DIW: Modern Mechanism Design: Dynamics and Robustness (2010)

May 2010,
DIW Berlin

Dirk Bergemann
Department of Economics
Yale University

Topic: This mini-course covers selected topics in auction theory and mechanism design. The aim of this course is to provide the students with the necessary tools to analyze dynamic incentive problems and evaluate the robustness of the mechanisms to private, and importantly to strategic information. The topics below will be addressed in some detail. The lectures will be supported by slides which will be posted prior to the course. The lectures will be based on the papers/publications in the following bibliography.

1. Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency

2. Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization

3. Robust Mechanism Design

4. Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games

Syllabus: The complete syllabus.

Schedule for Part II

Monday, December 14: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency:

Tuesday, December 15: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue

Wednesday, December 16: Robust Mechanism Design

Thursday, December 17: Incomplete Information and Robustness: Equilibrium Concepts

Friday, December 18: Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games

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