9:00-10:20 T TH, 28 Hillhouse, Room 106

Dirk Bergemann
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #24
432-3592
Email
Office hours T 1:00-3:00

Juuso Valimaki
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #6
432-6519
Email
Office hours T 1:00-3:00

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Topic: This course covers selected topics in the economics of information and uncertainty. The first part of the course will cover the theory of mechanism design and some of its applications. The second part of the course will cover some recent papers in communication and learning.

Course Requirements: This course has five basic requirements. They are: (i) reading the assigned papers before the presentation in class, (ii) solving the problem sets, (iii) presenting one research paper, (iv) writing six referee reports (before the presentation of the papers) and (v) writing a term paper. The assignments will be given biweekly. Class participation, assignments, and the term paper will jointly determine the final grade. The due date for the term paper is Monday, May 16th, 4pm in the mailbox of Professor Dirk Bergemann.

Readings: The current reading list will be completed as the class proceeds.

Syllabus: The complete syllabus.

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Schedule:

1/11-1/13 (JV): Efficient Mechanism Design

• Lecture Notes 1
• Problem Set 1
• Problem Set 1 Solution
  

1/18-1/20 (JV): Correlated and Interdependent Values

• Lecture Notes 2
  

1/25-1/27 (JV): Dynamic Mechanisms

• Lecture Notes 3
  
• Problem Set 2
  
• Problem Set 2: Solution

2/1-2/3 (DB): Epistemic Solution Concepts

• Bernheim (1984)
• Pearce (1984)
• Aumann (1974)
• Aumann (1987)
• Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)

• Problem Set 3
• Problem Set 3 Solution

2/8-2/10 (DB/PS): Bandit Problems and Optimal Stopping

• Whittle: Optimization over Time
• Bergemann and Valimaki: Bandit Problems
  
• Rothschild: A Two-Armded Bandit Theory of Market Pricing
  
• Seel and Strack: Gambling in Contests
  

2/15-2/17 (DB): Robust Mechanism Design

Robust Mechanism Design

• Robust Mechanism Design
• The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design
• Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Robust Implementation:

• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanism
• Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules
• Designing Stable Mechanisms for Economic Environments
• Lecture Slides

2/22-2/24 (DB): Application and Robust Predictions

Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games

• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanism
• Belief Free Incomplete Information Games
• Lecture Notes 2007
• Robust Predictions in Games of Incomplete Information
• Problem Set 4: Robustness

3/1-3/3 (DB): Robust Tax Policy and Bayesian Persuasion

• presentation by Nicolas Werquin and Vitor Luz: Slides: Bierbrauer

• Bierbrauer
  

• presented by Johann Caro Burnett and Sabyasachi Das: Slides: Bayesian Persuasion
  

• Kamenica and Gentzkow: Bayesian Persuasion

3/22-3/24 (DB): Coarse Matching

• Information Theory and Quantization
• Bergemann, Shen, Yey and Yun

• presented by Yingni Guo And Dongkyu Chang:

Kamenica and Gentzkow: Competition

• Varshney and Varshney: Quantization and Hypothesis Testing
• Varshney and Goyal: Conflict, Cooperation

3/29-3/31 (DB): Information Market/Algorithms
Orgaization Economics, Information Sharing, Consulting

• presented by Adam Kapor and Sofia Moroni:

McAfee and Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren

Slides of HMO

• L. Garicano and W. Fuchs (presented by Michelle Yi Lu and Yueyang Rao) “Markets for Advice”

4/5-4/7 (JV): Bayesian Learning

4/12-4/14 (JV): Social Learning

• ‘Delay and Information Aggregation in Stopping Games with Private Information’

• ‘Learning and Information Aggregation in an Exit Game’

4/19-4/21 (JV): Information Aggregation