

John S. Salmons III, Congress and the New Politics

S

¶ 174 - It reports on a previous study of his written (written) in 1967, based on a survey of 160 House members (see p 171 for details)

"Members replying to the survey averaged 8.0 radio appearances + 4.0 television appearances per month during the session. Some 56 per cent of the sample (85 out of 152 responding) gave regular radio or television reports to constituents. The most popular format was the weekly 5-minute radio report (used by 36 members) followed by the weekly 15-minute radio report (13 members).

¶ 175 "The congressional newsletter was used more extensively than either radio or television — by 122 of 152 members (80 percent) — over 30 members circulated more than one kind of newsletter."

¶ 175 "The congressional questionnaire was found to be a surprisingly popular form of communication with constituents. Ninety-one congressmen in the sample reported using them." — "An average questionnaire required roughly 20 hours for preparation + 118 hours for processing."

EE, Schattschneider, Philips, Bessner, and the Tariff (1929-30 version of tariff)
(1st, Benton-Hall, 1935) Nfe 42 9355 Copy 2

101 "The tariff is not an economic question exclusively. It is a political problem as well."

105 "Policies become intelligible when considered in connection with the sequence of causes and effects by which some demands are made effective while others are re-strategized."

113 "In tariff making, perhaps more than in any other kind of legislation, Congress writes bills which no one intended."

137ff The WRC committee considered the bill by item, relying not on detailed consideration

138ff Also industry requests look QC like agency estimates! eg, the Iron & Steel gives less than requested, so there are Executive appeals!

185 "Congress therefore seeks political support for the system, not by giving ample protection to a few industries whose stimulation is required by public welfare, but by giving a limited protection to all interests strong enough to furnish formidable resistance to it, and by making a virtue of the means by which the policy is executed."

Schattschneider COT #2

tariff = a national sales tax that it's popular to collect.

186 pol logic → "microsystem of the policy"

187 "Furthermore, in the process of gaining acceptance, the effort to broaden the base of support for the system leads to the gratuitous expansion of protection to industries that do not need it."

188 "A policy that is so hospitable and catholic as the protective tariff disorganizes its opposition."

114 - opps (in hearings): "The most conspicuous characteristic of the opposition was its extreme frustration and combined with a certain inclination to vanish. Duties on a remarkably large proportion of the items covered in the bill encountered no adverse pressure whatever."

115 "... pressures are grossly unbalanced."

131 "Duties, once established in the law, tend to become permanent and the longer they have been established the more difficult it becomes to dislodge them."
sounds like WILDAVSKY's base.

135 - "reciprocal non-interference"

"The circumstances that nearly all industries which consume taxed materials are themselves protected, so far as their own products are concerned, operates to restrain actively active hostility to the system."

Schattschneider POT #3

p 144: "The simple device of giving the manufacturing consumer of raw materials and semi-finished materials a bonus in the form of compensatory duties tends to resolve conflicts."

p 162 - Importers: Chief spokesman in hearings was National Council of American Importers and Traders, about 90% of whose members ~~were~~ had principal place of business in NYC!
(Importers had almost no political clout in all this.)

p 163 - Overall: "an amazing absence of conflict" over tariff bill among ec groups.

p 177 - Individual ^{Congressional} members: "They escorted witnesses to the hearings, introduced them to the committee, and interceded with the committee to give them a good hearing."

Schattschneider:

p 67-84 -

They had a dubious formula based on dubious figures on differences between production costs at home & abroad.

Schattschneider POT #4

Conclusion

- There's no direct data in this book (ie, on-the-scene) - It's all from written docs.
Hence it's hard to get a sense of the machinations of individual members.

p 283: "The history of the American tariff is the story of a dubious economic policy turned into a great political success" ✓

p 284: "Compensatory duties are used to implement a strategy of reciprocal noninterference in which each industry is encouraged to seek duties of its own and induced to ~~accept~~ accept the incidental burdens of the system without protest."

This is a quite narrow study (though very good).

There's little here about parties, except a pointing to GOP interest.

(But he has examples of D Congressmen engaging in the usual logrolling)

E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government

pp. 194-196: "The Veterans' Bonus as an Example"

p. 194. "In 1922, 1924, 1931, and 1935 the House voted to override the presidential vetoes of this legislation 258 to 54, 313 to 78, 328 to 79, and 318 to 90. That is, every president since 1920 has vetoed a bonus bill and in every instance the House has overridden the veto."

p. 196. "The party in Congress is like a Mexican army; everyone in it takes care of himself."

Seymour Schein, "The Politics of Agency Organization," 15 WPP 328-344, June 1962

NLRB again. structure changed by Congress in 1947.

— a political question (Stevens) that Congress has a
continuous interest in.

Sejourner Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control," 25 JOP 526-551, August 1963

p527: "This paper is an attempt at identifying the conditions under which committee review is likely to occur and, inversely, the factors which explain why frequently it does not occur at all."

p527 - Based on a review of hearings & reports, 1938-61, of 2 H + 1 Sen committees within whose oversight jurisdiction > the reg. community, plus interviews with members & staff.
House Committee + ExL - CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, SEC, NLRB
(more of this is on aggregations oversight.)

p528 - Scher's angle: Cong making ^{rational} decisions about allocation of scarce personal resources (energy, funds, etc.) so as to maximize gains to themselves & running losses.

p529 - Some prime leg values (to be max or min) are support, influence, & prestige.
(He doesn't reduce this to electoral motives - though they're there.)

p530 - In Cong interviews: "... the standard of importance tended to be a highly personal one - 'what wd do me the most good?'"

p530 - "In practice committee review is a spasmodic affair marked by years in which the agencies are virtually ignored followed by spurts of committee interest in agency activity."

SCHER, 1963 JOP #2

Reasons for steering clear of RA's:

p531 1) greater rewards elsewhere (leg + constituent - scarce activity)

p532 2) the impenetrable maze problem.

p533-34 3) Congmen with close relations with agency people are reluctant to force close review.

p534 "Congressmen who are friends of an agency or of groups interests that are promoted rather than regulated by an agency do not normally make aggressive overseers."
[there's a strong inference on this page that congressmen leave the agencies alone] when they're generally happy with their policies.

p534 4) "Congmen tend to view their personal contacts with the agencies as more efficient than committee investigations for serving constituent + group needs."

p534-35 "From the perspective of the Congressman the characteristic legislator-to-regulatory Commission telephone calls, which range from inquiries on the scheduling of constituents' cases to overt efforts at influencing an agency's determination in a particular case, afford generally satisfactory communication between the two."
"In interviews with locally-based members of committees with jurisdiction over RAs fourteen indicated that their personal efforts with agencies in behalf of constituents involved in adjudicatory or licensing proceedings consumed some part of their own or their staff's time."

SCHER, 1963 JOP, #3

(Steering clear)

p536 5) there can be (expected) costly reprisals from powerful eco interests regulated by the RA's.

p537 * "A pious fight for re-nomination, financial support for an opponent, clandestine organized campaign activity against his reelection revised the aggressive Congressman-investigator of the far-reaching implications of his oversight vigor."

p537) Scher talked with one Congman who was convinced that his investing activities had led to reprisal - "campaign support for an opponent which otherwise wd not have developed."

p537) 6) Busy same party; gains to be had from loyalty to busy. (more scrutiny in 1957-60 than 61+)

p539) 7) Committee routines resist change, lacking powerful external stimuli.

p540. "The typical pattern of committee review of the RAs is then, one of no review at all for long periods of time."

SCHER, 1963 JOP #4

When to INVESTIGATE (cost-benefit)

- 1) Cong majority party vs Opp majority appointees (proxy past or current)
- 2) "When the com leadership or powerful com members believe that commitment or gov interests important to them cannot be satisfied by the routine personal intercessions between Congman and agency...."
 - ✓ "The com member becomes aware of these agency tendencies as a result of incessant + anxious communications over a pd of time from eco groups in or out of his district whose interests he shares" — eg, lots of NLRB investigations.
- 3) "When com review of agency performance occurs under these circumstances, it is likely to be directed at those features of agency conduct that are expected to produce maximum returns in favorable publicity to the committee members."
 - ✓ Also, a look at RA procedures is lacking in not agreed, so it makes sense to go after alleged RA bias or improper agency-client links.
- 4) "Among seventeen Congressmen interviewed who participated actively in two sets of com hearings in which agency reviews, in all but three cases there appeared a clear orientation to one another of the private gov interests which were subject to agency regulation."

SCHER, 1963 JOP, #5

(When to intervene)

- 3) Perceived threat (primarily from busy) to Cong prerogatives. — "arms of Congress"
 - ~~"... the help by Congress of legislation..."~~
 - "The Congressman's recognition that the Reg. Commission affect private interests whose fate is or may be next to him contributes to his commitment to preserve the agencies' status within Congress's primary sphere of influence."
- 4) Periodic interest in Congress (generally) in reversing regulatory policy.
 - ie, investing incident to real legislation — eg, NLRB
- 5) Anticipation of a more hostile invest by somebody else.
 - (eg MT Nator's friendly review of NLRB in 1939.)
 - "bitten by friends than by enemies."

Seymour Scher, "Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case Study"

54 AFSR 911-920, Dec 1960

HE + L, review of NLRB in 1953 - interviews

913 - there had been a history of E+L intervention in NLRB

913 - "It can reasonably be concluded that Congressmen, in spite of formal disclaimers, seek to preserve for themselves the exclusive right to intervene in regulatory agency business."

914 - 1953 hearings: "... members expressed their own, what they considered to be their constituents' feelings about the way the [TH] Act was being administered. As the reg of his district + what he considered ~~to be~~ the inst gov interests primarily within it, the committee was concerned with the effect of particular agency acts on these interests." - individual cases were reviewed.

918 - ^{interviews} Committee Demos says alike viewed their role in reviewing NLRB activity largely in terms of how the agency treated "my people". This phrase frequently became a catch-all that identified not only constituents but the larger gov ~~of~~ commitments of the committee members as well.

Scher 1960 AFSR #2

919: "Among those interviewed, only one indicated that his understanding of how the NLRB was functioning was based on info other than what he obtained from cases brought to his attention, generally three committee hearings, by constituents or by other regulated parties. All acknowledged that they had no contacts with the agency except when they called its officials personally or in committee hearings to explain the Board's handling of specific cases." Discussion of the general direction in agency interpretation of statutory provisions was thereby, largely lost in the questioning of agency officials on their handling of individual cases.

- 3 points:
- 1) Scher: Congress look on reg agencies (NLRB anyway) just as they look on other agencies.
 - 2) DLM: Don't forget that the NLRB subject area is especially contentious.
 - 3) DLM: It looks as if Congress will poke into an agency when they want to.
Therefore, it's probably true that the policy activities of agencies follow an antycyclical reactions model. The life cycle of agencies is probably what it is because Congress want it that way.

Joseph A. Schlessinger, Positions & Politics: Political Careers in the United States

- Q1 - The argument for looking at ambition, including: "Of all those who perform for their fellow men, the politician leaves the clearest tracks between his purpose and his behavior."
- Q2 "What is needed, therefore, is a theory of politics which explicitly accepts the assumption that politicians regard primarily to their office goals, in effect an ambition theory of politics, rather than a theory which explains personal ambitions."
- Q3 "Party theory, by assuming cohesive behavior, is, in effect, a special case of ambition theory — one of whose principal problems is that of explaining when politicians will act cohesively."
- Then he goes on to office goals as his focus.
- Q10 - He has 3 "decisions which office ambitions may take."
- discrete: a man wants an office for a term + then chooses to withdraw from future office
 - stable: long term career in one office
 - progressive: intends to move up.

JA Schlessinger #2

Q92: a career tree for ^{all} U.S. Senators, serving in 1914 through 1958. (N=450)
About 27% of Senators had the House as their immediate preceding office. (This doesn't include other career lines including the House.) (eg, Retros)

(This isn't very usable)

This is a prime example of positive deking.

Robert A. Schoenberger, "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-Making in the 1964 Congressional Elections,"
63 APSR 515-520, June 1969

Uses diff. between 1962 and 1964 Cong. vote as base data. (p. 516)

p. 516. He divides GOP inc. cand. 1964 into 2 groups: signers and non-signers of a public pre-convention statement endorsing GW's candidacy.

(p. 517) There were 49 inc. cand. signers, 110 non-signers)

p. 517: for signers the r between 62-64 vote change and 64 Prexy vote is +0.49
for non-signers it's -0.01

p. 517 (and these figures vary acc. to ballot form, as expected)

p. 518. "Thus, the Party Column ballot had the effect of strengthening the relationship between the Goldwater vote and Congressional vote-change, but only for the group of early Goldwater supporters."

p. 518. In the Party Col. states, signers ran (mean) only 7.7% ahead of GW; non-signers ran 16.2% ahead.

p. 518. Party Column states; the signers dipped ~~5.3%~~^{6.8%} over 1962; non-signers dipped only 5.3%.

p. 518. In Office Bloc states, signers were 91.7% ahead of GW; nonsigners were 17.9% ahead; vote dip over 1962 was 4.4% and 2.2% respectively.

p. 519 Seat losses: "Among Congressmen who had won with less than 60% of the vote two years before, the proportion defeated in 1964 was well over half again greater among signers than non-signers (48% versus 30%)."

✓ Shows irrationality of some Congressmen (unlike DG in 1972!) p. 519 - he says that correlation alone is unrelated to 62-64 dip.

pp. 171-174, "Reviewing the Defense Budget"

p. 171: "Most public and congressional discussion of the baseline defense budget is concentrated on a surprisingly few issues, and even for these, important interrelationships are often overlooked. Examples in recent years are 1) the debates over whether to build the Safeguard system, or a new manned strategic bomber, or a new nuclear carrier; 2) the attention paid to cost overruns or mismanagement in the case of the C-5A transport, the F-111, and the F-14; and 3) the recurring controversy over maintaining large U.S. forces in Europe. These are indeed important questions. Individually or collectively, however, they affect only a small part of the defense budget. Moreover, issues of this kind are raised almost fortuitously instead of being the result of a systematic examination of the defense program. Too much attention is paid to a few individual defense issues that are generally unrelated, and too little to the objectives of the defense program and how they are being carried out."

pp. 171-172; What should be looked are 1) force levels, 2) support levels, and 3) short-term vs. long-term implications. ("Concentrating on current year outlays sharply limits the scope of the review and the opportunity to consider fundamental changes. p. 172")

Schultze et al #2

p. 172: "These factors are fundamental to the process of formulating the defense budget in the exec branch. Why, then, is there not a parallel examination outside the exec branch? In large measure, the answer lies in current congressional procedures, which determine not only the form and content of congressional scrutiny of defense appropriations, but also the character of the public debate."

pp. 172-73: "The legislative process is in two stages, authorizations and appropriations, each of which is the responsibility of separate committees. Authorizations cover only selected aspects of the defense program, principally procurement of major weapon systems, research and devt, and military manpower levels. Appropriations cover the entire defense budget, but in categories that are largely independent of those used by the exec branch for force planning purposes. Both the authorization and appropriation procedures tend to concentrate on the exceptional items of change in the current budget; neither focuses on the issues noted above—force levels, effectiveness, support, readiness, and the necessary tradeoffs among them. Furthermore, they are almost exclusively concerned with spending requests for the current fiscal year; the long-range consequences of spending decisions receive less attention."

"This approach is the more surprising in that the congressional review process is initiated by the secretary of defense's report on the five-year defense program, which states the purposes of the program and outlines the force decisions needed to achieve them."

Schultze et al #3

ch. 15 "A New Approach to Priorities"

p. 449. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ "It is no longer enough for politicians and federal officials to show that they have spent the taxpayers' money for approved purposes; they are now being asked to give evidence that the programs are producing results." (because the kinds of programs are new; direct govt. services.)

Harold Sidman, Politics, Boston, + Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization (1970)

Intro - economy + efficiency The old PA reorg cult

p 26: "The Congress is highly skilled in the tactical uses of org. reorg. If you come from a district with a jet airport, establishment of an Office of Noise Abatement in the Department of Transport has tremendous voter appeal. Even though there is doubt that a separate office could do much to reduce noise levels, at least it gives a place where congressmen can send constituent complaints."

my note: The 1960's legislation is quantitatively + maybe qualitatively different.
The place in it all for Congress is unclear.
(old time = jobs, who, staff, reorg agencies, not much else)

C 35 He sees, lately, "powerful centrifugal forces."

C 33-34 - "The struggle for power + position has contributed to fragmentation of the executive branch structure + the proliferation of categorical programs. By narrowing the constituency, agencies are made more susceptible to domination by their clientele groups + congressional committees."

Sidman #2

p 39 ^{Committee} "He says ^{staff} goes into specimen: "Those who hope that further expansion of staff resources will make it possible for the Congress to look at the big picture and regain legislative leadership are pursuing a well-oiled, but - wrong."

p 40 - In 90th Congress: 28 of the 33 members of MM+F came from prof. districts -

p 40 "In vital areas programs which have been consolidated or are effectively coordinated at the exec level remain fragmented in Congress. Hoped for benefits are lost when comprehensive + well integrated plans developed by the executive must be broken up and considered in separate pieces by the Congress."

p 43 "Almost every objective observer has confirmed the Hoover Commission's findings that the existing sharing of water resource responsibilities among Federal, State, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has resulted in poor planning, overlapping and duplication, working at cross purposes, and wasteful competition."

One committee jurisdictional interest is key here.

p 43 - on water resources: "Control over project authorization and funding are the essence of congressional power."

Sidman #3

Note: fed exec = [a mixture of what business want to do + what Congress want to do]

p 44 Still on water resources: Old Com have Corps of Engineers, Int Com have B of Rec, + Ag Com have SCS. So, 6 committees, each with its part + its policy umbrella (See Key line) → persistent battles
Exec agencies often have very allies vs policy

p 49: "As soul brothers, the exec agencies + legislative committees make common cause against the 'evil hour' of the Congress - the Appropriations Committees."

p 51 "Institutional types are judged by their relative accessibility to members of Congress, not by juridical concepts or abstract principles of organization." - 3 types, he says
1) President's men - w/ staff, cabinet secretaries, heads of exec opps units
2) agencies of progress - indep boards + commissions + the Army Corps of Engineers
3) mainline land - ind agencies, like GSA + SBA

p 53 "The Congress does not concede, however, that a Secretary's at & reign over his dept necessarily carries with it the power to veto."

p 54 - Office of the Secretary budget usually gets cut first - eg, 2655 requests for PPBS planning funds for Justice + other agencies were denied!

Sedman #4

- Q57. "Boards + commissions are beloved by everyone but the Congress. Bureaucrats may be inefficient administrators, but the Congress is more concerned with responsiveness than efficiency."
"Plans to replace bds + commissions with single administrators are opposed out of fear of disturbing the delicate balance of power between the exec + the Congress. It is too easy for a single administrator to become a 'President's man'."
- Q59. "Federal field structure is dictated more by political realities than administrative requirements or the convenience of those who do business with the Fed Govt."
- Q60. * "Recentralization makes an excellent theme for campaign speeches, but those who take campaign promises seriously run the risk of incurring congressional displeasure. Governors and mayors are competitors of Sen + Reps."
(Congressmen love credit + pay)
Hence a long bias vs. real reorganization
- Q61
Q62 "More studies of exec branch org., in isolation from the Congress, are bound to be exercises in futility."

Sedman #5

His concluding para in the Cong. chapter:

"Sooner or later the Congress will be compelled to grasp the nettle. The status quo breeds frustration in the Congress, ineffectiveness in the exec branch, and rising dissatisfaction among the citizenry."

Exec chapter:

Q65: "The diffusion of power within the Congress and the inherent constraints on the leg process do not foster concentration on long-range goals + allow anything other than a piecemeal approach to public policy."

Q65-66: * "Within the Congress words are sometimes equated with deeds. Votes represent final acts. There is concern with administration, but it is focused principally on those elements which directly affect constituency interests or committee jurisdictions. Legislative proposals seldom are debated from the viewpoint of their administrative feasibility."

Q66 * "Congress is weak on follow-through, even though it has been diverting increasing attention to leg oversight. Laws on the statute books are not news, except when investigating officers disclose scandals or serious abuses in their administration. The political pay-offs from measures to improve administrative efficiency or to promote admin reform are minimal. To capture the headlines, studies must be launched into publicness of the moment + new legislative proposals thrown into the hopper. The ambitions

Sidman #6

Right on!

(cont) ~~ET~~

p 66 Senator with a keen eye on the White House has an insatiable appetite for "ideas" which will keep him in the front pages + contribute to his national image."

p 67 - on ~~process~~ with Cong backgrounds:

LBJ - he "conceived of activism primarily in terms of bold, innovative legislative proposals."
What can happen - "... the enactment of administration bills in wholesale lots becomes the overriding objective."

p 68: "Unlike a legislator, a President did view the passage of a law as a beginning, not an end."

(He points out earlier that Nixon is the 1st Pres since FDR with experience in civilian public management.)

Sidman #7

He has a chapter called "Cooperative Feudalism" in which he talks of the alliance of agencies, cong committees + professional groups vs. exec + budget bureaus at 3 levels.

p 102: "Cooperative feudalism is an anachronism"

"The inability of our pol execs to act has contributed as much as anything else to loss of confidence in our gov'tal institutions."

This is a powerful chapter.

I suppose what happens is that the Congressman gains from identification with a highly organized + alert guild. (in a way he isn't from general gov'tal performance)

Robert Sherrill, "The Embodiment of Poor White Power" (Bobby Byrd)
Nytimes Magazine, February 28, 1971, p. 9 et al.

An example of personal org: (p. 51) ~~XXXX~~ "Bobby Byrd's little list' is well known in the Appropriations Committee. To keep in touch back home, he has three file drawers containing 2,545 cards, recording the names of people he considers important: party workers, ministers, editors, county judges, miners, taxi drivers, housewives. He calls them often--'Sometimes just to say hello, how are you getting along? How is Mrs. So and So? I know them all.' Every year he sends more than 200 \$18.75 Government savings bonds--out of his own pocket--to the graduating valedictorians in West Virginia."

p. 52. "Byrd's strength in the Senate is made up of his loyalty to the club, his thoughtfulness or sycophancy (depending on your perspective), his willingness to do the drudgery and take care of the details."

"If there's any cruddy work, count on Byrd." (e.g., chairing the Senate during allnight filibusters)

Sherrill on B.Byrd #2

p. 53 "When he was elected secretary of the party conference in 1967, that job didn't count to much. The conference met only a couple of times a year. But Byrd got a pocket notebook and began taking requests from Senators as to how he could help them on the floor. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield doesn't like to hang around the chamber during the typically listless debate, and Russell Long, then whip, didn't like to substitute for him. But somebody had to stick around to keep things moving, so Byrd happily moved in. And when Kennedy became whip, he found he didn't want to fill in for Mansfield either. But Byrd was still as available as ever, and the little notebook was still tick-ticking off the favors, scheduling debate for their convenience, delaying action on bills to save their faces. ('Say, Bob, I've got some constituents coming to lunch with me today. Would you be sure and call me if that bill comes up?' Oh, sure, glad to oblige.)

Edward A. Shils, "Congressional Investigation: The Legislator & His Environment"
18 Univ of Chicago Law Review, pp 571-584, 1950-51

Q 573: The Congressman needs to nurse his own constituency:

"The congressional investigation is often just the instrument which the legislator needs in order to remind his constituents of his existence." That is the reason why investigations often involve such unseemly uses of the organs of publicity. Outbursts is the next best thing to the personal contact which the legislator must forego. It is his substitute offering by which he tries to counteract the personal contact which his rivals at home have with the constituents."

Frank E. Smith, Congressman from Mississippi

Q127: "All members of Congress have a primary interest in being re-elected. Some members have no other interest."

Q128: "The general theme of the whips is, 'Vote with us if you can, but don't vote against your district.'"

Q137: "I recall no issue on which I deliberately withheld my vote until I was certain that it would not change the outcome; I was confident that that particular vote would be selected for the APT schedule, and I just didn't afford the luxury of one more favorable meeting."

Q141: "Except for some of the 'swing' districts in evenly balanced ~~districts~~ down party areas, the general belief is that a member who fails to return has little excuse for his defeat."

Frank Smith #2

Q186 on the STL Seaway — gives some background, then

"I took 41 years of study + debate, consideration + reconsideration, pleading, persuading and battering to overcome the obstructions and enact the Seaway legislation. (It took just five years to build it.)"

Q241: on carework for his Chinese constituents (which he enjoyed doing).
"My secretary observed that I might be cheaper to assign a staff member to bring my train to keep on paying the airmail postage for our steady stream of letters requesting consular reports on the progress of immigrant visa applications."

Q237 "Constituents' requests can be divided into three categories," he says
FF 1) personal help 2) issue mail 3) bigger projects

Moynihan, Political Brokers

Seats

say: % of National House vote D

51.3 - 1966

248 ?

51.1 - 1968

246

54.7 - 1970

255

% of eligibles voting in

47.0 - 1962

1 House election

45.6 - 1966

(actually voting)

45.4 - 1970

Combs - Hayes vs. Congress

See Federalist Papers

(esp. No. 51)

See Wilmerding, The Sparring Cowen (1943)

Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment and Representation," 60 APSR 627-39, Sept66

- p. 629. 5 inner city districts: "...the slating of candidates for Congress is controlled entirely by the party leaders." an ethos which inhibits use of issues. "Issues...are deemed irrelevant at best and dangerously divisive at worst."
- p. 630 (inner city) "The congressmen have been chosen by party regulars from among party regulars."
- p. 630 "Inner city Democrats abjure personality politics. Since recruitment is entirely controlled by the org., there is little incentive for individuals to cultivate personal publicity or personal followings among the electorate."
- p. 632 GOP suburban districts. "The non-hierarchical, highly permeable structure of Republican organization has compelled Rep. cand. for Congress to rely upon personal initiative and personal resources. The system tends to foster extreme sensitivity to the character of the primary electorate, which candidates must scrupulously cultivate." Result: cand. put premium on issues, on personality, not much on party cohesion (unlike Daleyites)
- p. 637: Inner city Dems in Congress: "Their practical, instrumental outlook and their preoccupations with tangible, highly specific goals have helped them to acquire much of value for the city....Pursuing limited, specific, tangible goals, they have been able to exercise considerable influence over the disposition of federal public works. In view of the recruitment patterns of the congressmen, it is not surprising that the federal projects and financing which the delegation has sought for Chicago typify the service ethic characteristic of the local political org. - Mass + harbor, highways, housing have been their forte."

Alvin D. Sokolow and Richard W. Brandsma, "Partisanship and Seniority in Legislative Committee Assignments: California After Reapportionment," 24 WPQ 740-760, Dec. 1971

741. Calif: "The Senate has relied almost exclusively on seniority while the Assembly has employed primarily a brand of partisanship."

742-73. 1965, e.g., the last shot before massive line-drawing.
"In the Senate, party identification was not a significant factor in committee patterns..." (p. 743): "All 24 Senators (20 Democrats, 4 Republicans) with four or more years of service received chairmanships or Rules Committee positions, while only one junior member was given a chairmanship."

744. Goes back at least to 1941 in the Senate. "Paying little attention to party labels, Senate leaders applied seniority in a consistent and through fashion. In every one of the five general sessions from 1955 to 1963, for example, each of the 25 to 28 senators with the longest service had a committee chairmanship or Rules Committee membership. Their junior colleagues lacked such positions."

744. "Seniority in the Calif. Sen. was a house-wide ranking; it dated from a member's entry into the house and was applied both in the selection of committee chairmen and rank-and-file members of important committees. This produced a legislative career ladder, which was structured by differences in the importance of individual committees

CONT

Sokolow 1971 #2

and the desirability of assignment to them. With increasing seniority a Calif. senator moved up the ladder--initially to chairmanships of lesser committees, then to the ranks of important committees, and later to more desirable chairmanships. Changes in party control did not effect this progression (sic).. "At the minimum the principle provided security for all members with some tenure."

747. 1967: seniority just as rigidly applied in Senate, even with member influx.

General: after 1967 there was a lot of unrest (from junior members). This upset the automaticity of the seniority system. There was an anti-Burns coup in 1969, etc. Upshot unknown. Little sign of rigid party control. What can be said is that after reapportionment the system has been in flux.

6. Walter Dill Scott, Social Insecurity: The Politics of Welfare (1966, Chicago, Rand McNally)

This may be usable. It's writing about public assistance, & he finds that, as of 1966, Congress had little interest in it all (just as costs are sky rocketing). — = an oversight oversight!

Q 18 "Although there is almost as much federal money involved now in public assistance as there is in foreign aid, agency hearings in p.a. remain relatively perfunctory. Costs are constantly increasing, and doubts are expressed about the efficiency & the values of some of those responsible for the administration of the program, but Congress has taken no steps to provide itself with independent, specialized assistance in this field. Neither the Sen Finance nor the H W & M C has a public assistance staff specialist. . . . The Congressional interest, p.a. has become the tail attached to soc sec — a reversal of the situation in 1935 — and soc sec itself ranks behind both taxation & receipt of aid as major concerns of the SFC and the H W & M C. Whatever the reason for the absence of analyses of p.a. prepared for Congress by its own staff people, the result is a primary dependence on the admin agency for info & an erratic pattern of legislative attention to fed relief prog. Long periods of inattention to anything other than the size of the fed grant contrast with sporadic bursts of interest in the program which result in policies that are either sharply restrictive or expansive."

Skema #2.

But, he goes on

Q 50 since WWII, increases in p.a. have come at Congressional initiative (and fairly often)

Q 50-51 "benefits were increased five times in the decade beginning with 1952, always on the initiative of Congress. Both before & after that year, the Senate was the starting point."

* The procedures have frequently been unorthodox because they have involved adoption of substantial increases by floor amendment rather than in committee, because in some instances the increases have been carried without the approval of the chair of the SFC, and because they have been consistently accepted by the House after originating in the Senate.

(Anti-welfare state because it can't be rationally handled in a US type system? — JRM)

Skinner #3 (continued)

Q51: "Few members of either the S or the H are in a position to oppose increases in the fed share of assistance. The increment is not great in any single instance, but the benefit to both the states + the recipients can have political and humanitarian advantages all at once. Normally, the sole disadvantage for a congressman is the need to buck a Party shaming to keep the budget under control. Less interest in benefit levels has been shown by Presidents than by Congressmen. When the former take strong opposition stands, legislators are squeezed — and usually they abandon the Party."

a
Topic
Case

Q51 { Incident set in 1948! (80th) passed from Sen floor many CA benefits, and this survived a lame-duck veto! but it turns out that this was an ambiguous situation

— He goes on to talk about how

- a) there are no agency controls on P.A. (it's extra-agency)
- b) the Byrd attack on welfare worked (Harty in 1962)

Skinner #4

Q252ff - "Political Supremacy" — he makes the point here that politicians don't interfere with distribution of relief funds — it's very rare.

Q254 . "Politics in relief is viewed differently from politics in highways, rivers, + harbors, public buildings, and even in defense contracts. In these latter activities, it is expected that public funds will be spent where the need is evident and also where partisan gain is possible."

— 255 — "... whatever the nature of pol. involvement of public assistance, it is not an involvement that can be explained as the crude exchange of votes for welfare favors. Written rules now reinforce a widely held antipathy to that kind of trade."

Herbert W. Stephens, "The Role of the Legislative Committees in the Appropriations Process: A Study Focused on the Armed Services Committees," 24 WPQ 146, 162, Mar. 1971

He says the AS Committees, set up in 1946, proceeded for 15 years giving vague general, continuing authorizations, with one major exception. p. 147 "Contrary to the general authorization of much larger programs, major military construction has been authorized by a detailed, line-item authorization act which prescribes each project and dollar amount." (in 1961 this was only 2.2% of budget of military, leaving out military personnel, ops & maintenance, procurement, and R&D.1)

p. 148. About 1960 the AS Comms extended their authzn procedures to other & bigger things

Well, it looks as if there has been some successful empire building here in the 1960's by the AS Comms, but it's hard to know what to make of it.

Philip Stern, The Rage of the Taxpayer

ch 3, p 34ff - gives some gd examples of tax loopholes for
specific people & circumstances.
- this reader only a few people

Also is Nancy R. Altay machine
uses assessments

Revenue code - a dash of symbolism, a gusting of reality

- 297-98 - He makes a case for depletion, by analogy on depletion allowances
(since Thorne (1944) argued in 1942 for rock asphalt + ball + saggin clay, by analogy
to other minerals in other states. - found in W.V., apparently from mines in Penn., etc.)
- 298 - "Since 1942, the list of tax-favored minerals has become all-encompassing
and there is likely not a single state without its own built-in pro-depletion lobby."
- 298 (also a congregation effect, as in bauxite - eg coal given a depletion rate to
match oil + gas)

Stern #2

ch. 20 has to do with campaign finance.

- p 384 - good stuff on Burdick-Klegge campaign of 1970. He uses as a source a
Washington Post account (Nov. 22, 1970, p A14).
Post says that 85 or 90% of \$ spent by both came from outside ND.
Burdick: Post says \$ came mainly from "liberal anti-war groups + labor unions"
Klegge: Post: "Klegge's entire campaign was planned, financed + directed
from Washington, D.C., by a team of professionals assembled by the White House."

- p 385. A Stern bit on Joe Puffey (1970). "He proposed a tax-reform 'package' in
which he included, almost casually, a proposal to tax capital gains on the
same basis as earned income. He was stunned by the reaction. The first result
was the cancellation of a businessman's fund-raising luncheon on his behalf
in New York City. Then some of his liberal-minded but wealthy financial backers
began calling him, saying, in effect, 'Good God, Joe, what are you trying to
do to us?' This was not a question being joy to the ear of a candidate
faced with raising \$1,000,000 to run for the United States Senate."

Stern #3

- p 388 - Stern quotes R. Harris, who in turn quoted Russell Long, on business
contributions in politics:
"investments in this area can be viewed as monetary bread cast upon
the water, to be returned a thousandfold."

Richard S. Sterne, Alvin Rabushka + Helen A. Scott,

"Serving the Elderly - An Illustration of the Niskanen Effect,"
13 Public Choice 81-90, Fall 1972

-82 - a program designed to supply low-cost meals for the ~~elderly~~ elderly in Miami.

Some spooky data.

Findings

p90. — "In summary, there is no relation (that we define) between the serving of low-cost meals + the designated social needs of the target clients. The stated purpose justifies the continuation of the centers + their funding, while the unstated but real purpose is the continuation of the org. by staff members whose chief concern is that the facilities be used."

George J. Stigler + Claire Friedland, "What Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of Electricity,"

5 Journal of Law + Econ 1-16, Oct 1962

This is main

This is, acc to Jordan, a "no effects" conclusion example

Q1 - on regulation - a basic Q: "Does it make a difference in the behavior
of an industry?"

Q1 - "... the innumerable regulatory actions are conclusive proof, not of
effective regulation, but of the desire to regulate."

They look at creation of state commissions with power to regulate rates of electric utilities.

no effect on rates, they say. (rate levels and rate structure are looked at
new.)

(They think this is because elec. cos. are not really perfect, must face
non-regulation - there are constraints on their production)

Donald E. Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces,"
ch. 7 in Chambers & Burnham

p. 186 US House 1952-1960....

"Much the largest component of the variance of party support is that measuring constituency influences; indeed, the third column of Table 1b shows that almost half of the total variance could be attributed to this level. (National .32, State .19, Constituency .49)

p. 188: UK, 6 elections 1950-1966, with a "regional" component....
(National .47, Regional .13, Constituency .40)

p. 189 "In Britain the national component was the most important element of party ~~change~~ change: very nearly half the total variance could be attributed to national forces."

p. 191. "The source of changes of voting for Congress lies a good deal within the individual constituency; of voting for Parliament, less so."

p. 200 He's got some distributions like mine (bimodal series) which tell us that there was high peakedness in 1874, much reduced in 1914, reduced further in 1958.

1958, sample of 116 ~~MEIC~~CDs

199. "It is therefore especially noteworthy how few of the reasons our respondents gave for their House votes in 1958 had any discernible issue content. The proportion that had--about 7 per cent--was less even than the proportion of party-image references touching current issues."

199. "...when a discount is made for guessing, the proportion of voters who really knew which party had controlled the Eighty-fifth Congress probably is still not more than half."

200. and the PI deviations in voting: "If anything, correcting perceived party control for guessing suggests that voters who defiated from their party in 1958 had poorer info. about the course of political events over the preceding two years."

202FN. Here are the Standard deviations, 1892-1960

p. 204. "Of the people who lived in districts where the House seat was contested in 1958, 59 per cent--well over half--said that they had neither read nor heard anything about either candidate for Congress, and less than 1 in 5 felt that they know something about both candidates."

Stokes & Miller - Saliency- #2

204. And of voters only. "Of people who went to the polls and cast a vote between rival House candidates in 1958, fully 46 per cent conceded that they did so without having read or heard anything about either man."

204. "The incumbent candidate is by far the better known. In districts where an incumbent was opposed for re-election in 1958, 39 per cent of our respondents knew something about the Congressman, whereas only 20 per cent said they knew anything at all about his nonincumbent opponent."

205. "In the main, recognition carries a positive valence; to be perceived at all is to be perceived favorably." (There are some negative evals. here too.) p. 205 chart gives the proportions of people, with various combos of knowledge, voting how.

206. Band interviews bear out all this. "After these allowances are made, it is still impressive how heavy a weight the incumbent assigns his personal record and standing." "Among the forces the Representative feels may enhance his strength at the polls, he gives his personal standing with the district front rank."

206. "Our constituent interviews indicate that the popular image of the Congressman is almost barren of policy content."

Stokes & Miller - Saliency #3

207. "By the most reasonable count, references to current legislative issues comprised not more than a thirtieth part of what the constituents had to say about their Congressmen."

207. Determinants of saliency..... Sex is important.

208 Friends & neighbors effect too.

Gerald D. Sturges, "The Challenges of a Freshman Congressman" on David R. Obey

Came in in April 1969 by-election (51.5%) - in 1970 67.6%

Among the things he did:

- p. 6 Visits to the district three weekends out of four (with speeches before service clubs, radio-TV station interviews, etc.)
- p. 7 daily and weekly newspapers were willing to publish a weekly column under his byline on public issues
- p. 7 "Several radio stations as a public service broadcast five-minute programs which he taped each week at the House recording studio."
- p. 7 a questionnaire free of charge to all 152,000 households in his district soliciting opinions on 18 issues.
- p. 9 initially on FW committee: "The assignment also made it quite natural for him to speak out on the House floor, as Obey frequently did, to demand increased Federal appropriations for water pollution control equipment." (plus the help of municipal officials to deal with the feds)
- p. 10 They he got onto Appropriations, secs on Dc and Interior. "The latter position offered him a good vantage point from which to oversee expenditures for the conservation of natural resources, including timber, water, minerals, oil, fish and wildlife, major concerns of Obey's district."
- p. 12 Bills. One "to make indemnity payments available to dairy manufacturers as well as to milk producers when their milk has been contaminated by pesticides" (This got through, in the 1970 farm bill)

Sturges #2

- p. 12 other bills (p. ~~12~~ 12-13) "He also introduced legislation to boost Social Security benefits, and a package of bills pertaining to the environment. And lots of other bills."
- p. 13. "....Obey sent out postal patron newsletters on such topics as the tax reform bill, crime and the economy."
- p. 14 and 15. The NYTimes endorsed him in 1970, and also Field and Stream ranked him among the top 21 House members (environmental stuff)

Stanley S. Surrey, "The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist — How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted," 70 HLR 1145-82, May 1957

1145 — he thinks Congress has done well in the matter — "has shown remarkable collective wisdom" — can be measured favorably vs. other countries.

1148 "But despite an absence of consensus on any particular list of provisions there seems to be considerable agreement that Congress in its tax legislation has adopted provisions favoring special groups or special individuals & that these provisions ~~favor special~~ ~~individuals~~ run counter to our notions of tax fairness. Moreover, the tendency of Congress to act in this way seems to be increasing."

Factors that may be of import:

- 1149 1) High tax rates
1150 "The point is that the average congressman does not basically believe in the present rates of income tax in the upper brackets: (91%) apparently they don't believe in this — certainly not in the concrete & perhaps not even in the abstract. Since they are not, however, willing to reduce those rates directly, the natural outcome is indirect reduction through special provisions."
UK does the same. (+ other countries — a general problem)

SURVEY #2

- 1151 2) Tax identity: separate schedule, eg, for capital gains, that's available to switch to.
1152 3) technical complexity: :: easy to show inequity
4) lobby + politics: oil + gas, eg
1153 5) Sep of exec + leg branches — Congress have indep power (not true in UK).

Some institutional factors:

- 1155 1) The Congressman's desire to be helpful:
1156 for a member of a tax committee: "His legislative stock in trade, so to speak, is special tax treatment."
As a Sen or SF can once put it: "What's the good of being on this committee if you can't get through a little old amendment now & then?"
1156 "In view of all this, it is a credit to the Congress on the tax committees that our tax laws are not in far weaker shape. Congressmen have withstood great pressures more staunchly than most people assume."
1156 2) Lack of org cooperation of legislators from fairness: ← ("chance")
"He sees only the problem of the particular constituent or group concerned"
1157 "His brother congressmen are quite willing to be good fellows + go along, esp. if the congressman urging the proposal is well-liked."

SURREY #3

- Q 1157 — Fairness: The Congress doesn't think in terms of general equity.
- Q 1158 3) The Treasury Dept's presentation: on the one hand, then the other hand, etc.
(clear advocacy vs TD complexity) (expertise problem)
- Q 1161 4) Lack of ~~some~~ omniscience on the part of Treasury:
Q 1161 "The approach of the average congressman is to hear the private groups, find out in general what it wants, react sympathetically for a variety of reasons, and then ask the Treasury whether ~~any~~ there is any objection to the proposal."
TD of fails to block.
- Q 1164 5) Lack of opposition against TD to payments of special tax provisions:
Q 1164 "The question, 'Who speaks for tax equity + tax fairness?' is answered today largely in terms of only the TD." If that dept. fails to respond, then tax fairness has no champion before the Congress."
— There are no opps on the other side.
- Q 1166 6) The Cong tax staff: — (Most are on staff of JCM IRT)
Q 1166 The chief of the JC staff: "Perhaps inevitably on the crucial issues his role tends to
Q 1167 be that of the advocate of the congressman advancing a particular proposal on behalf of a special group."

SURREY #4

- Q 1170 7) Lack of effective aid from the tax bar
- Q 1175 8) Lack of public knowledge of special tax provisions ← *
- Q 1175 "Almost entirely, these matters lie outside of the public's gaze, outside of the voter's knowledge." — V. complex + technical
... "Hence the congressman favoring these special provisions has for the most part no accountability to make to the voters for his actions."
- Q 1176 9) The Relationship of Special Tax Provisions to Private Relief Bills:
A lot of what goes on is really disguised private relief (clams vs govt), which, in non-tax areas, is handled better by other Cong. processes.