Topic: This mini-course covers selected topics in auction theory and mechanism design. The aim of this course is to provide the students with the necessary tools to analyze dynamic incentive problems and evaluate the robustness of the mechanisms to private, and importantly to strategic information. The topics below will be addressed in some detail. The lectures will be supported by slides which will be posted prior to the course. The lectures will be based on the papers/publications in the following bibliography.
1. Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency
- Bergemann, D., and J. Välimäki (2010): “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, ”Econometrica, 78, 771-–790.
- Bergemann, D., and M. Said (2010): “Dynamic Auctions: A Survey,” Discussion Paper 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics,Yale University.
- Slides for Dynamic Mechanism Design
2. Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization
- Baron, D., and D. Besanko (1984): “Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship,”Information Economics and Policy, 1, 267-–302.
- Battaglini, M. (2005): “Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers,” American Economic Review, 95, 637–-658.
- Bergemann, D., and M. Pesendorfer (2007): “Information Structures in Optimal Auctions,”Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 580-–609.
- Courty, P., and H. Li (2000): “Sequential Screening,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 697-–717.
- Pavan, A., I. Segal, and J. Toikka (2009): “Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Profi…t Maximization, and Information Disclosure,” Discussion paper, Northwestern University and Stanford University.
3. Robust Mechanism Design
- Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2005): “Robust Mechanism Design,” Econometrica, 73, 1771–-1813.
- Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2009): “Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms,” Review of
- Economic Studies, 76, 1175-–1206.
- Bergemann, D., and J. Valimaki (2006): “Information in Mechanism Design,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, ed. by R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, pp. 186–221. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Slides for Robust Mechanism Design
4. Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games
- Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2008): “The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation,”
Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 6, 551–-559.
- Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2007): “Belief Free Incomplete Information Games,” Discussion
- Paper 1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Slides for Robust Predictions
Syllabus: The complete syllabus.
Schedule for Part II
Monday, December 14: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency:
- “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism” Econometrica, forthcoming
- “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism: Slides”
- A recent, useful and easy to read survey for application in macroeconomics and public economics.
- Problem Set 1
- Problem Set 1 Solution
Tuesday, December 15: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue
- “Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship” is a two-period generalization of the earlier and seminal paper “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost”
- “Sequential Screening”
- “Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers”
- “Dynamic Mechanism Design” Dynamic Mechanism Design: Slides
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Problem Set 2
- Problem Set 2 Solution
Wednesday, December 16: Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust Mechanism Design
- The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design
- Multidimensional Private Value Auctions
- Lecture Slides
- Problem Set 3
- Problem Set 3 Solution
Thursday, December 17: Incomplete Information and Robustness: Equilibrium Concepts
Friday, December 18: Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games