constitutive of Dasein, together with state of mind (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding. *Rede* was said to be disclosure. But what then does conscience disclose? Does it disclose our true selves?

Heidegger grants that first of all "they" have already determined how we understand ourselves.

To any state-of-mind or mood, understanding belongs equiprimordially. In this way Dasein ‘knows’ what it is itself capable of [*woran es mit ihm selbst ist*], inasmuch as it has either projected itself upon possibilities of its own or has been so absorbed in the “they” that it has let such possibilities be presented to it by the way in which the “they” has publicly interpreted things. The presenting of these possibilities, however, is made possible existentially through the fact that Dasein, as a Being-with which understands, can *listen* to Others. Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the “they”, it fails to hear [*überhört*] its own Self in listening to the they-self. (SZ 270-271)

Today we may want to speak in this connection of the social construction of self-identity.

**The call of conscience calls every such constructed self into question.**

Dasein fails to hear itself, and listens away to the “they”; and this listening-away gets broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as such, arouses another kind of hearing, which in relation to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every way opposite. If in this lost hearing, one has been fascinated by the ‘hubbub’ of the manifold ambiguity which idle talk possesses in its everyday ‘newness’, then the call must do its calling without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. *That, which, by calling in this manner, gives us to understand, is the conscience.* (SZ 271)
Heidegger reiterates that the call of conscience is to be understood as a mode of discourse, as a form of *Rede*; indeed, it presents itself to the reader as the only example of authentic discourse discussed in *Being and Time*.

If the everyday interpretation knows a ‘voice’ of conscience, then one is not so much thinking of an utterance (for this is something which factually one never comes across); the voice is taken rather as giving-to-understand. In the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push — of an abrupt arousal. The call is form afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back. (SZ 271)

**Par. 56**

further analyzes this character of conscience as a call. What or who is the addressee of this call, *das Angerufene*? Dasein itself. And to what is it called? To its own self. The call brings Dasein back to itself.

The call reaches Dasein in this understanding of itself which it always has, and which is concernful in an average, everyday manner. The call reaches the they-self *[Man-selbst]* of concernful Being with Others.

And to what is one called when one is thus appealed to? To one’s own Self. Not to what Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in its being with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of, set about, or let itself be carried along with. The sort of Dasein which is understood after the manner of the world both for Other and for itself, gets passed over in this appeal; this is something of which the call to the Self takes not the slightest cognizance. And because only the Self of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the “they” collapses. (272-273)

The call of conscience speaks in the mode of silence and yet, Heidegger insists, what it discloses has one clear sense, is unequivocal or *eindeutig*.

**Par. 57**

seeks to clarify just who here is calling. The call comes from within, even as it overcomes me. But what thus overcomes me is not God or the moral law, is indeed nothing other than my ownmost self. This self is not at home with the they. Inseparable
Heidegger's *Being and Time*

from that call is therefore a sense of homelessness or **uncanniness** (*Unheimlichkeit*). And how are we to understand this ownmost self? Heidegger answers in the form of a rhetorical question:

Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety; and, as the ownmost elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts Dasein’s being-in-the-world face to face with the “nothing” of the world; in the face of this “nothing”, Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. *What if this Dasein which finds itself [sich befindet] in the very depths of its uncanniness, should be the caller of the call of conscience?* (SZ 276)

Dasein is both caller and called. In the call of conscience Dasein calls itself, anxious about its own being. Breaking into the world of the they from without, it does not belong to that world. To the everyday they-self; it is something like an *alien* voice. Dasein calls itself in its uncanniness, *seiner Unheimlichkeit*. To everyday Dasein, “Dem alltäglichen Man-selbst,” this call presents itself as an alien voice, “eine fremde Stimme.” (277).

But any attempt to interpret the caller as a power beyond Dasein, say God or some *daimon*, is interpreted by Heidegger as a flight from conscience.

Heidegger himself raises the obvious question: what does the phenomenon here described have to do with what we usually call conscience?

So then, only by analyzing the way the appeal is understood can one be left to discuss explicitly what the call gives one to understand. But only with our foregoing general ontological characterization of the conscience does it become possible to conceive existentially the conscience’s call of “Guilty”! All experiences and interpretations of the conscience are at one in that they make the ‘voice’ of conscience speak somehow of ‘guilt’. (SZ 279-280)

The challenge is taken up in the next par.

**Par. 58**

Conscience speaks of **guilt**. Bad conscience tells me that I am guilty. What makes me guilty? The ordinary understanding of guilt presuppose both *authorship* and *negativity*. I am either *author* of what I should *not* have done or *not* the *author* of what I
should have done. Heidegger’s existential understanding transforms this ordinary understanding: How then are we to understand his claim: *Dasein ist als solches schuldig.* In its very essence Dasein is linked to guilt, and that is to say to both authorship and negativity.

If the ‘Guilty!’ is something that can definitely apply to existence, then this raises the ontological problem of clarifying existentially the character of this “not” as a “not”. Moreover, to the idea of ‘Guilty!’ belongs what is expressed without further differentiation in the conception of guilt as ‘having responsibility for’ — that is, as Being-the basis for… Hence we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as “Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not’”— that is to say, as “Being-the-basis of a nullity”. (283)

Ontological guilt cannot be understood as resulting from something we did or failed to do. It does not present some unfortunate fall from some more primordial state.

This implies, however, that Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness [*Verschuldung*], but that, on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only ‘on the basis’ of a primordial Being-guilty. Can something like this be exhibited in Dasein’s Being, and how is it at all possible existentially. (SZ 284)

We are essentially subject to facticity and death, also essentially subject to others. We did not choose to get born, born then and there rather than in some other place, of this rather than that gender, race, nationality. Objectively considered our being is contingent through and through.

From the foregoing it follows that Heidegger would have to reject any ontological interpretation of the problem of guilt that appealed to the idea of evil.

The concepts of privation and lack — which moreover, are not very transparent — are already insufficient for the ontological Interpretation of the phenomenon of guilt, though if we take them formally enough, we can put them to considerable use. Least of all can we come any closer to the existential phenomenon of guilt by taking our orientation from the idea of evil, the *malum* as *privatio boni*. Just as the *bonum* and its *privatio* have the same ontological origin in the ontology of the present-at-hand, this
ontology also applies to the idea of ‘value’, which has been abstracted from these. (SZ 286)

Why would the idea of evil have its origin in the ontology of presence-at-hand? The same goes for the presupposed idea of good. And the same, Heidegger insists, holds for values. In this connection we may want to consider talk about “moral facts” or “objective values.” All such talk, Heidegger suggests, rests on a refusal to question the derivative ontological status of what here is being talked about. Talk of malum as a privatio boni presupposes a determination of the place human beings ought to occupy. But as Sartre recognized, Heideggerian Dasein does not allow for such a determination.

Heidegger claims that the will to have a conscience is the most primordial presupposition of any genuine factual becoming guilty. To become thus guilty Dasein must have chosen itself:

In so choosing, Dasein makes possible its ownmost Being-guilty, which remains closed off from the they-self. The common sense of the “they” knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them. It reckons up infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from its ownmost Being-guilty to be able to talk loudly of making “mistakes”. But in the appeal the they-self gets called to [angerufen] the ownmost Being-guilty of the Self. Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as Being-free for one’s ownmost Being-guilty. “Understanding the appeal” means “wanting to have a conscience”. (288)

And yet: in what sense can authentic Dasein become factually guilty? Heidegger’s ontological understanding of guilt threatens to render any actual guilt ambiguous, just as Heidegger’s ontological understanding of truth threatens to render all ontic truth ambiguous. In a sense Heidegger’s point seems obvious: to become guilty I have to act. If it is not so much I, but das Man who acts through me, in what sense can I be said to be guilty? On the other hand, does not factual guilt presuppose an understanding of right and a wrong? Does such an understanding inevitably mean subjection to das Man? That Heidegger should have had difficulty understanding himself as guilty in his embrace of Nazism is easy to understand. To be sure, in his ontological sense we are all guilty. This
Heidegger's *Being and Time* raises the question: what is the relationship of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to ethics?
10. Conscience, Guilt, Resolve

Last time we considered Heidegger’s understanding of guilt. Dasein is said to be essentially guilty. Calling itself to be author of itself, it yet cannot escape its subjection to facticity, including its subjection to the they. I suggested last time that Heidegger’s ontological understanding of guilt threatens to render any actual guilt ambiguous. Does not factual guilt presuppose an understanding of right and wrong? To be sure, in his ontological sense we are all guilty. But this leaves the question: what is the relationship of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to ethics? That question will continue to occupy us.

Par. 59

In characteristic fashion Heidegger turns next to the everyday interpretation of conscience, which, on the one hand, is said to be incapable of providing a final criterion for the "objectivity" of the ontological analysis. Indeed, the everyday understanding of conscience seems to call Heidegger’s existential analysis into question. That, as Heidegger points out, is not necessarily an argument against it. But that analysis does need to give an account of the origin or ground of whatever everyday understanding would question it:

Two things follow from this: on the one hand, the everyday way of interpreting conscience cannot be accepted as the final criterion for the ‘Objectivity’ of an ontological analysis. On the other hand, such an analysis has no right to disregard the everyday understanding of conscience and to pass over the anthropological, psychological, and theological theories which have been based upon it. (SZ 289-290)

Fundamental ontology must be open to the everyday interpretation and try to understand why that interpretation holds what it holds. And what does it hold? (290)

1. Conscience has a critical function.
2. Conscience speaks of something specific that has been done or omitted.
3. That voice is not rooted in Dasein itself.
4. Conscience appears as good or bad conscience, where the second has priority.
Heidegger insists that the call of conscience has the character of a kind of care.
Here, too, Dasein is ahead of itself, but
in such a way that it directs itself towards its own thrownness. Only by first positing that Dasein is an interconnected sequence of successive Experiences, is it possible to take the voice as something which comes afterwards, something later, which refers back. The voice does call back, but it calls beyond the deed which has happened, and back to the Being-guilty into which one has been thrown, which is earlier than any indebtedness. (SZ 291)
Even less than bad conscience is good conscience able to do justice to the primordial phenomenon of guilt:
Just as Dasein’s ‘Being-evil’ would be made known to us in the ‘bad’ conscience, the ‘good’ conscience must have made known its ‘Being-good’. It is easy to see that the conscience which used to be an ‘effluence of divine power’ now becomes a slave of Pharisaism. Such a conscience would let a man say of himself: ‘I am good’ (SZ 291)
How would one settle an argument between Heidegger and someone who argues that conscience calls him who has strayed from the right path? Heidegger would insist that conscience calls always. Phenomenologically there ought to be a difference. Consider the case of an Eichmann who, as Hannah Arendt reports, considered himself a Kantian, duty-bound to follow the law, and felt pangs of guilt when he failed to live up to what the law demanded. But he perverted Kant and the law by substituting for the voice of reason that of Hitler. Guilt here is relative to having lost oneself to a particular conception or, should we say, perversion of what is right and wrong. — But is all understanding of the call of conscience as a call back to the right path to be understood in this way?

Par. 60
sums up the discussion of Chapter Two of Part Two. Conscience calls us to acknowledge our guilt. Conscience calls in silence, in anxiety. The authentic response to its call is resolve, Entschlossenheit. It is said to constitute the most fundamental, authentic truth of Dasein.
Resoluteness is a distinctive mode of Dasein’s disclosedness. In an earlier passage, however, we have interpreted disclosedness existentially as the *primordial truth*. Such truth is primarily not a quality of ‘judgment,’ not of any definite way of behaving, but something essentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world as such. Truth must be conceived as a fundamental *existential*.

In our ontological clarification of the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ we have called attention to the primordial disclosedness of this entity as the *truth of existence*; and for the delimitation of its character we have referred to the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity. (SZ 297)

Resoluteness is the authentic appropriation of the truth of existence. But in what relationship does this "truth of existence" stand to "truth as correctness"? That problem remains.

Heidegger insists that authenticity does not isolate Dasein from the world: And how could it, given that Dasein’s being is a being-in-the-world and a being-with-others? As authentic disclosedness, resoluteness is

*authentically* nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being-with Others. (SZ 298)

Resolute Dasein seizes itself as it is, with others. Busying itself with others, resolve lets Dasein find its place in the world, and yet Heidegger does not analyze in detail how we are to think that. How is the return of the essentially homeless self to others to be thought? Once again Kierkegaard’s Abraham in *Fear and Trembling* comes to mind. It seems that Heidegger has to argue that even while with others, the authentic person remains alone. This recalls a remark by Nietzsche:

> “One hundred deep lonelinessestogether form the city of Venice—that is its magic, An image for the human being of the future.”

Heidegger cites this remark in a

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letter to Jaspers, who, pleading for dialogue, had charged Heidegger with losing his way in monologues.  

I would like to oppose to Heidegger’s understanding of resoluteness as the appropriation of the truth of existence a remark made by Jacques Maritain in *Art and Scholasticism*:

> The moment one touches a transcendental, one touches being itself, a likeness of God, an absolute, that which ennobles and delights our life; one enters into the domain of the spirit. It is remarkable that men really communicate with one another only by passing through being or one of its properties. Only in this way do they escape from the individuality in which matter encloses them. If they remain in the world of their sense needs and of their sentimental egos, in vein do they tell their stories to one another, they do not understand each other. They observe each other, without seeing each other, each of them infinitely alone, even though work and sense pleasures bind them together. But let one touch the good and Love, like the saints, the true, like an Aristotle, the beautiful, like a Dante, or a Bach, or a Giotto, then contact is made, souls communicate. Men are really united only by the spirit.  

What would Heidegger have had to say to Maritain? What would Maritain have had to say to Heidegger?

Let me recall two important points:

1. About being-unto-death:
   
   If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relationships to any other Dasein have been undone. (SZ 250)

2. About freedom towards death:

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anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but being itself, rather in an impassioned freedom towards death — a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the “they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious. (SZ 266)

In the second chapter this freedom comes to be demanded in the call of conscience and with it the liberation from the dictatorship of the "they."

The call does not report events; it calls without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent. And it does so only because, in calling the one to whom the appeal is made, it does not call him into the public idle talk of the “they”, but calls him back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being. When the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious. (SZ 277)

And yet, on p. 298, as we have seen, Heidegger speaks, as he must, given his understanding of Dasein as essentially with others, of a return to these others with whom we are. How are we to think this return, this homecoming, once home has been left behind for the wilderness of the authentic? Recall that idle talk was said to be the mode of being with others (177) To repeat: how is the call of conscience related to community?

Chapter Three

In this chapter Heidegger moves from a discussion of care to that of temporality.

Par. 61

As usual, Heidegger begins with an introductory section that lays out the structure of the chapter. Again he appeals to the eigentliches Ganzseinkönnen of Dasein.

An authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole on the part of Dasein has been projected existentially. By analyzing this phenomenon, we have revealed that authentic Being-towards death is anticipation. Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, in its existentiell attestation, has been exhibited, and at the same time existentially Interpreted, as resoluteness. (SZ 301-302)
The existential phenomenon of resoluteness is said to be testified to in an existentiell manner by resolve. With this turn to the existentiell the previous discussion is said to lose its character as an arbitrary construction. Resolved Dasein is unto its death. But is it, Heidegger asks, really legitimate to tie these two ideas, resolve and being-onto-death together, as he has done:

Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality—for-Being-a-whole led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What can death and the ‘concrete Situation’ of taking action have in common? In attempting to bring resoluteness and anticipation forcibly together, are we not seduced into an intolerable and quite unphenomenological construction, for which we can no longer claim that it has the character of an ontological projection, based upon the phenomena? (SZ 302)

The task is to provide a convincing answer to this rhetorical question

What this signifies for the question of the possible connection between anticipation and resoluteness, is nothing less than the demand that we should project these existential phenomena upon the existentiell possibilities which have been delineated in them, and ‘think these possibilities through to the end’ in an existential manner. (SZ 302/303)

Note that Heidegger founds his interpretation of time, as well as his interpretation of both Dasein and Being, on his interpretation of the death phenomenon. Someone like Maritain would have to come to a different conclusion with respect to both. Heidegger’s analysis seems to me to be too one-sided. How would such a claim be substantiated? There are a great many rhetorical questions in Being and Time. More often perhaps than Heidegger would seem to have intended, they should be taken by us as more than just rhetorical questions.

Once again the first par. of this chapter has an introductory character and I shall pass on to the next par. unless there are further questions.

Par. 62
This par., too, begins with a number of questions: to be clarified is the relationship between resolve and being- unto-death. To be resolved means to permit oneself to be called to one's own being guilty.

Dasein is essentially guilty — not just guilty on some occasions, and on other occasions not. Wanting to have a conscience resolves upon this Being-guilty. To project oneself upon this Being-guilty, which Dasein is as long as it is, belongs to the very meaning of resoluteness. (SZ 305)

Crucial here is that to project oneself upon one's Being-guilty is to project oneself unto something constant. (SZ 305)

The existentiell way of taking over this ‘guilt’ in resoluteness is therefore authentically accomplished only when that resoluteness, in its disclosure of Dasein, has become so transparent that Being-guilty is understood as something constant. (SZ 305)

With this the possibility of opposing to the many different activities that engage us something resembling a constant self presents itself. Again, I would grant that Heidegger has sketched a human possibility. The question remains: should we give this possibility a normative weight? Note that there is some reason to speak in this connection of a "constant self." This is inevitably also an abstract self. Resoluteness grants such an abstract self.

Resoluteness does not just ‘have’ a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity. This ‘connection’ must be elucidated phenomenologically. (SZ 305)

On Heidegger’s interpretation death and guilt are co-fundamental. Could one argue, as I hinted last time, that guilt is more fundamental? That we are indeed author of a lack, but what we lack is precisely the whole? Heidegger of course could object that there is a sense in which this is precisely what we need not lack.

When Dasein is resolute, it takes over authentically in its existence the fact that it is the null basis of its own nullity. We have conceived death existentially as what we have characterized as the possibility of the impossibility of existence — that is to say, as the utter nullity of Dasein. Death is not “added on” to Dasein as its ‘end’; but Dasein , as care, is the
thrown (that is, null) basis for its death. The nullity by which Dasein’s Being is dominated primordially through and through, is revealed to Dasein itself in authentic Being-towards-death. Only on the basis of Dasein’s whole Being does anticipation make Being-guilty manifest. Care harbours in itself both death and guilt equiprimordially. Only in anticipatory resoluteness is the potentiality-for-Being-guilty understood authentically and wholly — that is to say, primordially. (SZ 306)

Note that ursprünglich, primordial, here is taken to mean eigentlich und ganz, authentic and whole. Note also the footnote Heidegger adds, trying to distinguish his account of guilt from the theological:

The Being-guilty which belongs primordially to Dasein’s state of Being, must be distinguished from the status corruptionis as understood in theology. Theology can find in Being-guilty, as existentially defined, an ontological condition for the practical possibility of such a status. The guilt which is included in the idea of this status remains closed off in principle from any philosophical experience. The existential analysis of Being-guilty proves nothing either for or against the possibility of sin. Taken strictly, it cannot even be said that the ontology of Dasein of itself leaves this possibility open; for this ontology, as a philosophical inquiry, ‘knows’ in principle nothing about sin. (SZ 306)

This parallels the earlier remark on the possibility of an afterlife. (cf. SZ 248). As before Heidegger insists on the distance between fundamental ontology and theology. What is the relationship between the two accounts of guilt?

1. It would seem that if we admit that death need not mean the end of Dasein in Heidegger’s sense, as I take it the traditional understanding of an afterlife would have to insist, then guilt could also not be considered in quite the way Heidegger would have us understand it. The relationship of guilt and death would have to be rethought.

2. Is Heidegger’s attempt to separate theology and ontology in such a way that the latter in no way pre-empts the claims of the former not one that we have to reject? If original sin is indeed admitted, if only as a possibility, does this not mean that the present (fallen) state of human beings is not the state that defines humanity? Then Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, even with its analysis of death, may appear bound to the zunächst
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*und zumeist*, to an ontology that has its foundation in a particular human project, the project of fallen humanity, a fall so deep that human beings do not recognize this fall as a fall, but make it constitutive of human being in a way that leaves no possibility for salvation.

Resolve is said to lead us to Dasein's primordial truth. (SZ 307) Resolved Dasein is said to be *certain*. (SZ 307) What does *certainty* mean here? It would seem to be quite possible to be certain in this sense and yet quite mistaken about what is the case. Certainty does not mean here acquisition of a firm foundation on which to base one's decisions.

Such certainty must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means that it simply cannot become rigid as regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be *held open* and free for the current factical possibility. The certainty of the resolution signifies that one *holds oneself free* for the possibility of *taking it back* — a possibility which is factically necessary. (SZ 307-308)

Resolved, Dasein remains free and open. It cannot insist on the finality of its resolutions, but must be prepared to take them back. This Heidegger insists, does not mean that Dasein therefore falls into irresoluteness.

On the contrary, this holding-for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself free for taking back, is *authentic resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself*. Thus in an existentiell manner, one’s very lostness in irresoluteness gets undermined. The holding-for-true which belongs to resoluteness, tends, in accordance with its meaning, to hold itself free *constantly* — that is, to hold itself free for Dasein’s *whole* potentiality-for-Being. This constant certainty is guaranteed to resoluteness only so that it will relate itself to that possibility of which it can be utterly certain. In its death, Dasein must simply ‘take back’ everything. Since resoluteness is constantly certain of death — in other words, since it *anticipates* it — resoluteness thus attains a certainty which is authentic and whole. (308)

Striking is the abstract, formal character of Heidegger’s discussion. Nothing is said here about how Dasein would decide in some particular situation. Only that it would remain
free and open to that situation. Uncertainty would seem to be part of having to make some particular decision. And striking once again is the emphasis placed on self-constancy and existing as a whole. But that self, which is to remain constant, is left an empty form into which the world can pour its contents. And there would seem to be no pre-given measure to sort these contents:

But Dasein is equiprimordially in the untruth. Anticipatory resoluteness gives Dasein at the same time the primordial certainty that it has been closed off. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein holds itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the “they” — a lostness which is possible from the very basis of its own Being. As a constant possibility of Dasein, irresoluteness is co-certain. When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the indefiniteness of one’s potentiality-for-Being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current Situation. (SZ 308)

Resolve is tied to the making of particular resolutions. But how are we to think such decisions? To make a particular resolution, do I not require criteria, some measure? Is it not precisely the specific resolve that lets me gain my place?

Heidegger insists that authentic resolve can never secure itself by appealing to something outside itself, say given values or the categorical imperative. Like Kierkegaard’s movement of infinite resignation, Heidegger’s authenticity demands a teleological suspension of the ethical. But to say with Heidegger that only the resolved person knows his place, is this not to make resolve utterly groundless? Heideggerian authentic resolve thus invites comparison with the decisionism of Carl Schmitt.

Important is the last par:

Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factual idea of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein’s existence? That is so indeed. But not only is this Fact one which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of the object which we have taken as the theme of our investigation. Philosophy will never seek to deny its ‘presuppositions’, but neither may it simply admit them. It conceives them, and it unfolds with more and more penetration.
both the presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions. The methodological considerations now demanded of us will have this very function. (SZ 310)

Does Heidegger's fundamental ontology then presuppose a particular ideal? His philosophizing presupposes indeed a particular project of recovering authentic existence. Suppose we don't share this ideal? Is it in the end only *ad hominem* arguments that get at what is essential in philosophy? And this may mean that philosophic arguments are fruitful only among friends, and are the less likely the more the individual finds his academic niche and place.

**Par. 63**

What is hinted at the end of par. 62 is developed in the next par. Phenomenology and the recovery of Dasein's self are necessary because Dasein has a tendency to lose itself in so far as its being is a being with others. That also goes for the Dasein that philosophizes.

… the entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest. The reason for this lies in care itself. Our Being alongside the things with which we concern ourselves most closely in the ‘world’ — a Being which is falling — guides the everyday way in which Dasein is interpreted, and covers up ontically Dasein’s authentic Being, so that the ontology which is directed towards this entity is denied an appropriate basis. Therefore the primordial way in which this entity is presented as a phenomenon is anything but obvious, if even ontology follows proximally the course of the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The laying-bare of Dasein’s primordial Being must rather be wrested from Dasein by following the *opposite course* from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation. (SZ 311)

Heidegger’s analysis will, therefore, when measured by our everyday understanding, have the character of *Gewaltsamkeit*, of doing violence to what is usually taken for granted. Heidegger argues that Dasein demands such violence of itself: “will not the violence of this projection amount to freeing Dasein’s undisguised phenomenal content.” (SZ 313)
Does Dasein have a higher court of appeal than its own death? (SZ 313) This is stated as a rhetorical question and just this chapter abounds in such questions. But, as I suggested, these rhetorical questions are not just rhetorical. In the case of the question just posed, must our answer be a firm “no”? Are we left with a groundless decision on our part? This invites a further discussion of the circle of understanding: in being itself Dasein has inevitably always already projected an understanding of being:

Because it is primordially constituted by care, any Dasein is already ahead of itself. As being, it has in every case already projected itself upon definite possibilities of its existence; and in such existentiell projections it has, in a pre-ontological manner, also projected something like existence and Being. Like all research, the research which wants to develop and conceptualize that kind of Being which belongs to existence, is itself a kind of Being which disclosive Dasein possesses; can such research be denied this projecting which is essential to Dasein?  (SZ 315)

That brings us back to Heidegger’s claim that his fundamental ontology presupposes a particular ideal. Consider especially the end of this par: Existentielle Wahrheit is here said to be the ground of ontologische Wahrheit. This is to say, our understanding of Being cannot be divorced from a concrete way of being. Thus the particular way of being that is characteristic of our everyday understanding is also marked by a particular understanding of, more precisely by a passing over, the primordial phenomenon of being. This gives it a sense of security authentic Dasein cannot know.

Par. 64

With this par. Heidegger returns to the problem of the self and its unity:

We made it plain … that in the call of conscience care summons Dasein towards its ownmost potentiality for Being. When we came to understand in a primordial manner how this appeal is understood, we saw that the understanding of it manifests itself as anticipatory resoluteness, which includes an authentic potentiality for Being-a-whole — a potentiality of Dasein. Thus the care structure does not speak against the possibility of being-a-whole but is the condition for the possibility of such an existentiell potentiality-for-Being. In the course of these analyses, it became plain that
the existential phenomena of death, existence, and guilt are anchored in the phenomenon of care. *The totality of the structural whole has become even more richly articulated; and because of this, the existential question of the unity of this totality has become still more urgent.* (SZ 317)

How then are we to think this unity? Heidegger takes for his point of departure the everyday interpretation of the self. When I say "I," I mean myself, this entity I happen to be, an entity among entities, in the world, but not just another entity, but a being that experiences these other things, that endures through time. But does this allow me to unpack the being of this "I" by understanding it, say, as a simple substance, a *hypokeimenon* or *subiectum*, that underlies all I experience, remains the same even though it experiences a great many different things and thinks a great many different thoughts? Clear is that any adequate analysis of the being of this one will have to do justice to both poles, to the one and the many.

Heidegger next turns to Kant, who, he suggests, was right to reject an interpretation of the I as a soul-substance, yet in the end was unable to really break away from the Cartesian understanding of the I as thinking subject. Note that when Kant thinks the proper activity of the logical subject as a binding together he holds on to the mentioned poles of the one and the many. But clear is also that Kant remains caught within an inadequate philosophical framework. He fails to illuminate the being of the subject.

Against this Heidegger emphasizes the being of Dasein as care. This gets developed in a foreseeable way:

If the ontological constitution of the Self is not to be traced back either to an “I”-substance or to a subject, but, if, on the contrary, the everyday fugitive way in which we keep saying “I” must be understood in terms of our *authentic* potentiality for Being, then the proposition that the Self is the basis of care and constantly present-at-hand, is one that still does not follow. Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one’s authentic potentiality-for–Being-one’s-Self — that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care. In terms of care the constancy of the Self, as the supposed persistence of the *subiectum*, gets clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-Being also opened our eyes for the
constancy of the Self, in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The constancy of the Self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. (SZ 322)

Note once again the emphasis on constancy: the constant self is constituted by authentic care. Again

Care does not need to be founded in a Self. But existentiality, as constitutive for care, provides the ontological constitution of Dasein’s Self-constancy, to which there belongs, in accordance with the full structural content of care, its Being-fallen factically into non-Self-constancy. When fully conceived, the care-structure includes the phenomenon of Selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by Interpreting the meaning of care; and it is as care that Dasein’s totality of Being has been defined. (SZ 323)

Heidegger here gives his answer to the old question: how are we to think the unity of experience. The role of the transcendental unity of the apperception is assigned to death-shadowed care.

Par. 65

seeks to exhibit Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care. But why can we not turn the statement around and understand Care as the Ontological Meaning of Temporality?

But what are we asking for? Recall Heidegger's understanding of meaning. As stated earlier in Being and Time:

Meaning is the “upon-which” of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a forehaving, a foresight, and a fore-conception. (SZ 151)

Heidegger now briefly sums up the earlier discussion. Meaning is what is capable of being articulated. To "that which an understanding interpretation articulates" belongs something like a conceptual framework: Heidegger speaks of a formales Gerüst. This formal structure is a space of possibilities. To understand something is to assign it a place in that space. Heidegger in this earlier discussion had made Sinn constitutive of
Dasein. Dasein has always already projected itself towards such a space. Such a space is presupposed whenever I understand something as this or that.

If we say that entities ‘have meaning’, this signifies that they have become accessible in their Being; and this Being, as projected upon its “upon-which”, is what ‘really’ ‘has meaning’ first of all. Entities have meaning only because, as Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of that Being — that is to say, in terms of the “upon-which” of the projection. This primary projection of the understanding of Being ‘gives’ the meaning. The question about the meaning of the Being of an entity takes as its theme the “upon-which” of that understanding of Being which underlies all Being of entities. (SZ 324-325)

All ontic understanding of entities presupposes a projection of their Being. Take Descartes' projection of the being of nature as res extensa. What is the meaning of that projection? To ask for the meaning of Being (Sein) is to inquire into what is inevitably presupposed by all inquiry into Being. And what is inevitably presupposed is Dasein, understood as care projecting an understanding of Being. Dasein's finite care is possible only as a being unto its own possible not-being. Implicit is an understanding of Dasein's essential temporality. This temporality reveals itself as the ontological meaning of care.

Implicit is a privileging of the future, which is said to be the primary meaning of existentiality (SZ 327). Existentiality here names the structures constitutive of Existenz. The being of Dasein lies in its being-to (Zu-sein). Dasein ist je seine Möglichkeit: Dasein does not have, it is its possibilities.

"Future" here should not be understood as completely open possibility. This would overlook the facticity and thrownness of Dasein.

As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as “having been”. Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost “been”. (SZ 326)

In what follows the past will become ever more important:

Only because care is based on the character of “having been”, can Dasein exist as the thrown entity which it is. ‘As long as’ Dasein factically exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it always is indeed as already having
been, in the sense of the “I-am-as-having-been”. And only as long as Dasein is, can it be as having been. On the other hand, we call an entity “past”, when it is no longer present-at-hand. Therefore Dasein, in existing, can never establish itself as a fact which is present-at-hand, arising and passing away ‘in the course of time’, with a bit of it past already. (SZ 328)

Heidegger sums up his discussion in the following theses:

1. Time is primordial as that temporalizing of temporality that makes possible the constitution of the care structure. That is to say, time is relative to Dasein.

2. This temporality is essentially ecstatic.

The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the ‘towards-oneself’, the ‘back-to’, and the ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by’. The phenomena of the “towards…” the “to…”, and the “alongside…”, make temporality manifest as the ekstatikon pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the “ecstasies” of temporality. (SZ 328/329)

Again temporality is thought in relation to Dasein. A question raises itself: how are we to understand the spatial metaphor Ausser-sich here?

3. Temporality shows itself primordially from the future. Again this makes perfect sense, given Heidegger’s analysis and insistence on temporality’s relativity to Dasein.

4. Primordial time is finite.

In conclusion I would like to spend a bit more time on this claim:

What does it mean to say, ‘Time goes on’ or ‘Time keeps passing away?’ What is the signification of ‘in time’ in general, and of the expressions ‘in the future’ and ‘out of the future’ in particular? In what sense is ‘time’ endless? Such points need to be cleared up, if the ordinary objections to the finitude of primordial time are not to remain groundless. But we can clear them up effectively only if we have obtained an appropriate way of formulating the question as regards finitude and in-finitude. Such a formulation, however, arises only if we view the primordial phenomenon
of time understandingly. The problem is not one of how the ‘derived’ [abgeleitete] infinite time, ‘in which the ready-to-hand arises and passes away, becomes primordial finite temporality; the problem is rather that of how inauthentic temporality arises out of finite authentic temporality, and how inauthentic temporality as inauthentic, temporalizes an in-finite time out of the finite. (SZ 330-331)

How does infinite time arise from authentic finite temporality? How are we to understand the infinity of time? Earlier we encountered passages where Heidegger suggests that being, not entities, must be understood as relative to Dasein. But must something similar then not be said about time? Does an understanding of the finitude of time not require the background provided by an understanding of time as infinite? And does this not mean that time, too, must be thought as in some sense transcending what is here called primordial time? And does this not presuppose that Dasein is ecstatic in a sense that requires us to go beyond what Heidegger here calls its ecstatic being? Is this transcendence not a necessary condition of our understanding of the reality of things?

Par. 66

prepares us for the next three chapters and we can skip over it.
11. Time and Subjectivity

Chapter Four

On the whole this strikes me as perhaps the least demanding of the chapters of *Being and Time*. Heidegger here seems to be laboring dutifully and a bit mechanically to recapitulate what has been achieved in the first part of *Being and Time* with an eye to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. A lot of what he has to say in this chapter does not add very much to what he has already said.

Par. 67

is once again one of Heidegger’s characteristic introductory paragraphs, which briefly outlines the structure of the chapter and relates it to the preceding discussion. Key is the necessity of a return to the everyday and with it to the multiplicity of phenomena that the previous analysis uncovered,

   Far from excluding such a multiplicity, the primordial totality of Dasein’s constitution as articulated demands it. The primordiality of a state of Being does not coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate structural element. The ontological source of Dasein’s Being is not ‘inferior’ to what springs from it, but towers above it in power from the outset; in the field of ontology, any ‘springing from’ is degeneration. If we penetrate the source ontologically, we do not come to things which are ontically obvious for the ‘common understanding’; but the questionable character of everything obvious opens up for us. (SZ 334)

The questionable character of the everyday is to be opened up. This is to say, the discussion is to bring us closer to an understanding of the meaning of the *zunächst und zumeist*, i.e. of the brackets that enclosed much of the preceding analysis, of the way we have always already fallen away from our ontological source.

Par. 68

Heidegger refers us back to the unity of *Verstehen* (future), *Befindlichkeit* (past), *Verfallen* (present), and *Rede* as structures of care.
Care has been characterized with regard to its temporal meaning, but only in its basic features. To exhibit its concrete temporal Constitution, means to give a temporal Interpretation of the items of its structure, taking them each singly: understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse. (SZ 335)

It is worth noting is that the order of the discussion has changed; the temporal interpretation of everyday Dasein starts not with everyday being-in-the world and state-of mind, but with understanding, followed by state-of mind, falling, and discourse.

a. The temporality of understanding

To understand for Heidegger means first of all to recognize what is possible:

If the term understanding is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality for Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists. In understanding, one’s own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in such a way that one’s Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of. It ‘knows’ this, however, not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining itself in an existentiell possibility. (SZ 336)

Resoluteness means to project oneself towards that ultimate possibility which means that there shall be no further possibilities for me. To be sure, first of all and most of the time we are not resolute in that sense.

Proximally and for the most part, to be sure, Dasein remains irresolute; that is to say, it remains closed off in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to which it brings itself only when it has been individualized. This implies that temporality does not temporalize itself constantly out of the authentic future. This inconstancy, however, does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks a future, but rather that the temporalizing of the future can take various forms. (SZ 336)

Expected is Heidegger’s distinction between an authentic and an inauthentic future:

To designate the authentic future terminologically we have reserved the expression “anticipation”. This indicates that Dasein, existing authentically, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being — that the future itself must first win itself, not from the Present, but
from the inauthentic future. If we are to provide a formally undifferentiated term for the future, we may use the one with which we have designated the first structural item of care — the "ahead-of-itself". Factically Dasein is constantly ahead of itself, but inconstantly anticipatory with regard to its existentiell possibility. (SZ 336-337)

Anticipation here translates Vorlaufen, which in ordinary German means “to run ahead.”

Consider an activity such as boiling an egg: I fill a pot with water; turn on the stove; bring the water to a boil; put in the egg; set the egg timer; hear it ticking. I understand myself through these activities, as death recedes into an indefinite background, I am present to myself in the activities, but I do not really seize myself: Aus dem Besorgten her kommt das Dasein auf sich zu, “Dasein comes towards itself from that with which it concerns itself” (SZ 337). This inauthentic future has the character of Gewärtigen (awaiting), suggesting an oblique kind of self-understanding. One understands oneself in terms of what one does: Das Erwarten (expecting) ist ein im Gewärtigen fundierter Modus der Zukunft.

Expecting is founded upon awaiting, and is a mode of that future which temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation. (SZ 337)

In this sense we all expect to die, but this does not mean that we are authentically unto death.

Corresponding to this authentic and inauthentic understanding of the future, Heidegger distinguishes an authentic and inauthentic understanding of the present: Augenblick and Gegenwärtigen: “Corresponding to the inauthentic future (awaiting), there is a special way of Being – alongside the things with which one concerns oneself.” (SZ 337)

In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having-been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the “moment of vision.” This term must be thought in the active sense as an ecstasis. (SZ 338)

The moment is seized only in the decision. In chapter 3 of Part Two Heidegger had already tied the Augenblick to resolute action:
When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of vision’ as regards the Situation which has been disclosed. (SZ 328) ‘Moment of vision’ translates here Augenblick, ‘the twinkling of an eye,’ Here we should think, as Heidegger did, of the Biblical reference. Consider 1 Corinthians 15:51-52.

Lo! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.

Paul’s letters had occupied the young Heidegger (GA 60, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, 98-105, 150-151). What he had to say about the Augenblick in his lecture course “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” of the winter semester 1920/21 invites us to understand Heidegger’s understanding of the Augenblick in Being and Time as a secularization of the Pauline kairos, the moment when the individual is suddenly seized by the certainty of the parousia, the second coming of Christ, which tears the Christian out of the everyday. Heidegger there wonders especially about this passage:

2 Corinthians 5, 1-8: For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heavens. Here indeed we groan, and long to put on our heavenly dwelling so that by putting it on we may not be found naked. For while we are still in this tent, we sigh with anxiety; not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. He who has prepared us for this very thing is God, who has given us the Spirit as a guarantee.

So we are always of good courage; we know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. We are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord.

Heidegger there asks, “if death is the immediate passage to communion with Christ, why is the motif of consolation sought only in the future parousia? Is death not already its
equivalent?” (GA 60, 1500) In *Being and Time* the resolute anticipation of death in the moment vision has replaced anticipation of the parousia.

As Heidegger distinguishes authentic and inauthentic ways of facing the future, he distinguishes between two related modes of pastness, *Gewesenheit: Wiederholung* and *Vergessen*.

If *Being*-as-having-been is authentic, we call it “repetition”. But when one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has *forgotten* itself in its ownmost *thrown* potentiality-for-Being.” (SZ 339)

This is to suggest once again that authentic Dasein is its past, while for inauthentic Dasein the past is no longer and needs to be recovered. Note that authenticity here is discussed in terms that suggests something like a collapse of the distinction of past and present: the past is carried back into the present. This invites consideration of the category of “repetition,” so important to Kierkegaard.

**b. The temporality of Befindlichkeit**

That Dasein finds itself in the world in always particular ways has its foundation in thrownness. That thrownness should be tied to the past should be expected. That I have been thrown into a particular place reveals itself in the way possibilities open up for me, that is to say, as limited by what I have become and therefore am.

Heidegger tries to support this analysis with an analysis of the two already discussed moods of **fear** and **anxiety**. Fear may seem to be essentially future directed, towards some *malum futurum*, some future evil that might befall me. (SZ 341). I fear something that might happen. My fear, however, is not only a fear of, but more fundamentally a fear for, and what I fear for is myself, and not simply myself, but my possessions, my health, etc., i.e. something that I have and may lose. But this having has its foundation in the past. In this sense fear leads to a loss on the part of the individual, subject to fear, of what he is in a fuller sense. In fear we forget ourselves: think of the saying, he runs around like a chicken with its head cut off.
When concern is afraid it leaps from next to next, because it forgets itself and therefore does not take hold of any definite possibility. Every possible possibility offers itself, and this means that the impossible ones do so too. The man who fears, does not stop with any of these; his ‘environment’ does not disappear, but it is encountered without his knowing his way about in it any longer. This bewildered making-present of the first thing that comes into one’s head, is something that belongs with forgetting oneself in fear. (SZ 342)

While fear lets me forget who I am, anxiety lets me recover myself. He who is resolute knows no fear; but he understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him from possibilities which ‘count for nothing’ [“nichtigen”], and lets him become free for those which are authentic. (SZ 344)

Fear is another phenomenon of inauthenticity.

Moods are once again tied by Heidegger to the burden character of Dasein: hope promises to make the burden lighter, fear heavier (SZ 345; cf. SZ 134). But what is the measure I use when I call this burden heavier and lighter? What is presupposed by speaking about a burden at all? In this connection words like passion, Leidenschaft, suggesting that the self somehow suffers or is overcome by its passions, invite discussion.

That I have been cast into the world in a certain way would seem to constitute the burden-character of Befindlichkeit. But then that “I” would not seem to be Dasein, understood as essentially being-in-the-world. Is it not said to be essentially homeless in that world? Challenging Heidegger, I can imagine an argument showing that authentic Dasein does not experience life as a burden; nor does it experience itself as homeless.

c) The temporality of Verfallen

Again Heidegger warns us to keep the unity of temporality in view. Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of fallenness with respect to curiosity. The phenomenon would at first seem to be directed first of all to the future: the curious person is eager to see new things. Why? For no reason. Just to see. Gegenwärtigen sucht sich dem Gewärtigen zu entziehen. This is a movement within the realm of the inauthentic.
Curiosity is futural in a way that is altogether inauthentic, and in such a manner, moreover, that it does not await a possibility, but, in its craving, just desires such a possibility as something that is actual. Curiosity gets constituted by a making-present which is not held on to, but which, in merely making present, thereby seeks constantly to run away from the awaiting in which it is nevertheless ‘held’, though not held on to. (SZ 347)

d) The temporality of Rede

Once again Heidegger shows a certain reluctance to tackle the problem of language. Rede is said to be not tied to a particular ecstasis, where there is some tension between the following two passages:

When the “there” has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding, sate-of-mind, and falling; and this disclosedness becomes Articulated by discourse. Thus discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in any definite ecstasis. (SZ 349)

And the immediately following:

Factually, however, discourse expresses itself for the most part in language, and speaks proximally in the way of addressing itself to the ‘environment’ by talking about things concernfully; because of this, making-present [Gegenwärtigen] has, of course, a privileged constitutive function. (SZ 349)

That is to say, first of all and most of the time discourse expresses itself as language and thus presents itself as a phenomenon of inauthenticity, i.e, as idle talk.

On the whole the entire paragraph is not especially illuminating. Heidegger’s summary statement should pose few problems:

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States of mind temporalize themselves primarily in having-been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots primarily in the Present (whether in making present or in the moment of vision. All the same, understanding is in every case a ‘Present’ which is in the process of having been. All the same, one’s state of mind temporalizes itself as a future which is ‘making present’. And all
the same, the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future. Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole, and this means that in the ecstactical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling that is, the unity of the care structure. (SZ 350)

Par. 69

Here Heidegger tries to tie together the phenomena of temporality and the transcendence of the world. On the whole this is once again a paragraph that poses few problems, although certain features of it may be worth singling out: that being in-the-world referred back to temporality was evident already from the initial analysis. Most of what Heidegger now has to say about missing something or being surprised should pose few difficulties. But let me pick out just two special points:

A specific kind of forgetting is essential for the temporality that is constitutive for letting something be involved. The Self must forget itself if, lost in the world of equipment, it is to be able ‘actually’ to go to work and manipulate something. But all the same, inasmuch as awaiting always leads the way in the unity of the temporalizing of concern, concernful Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being has, as we shall show, been given a position in care. (SZ 354)

Heidegger here ties inauthenticity to being-to-hand: In order to really do one's work, Dasein must forget itself. The remark applies especially to the artist. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger will endorse a version of the traditional inspiration theory: the artist does not really create himself, something creates through him. What is the temporality of creation, given the inspiration theory that Heidegger here fundamentally adheres to? It seems impossible to square with the requirements of authenticity.

Heidegger suggests in this paragraph that only on the basis of trying to take care of something can we discover something resisting our efforts. (SZ 356) Only in this way do we discover our subjection to a world, learn that that we shall never completely be its master. Here you have a foundation of transcendence: the world transcends me in the
sense that I can never totally master it. Transcendence is thus founded by Heidegger in the care structure that is constitutive of Dasein. Dasein is a being that encounters transcendence. From this perspective the Cartesian proof of God's existence from his perfection, a perfection lacking to the human knower, would seem, with some modifications, worth serious consideration.

**In par. b** Heidegger returns to the discussion of the genesis of the theoretical attitude.

When in the course of *existential ontological* analysis we ask how theoretical discovery ‘arises’ out of *circumspective* concern, this implies already that we are not making a problem of the ontical history and development of science, or of the factual occasions for it, or of its proximate goals. In seeking the *ontological genesis* of the theoretical attitude, we are asking which of those conditions implied in Dasein’s state of Being are existentially necessary for the possibility of Dasein’s existing in the way of scientific research. (SZ 356-357)

Heidegger would have us distinguish such an existential account from a “logical” conception, which is concerned with science as a set of interconnected true propositions. But has Heidegger himself lost sight of the truth of science?

Yet a fully adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of Being and the ‘connection’ between Being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence. The following deliberations are preparatory to the understanding of this central problematic, within which, moreover, the idea of phenomenology, as distinguished from the preliminary conception of it which we indicated by way of introduction will be developed for the first time. (SZ 357)

There is indeed an important gap here. The connection between Being and truth has not been sufficiently clarified. Such clarification is said to be essential to “a fully adequate existential interpretation of science.”

One way of approaching the relationship of scientific research to everyday praxis is to suggest that theory results from the absence of praxis: “What is decisive in the ‘emergence’ of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the *disappearance of praxis*” (SZ
Heidegger's *Being and Time*

357). Heidegger resists such a separation of theory and practice, not only here, but much more vigorously in subsequent works.

Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer ‘theory’ that the kind of circumspection which tarries and ‘considers’, remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned.

“Practical” dealings have their own way of tarrying. And just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own. (SZ 358)

Heidegger makes quite a bit of the distinction between “the hammer is too heavy,” and “the hammer is heavy.” The latter loses sight of hammer as a tool; instead it comes to be interpreted as “a corporeal Thing subject to the law of gravity.” (SZ 361) What was experienced as something ready-to-hand is now considered as something present-at-hand. “Too light” and “too heavy” now no longer make much sense. And place, too, loses its former significance. “This does not mean that what is present-at-hand loses its ‘location’ altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal position, a ‘world-point’, which is in no way distinguished from any other.” (SZ 362)

As Heidegger points out,

The classical example for the historical development of a science and even for its ontological genesis, is the rise of mathematical physics. What is decisive for its development does not lie in the rather high esteem for the observation of ‘facts’. Nor in its ‘application’ of mathematics in determining the character of natural processes; it lies rather in the way in which Nature herself is mathematically projected. In this projection something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time). (SZ 362)

Descartes’ example of the wax can serve as an illustration.

In the mathematical projection of Nature, moreover, what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such; what is decisive is that this projection discloses something that is a priori. Thus the paradigmatic character of mathematical natural science does not lie in its exactitude or in the fact
that that it is binding for ’Everyman’; it consists rather in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered — by the prior projection of their state of Being. (SZ 362)

What this leaves unaddressed, however, is the relationship between this projection of Being and science’s claim to truth.

That this kind of projection presupposes some sort of self-transcendence is evident.

If the thematizing of the present-at-hand — the scientific projection of Nature — is to become possible, Dasein must transcend the entities thematized. Transcendence does not consist in Objectifying, but is presupposed by it. If, however, the thematizing of the present-at-hand within-the-world is a change-over from the concern which discovers circumspection, then one’s ‘practical’ Being alongside the ready-to-hand is something which a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie. (SZ 363-364)

But Heidegger leaves the discussion of the required transcendence of Dasein underdeveloped. Can his fundamental ontology do justice to it in principle?

Par. c returns us to the problem of transcendence: Temporality, as Heidegger has understood it, cannot be divorced from the world and from being-in-the-world. World is understood as that towards which Dasein is. Last time I pointed out that this might lead one to construct an argument that would make world the meaning of temporality. I suggested that whenever we get into such circles we are trying to separate what belongs together.

Par. 70

This discussion of “The Temporality of the Spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein” adds nothing of great importance to the earlier discussion of Dasein.

Par. 71
finally explicitly addresses the question of the meaning of everydayness or of the
zunächst und zumeist, the “proximally and for the most part” or “first of all and most of
the time,” that Heidegger has been fond of invoking,

But what we have primarily in mind in the expression
“everydayness” is a definite “how” of existence by which Dasein is
dominated through and through ‘for life’ ['zeitlebens']. In our analyses
we have often used the expression ‘proximally and for the most part’.
‘Proximally’ signifies the way in which Dasein is ‘manifest’ in the “with-
one-another” of publicness, even if ‘at bottom’ everydaynes is precisely
something which, in an existentiell manner it has ‘surmounted’. [Once
again I am reminded of Kierkegaard's knight of faith]. ‘For the most part’
signifies the way in which Dasein show itself for Everyman, not always,
but ‘as a rule’. (SZ 370)

Interesting is the phrase Das Morgige ist das ewig Gestrige, which Heidegger
uses to characterize the everyday:

To this “how” there belongs further the comfortableness of the accustomed,
even if it forces one to do something burdensome and ‘repugnant’. That
which will come tomorrow (and this is what everyday concern keeps
awaiting) is eternally yesterday’s. In everydayness everything is one and
the same. (SZ 370-371)

This raises the question of how the repetitiveness of everyday existence is related to
Heidegger’s understanding of authentic repetition or Wiederholung, to which he and we
will return in the next chapter.

Noteworthy is the claim

Everydayness is determinative for Dasein even when it has not chosen the
“they” for its ‘hero’. (SZ 371)

Where does this rhetoric of choosing one’s hero come from? The next chapter will cast
more light on this matter.

Heidegger concludes this chapter once again by pointing out that by choosing the
everyday as our pint of departure, we have not as yet really done full justice to Dasein.
The ‘natural’ horizon for starting the existential analytic of Dasein is only
seemingly self-evident. (SZ 371)
For instance, what is the ontological significance of the fact that I now feel older than I once did, or that I feel myself belonging to a late age? The constant self gained in the resolute anticipation of death remains too formal to cast any light on this. But we shall return to such questions in Chapter Five.
Chapter Five
Par. 72
begins by taking up once more the question of the wholeness of Dasein:
Have we indeed brought the whole of Dasein, as regards its authentically Being-a-whole, into the fore-having of our existential analysis? It may be that a formulation of the question as related to Dasein’s totality, possesses a genuinely unequivocal character ontologically. It may be that as regards Being-towards-the-end the question itself may even have found its answer. But death is only the ‘end’ of Dasein; and taken formally it is just one of the ends by which Dasein’s totality is closed round. The other ‘end’, however, is the ‘beginning’, the ‘birth’. (SZ 372-373)

Have we not overemphasized the end and neglected the beginning? The entire Dasein we are seeking is the Dasein between birth and death. Heidegger here seeks to overcome the one-sidedness of his understanding of Dasein, where one-sidedness also has to mean an excessive formality: consider once more

If the ontological constitution of the Self is not to be traced back either to an ‘I’-substance or to a ‘subject’, but, if, on the contrary, the everyday fugitive way in which we keep on saying “I” must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality-for-Being, then the proposition that the Self is the basis of care and constantly present-at-hand, is one that still does not follow. Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-one’s-Self — that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care. In terms of care the constancy of the Self, as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, gets clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-Being also opens our eyes for the constancy of the Self in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The constancy of the Self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. (SZ 322)
Chapter Five promises to remedy this formality:

The ‘between’ which relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of Dasein. On the other hand, it is by no means the case that Dasein ‘is’ actual in a point of time, and that, apart from this, it is ‘surrounded’ by the non-actuality of its birth and death. Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having the kind of Being of something still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factual Dasein exists as born; and as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-its-death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the ‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are, and they are in the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein’s Being as care. Thrownness and that Being towards death in which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are ‘connected’ in a manner characteristic of Dasein. (SZ 374)

It would appear that the resolute anticipation of death cannot give Dasein a content; for that content we have to look to the past. As Heidegger turns to the past he also redefines care: “As care, Dasein is the ‘between’” (SZ 374). Heidegger speaks of the event character of Dasein, of its Geschehen.

The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its “historizing”. The question of Dasein’s ‘connectedness’ is the ontological problem of Dasein’s historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicality. (SZ 375)

An understanding of Dasein’s structure of historizing, Geschehensstruktur, is said to lead to an understanding of historicality, Geschichtlichkeit.

Why is it that we so readily pass beyond the end of Dasein which is birth, while there is no similar going beyond that end which is death? Heidegger fails to clarify this? But is it even in need of clarification? What would happen to our understanding of Dasein if we took death no more seriously than birth?
“Disclosing and interpreting belongs essentially to Dasein’s historizing.” (SZ 376)

Zum Geschehen des Daseins gehört Interpretation und Auslegung, gehört Geschichte. In this connection Heidegger appeals to Dilthey. Dilthey’s thought is here to be given a foundation.

The researches of Dilthey were, for their part, pioneering work; but today’s generation has not as yet made them its own. In the following analysis the issue is solely one of furthering their adoption. (SZ 377)

Note the terms: Historie (historiology) — Geschichte (history) — Geschichtlichkeit (historicality) — Geschehen (historizing).

Par. 73

Heidegger begins his analysis of the following paragraph by analyzing what we usually mean by the word Geschichte. It has a twofold meaning: we refer to historical reality and to the science of that reality.

Consider also locutions such as:

1. "This is now history" — history as something we are now done with.
2. He can’t escape history. The past is said to be still with us. It remains effective. Heidegger speaks of the remarkable double meaning of the past.
3. We also use history to refer to a context in which we stand and of which we are not the authors:

   Anything that ‘has a history’ stands in the context of a becoming. In such becoming, ‘development’ is sometimes a rise, sometimes a fall. What ‘has a history’ in this way can, at the same time, ‘make’ such history. As ‘epoch-making’, it determines a ‘future’ ‘in the present’. Here “history” signifies a ‘context’ of events and ‘effects’, which draws on through ‘the past’, the ‘Present’, and the ‘future’. On this view the past has no special priority. (SZ 378-379)

4. What do we mean when we oppose, with Hegel, nature to history or say, “primitive people lack history,” or speak of “the dawn of history”? Here “history” suggests the way “man’s existence is essentially determined by ‘spirit’ and ‘culture.’

   And finally history refers to all that has been handed down to us.
Summing up these different meanings Heidegger arrives at the following understanding of history:

History is that specific historizing of existent Dasein which comes to past in time, so that the historizing which is ‘past’ in our Being-with-one-another, and which at the same time has been ‘handed down to us’ and iscontinuingly effective, is regarded as “history” in the sense that gets emphasized. (SZ 379)

Important is the link between history and community. Our past is essentially a shared past. An authentic being-with-others, it would seem, is only possible through an authentic relation to history.

Several moments are said to be constitutive of Geschichtlichkeit:

1. irreversibility: the past has been inescapably lost.
2. facticity: the past limits freedom.
3. communality: the past is our past.

Note how being with others and inauthenticity come to be linked more with the past, authenticity more with the future. Consider in this connection what Nietzsche in his Zarathustra calls the spirit of revenge, (Geist der Rache).

4. The past still affects us, has power, limits our will to power.

We see how the problem to history intertwines with that of community: also with the problem of how we are to find our place with others, how resolve is possible. Consider in this light Sartre's turn to Marxism. The "death of God," more generally the inability to perceive absolute binding measures, gives a new weight to history as the apparently only remaining source of what might bind freedom.

The ‘antiquities’ preserved in museums (household gear, for example) belong to a ‘time which is past’, yet they are still present-at-hand in the ‘Present’. How far is such equipment historical, when it is not yet past? Is it historical, let us say, only because it has become an object of historiological interest, of antiquarian study or national lore? But such equipment can be a historiological object only because it is in itself somehow historical. We repeat the question: by what right do we call this entity “historical”, when it is not yet past? Or do these ‘Things’ have ‘in themselves’ ‘something past’, even though they are still present-at-hand
Consider the parallel discussion of the Aegina marbles in Munich’s Glyptothek, of the Greek temple and Bamberg cathedral in “The Origin of the Work of Art”: their world has perished, even though they remain present-at-hand. But they are not just present-at-hand; they give us something to understand about this perished world. But if they do, in just what sense is our world a final horizon? How can we understand a world that is not our own?

This preliminary discussion leads to an analysis of the structure of historicity

Par. 74

The being of Dasein is said to be constituted by its historicity. Resolve implies the ability to resolve in particular concrete situations. But this is to say also that the possibilities Dasein faces are never altogether open, but limited. History circumscribes the possibilities that are real possibilities for us. It thus delimits and in this sense binds Dasein. Such a delimitation of Dasein is necessary if we are to be able to resolve.

Consider especially:

In the existential analysis we cannot, in principle, discuss what Dasein factically resolves in any particular case. Our investigation excludes even the existential projection of the factual possibilities of existence. Nevertheless we must ask whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself. One’s anticipatory projection of oneself on that possibility of existence which is not to be outstripped — on death — guarantees only the totality and authenticity of one’s resoluteness. (SZ 383)

Note the "only" in the quote. The anticipation of death provides no content, but only a form. The content has to be provided by one’s history.

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factual possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown takes over. In one’s coming back resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a
handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having thus come down. (SZ 383)

Heidegger’s conception of the heritage, Erbe, is necessary to a full account of resoluteness. Dasein is resolute only when it is able to make particular decisions. But where is it to find the measure for such decisions?

Only Being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one — those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly — and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. This is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historizing which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. (384)

Here Heidegger threatens to become, not so much a decisionist, as a fatalist. Schicksal, fate, now comes to play an important part. Schicksal names an inherited, but nevertheless chosen possibility. Think of the family as Schicksal.

The notion of Geschick (destiny) is related, yet tied to being-with-others. At the bottom of SZ 384 Heidegger speaks of the schicksalhafte Geschick.

Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein. (SZ 384-385)

This would seem to mean that Dasein can be authentic only when with others, communicating with them, battling with them. Dasein becomes authentic by accepting its Geschick as member of its generation. A good paper or even dissertation could be written on the Generationsbegriff. Why does the problem of the generation gain such significance in the twenties and thirties. Cf. Dilthey, the art historian Wilhelm Pinder.

Yet there is something unsatisfactory about Heidegger’s analysis so far: Does history speak with only one voice? Who is to interpret history? How is such interpretation to gain its focus?

Let me return to the conception of the Erbe. Unfortunately this heritage does not speak with one voice. And yet resoluteness demands that these many voices be reduced
to one. Does the anticipation of death bring with it such a reduction? The problem we face here is not altogether unlike that Kant faced in an area that at first seems altogether unrelated to what now concerns us, namely in his analysis of the conditions of the possibility of experience. The problem he faced was that of bringing the manifold of experience under the transcendental unity of the apperception. Is there only one way in which such synthesis is to be achieved? In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant seems to assume this. But does he have any right to do so? In the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant himself comes to question this assumption. But if that assumption is questioned the problem of the genesis of the empirical concept must surface. How do they originate? By an aesthetic judgment? Pushing this point one can move from Kant towards views that argue that the work of the poetic imagination is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience.

Heidegger faces an analogous problem: how to reduce the many strands of our past to one coherent story that allows us to affirm ourselves in our **totality and authenticity**. In this connection it may be tempting to invoke the community, as Heidegger appears to do in a passage that we already looked at (SZ 384-385)

The discussion is summed up in the italicized passage on p. 385:

*Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially **futural** so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual “there” by shattering itself against death — that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of **having-been**, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for ‘its time’. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate — that is to say, authentic historicality.* (SZ 385)

The moment of vision, understood here, not as an ecstatic verticality linking the human being with the eternal, cutting the horizontality of everyday existence, as with Kierkegaard, but as ecstatic, yet still horizontal anticipation of death, cutting into the horizontality of the everyday, is linked by Heidegger to the repetition of a particular possibility of past existing and this again is linked to the choice of a hero-precursor:

The authentic repetition of a possibility that has been — the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero — is grounded existentially in anticipatory
resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of what can be repeated. But when one has, by repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been, the Dasein that has-been-there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again. The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again [Wiederbringen] something that is ‘past’, nor does it bind the ‘Present’ back to that which has already been ‘outstripped’.

Arising as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is ‘past’, just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the “today”, is working itself out as the ‘past’. Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to these alternatives. (SZ 385-386)

Heidegger explicates the meaning of repetition by emphasizing that it is not a slavish imitation of what has been, but a reciprocative rejoinder, where the question is: what is to govern the particular form taken by this rejoinder?

The choice of a hero is to give to the past that focus and thus that unity which authenticity requires. How are to think this? Is it then a work of the poetic imagination?

As an aside let me ask: what are the consequences of this understanding of the hero for authentic speaking? What would it mean to speak authentically? It would seem that in this case, too, you would have to choose your hero, struggle with that hero so that your poetry would be a reciprocative rejoinder. What would such a Heideggerian poetics look like? Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence comes to mind, although I doubt whether Bloom would be pleased about this association with Heidegger.

Another question: what are the consequences of Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity for ethics and politics? Let us recall the most important steps of our discussion.

1. Heidegger analyzes authenticity as a human possibility.
2. Not just that, Dasein is said to be called to that possibility. Dasein demands authenticity of itself. It does so in the call of conscience.

3. Authenticity is an appropriation of guilt. Never will Dasein be truly master of itself. Just because of this, it is faced with having to make decisions, for genuine decision is only in the face of what has not been fully mastered, as Heidegger will remind us in *The Origin of the Work of Art*: "Every decision, however, bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision."²⁶

4. Resolve becomes actual only in concrete decisions. How is decision possible? Is there decision, where there are no criteria? What are the necessary conditions for the possibility of decision?

5. But does not decision, if it is not to collapse into meaningless arbitrariness or spontaneity, require some measure? Where do we find that measure?


7. “To give the law to oneself is the highest freedom.”²⁷

8. What sense does this Kantian understanding of authenticity make, given the context of *Being and Time*? The only content, it would seem, can come from the past.

9. Resoluteness is understood as fidelity to self and respect for the repeatable possibilities that are part of one's inheritance (SZ 391). But does the past speak with one voice?

10. The need for authoritative interpretation that lets us discover in our past our hero.

12. The search for such a hero. Consider in this connection Nietzsche's relationship to Wagner (*The Birth of Tragedy* and *Wagner in Bayreuth*), Heidegger’s to Hitler.

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The historicity of Dasein is said by Heidegger to be essentially the historicity of the world.

*The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world.* Dasein’s historicality is essentially the historicality of the world, which, on the basis of ecstatico-horizontal temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it already encounters that which has been discovered within-the-world. *With the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world.* (SZ 388)

Heidegger here distinguishes an authentic from an inauthentic understanding of history. Once again *Wiederholung* (repetition) is said to be characteristic of the authentic understanding of history. I relate to history in such a way that through it I gain my place: *Gechick is Schicksal.* This, however, is not true of inauthentic Dasein: History to it is first of all what is past and done with.

Resolve is said to constitute itself in the faithfulness of *Existenz* to its own self. Part of such faithfulness is said to be *Ehrfurcht*, respect, **before the only authority which a free existing can have**: *die wiederholbaren Möglichkeiten der Existenz.*

Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for *anxiety*, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of receiving the sole authority which a free existing can have — of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence. (SZ 391)

Heidegger contrasts this with the way inauthentic historicity evades choice by following the conventions of he they.

But when historicity is authentic, it understands history as the ‘recurrence’ of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition. (SZ 391-392)

**Par. 76**

Heidegger here tries to exhibit the origin of history in historicity. Heidegger points to a connection between the rise of **history as a science and the loss of history**.
What should a more authentic history strive for? Note the parallels between this discussion of history and the earlier discussion of space: just as a medieval map-maker could be said to do greater justice to our fundamental sense of space, so there is a sense in which the medieval historian could be said to do greater justice to a primordial sense of history than a historian who thinks he can be truly objective. The former history places us. The historian here provides that place by telling the story of history in such a way that it is presided over by a hero. In this sense someone might call Christ the *Held der Geschichte*.

**Par. 77**

Since none of you, I suspect, are really up on either Dilthey or Yorck von Wartenburg, I shall pass over this paragraph and only point out that Yorck here appears as a kind of mediary between Heidegger and Dilthey, whose questioning of Dilthey suggests Heidegger’s own. Important here for Heidegger is Yorck’s distinction between the **historical** and the **ontical**. (SZ 399)
13. Conclusion

Towards the end of our last session I raised the question: what are the consequences of Heidegger's understanding of authenticity for ethics and politics? Let me recall the most important steps of the preceding discussion.

1. Heidegger analyzes authenticity as a human possibility.
2. Dasein is said to be called to that possibility in the call of conscience.
3. Conscience calls us to own up to or appropriate our guilt: never will Dasein be truly master of itself. Just because of this it is faced with having to make decisions, for genuine decision is only in the face of what has not been fully mastered, as Heidegger will remind us in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Conscience calls us to resolute decision in the face of an inevitable opacity.
4. How is such decision possible? Does it not require criteria? What are the necessary conditions for the possibility of decision? Does decision, if it is not to collapse into meaningless arbitrariness or spontaneity require some measure? Where do we find that measure?
5. Authenticity would seem to require that we give that measure to ourselves? Thus Heidegger's claim: To give the law to oneself is the highest freedom. Cf. Kantian autonomy.
6. But what sense does this Kantian sounding understanding of authenticity make, given the context of *Being and Time*? Is it compatible with Heidegger's understanding of Dasein's essential guilt? Must that law which the human being is to give him- or herself, not also be in some sense discovered, a gift?
7. In *Being and Time* Heidegger links this gift to the past. Resolve is said to constitute itself in the faithfulness of Existenz to its own self. Part of such faithfulness is said to be Ehrfurcht, respect, before the only authority which a free existing can have: die wiederholbaren Möglichkeiten der Existenz, the repeatable possibilities of existence. But does the past speak with one voice?
8. The past needs to be interpreted. It has to be re-presented in something like a narrative presided over by a theme that binds it into a coherent whole and allows us to place our existence in that hole. Heidegger does not speak of a theme, but of the hero. The choice of a hero, I want to suggest, gathers history into such a whole, where the place
marked by the word "hero" is left disturbingly empty in *Being and Time* and thus presents itself to us as an empty vessel demanding to be filled, where the authentic choice of a hero, given Heidegger’s analysis, can in principle not be secured and supported with good reasons. One might, to be sure, call such choice of a hero into question given Heidegger’s understanding of the essential homelessness of Dasein. The choice of a hero could be considered as a homecoming that flees from authenticity, as a choice in bad faith. But what makes bad faith bad? How do we distinguish bad from good faith?

But let me turn to the last chapter:

**Par. 78**

This first par. of the last chapter is once again preparatory and we can pass over it rather quickly. Heidegger points out that our discussion up to this point has neglected the **everyday understanding of time**. How do we think of time? We think of events as taking time; we tell people not to waste time; we have time on our hands; we don't have enough time. Time appears in all these cases as an entity of sorts that we encounter and deal with, almost as if it were a strange kind of equipment. **Clocks allow us to measure time**, where the sun provides us with most obvious natural clock. How is time, thus understood, related to the **existential understanding of time** developed in the preceding chapters?

Everyday Dasein, the Dasein which takes time, comes across time proximally in what it encounters within-the-world as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. The time which it has thus ‘experienced’ is understood within the horizon of that way of understanding Being which is the closest for Dasein; that is, it is understood a something which is itself somehow present-at-hand. How and why Dasein comes to develop the ordinary conceptions of time, must be clarified in terms of its state-of-Being as concerning itself with time — a state-of-Being with a temporal foundation. The ordinary conception of time owes its origin to a way in which primordial time has been leveled off. By demonstrating that this is the source of the ordinary conception, we shall justify our earlier Interpretation of temporality as *primordial time*. (SZ 405)
Heidegger goes on to point out that in the theoretical unfolding of the vulgar conception of time there has been a remarkable oscillation between subjective and objective interpretations of time:

In the development of this ordinary conception, there is a remarkable vacillation as to whether the character to be attributed to time is ‘subjective’ or ‘Objective’. Where time is taken as being in itself, it gets allotted primarily to the ‘soul’ notwithstanding. And where it has the character which belongs to ‘consciousness’, it still functions ‘Objectively’.

(SZ 405)

Is time to be understood as somehow being in itself? Is it to be linked to consciousness? In this connection Heidegger points to an apparent similarity between his analysis of the essential temporality of Dasein and Hegel’s understanding of the link between spirit and time, where Hegel tried to show why spirit had to fall into time. For this reason Heidegger thinks it necessary to address the fundamental difference between them.

Par. 79

Following this preliminary discussion Heidegger returns to our ordinary understanding of time. The ordinary understanding is marked by its privileging of the present: back then, when I was younger. The past here is understood as what is no longer, and similarly the future as what is not yet. Heidegger’s claim that the time of fallen everyday being with others gives primacy to the present seems unproblematic, even as this present is marked by negativity, as the threshold between a not yet and a no longer.

Heidegger next turns to another structure: back when; I will see you at 5; it is just about noon: we fix time with respect to a time scale, a calendar or something of the sort. We date events. Heidegger thus speaks of their Datierbarkeit, their datability. In this connection you may want to think about the ontological significance of having a date or, to be more up to date, about the ontological significance of a certain resistance today to the term "dating."
The datability of events has its foundation in the priority of \textit{Zuhandenheit} and its temporality. How much time do I have to catch the train; it is almost time to start; time for a break. In this connection Heidegger speaks of a \textbf{time span}:

Not only does the ‘during’ have a span; but every ‘now’, ‘then’, and ‘on that former occasion’ has, with its datability structure, its own spanned character, with the width of the span varying: ‘now’ — in the intermission, while one is eating, in the evening, in summer; ‘then’ — at breakfast, when one is taking a climb, and so forth. (SZ409)

\textbf{Time span}, like \textit{epoch}, once again invites comparison with the earlier discussion of \textit{region}.

Worth noting is Heidegger’s suggestion that saying "I have no time" betrays an \textbf{inauthentic mode of existence}:

He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and befallings which he encounters in such a making-present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways. Busily losing himself in the object of his concern, he loses his time in it too. Hence his characteristic way of talking — ‘I have no time’. But just as he who exists inauthentically is constantly losing time and never ‘has’ any, the temporality of authentic existence remains distinctive in that such existence, in its resoluteness, never loses time and ‘always has time’. (SZ 410)

What allows Heidegger to say this? A wedge is driven here between temporality and Dasein:

A last aspect Heidegger calls our attention to is the \textbf{publicness} of everyday time. It is not my time, but a time that has its foundation in the anonymous one. We have to use the time with which one reckons. Don't take so much time!

\textbf{Par. 80}

In this par. Heidegger analyzes this last feature in greater detail. This public time is the time in which we encounter things ready-to-hand and present-at-hand: the train is leaving at ...; the morning light is falling into my room; it is time to get up. Time is
initially **time to...** The example just given points to what Heidegger calls the most natural measure of time:

In terms of this dating arises the ‘most natural’ measure of time — the day. And because the temporality of that Dasein which must take its time is finite, its days are already numbered. Concernful awaiting takes precaution to define the ‘thens’ with which it is to concern itself — that is, to divide up the day. And the ‘during-the-daytime makes this possible. This dividing up, in turn, is done with regard to that by which time is dated — the journeying sun. Sunset and midday, like the sunrise itself, are distinctive ‘places’ which this heavenly body occupies. Its regularly recurring passage is something which Dasein, as thrown into the world and giving itself time temporalizingly, takes into its reckoning. Dasein historizes from day to day by reason of its way of interpreting time by dating it — a way which is adumbrated in its thrownness into the “there.” (SZ 413)

The very word "everyday" points to the significance of this measure. Part of our thrownness are the temporal orders in which we always already have been placed: time to go to bed; time to get up; time to work. We measure time. And a public time requires a shared measure. This public time is the *Weltzeit*, where world is to be thought as in the first part of *Being and Time*.

As the ‘time-for-something’, the time which has made itself public has essentially a world-character. Hence the time which makes itself public in the temporalizing of temporality is what we designate as “world-time”.

And we designate it thus not because it is present-at-hand as an entity within-the-world (which it can never be), but because it belongs to the world [zur Welt] in the sense which we have interpreted existential-ontologically. (SZ 414)

What is the significance of the shift from natural time to clock time? Of this turn to ever more objective measures? In this connection consider the significance of the history of time-keeping devices.

A certain **homogenization of time** corresponds to the **homogenization of space**. Both are linked. Both are founded in the self-transcendence of Dasein. Hegel might
have spoken of the progress of the spirit. Both bring with it something like a loss of place.

Is time subjective or objective? The question is related to the question "is the world subjective or objective?" If Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world this "or" must be challenged. Heidegger thus insists that there is a sense in which time is more objective than any object:

The time 'in which' the present-at-hand is in motion or at rest is not 'Objective', if what we mean by that is the Being-present-at-hand-in-itself of entities encountered within-the-world. But just as little is time 'subjective' if by this we understand "Being-present-at-hand and occurring in a subject' World-time is 'more Objective' than any possible Object, because, with the disclosedness of the world, it already becomes 'Objectified in an ecstatico-horizontal manner as the condition for the possibility of entities within-the-world. Thus contrary to Kant's opinion, one comes across world-time just as immediately in the physical as in the psychical, and not just roundabout by way of the psychical. (SZ 419)

And time is also more subjective than any possible subject:

World-time, moreover, is also 'more subjective' than any possible subject; for it is what first makes possible the Being of the factically existing Self — that being which, as is now well understood, is the meaning of care. (SZ 419)

It is in this way, as world-time, that time gets understood first of all and most of the time: think of the sun's movement across the sky, or of the moving hands of a clock, which is said to have blocked a more fundamental understanding of time.

**Par. 81**

How then does time show itself? Consider once more the clock: The hands turning around: now here, now here. It is this understanding of time that seems to be captured well by the Aristotelian definition:

For time is just this — a number of motion in respect to 'before' and 'after.'

*Physics*, Delta 11, 219 b - BT473

The definition seems both questionable, indeed question begging, and obvious:
Ever since Aristotle all discussions of the concept of time have clung in principle to the Aristotelian definition; that is, in taking time as their theme, they have taken it as it shows itself in circumspective concern. Time is what is ‘counted’; that is to say, it is what is expressed and what we have in view, even if unthematically, when the traveling pointer (or the shadow) is made present. When one makes present what is moved in this movement, one says ‘now here, now here, and so on. The "nows" are what gets counted. And these show themselves ‘in every ‘now’ as “nows” which will ‘forthwith’ be ‘no-longer-now’ and “nows” which have ‘just been not-yet-now’. The world-time which is ‘sighted’ in this manner in the use of clocks, we call the “now-time” [Jetzt-Zeit]. (SZ 421)

This "now-time" expresses the ordinary understanding of time:

Thus for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of “nows” which are constantly ‘present-at-hand’, simultaneously passing away and coming along. Time is understood as a succession, as a ‘flowing stream’ of “nows”, as ‘the course of time’. What is implied by such an interpretation of world-time with which we concern ourselves? (SZ 422)

And yet, even though rooted in world-time this now-time also involves a leveling of the former:

In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of ‘nows”, both datability and significance are missing. These two structures are not permitted ‘to come to the fore’ when time is characterized as a pure succession. The ordinary interpretation of time covers them up. When these are covered up, the ecstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality, in which the datability and significance of the “now” are grounded, gets leveled off. The “nows” get shorn of these relations, as it were; and, as thus shorn, they simply range themselves along after one another so as to make up the succession. (SZ 422)

We speak of the flow of time; time passes. In every now another now has perished and yet: do this now that is now and the now that just was share this: their participation in the
self-same “now”? Something of the sort finds expression in the passage from the *Timaeus* Heidegger cites:

> Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal, but moving according to number, while eternity rests in unity; and this image we call time

(*Timaeus*, 37 d, SZ 423)

This view of time as the moving image of eternity would seem to have its foundation in a desire to keep time. But time of course, despite all our time keeping devices, refuses to be kept. In this desire to ground time in eternity and unity in something eternally at rest, which therefore does not pass away, something like a tendency to flee from what Heidegger considers a more primordial time betrays itself. This more fundamental understanding of time is implicit in saying: *Die Zeit lässt sich nicht halten* — "time will not be kept." This awareness of a time that will not be kept, that time passes — and Heidegger insists on the remarkable priority which time passes has over time arises — is linked to an awareness that we must die.

*Dasein knows fugitive time in terms of its ‘fugitive’ knowledge about its death.* In the kind of talk which emphasizes time’s passing away, the finite futurity of Dasein’s temporality is publicly reflected. And because even in talk about time’s passing away, death can remain covered up, time shows itself as a passing-away ‘in itself’. (SZ 425)

But even in now-time this primordial time manifests itself as the **irreversibility** of time (SZ 426).

Even the everyday understanding of time as world-time recognizes its special relationship to something like soul or spirit. Once again Heidegger cites Aristotle:

> But if nothing but soul, and in soul reason is qualified to count, there would be no time unless there were soul. (*Physics*, Delta 14. 223 a 25 — SZ 427)

 Might there be movement? And thus time of some sort?

Heidegger adds a quote from Augustine's *Confessions*:

> Hence it seemed to me that time is nothing else than an extendedness; but of what sort of thing it is an extendedness, I do not know; and it would be
Heidegger's *Being and Time*

It is surprising if it were not an extendedness of the soul itself. (*Conf XI, 26 — SZ 427*)

The paragraph closes with a reference to Hegel, who is said to have attempted to make explicit the connection between time and spirit.

**Par. 82**

Heidegger begins this paragraph with Hegel's observation that history takes place in time. But this is also to place spirit in time. How is this placement of spirit in time to be understood?

History, which is essentially the history of spirit, runs its course ‘in time’. Thus ‘the development of history falls into time’. Hegel is not satisfied, however, with averring that the within-time-ness of spirit is a Fact, but seeks to understand how it is possible for spirit to fall into time, which is the non-sensuous sensuous. Time must be able, as it were, to take in spirit. And spirit in turn must be akin to time and its essence. Accordingly two points come up for discussion: (1) how does Hegel define the essence of time? (2) What belongs to the essence of spirit which makes it possible for it to ‘fall-into-time’? (*SZ 428*)

Heidegger points out that it is in Aristotle's *Physics*, i.e. in his ontology of nature, that we meet with the first developed interpretation of the ordinary understanding of time; and it is in the context of his philosophy of nature that Hegel's discussion of time has its proper place.

True to tradition, Hegel’s analysis of time has its locus in the second part of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which is entitled ‘Philosophy of Nature’. The first portion of this treats of mechanics and of this the first division is devoted to the discussion of ‘space and time’. He calls these ‘the abstract “outside-of-one-another”’.

Though Hegel puts space and time together, this does not happen simply because he has arranged them superficially one after the other: space, ‘and time also’. The transition from space to time does not signify that these are treated in adjoining paragraphs; rather ‘it is space itself’ that makes the transition’. Space ‘is’ time; that is, time is the ‘truth’ of space.
If space is thought dialectically in that which it is, then according to Hegel this Being of space unveils itself as time. How must space be thought? (SZ 429)

What then is space: *die vermittlungslose Gleichgültigkeit des Aussersichseins der Natur*: Space is the ‘unmediated indifference of Nature’s Being-outside-of-itsel. This is a way of saying that space is the abstract multiplicity [Vielheit] of the points which are differentiable in it. (SZ 429)

The point is understood here as the negation of space.

Nevertheless, the point, in so far as it differentiates anything in space, is the negation of space, although in such a manner that, as its negation, it itself remains in space; a point is space after all. The point does not lift itself out of space as if it were something of another character. (SZ 429)

If the point is thought only as the negation of space, space itself in turn is thought only as the negation of that negation, i.e. as punctuality. But to think a particular point we have to negate space so understood:

In the negation of the negation (that is, of punctuality) the point posits itself for itself and thus emerges from the indifference of subsisting. As that which is posited for itself, it differentiates itself from this one and form that one: it is no longer this and not yet that. (SZ 430)

But it is in time alone according to Hegel that the point has actuality:

According to Hegel, this negation of the negation as punctuality is time. If this discussion has any demonstrable meaning, it can mean nothing else than that the positing-of-itself-for-itself of every point is a “now-here”, “now-here”, and so on. Every point ‘is’ posited for itself as a now-point. (430)

Time is understood as the *angeschaute Werden*, intuited becoming: Being in transition to nothing, nothing in transition to being.

Heidegger has good reason to claim that Hegel’s discussion remains totally within the orbit of a privileging of the Now:

When he characterizes time in terms of the “now”, this presupposes that in its full structure the “now” remains leveled off and covered up, so that it
can be intuited as something present-at-hand, though present-at-hand’ only ideally. (SZ 431)

Some quotations from the Encyclopedia are adduced to support that interpretation.

What then is the connection of time to spirit?

If Hegel can say that when spirit gets actualized, it accords with it to fall into time, with “time” defined as a negation of a negation, how has spirit itself been understood? The essence of spirit is the concept. By this Hegel understands not the universal which is intuited in a genus as the form of something thought, but rather the form of the very thinking which thinks itself: the conceiving of oneself — as the grasping of the not-I. Inasmuch as the grasping of the not-I presents a differentiation, there lies in the pure concept, as the grasping of this differentiation, a differentiation of the difference. Thus Hegel can define the essence of the spirit formally and apophantically as the negation of a negation. This ‘absolute negativity’ gives a logically formalized interpretation of Descartes’ “cogito me cogitare rem”, wherein he sees the essence of the conscientia. (SZ 433)

The essence of spirit is not just to think something, but to think itself as thus thinking something. But the thinking subject is other than what it thinks. In that sense it is negation. To think itself it has to think itself as this negation. Thinking as the grasping of what it is not, now grasps itself as this grasping, thus negating the initial negation. Again we meet with the formulation: negation of the negation.

This negating of the negation is both that which is ‘absolutely restless’ in the spirit and also its self-manifestation, which belongs to its essence. The ‘progression’ of the spirit which actualizes itself in history, carries with it a principle of exclusion’. In this exclusion, however, that which is excluded does not get detached from the spirit; it gets surmounted. The kind of making-itself-free which overcomes and at the same time tolerates, is characteristic of the freedom of the spirit. Thus ‘progress’ never signifies a merely quantitative “more”, but is essentially qualitative and indeed has the quality of spirit. ‘Progression’ is done knowingly and
knows itself in its goal. In every step of its ‘progress’ spirit has to overcome ‘itself’ “as the truly malignant obstacle to that goal”. In its development spirit aims ‘to reach its own concept’. The development itself is ‘a hard unending battle against itself’. (SZ 434)

Given this understanding of spirit it is evident why it has to be tied to time. But Heidegger remains unconvinced by Hegel's attempt to thus bring together spirit and time:

By going back to the selfsameness of the formal structure which both spirit and time possess as the negation of the negation, Hegel shows how it is possible for spirit to be actualized historically ‘in time’. Spirit and time get disposed of with the very emptiest of formal-ontological and formal-apophantical abstractions, and this makes it possible to produce a kinship between them. But because time simultaneously gets conceived in the sense of a world-time which has been utterly leveled off, so that its origin remains completely concealed, it simply gets contrasted with spirit — contrasted as a something that is present-at-hand. Because of this, spirit must first of all fall ‘into time’. (SZ 435)

For the human being to recognize itself as in time is to recognize that the spirit has not yet reached its own concept. Time is the fate of spirit that lacks completeness: in the words of the *Phenomenology*:

Thus time appears as the very fate and necessity which spirit has when it is not in itself complete: the necessity of its giving self-consciousness a richer share in consciousness, of its setting in motion the immediacy of the “in-itself” (the form in which substance is in consciousness), or, conversely, of its realizing and making manifest the “in-itself” taken as the inward (and this is what first is inward), that is, of vindicating it for its certainty of itself. (SZ 435)

To Hegel's analysis Heidegger opposes his own:

Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts with the ‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes such existence possible. ‘Spirit’ does not first of all fall into time, but it exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality. Temporality temporalizes world-time,
within the horizon of which ‘history’ can ‘appear’ as historizing within time. “Spirit” does not fall into time; but factical existence ‘falls’ as falling from primordial, authentic temporality. This falling [“Fallen”], however, has itself its existential possibility in a mode of its temporalizing — a mode which belongs to temporality. (SZ 435-436)

Spirit does not fall into time, but fallen Existenz falls out of primordial time.

As Heidegger himself points out, this is an all too sketchy analysis. But the little Heidegger here offers does suggest that Hegel orients himself by taking for granted the traditional understanding of time. More fundamentally, he takes for granted the desire to grasp, to comprehend and thus keep time, and elevates, just as Platonism and Christianity did, the conditions that allow for such a grasping into the absolute.

Par. 83

Being and Time remained a torso. This shows itself especially in this last paragraph, which seems insufficiently developed. So before returning very briefly to this brief final paragraph, let me add a few concluding remarks.

In our very first session I called attention to the fact that in his dissertation the young Heidegger calls for a liberation of logic from grammar. That call was of a piece with his effort to join the battle against psychologism in which he saw the neo-Kantians, Frege, and Husserl involved. Still committed to the Catholicism in which he was raised the young Heidegger turned to the time-transcendent realm of logical truth to answer those that would allow destructive time the last word.

In the first part of Being and Time we saw that call explicitly reversed, as Heidegger now calls for a liberation of grammar from logic. In the second part of Being and Time the possibility of an understanding of authentic Rede suggests itself that would suspend both grammar and logic for the sake of the silent call of conscience. Any one-sided absolutization of this call, however, is called into question by Heidegger's understanding of guilt, which demands a return to the world. A key to Heidegger's attempt to think this return with respect the problem of language is his confrontation with the poet Hölderlin. Here I only want to point out that Heidegger's journey marks out a spectrum whose end points are logic and mathematics, on the one hand, poetry, on the other.
This development of the theme of *logos* in Heidegger's thought has a parallel in his closely related thinking of *time*. In his *Habilitationsschrift, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, Heidegger speaks of the problem of "the relation of time and eternity, change and absolute validity, world and God," which is said to find its theoretical reflection in the division between *Geschichte (Wertgestaltung)* and *Philosophie (Wertgeltung)*. (GA1, 410) That distinction mirrors that between grammar and logic. The *Habilitationsschrift* closed with a call to face that problem of the relation of time and eternity by confronting once again Hegel. Hegel is indeed the *Habilitationsschrift's* last word. And the lecture "*Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft*, also dating form 1916, is thus introduced with a motto taken from Meister Eckhart: "*Zeit ist das, was sich wandelt und mannigfaltigt, Ewigkeit hält sich einfach.*" “Time is what changes and unfolds, eternity keeps itself simple.” (GA1, 415) A spectrum opens up whose endpoints are marked by eternity and time. In the first part of *Being and Time* this realm of the eternal is called into question by insisting on what Heidegger later will call world-time, which is not yet the homogenized time of physics. In *Being and Time* the contrast between *Ewigkeit* and *Zeit* gives way to the contrast between the *vulgar understanding of time* and the *primordial, ecstatic-horizontal* understanding of time. Heidegger’s questioning of the privileging of the present-at-hand so characteristic of traditional philosophy invites itself question. Can that privilege perhaps be defended? Can we rest content with an easy critique of “reifying consciousness”? Especially questionable is Heidegger’s privileging of primordial time presupposed by the closing question:

Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*?

Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*? (SZ 437)

I would suggest that we need to reconsider the relationship of primordial time, not just to ordinary time, but to that eternity which so preoccupied the young Heidegger. The possibility of such preoccupation needs to be made more transparent if Heidegger is to do justice to logic and mathematics, and that is to say to our science and technology, and that is to say to our modern world.

The problem of thinking "the relation of time and eternity, change and absolute validity, world and God," remains with us, which is also the problem of thinking the relationship of history and philosophy, of history and truth. I have suggested that in
Heidegger’s *Being and Time* Heidegger fails to heed sufficiently the legitimacy of what the tradition had thought in thinking the thought of eternity. This calls the path Heidegger traveled in *Being and Time* and from *Being and Time* into question.

In our considerations hitherto, our task has been to Interpret the primordial whole of factual Dasein with regards to its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic existing, and to do so in an existential-ontological manner in terms of its very basis. Temporality has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care. So that, which our preparatory existential analytic of Dasein contributed before temporality was laid bare, has now been taken back into temporality as the primordial structure of Dasein’s totality of Being. In terms of the possible ways in which primordial time can temporalize itself, we have provided the ‘grounds’ for those structures which were just ‘pointed out’ in our earlier treatment. Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general. The thematic analytic of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand. (SZ 436)

This raises questions concerning Heidegger’s understanding of just what it is that he thinks he has accomplished. Just how are we to understand: “our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take”? This implies that there are others. And how might a clarification of “the idea of Being in general” support or call into question what has been accomplished?

This holds particularly if we adhere to the principle which we expressed in our introduction as one by which any philosophical investigation may be gauged: that philosophy “is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding line for all philosophical inquiry as the point where it arises and where it returns.” This thesis, of course, is to be regarded not as a dogma, but rather as a formulation of a problem of principle which still remains ‘veiled’: can one provide *ontological* grounds
for ontology, or does it also require an ontical foundation? And which entity must take over the function of providing this foundation? (487) What entity indeed?

We have already gotten hints of how Heidegger would have us answer this last question when he admitted that a factical ideal endorsed by a historically situated Dasein was presupposed by his ontological analysis. With that admission any philosophical investigation as here understood is called into question. **Ontology is incapable of providing itself with an adequate foundation.**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger thus understanda Dasein as geworfen, as essentially cast or thrown into the world of things. This raises the question: What or who is here is the thrower? There are obvious ontic answers in terms of the past that has made us who we are, but all such answers already presuppose that this past has disclosed itself, presuppose the finite being of Dasein. Cast into the world Dasein essentially finds itself in the midst of what is given. But once again the question arises: who or what is the giver of that gift? There is the obvious answer that the very question fails to recognize the ontological difference. We are left with an understanding of Being as the groundless presencing of things. A deeper understanding of time was to help us to a more adequate understanding of the mode or modes of their presencing, of their being. But such presencing must be understood as a being given and time itself would seem to be part of the gift. Being and time are so intimately joined that they cannot be untangled. Later, in the *Beiträge* and in many works that follow, so in the late essay “Zeit und Sein,” Heidegger will name “What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together” (GA14, 24) the Ereignis. But this names nothing other than the authentic being of Dasein, underscoring, however, that this being is in its essence historical and as such determines the way we experience persons and things, their being. As far as responsible thinking can reach, that destiny is essentially groundless. The recourse to original time cannot provide ontology with the foundation that Heidegger once had promised. There is indeed a sense in which with *Being and Time* not only Heidegger’s thinking, but philosophy had come to an end. And so it seems fitting that Heidegger chose to include in the volume *Zur Sache des Denkens*, together with “Time and Being”, which by its title, suggests that it offers us belatedly something like the
missing third part of the projected first volume of *Being and Time*, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (1964).