Since 1945 the dominant form of large-scale violence has been civil wars. Although the annual count of extant civil wars (far larger than the number of interstate wars) peaked before the turn of the century, civil wars continue to inflict vast suffering—including displacement, sexual violence, and death—on millions of civilians each year.

Scholars in various disciplines, particularly political science, have increasingly turned their attention to analysis of civil war, especially after the turn of the century. An early theme was the identification of the structural determinants of civil war onset, largely addressed through cross-national quantitative studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2001, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In-depth analysis of sub-national patterns of violence and political participation in particular civil wars, often based on extensive field or archival research, increasingly provided a complementary focus and method. Recent works deploy more sophisticated research designs and methodologies to develop and test theoretical insights at either the cross-national or sub-national level (or both). Examples include the analysis of ethnic dyads across borders to study transnational dynamics (Cederman et al. 2013), patterns of order within civil war (Arjona 2010; Staniland 2012), trajectories of different insurgent organizations within a field of rebellion (Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014), variation in wartime sexual violence across states as well as insurgents (Cohen 2013; Leiby 2009; Wood 2006, Wood 2015), negotiated settlements (Hoddie and Hartzell 2007; Toft 2009; Walter 2002, 2009), and the legacies of wartime violence and mobilization (Bateson 2013; Wood 2008).

Rather than attempt a synthesis of this burgeoning field of scholarship, I emphasize three themes that are particularly relevant for this volume. The first, patterns of violence against civilians during civil war, is particularly rich in its theoretical and policy implications. Specifically, scholars increasingly focus on documenting the repertoires of violence on the part of both states and non-state groups and on assessing the extent...
to which group institutions and ideology account for the wide variation in those repertoires. These emergent themes evoke key concepts of the social movements literature, including repertoires of contention, political opportunity, framing processes, and mobilizing structures. The second theme, political mobilization during civil war, more directly evokes those concepts, but the connections between their role in peacetime and in wartime are as yet not well established. The third, the social legacies of war, also echoes ongoing themes in the literature on social movements, particularly the legacies of political mobilization and the origins of pro-social norms.

I first discuss violence, emphasizing the recent turn to analysis of group institutions and ideologies to explain the sharp variation in patterns of violence observed across armed groups. I then assess the sparser literature on social mobilization and civil war, focussing on escalation from unarmed protest to armed insurgency; mobilization of both recruits and civilians by insurgents, the state, and its allies; and the consequences of both indiscriminate state violence and hearts-and-minds approaches to counterinsurgency. In the penultimate section, I discuss the social legacies of civil war, emphasizing its positive as well as negative legacies. In the conclusion, I identify particular topics for which scholarly understanding would benefit from increased exchange between with scholars of civil wars and social movements as distinct forms of contentious politics.

**Patterns of Violence Against Civilians in Civil War**

In his magisterial *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (2006), Stathis Kalyvas argues that an armed actor (either a state or non-state group) should exert selective violence based on civilian denunciations in the areas that it partially controls, and indiscriminate violence in areas that it does not control. The argument is based on a two-fold logic: because indiscriminate violence may be counterproductive, armed actors prefer to exert selective violence against civilian supporters of their rival. However, they need information from civilians to do so. Such information is not available in contested areas as civilians are too fearful to denounce their neighbors; and in areas of total control, no civilian would dare defect. Thus selective violence is exercised in the group’s areas of partial control. In contrast, an armed group engages in indiscriminate violence in areas where its rival exerts total or partial control (if accessible) because it has no information with which to select victims. Data from the Greek civil war (Kalyvas 2006) and the Vietnam War (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011) confirm several observable implications of the theory: selective and indiscriminate violence roughly occurred where the theory predicted. However the theory, in its focus on where violence occurs, does not account for other variation in violence across non-state actors, particularly in its frequency and repertoire. Moreover, the theory treats collective targeting (when a group targets a particular ethnic, political or social group) as part of
indiscriminate violence, which obscures other logics of violence (Balcells 2010; Steele 2009). (But see Kalyvas 2012 on extensions of his argument to account for non-lethal violence and motives for violence that do not stem from territorial control.)

In contrast to the territorial control model’s emphasis on strategic logic, its presumption that all actors respond similarly to its imperatives, and its neglect of the principal agent challenges that armed groups confront, Jeremy Weinstein (2007) traces variation in violence against civilians across non-state actors to differences in their initial endowments. Those with access to economic endowments attract opportunistic recruits who are difficult to discipline, with the result that such groups engage in a broad repertoire of frequent violence against civilians. Those who rely on social endowments attract activist recruits amenable to the group’s training and discipline, with the result that they engage in violence much more selectively. Thus non-state actors engage in either a broad repertoire of frequent violence against civilians, or only lethal and highly selective violence. However, his parsimonious emphasis on distinct pools of recruits neglects the powerful potential of socialization, which he rejects as unable to account for variation in group norms (2007: 125), a point to which I return later in discussing ideology. Moreover, the claimed correlation between reliance on lootable resources and abuse of civilians may not be true: Stanton (2009, 2013) shows that rebel reliance on contraband is not correlated with relevant patterns of violence against civilians in civil wars since 1989.

Scholars continue to document the wide variation in violence against civilians during civil war, exploring the extent to which it is explained by variation in territorial control, economic endowments, and other characteristics of the conflict or the armed organization. In particular, restraint in the use of violence toward civilians during civil war is a theme important for both its policy and theoretical significance. Stanton (2009, 2013) shows that more than 40 per cent of states and of rebels during civil conflicts since 1989 exercise restraint—the absence of massacres, scorched earth campaigns, forced displacement, bombing and strafing of civilian areas. Moreover, despite the emphasis in policy and media publications on wartime sexual violence, not all armed groups engage in high levels of rape: during civil wars in Africa from 2000–09, 59 per cent of the 177 armed groups (states, rebels, and militias) were not reported to have engaged in moderate or high levels of rape (Nordås 2011). (Importantly, by 2000, media and NGO organizations were actively documenting rape of civilians.) Restraint is particularly puzzling when exercised against an enemy that engages in violence against the group’s civilian base. In a study of wartime rape by armed groups in all major civil wars between 1980 and 2009, Cohen (2013) found that in 38 per cent of wars where there were (at least) some reports of rape, only one side perpetrated the violence. (State forces are more likely than rebels to do so, she shows.) Countrywide social structures and cultural norms cannot explain such sustained asymmetry in rape, suggesting that characteristics of the armed group are important for explaining variation in wartime violence (Cohen, Hoover Green, and Wood 2013; Wood 2012, 2015).

Before assessing this “organizational turn” in the literature on civil war violence, it is important to note that scholars increasingly emphasize the importance of documenting
and analyzing non-lethal elements of the armed group’s repertoire of violence, including the recent emphasis on sexual violence (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011; Leiby 2009, 2011; Wood 2006, 2009, 2015). Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood (2014b), for example, in defining what scholars should mean by “pattern of violence,” analyze three distinct dimensions: the group’s repertoire, and for each element of the repertoire, its targeting (selective, collective against groups defined by a specific ethnic, social or political identity, and indiscriminate) and for each element and target, its frequency. In contrast to Weinstein, they argue that variation in patterns of violence cannot be reduced to the binary all-forms-of-terror vs. restraint.

Much recent scholarly analysis has focussed on armed group institutions to explain the observed variation in violence against civilians, building on Weinstein’s work but without his focus on initial endowments. A theoretically consequential question is the extent to which that variation is explained by unordered violence. To account for variation in unordered as well as ordered violence, many authors draw on principal agent approaches to organizations as their theoretical starting point (Gates 2002; Hoover Green 2011; Mitchell 2004; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2009, 2015). Such approaches build on a two-fold insight: commanders and combatants may have different preferences for violence, and combatants but not commanders have information about the violence they are in fact carrying out. Wood (2009) argues that group institutions mediate this tension: groups with strong institutions (as indicated by the ability to distribute financial resources across the organization without significant corruption, for example) implement commander preferences, while those with weak ones implement those of combatants (which evolve during war). In contrast to Weinstein, scholars increasingly emphasize the importance of socialization rather than endowments. For example, Stanton (2009, 2013) shows that rebels that have a political wing to their military organization are more likely to exhibit restraint; her other findings similarly emphasize the group’s institutions and also those of its rival. In light of the social psychological dynamics of combat—dehumanization of victims, brutalization of combatants, etc.—Hoover Green (2011, 2014) argues that reiterated political training is necessary if armed groups are to engage in a narrow repertoire. Cohen (2013) shows that wartime rape is significantly more frequent by armed groups (rebel or state forces) that forcibly (particularly when also randomly) recruit their combatants: gang rape serves as a source of social cohesion for such groups, she argues. In their careful analyses of variation in patterns of violence, Hoover Green (2011) and Manekin (2012) show that internal group institutions explain differences in violence patterns between state and rebel forces in El Salvador (and among different constituent groups of each) and between different state forces in Israel, respectively.

These recent works of course beg the question: what is the origin of armed group institutions? Diffusion across non-state actors and also across state military institutions clearly plays a role (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), but the precise mechanisms of diffusion—learning (adaptation due to belief in an innovation’s effectiveness), imitation, agent migration, coercion, or competition—are not well understood (Wood 2013).
One source is group ideology, another emergent theme in the literature. Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood (2014a: 215; see also Freed 2004: 6) argue that ideology is best understood as “a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change—or defense against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action.” Thus in carrying out the political violence of civil war, armed groups (including ethnic nationalist groups) necessarily embrace ideologies, which vary from highly systematic doctrines on the part of some groups to loosely related ideas vaguely advanced by leaders of others. In short, if violence is political, it is ideological, to sharply varying degree. Moreover, ideologies prescribe—to widely varying extent, from no particular blueprint to very specific instructions—particular institutions and strategies as the means to attain group goals. Latin American insurgent groups built different institutions, for example, depending on whether they followed Maoist, Guevarist, or Leninist ideology.

Ideologies also partly determine the perceived set of alternative strategies and tactics from which commanders develop not only institutions, but also group norms, rhetoric, and alliances. They do not calculate the costs and benefits of distinct possibilities through some abstract calculus but consider historically available options, possibly restricted by the strategic and normative constraints their ideology prescribes (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014a). Scott Straus (2012) argues that state ideology in some settings may serve as a source of de-escalation (rather than escalation) of violence, as in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, which contrasts sharply with Rwanda in terms of state ideology as well as mass killing. (Other scholars attribute differences in the type of warfare and in the duration of the conflict during and after the Cold War to ideological differences: Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014.)

However, the recent emphasis on group institutions and ideology—the “organizational turn”—runs the risk of neglecting other determinants of civil war violence. Three issues are particularly important. First, a narrow focus on the armed group may ignore the effects of its interaction with enemy organizations and with “on-side” rivals. Violence against civilians may escalate because of conflict dynamics, particularly looming defeat (Hultman 2007) or competition for resources with rivals (Metelits 2010). Patterns of violence may diffuse directly (without the mediation of institutions stressed earlier), as combatants imitate or learn enemy or rival repertoires. The emergence of revolutionary movements may reflect characteristics of the state, not just the armed organization (Goodwin 2001). Second, whether or not a fledgling rebel organization develops the coherence necessary to pose a sustained challenge to the state depends on its social embeddedness—the type and extent of its social networks—before (Staniland 2014) and during the conflict (Stearns 2015). Third, the emphasis on the principal agent approach to understanding civil war violence may obscure a distinct approach that focuses on collective action as the result of non-material, in-process benefits and the dynamic co-evolution of organizational culture and group institutions (Wood 2003).
Social Mobilization and Civil War

Despite the work of eminent scholars Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2003, 2008; Tilly and Tarrow 2006) to build a unified field of “contentious politics,” scholars who work primarily on social movements and on civil wars largely work in isolation from one another, with too few analyzing the relationship between the two forms of political opposition as instances of the broader field of contentious politics, as several scholars have argued (Bosi and Giugni 2012; Goodwin 2012; Tarrow 2007; Tarrow 2014, this volume). Yet scholars of social movements and civil wars share an emphasis on the dynamics of escalation of violence and social mobilization.

Escalation in violence takes many forms: it may mean an increase in the frequency and scale of attacks or a widening of the repertoire or the targeting of violence (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014b). Just as some social movements in peacetime develop explicit long-term strategies of escalation (particularly civil resistance campaigns, Sharp 2005), so too do some insurgent groups in wartime. For example, the Guevarist foco theory of revolution claims that small networks of insurgents can foment armed insurrections in cities (Guevara [1961] 1998). However, despite various attempts, armed insurrection to overthrow the regime has generally failed, with some exceptions (e.g., Nicaragua in 1979).

A particular form of escalation that spans the two fields of study is the decision by a hitherto nonviolent social movement to deploy violence. The recently released Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset makes possible quantitative analysis of the distinct types of campaigns and the correlates of engaging in violence (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). An important initial insight is the documentation that a significant fraction of nonviolent campaigns have a “radical flank” (for an analysis of radicalization of ethno-nationalist movements, see Alimi et al. 2012).

One reason often cited for the switch from nonviolence to violence is that indiscriminate state violence provokes moral outrage that legitimizes the turn to violence as in El Salvador in the late 1970s (Wood 2003), shifts the balance of power within the opposition to those that favor violence (Wood 2003), or leads civilians to perceive that they will be more secure by joining the insurgency than by not doing so (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). However, the determinants of the onset of primarily violent and primarily nonviolent campaigns appear to be distinct: instead of poverty, mountainous terrain, oil, and a history of instability, nonviolent campaigns occur more frequently where there is durable authoritarian regime (as well as the shared determinant, population size) (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; see also Cunningham 2013). This suggests that scholars should not presume that violent campaigns generally originate as an escalation of previous nonviolent campaigns. Nonetheless, the same dataset shows that about 12 per cent of campaigns switch between primarily violent and nonviolent categories; with about 60 per cent of campaigns that switch beginning as primarily nonviolent (Wasser 2014). Moreover, in some settings, there are significant (often
covert) ties between nonviolent and revolutionary activists and organizations, as in Central America (Brockett 2005; Wood 2003). These issues clearly merit more scholarly attention.

Less frequently analyzed is social mobilization during civil war. Such mobilization occurs not only in the obvious form of recruitment of combatants but also in the ongoing mobilization of civilian supporters of both insurgencies and the state. For insurgents, survival as well as success in wars fought through irregular warfare—about half of civil wars (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010)—relies on the ongoing support of at least some civilians. Insurgent supports provide “cover” for non-state combatants as well as intelligence, supplies, transportation, and fresh recruits. While the last three can be coerced relatively effectively, as evident in the pattern of forced recruitment in many wars, the coercing of high-quality intelligence is much more problematic (Wood 2003). Despite a massive influx of aid and training to state forces and major counterinsurgent reforms, the insurgency in El Salvador was not defeated due to the provision of such intelligence by networks of deeply committed civilians, support that reflected moral outrage at state violence and the pleasure of agency on the part of hitherto subordinate actors (Wood 2003). Insurgencies vary sharply in the degree of coercion they exercise over civilians, from groups that require only a “coerced minimum” of not providing support to the state as in El Salvador, to those that recruit forcibly and brutally, to those that deploy a reign of terror to “cleanse” territory of civilians unlikely to support their project. Scholars increasingly document and analyze “rebel governance” as forms of order in the midst of civil war, tracing variation in its type and degree to the extent of state authority before the war, insurgent internal organization and ideology, and the cohesion of the local community, which facilitates its posing constraints on both insurgent and state forces (Arjona 2010; Mampilly 2011).

States (to varying extent) and actors allied to the state also attempt to mobilize not only recruits but also civilian support during civil war. State militaries often attempt to draw or conscript recruits from a wide range of sub-cultures in order to build national unity (Weber 1976). In particular, the state may promote the process of “ethnic defection” (Kalyvas 2008), recruiting disaffected members of an ethnic community on whose behalf an insurgent organization is seeking autonomy or secession. State actors may also bolster their forces by drawing on clientelist networks of local allies or organizations of retired soldiers to found civilian militias or defense forces, as in El Salvador.

In many settings, local elites also mobilize existing social networks, particularly kin and clientelist ties, to counter actors encroaching on their interests through the arming of these networks (Romero 2003; Wood 2008). They may target not only insurgent organizations and their presumed civilian supporters but also rival elites seeking advantage in the disorganized context of war. Rwanda represents an extreme case of such mobilization: local elites drew on kin and social networks to recruit participants in the genocidal killing of neighbors (Fujii 2011). In contrast, in other settings it is community leaders who found local militias to protect the community from insurgent violence. This form of collective action—community-initiated militias—spreads to other
communities that have local cultures that resonate with its particular ideology and practices (Jentzsch 2014).

Returning to the state, the conditions under which counterinsurgency strategy based on cultivating hearts-and-minds through service provision and nation building will succeed are sharply contested, not only in recent policy debates over US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan but also among scholars. For example, major political science journals such as Perspectives on Politics (Review Symposium 2008) and Politics and Society (Branch 2010; Branch and Wood 2010; Hunt 2010; Peceny and Stanley 2010) have published special sections assessing the strategy and its unintended as well as intended effects. On the one hand, some scholars and military strategists emphasize the responsiveness of local residents to provision of services (Berman et al. 2011; US Army and Marine Corps 2007). On the other, the attempt to cultivate local support through such assistance may not succeed as it may not in the eyes of local residents compensate for former violence: indiscriminate state violence against nonviolent protestors as well as the long history of marginalization, exclusion, and mis-rule led to significantly greater active support for the insurgents than for state forces in El Salvador even during periods when the state moved from indiscriminate violence to a hearts-and-minds approach (Wood 2003). The conditions for successful external intervention may be quite narrow: “the settings where the conditions for successful counterinsurgency by foreign powers are met—the existence of allies able to gather high-quality intelligence from local people and to help build local institutions to deliver services—are the very settings where counterinsurgency is least ‘needed’” (Branch and Wood 2010: 4). Economic assistance by the counterinsurgent coalition in Afghanistan has had little effect on civilian attitudes in particularly violent Pashtun villages, the critical setting for counterinsurgency efforts (Lyall et al. 2013). Moreover, the effects of violence against civilians on civilian support for the group carrying out the violence appears to be conditional on who carried out the violence: civilian support for the Taliban increased after coalition violence against civilians, but support for the coalition did not increase after Taliban violence (Lyall et al. 2013).

Despite the supposed benefits of the hearts-and-minds approach to counterinsurgency, states nonetheless often employ indiscriminate violence. Although many scholars argue that it is counterproductive, in part because it may render joining the insurgents less risky than not doing so (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007), it is sometimes effective, as in Chechnya (Lyall 2009). In her exploration of the conditions under which it results in sustained collective action by civilians in support of the state, Livia Schubiger (2013, 2014) argues that direct and collective violence by the state against civilians weakens insurgents both because local communities seek to signal to the state their renewed loyalty by forming local militias, and because insurgents cannot in the face of such violence successfully integrate the flood of new recruits it generates and is therefore likely to fragment. Yet in the long run, she suggests, such violence prolongs the conflict as it destroys the insurgent coherence needed for negotiated resolution and fuels conditions for the later resurgence of conflict.
Civil wars leave death, devastation and destruction in their wake, legacies that pose challenges for post-war development and reconciliation. Civil wars result—to sharply varying degree across countries—in lower incomes, investment rates, and social service provision (Chen et al. 2008). Legacies for civil society may be latent for decades and then re-emerge when conditions allow, as in the debate in newly democratic Spain about appropriate memorialization of those killed in the civil war in 1936–39. Indeed, Laia Balcells (2012) found that patterns of extreme violence were associated with political identities a generation later. In Guatemala, Regina Bateson (2013) found that post-war violence against suspected criminals took the collective form of public lynching in areas where pro-state militias had patrolled communities during the war, whereas elsewhere it took the form of individual killing.

Yet legacies are not uniformly negative: the wartime destruction of some forms of political and social domination and the emergence of new actors may facilitate new forms of political order and participation in its wake. In oligarchic societies, sustained insurgency—either violent as in El Salvador or primarily nonviolent as in South Africa—may lead to democratic rule (Wood 2000). This path to democracy is likely uncommon, however: it is nonviolent forms of mass mobilization that play an essential role in many transitions to democratic rule (Collier 1999, 2004). Moreover, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show that nonviolent campaigns more frequently succeed than violent ones: in their analysis of the more than 300 campaigns for major political change between 1900 and 2006, more than half of the nonviolent campaigns succeeded while only about a quarter of the violent ones did so. They argue against the suggestion that nonviolent campaigns succeed more often because they emerge in “easier” settings, but more work needs to be done on the conditions under which distinct types of campaigns emerge as well as when they succeed.

Turning from regimes to local legacies, in Wood (2008) I pointed to some surprisingly positive social legacies of some civil wars including more egalitarian gender roles, a more equitable distribution of property rights, an empowered civil society, and unprecedented political participation. Recent works confirm the existence of “pro-social” legacies of war. Survey evidence gathered during and after civil war demonstrates that exposure to civil war violence sometimes increases pro-social behavior by both individuals and communities. John Bellows and Edward Miguel (2009) found that the individuals more exposed to violence during Sierra Leone’s civil war were more likely to vote, join community groups, and attend community meetings in its aftermath. Christopher Blattman (2009) similarly found that former child soldiers in Uganda were more likely to participate politically than their civilian peers; his qualitative evidence suggests that it is child soldiers who witnessed violence who were particularly likely to participate after the war.

Scholars increasingly use behavioral game experiments to measure the extent to which war and violence generate these pro-social outcomes and to identify the underlying mechanisms. In Tel Aviv, senior citizens were more likely to cooperate with one
another (and to punish those who did not cooperate) during Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006 than either before or after (Gneezy and Fessler 2011). Greater exposure to violence led to more altruistic behavior in the post-war period in Burundi (Voors et al. 2012). Michael Bauer and his collaborators (2013) found increased egalitarian motivations towards in-group but not out-group members among children and youth between 7 and 20 years of age at the time of war in both Georgia (six months after the war with Russia) and in Sierra Leone (a decade after the civil war), suggesting that exposure to violence at those ages is particularly consequential. Communities affected by violence during Nepal’s civil war exhibited more pro-social motivation, an outcome possibly driven by the flight of individuals not inclined to cooperate and the coalescing of those remaining to cope with wartime challenges (Gilligan et al. 2014).

In my earlier analysis, I traced the social legacies of civil war to six local social processes—political mobilization, military socialization, the polarization of social identities, the militarization of local authority, the transformation of gender roles, and the fragmentation of local political economies (Wood 2008). I showed that their incidence varied sharply across the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Peru, El Salvador, and Sri Lanka, which suggests that variation in those processes may contribute to variation in the pro-social outcomes just discussed. In contrast to the pro-social legacies discussed earlier, Alessandra Cassar and her co-authors (2013) found that violence undermined trust within localities after civil war in Tajikistan. The authors suggest that the discrepancy with other studies reflects differences in how war is fought locally: in Tajikistan war was fought between different Tajik factions within local communities. Variation in wartime processes may also explain variation in post-war political mobilization. For example, the erosion of rural secret societies during the civil war in Liberia was followed by massive mobilization by women that pushed elites to negotiate an end to the conflict; in contrast, in neighboring Sierra Leone the secret societies emerged relatively unscathed and women’s political participation remained limited in the post-war period (Nielsen 2015).

Conclusion

Recent literature on social mobilization and violence in civil war analyzes their variation across not only conflicts but also across armed actors within each conflict. Scholars continue to develop and test theories to account for that observed variation, with increasing success in the case of patterns of violence, including repertoires. Variation in social mobilization during civil war is less well understood, perhaps in part because of challenges in analyzing political opportunity, framing processes, and mobilizing structures during war. And scholars are only beginning to document and analyze the varied social legacies of civil war. Among the topics likely to benefit from increased exchange between scholars of civil wars and social movements as forms of contentious politics are the determinants of repertoires of violence and contention; the origins of group institutions and ideology, including diffusion across groups; the dynamics of escalation and
de-escalation; the emergence of dual political opportunity structures—one defined by the state, the other by the insurgents—as insurgent organizations build territorial control; the evolution of framing processes and mobilizing structures as mobilization becomes violent or the state more repressive; the conditions for movement success; and the unintended as well as intended social legacies of mobilization and violence.

References


