

Ranney, Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain (C. Wright, 1965)
CCL JN 558 R35

Q10. "Many local activists... are fiercely loyal to their parties' ideals + leadership, and are often eager to punish rebellious candidates + M.P.s more rapidly + ruthlessly than the national party leaders attempt or sometimes even approve."
- (So, it's not central control that preserves cohesion.)

Q62 At least twice, Tory Constituency associations have resorted to QC like a direct primary.
- 1947 example - a secret ballot, polls open all day, among members of ca ~~ca~~
(plus votes castable at an eve meeting) - votes cast = ca 1200.
- 1959 - Nicolson - postal vote of ca members, on an appeal - ca 7400 votes cast

Q70 - Local activist core (Tories) puts a high premium on loyalty to national leadership
(though see the re-orientation in Suez - they're OK)

Q89 - "The ca's and not Central Office, then, are the true guardians of the orthodoxy of Conservative M.P.s."

Ranney (PtoP) # 2

Q161 - central office veto of candidates has been more used in BLP than in Tory Party in recent years.

Q164 - since 1945, Transport House has vetoed at least 10 locally adopted candidates for being too far left. (incl 5 incumbents!)

Q165 - but this power has been used vs incumbents only who were Communists or near-Communists. - and all 5 in late 1940's. ✓

Q166 - So it's correct that Labour's national organs have more power over candidate selection than Tories do -
- but still the final word generally rests at local level.

→ (Labour calls their outlets Constituency Labour parties - CLPs rather than Constituency associations - like the Tories)

Ramsey (P to P) #3

178 Labour — small groups of activists run things at local level (as in CP)

191-93 Conclusion on Labour:

192 - "... Transport House has controlled the selection of parl candidates more closely than Central Office."

Why?

- 1) Labour factional divisions more prominent, giving more desk of strength.
- 2) Tory CAs are loyal to leaders, Labour CAs have often thought it their right + duty to support rebels.

193 Yet even so:

"In short, although the Labour Party's national agencies are more active in candidate selection than the Conservative's, the vast majority of Labour candidates are selected acc. to the desires + standards of their constituent parties, not of Transport House."

Ramsey (P to P) #4

Candidate Selection + Cohesion (summary)

280 central control plays only a minor role.

281) "Yet even though the national leaders cannot force them to do so, the local parties voluntarily continue to adopt candidates who, when elected, dutifully vote as the whips direct. Hence, although the de jure local control of candidate selection in Britain resembles the de jure local control in the U.S., ~~much~~ much more closely than is commonly supposed, it does not produce parl parties of nearly so low cohesion as those in Congress."

"Why? The fundamental answer lies in the fact that British constituent parties are not local in the same sense as Am. S + R parties. They are run by activists primarily loyal to the national parties' leaders + causes."

"In short, the national leaders do not need to control local candidate selection in order to maintain party cohesion in Parliament; the local activists do the job for them."

Riley book:

Q 31 - No fiduciary relation.

Q 21-28 - he specifically ellected agents in the fiduciary relation.

Q 32 - The usual agency exists but. (with conditions specified)

Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," 58 APSR 561-576, Sept. 1964

568. In 1962 and 1963 McCormack began to use whips for more polls (formal) than Reyburn had done.

569 "major legislation" = measures on which leaders decided to take a poll, on which poll was taken & completed, and on which the House acted by RC up or down.

There were 7 such bills in 1962 and 10 in 1963.....

569....Dems have a lot of assistant whips of some of uncertain loyalty. On the other hand, GOP look on their assistant whips "as definite agents of the leadership."

570-71. Dem attendance arousing activities are often pretty good & effective, he says.

. 572. Bargaining for credits shows up at the strangest places! even on whipping. FN 46: "There are several reasons for a member's making an inaccurate report of his position.....Finally, he might use the report of opposition as a bargaining device. For example, on the poll on the debt limit increase in May, 1963, a loyal Administration supporter from the midwest reported 'doubtful' and, at the same time, indicated his eagerness for final Treasury confirmation that a new Internal Revenue Service installation would be located in his district." !

572-73: Accuracy of polls? He has most of this in the later article. The % correct was a little lower in 1962 than in 1963. (best record - 97% - came on 1963 Rules vote)

Ripley 1964 #2

p. 576. Evidence that there's a difference between the parties.

!The Democratic assistant whips are regarded primarily as informing agents rather than as pressuring agents, although individual assistant whips may on occasion choose to pressure their zone members. The Democratic whip's office keeps no systematic voting records ~~XXX~~ with which to confront the less loyal members. The Republican assistant whips, however, are expected to work for a solid Republican vote in accord with the dictates of the Policy Committee. The Republican whip's office keeps voting records, even on teller votes, so that the whip may berate the goats and praise the sheep when the occasion demands."

573-74. His discussion of success in whipping is anecdotal. He believes that it works ; (574) "Some small, yet definite, net gains for the Dem. maj. in the House."

Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives

p. 67. More on the Whips..... On D House polls. "Some Democratic assistant whips are reluctant to report the names of those opposing the leadership. A few report by number, no name. In the Eighty-~~EIGHTH~~ Eighth Congress only one zone (containing 16 of the 257 Democrats) reported in this unsatisfactory manner and the assistant whip was usually willing to divulge the names privately to the Whip's administrative assistant, whom he trusted. By 1966 this problem had become acute, however, and four assistant whips (responsible for 72 of the 294 Democrats) generally refused to report members' positions by name."

James A. Rohrum, The House Rules Committee

23) Schedule is itself a critical management problem (The Senate screws up on this regularly)
p 4) NB - There's an Objectors Committee to watch the Consent Calendar.
(This is a guardianship device) (and it's unconstitutional)

* For a statement on the phases of these Objectors, see Ches, 85th Cong., 1st sess. p 2249
p 5) ["The House internal norm opposes use of discharge proceedings."
p 6) * "On the other hand, there is an external pressure from effective interest groups to sign the petition that will benefit their legislation."

p 12 Rules Com: its greatest power is negative. "So it is the actual exercise of a negative decision that is the greatest potential means of power."

p 13 (Initiative by Rules is very rare)
p 13ff) A discussion of bills a) not given hearings, or b) denied rules after hearings. - a lot per session.

p 20) * On the bills denied rules: ... "proposals from the Committee on Veterans Affairs, Public Works, and Internal and Insular Affairs seem to dominate"...
(eg, Veterans pensions).
NB

Rohrum on Rules #2

p 28 - Pres & Gov: (bills denied rules). He says that the money problem seems to go on here.

p 32 another example of Rules activity: 1958 Rules, in "alliance" with Appops Com, refused to let B+C report out some bills with direct Treasury borrowing in them. (Rules forced a change on this business) ✓

Ch 5 - Rules members, 1937-62

p 94: an old study shows that W & M, App & Rules were top 3 prestige committees in 1914-41 period

p 102: "a decidedly favorable representation of self interests."

p 103: "The leadership wants men who will 'go along' when a party issue is at stake and who can 'take the heat' for the House."

Johnson (Rules book) footnotes to follow up:

Jellison, History of the H of R
my files on committee history

Curtis J. Loggans, Party Leadership + the House Committee on Rules (Harvard Ph.D., 1953)

De Hon Alexander — ?

Judith Robinson "American Medical Political Action Committee" ch. 3 in

Judith G. Smith, Political Brokers (Liveright, NY, 1972)

(This book is a rundown of 10 pt groups - from Med Journal coverage

- ADA, ACA, AMPAC, COPE, BIPAC, NCEC, NRCC, Regon, DNC, Comm Comm)

069: "AMPAC reports that since 1962 it has spent \$3.09 million in support of candidates for congressional office; it estimates that no state and local groups have contributed four times that much."

70 - All this may be second only to COPE (in \$)

David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Committee Assignment Process:
A Case Study of Social Choice," ms ~~XX~~ 1971 APSA convention
on

based on requests of D Congmen, to D Com Committees, 86,87,88,90th Congresses.
(requests from new members, or from old ones wanting other or transfer assignments)

p. 16 "Marginal freshmen are slightly less likely to received no requested committee
and are much more likely to receive their first choice than are safe freshmen."

Nathan Rosenberg, "Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations"
68 Journal of Political Economy 557-570, Dec 1960

This is very nice, altho it's not directly relevant.

Howard Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the
Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interests?"
63 APSR 476-487, June 1969

This is not terribly useful here, but it can be cited.

It makes a case for "opportunism" (in voting & coalition formation)
among Gaullist MP's in the 4th.

① 487 — "... there may be a presidential game of adapting one's
position to winning electoral contests. Consideration of what is
necessary to win in a constituency may then dictate the
deputies' decisions in the legislature".
✓

OK — His conclusion is strong on these points, and he has
evidence pointing in this direction.

Richard Rovere, Senator J. McCarty

p15: "He had enormous insight on American foreign policy at a time when that policy bore heavily on the course of world history, and American diplomacy might bear a different aspect today if McCarty had never lived."

So much for insight.

p120: "McCarty took up the Communist menace in 1950 not with any expectation that it would make him a sovereign of the assemblies, but with the single hope that it would help him hold his job in 1952."

Bruce M. Russett, What Price Vigilance?

Ch. 3. #Defense Spending and Senatorial Behavior"

general statement here. He uses voting from both early and late 60's, looking at various defense-related roll call scales. No correlations between voting and distributive military-related spending are very high.... But DoD military payrolls work best:

P. 85. "No matter how we look at the data, however, the relation between DoD payrolls and voting behavior, on a constellation of domestic, defense, and foreign policy issues, just does not exist in comparable degree for contracting. XXX Perhaps military bases, because they are stable and enduring, exert a political influence on Capitol Hill that here-today, gone-tomorrow government contracts cannot."