Spring 2008
9:00-10:20 T/TH, 28 Hillhouse, Room 106
Part 1: Information Economics and Repeated Games
Dino Gerardi
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #22A
432-6519
Email
Office hours 3:00-5:00 F
Part 2: Information, Types and Dynamic Mechanism Design
Dirk Bergemann
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #24
432-3592
Email
Office hours 2:00-4:00 T
Topic: This course covers selected topics in the economics of information and uncertainty. The first part of the course will cover the theory of mechanism design and some of its applications. The second part of the course will cover some recent papers in communication, learning and networks.
Course Requirements: This course has five basic requirements. They are: (i) reading the assigned papers before the presentation in class, (ii) solving the problem sets, (iii) presenting one research paper, (iv) writing six referee reports (before the presentation of the papers) and (v) writing a term paper. The assignments will be given biweekly. Class participation, assignments, and the term paper will jointly determine the final grade.
Readings: The current reading list will be completed as the class proceeds.
Outline — Part I
- Mechanism Design
- Implementation via dominant strategies and Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- The revelation principle
- Implementation of efficient outcomes
- Auction Theory
- First and second price auctions
- Design of optimal auctions
- Bilateral Trading
- Two person double auctions
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Implementation Theory: Unique implementation in Nash and subgame perfect equilibria
- Moral Hazard: The principal-agent model with moral hazard
- Games with Communication: Correlated and communication equilibria
- Repeated Games with Perfect and Imperfect Public Monitoring
- The one-shot deviation principle
- Decomposability and self-generation
- Folk theorems.
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (Johannes Hörner — 2 lectures)
Outline — Part II
The following lecture notes cover the material presented in the lectures.
- Thursday, February 28: The E-Mail Game and Strategic Uncertainty
Homework 1
Rubinstein (1989)
Morris (2002) - Tuesday, March 4: Types Spaces and Strategic Uncertainty
Guest Lecture by Jeff Ely - Thursday, March 6: Types Spaces and Strategic Uncertainty
Guest Lecture by Jeff Ely - Tuesday, March 25: Robust Mechanism Design
Bergemann and Morris (2005) - Bergemann and Valimaki (2006)Thursday, March 27: Dynamic Allocation Problems, Index Policy
Bergemann and Valimaki (2006)
Homework 2
- Tuesday, April 1: Dynamic VCG Mechanism
Bergemann and Valimaki (2007) - Thursday, April 3: Sequential Screening
Courty and Li (2000)
Eso and Szentes (2007)
- Tuesday, April 8: Dynamic Revenue Maximizing Mechanism
Segal and Toikka (2007)
Pavan (2007)
- Thursday, April 10: Internet Auctions
Peters and Severinov (2007)
Peters and Severinov (1997)
Homework 3
Solution 3
Some interesting empirical evidence is collected in these papers:
Anwar et al (2006)
Nekipelov (2007) - Tuesday, April 15: Dynamic Matching
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) - Thursday, April 17: Entropy and Communication Cost
Cover and Thomas (2006)
Mackay (2004) - Tuesday, April 22: Information Processing
Sims (2006)
Woodford (2007) - Thursday, April 24: Slow Decision Making
Reis (2006)