

Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman
mail

p. 73. On handling legislative. This is part of a quote from a congressman:
"I've seen enough happen to know that members in many cases regret being too specific on issues, especially if they are controversial, when it may be that they are going to be saved by the legislative committee, or perhaps by that much maligned Rules Committee, from the necessity of taking their ~~yes~~ of no position on it."

"If you are in agreement with the writer and you feel no hesitation (now p. 74) about saying so, it's flattering to them to have you support their views, the sensible nature of their views, and so on. But if you may disagree, or if you violently disagree, it may be just as well to say, 'I have received your comments (or your views) and you may be sure that I will give /them/ my thoughtful consideration should /the matter/ come up to the floor for a vote.' Something of that kind."

pp. 280-288, an appendix on "The Congressional Office Work Load", with data taken from Saloma's 89th Congress study, 158 questionnaires.

- Saloma data*
- p. 281. Mean days per month spent in district while Congress in session - 5.6
 - p. 281. Mean no. of radio appearances per month while Congress in session - 7.3
 - p. 281. Mean no. of TV appearances per month while Congress in session - 3.5

Tacheron & Udall, #2

p. 281. Of 158 questionnaires, 82 members report regularly to their constituents by radio or TV. 36 do not so report regularly. (The rest?)

p. 282. Average mail count per week = 521 pieces. incl. 64 letters involving casework, 154 pressure or opinion letters, 51 opinion ballots (org preprinted), 44 requests for info, 77 misc letters from constituents, 120 letters from outside district, 11 letters referred to member by other mc's.....good.

p. 286. of 158 offices, 121 members said they send newsletters to constituents regularly; 29 said they didn't. (the rest?) Of the senders, 12 mail to all postal patrons, 98 by mailing list, 14 do both.

p. 287. Newsletter reprinted in district newspapers. 51 said yes, 65 no.

p. 287. of 158, 48 members said they write a separate news or opinion column for newspapers, 94 said no.

p. 287. 89 members reported use of mail questionnaires. (Only 7 report circulation of under 30,000)

p. 288. of the 89, 49 also notify constituents of the results.

Taussig, F.W., The Tariff History of the United States (1931 ed.)
(G.P. Putnam's Sons, NY, 1931) - CCL HF 1753 T38 1931 (10)

He talks of the post war reform efforts as efforts to get rid of the war rates, which had persisted as a kind of permanent base.

Clearly he thinks there's a GF pervence about the failure of reform efforts.

1894 - a big defeat - Demos rejected off by sugar trust etc.
(Cleveland let the 1894 law take force without his signature.)

326-327: 1897 tariff in House: "In the main, the committee scheme was adopted as it stood, being accepted once for all as the party measure + passed under the pressure of rigid party discipline. The whole procedure was doubtless in accord with the theory of legislation after debate + discussion. But it was not without its goods also. It served to concentrate responsibility, to prevent haphazard amendments, to check in some measure the log-rolling + the give-and-take which beset all legislation involving a great variety of interests." - No Dingley tariff act (~~1897~~)

Taussig #2

373 - (only of 1909 tariff) - "In most of the tariff acts of the previous generation, the influence of the Senate had been greater than that of the House, and had been exercised in favor of higher duties." - same in 1909.

Why higher? "greater subservience of Senators to large national interests," he suggests.
- but also the small state effect, he says.

374 - "The log-rolling process, as has been said by President Lowell, is the great evil of democratic government; and that evil nowhere appears more conspicuously than in the dealings of a body like the American Senate with tariff legislation."

1909 - a bad tariff - + high - lots of logrolling.
1913 tariff - he likes this, sees no real Senate problems

Tausig #3

1922 tariff very high
1922:

Q 454: "The senators, always in the habit of acceding to the wishes of their colleagues in what concerns the confirmation of presidential appointments, naturally yield to one another on other matters also, and not least on those of tariff rates on the products of their several states."

1930 tariff: Logically again.

Q 492: He points to subcommittee structure of House W + M.

15/25 GOP — "Each of the 15 Republicans is chairman of a SC of three which considers a particular schedule — textiles, metals, chemicals. There is naturally a tendency that each chairman shall be assigned to a schedule because he represents constituencies interested in that schedule. The Massachusetts member is likely to be chairman of the SC on textiles, the Pennsylvania member of that on iron & steel, and so on."

— SC's get their way in full meeting. "... each member gets his others have their way, provided his own proposals are not interfered with."

— open hearing has in full committee only!

all 30 are GOP

Tausig #4

1930 tariff:

S is like H in its logically, though S is less controlled than H + W + M.

David Thomson: Democracy in France Since 1870 (5ed, 1969, NY, Oxford UP) DC340748 P169pp2

3rd Republic:

Q105 - he talks of the left-center core of 3rd Rep politics - the Rad & Rad Soc deputies.
locally chosen & oriented.

Q106 - These deputies: "an agent of local interests & provincial outlook."

Q109 "It was often boasted that every nuance of public opinion, however subtle, could find expression in parliament. What mattered more was that every special interest, however local & exclusive, could encounter national politics with its demands."

Q111 Shadow committees in lower house.

Ch5: He argues that the 3rd Republic didn't work very well on domestic policy.
→ popular disillusionment, esp in W.C.

Q176 "Thus the experience of the pre-war years had disillusionment amongst the working classes, and spread the conviction that social reform was, in the existing system and with the
✓ prevailing balance of parties, subordinated to the political mechanism of parliamentary manoeuvres."

Q191 It mentions "the inertia of the Third Republic in dealing with the social and economic changes of the inter-war years."

Thomson #2

Q205: On the 4th Republic: "... it layed into a weak system of gouvernement d'assemblée of proven incapacity to deal firmly with the clamorous problems of mid-century France?
The Monnet Plan was extra-parliamentary."

Touman, Rank B., The Governmental Process

324 - fact: 4 boxes in a row (Hoarding → FDR) vetoed veterans' bonus leg.
altho on each occasion about $\frac{4}{5}$ of 1892 chrs to overrule. (PT)

363 - Coyolling: _____

368: The Mississippi Constitution of 1890, he says, "required
legislators to take an oath that they wd not trade votes." !
— the implies that there've been other such cases

David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (Wiley, NY, 1959) CCL JK 1061 T78 copy 3
81st Cong ~~20~~

Q 213-214

- House Dems both a) freshmen, and b) terms from districts close in 1948 were disproportionately included to vote with McClellan on P.C. voting.

(all this in
211-219
to)

(with sections omitted fr)

(unfortunate statistically to distinguish closeness + freshmanness here).

- There's slight evidence that near equality is more important than freshmanness.

Q 217

And it's not demography that's doing this.

"That is, the evidence suggests that strictly political factors, such as inexperience in the House and narrowness of the electoral margin in the district, prevail more about those members of the party who tended to agree frequently with the Majority leader than does a socio-economic index such as the occupational composition of the district."

Q 218 A lot of this, but not all of it, just shows that there were better HST supporters

Edwards R. Tufte, "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two Party Systems"
 - original ms, for APSR June 1973

- Q1) "swing ratio" = "rate of translation of votes into seats"
 also, partition bias
- Q4) swing ratio for last 12 US House elections = 1.9 (ie, 1% shift in vote \rightarrow 1.9% shift in seats)
 (with a single linear equation)
- Q4) in recent House elections, a 2% D bias (ca) - ie, Dems need ca 48% vote to break even
- Q7) some swing ratios:
- | | swing ratio | bias |
|---|-------------|-----------|
| UK 1945-70 - 2.83 (the highest value of any ^{nation} here) | | Fav D 0.2 |
| US 1868-1970 2.39 | | D 0.9 |
| US 1900-1970 2.09 | | D 2.0 |
| US 1948-1970 1.93 | | D 1.2 |
- US - a deciding SR

Tufte #2 Swing ratios

QIP :	on years	% years
1872-1890	6.8	4.0
1892-1910	2.8	3.5
1912-1930	1.9	1.1
1932-1950	3.3	3.0
1952-1970	2.1	1.7

ie, irregular fall.

Q23,24 - recent years US House (duplets)

	swing ratio	D advantage
1948-52	2.82	0.5
1954-58	2.35	-0.1
1960-64	1.65	2.6
1966-70	0.71	7.9

there's a lot of fluctuation
 before 1948 (NB)

Tufte #3

Q13) - 1966-70 duplet - has problems, because of low over-all variance, so this isn't well represented.
 But, still (and the bias measure has problems too)

Q25) - "Compared with all the other performances of the electoral systems examined in this paper, a system with a swing ratio of 0.7 and a bias of 7.9 percent, describes a set of electoral arrangements that is both quite unresponsive to shifts in the preferences of voters (as expressed in their party votes for their reps) and, at the same time, badly biased."

Q31) - figure 6 - gives appearance of kinokinesis.
 (the British reorganisation has done it.)

Gordon Tullock, "Information Without Profit"

in Tullock (ed.), Papers on Non-Market Decision Making

(~~Proceedings of the~~ Center for Political Economy, UVA, 1966 — CCL #35785)

This is the piece on charitable enterprises (penultimate page)

145: "With charitable expenditures... I am not inevitably going to have any defects in the product brought to my attention, and defects will in any case, not directly affect me. If I make a contribution to the starving children of Swondoland, or vote for a congressman who promises to use public funds for that end, I will not be in any way injured by a successful fraud found or by inspiring. As long as I continue to think that the children have been helped by my contribution, the fact that they have not been will not reduce my state of satisfaction. The situation is radically different if I am purchasing some object or service for my own use, since I will automatically find out if the product or service does not come up to expectations."

146: Christie reply: "They are (still) a feeling of satisfaction derived from sacrifice. Whether the sacrifice does or does not injure the well being of someone else is out of his intent to do so. He is interested just in what actually happens, but in his way of it. The entrepreneurs, accordingly, should pitch the image."

Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (rev. ed., Schneier)

p. xi. late changes. "The incidence of party voting has declined in the period 1964-69."

p. 17 table. Time series data on party votes (giving both 90 vs. 90 and 50 vs. 50) Whichever way looked at, there's a long term decline since 1921 (Turner's first reading), with the last half of the 1960's having clearly the lowest readings. (90-vs-90 dips to 2.8% in 1965, 1.6% in 1966, 3.3% in 1967.)

p. 215. The highest known 90vs90 readings are Lowell's, for late 1890's. (He cites Lowell here)

p. 37 He also cites Lowell's figures here. So it makes sense just to cite this whole chapter, ch. 2, "The Comparative Effectiveness of Party Pressure," as a good summary of the party-voting situation over time.

p. 37. "By statistical test...the trend toward a weakening of party lines in Congress has been an unmistakable feature of twentieth-century American politics."

This book can also be cited generally for its info on constituency influences: e.g., metro-rural, ethnic & racial, D&R intraparty sectionalism, etc.

p. 239. "By comparison with Julius Turner's original PandC, the single most striking finding of this study is the continuing decline of party voting in the Hoff."

Turner published 1951, Schneier published 1970