

A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the value for privacy class, we spent the majority of our time on [10], and then quickly covered [2] at a high level.

There are other papers studying the effect of various privacy policies in this sort of model, notably: [1], [3] and [4].

Differential privacy was originally proposed in [5]. A vast literature has sprung up in the subsequent decade. The monograph [6] is a nice gentle introduction to what's been done, PDF available on the authors' websites.

[8] were the first to observe that differential privacy implied approximate dominant strategies in the context of mechanism design, and also showed the application to digital good pricing. [7] showed that the exponential mechanism maximized expected quality plus Shannon entropy. [9] survey other results using differential privacy in mechanism design, and also work on privacy-aware mechanism design.

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