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James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (Yale UP, New Haven, 1968)
CCL HN 303.5 P39

Part I He goes at Colombia by looking at the incentives of politicians.
pp. 19-20 Legislature turnover in Colombia is very high.

Robert L Peabody, "The Selection of a Majority Leader, 1970-71: The Democratic Caucus and Its Aftermath." This is ch. 3 of his May 1971 confidential draft.

p. 21. Why did Boggs beat Udall and the others?
simple answer at first glance:

21-22
"The incumbent Whip was supported by senior, establishment types, only a few of which broke away to back Hays and Sisk. Udall and O'Hara, on the other hand, split-up the more junior, change oriented members with the Arizonian receiving most of these votes. In the HofR the former types of Dems. tend to outnumber the latter, by a rough ratio of three to two. Then he takes the Dem. membership and arbitrarily putting members into 2 categories: "establishment (or status-quo oriented) and change-oriented (especially in the institutional reform sense)" This doesn't follow strict ideological lines.... ~~XXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ p. 22-23: "...some members seem to be moving from the change-oriented group toward the establishment sector as they grow older or gain more seniority."

p. 23. The figures suggest: "...an establishment like Boggs, or for that matter, Wayne Hays and B.F. Sisk, starts off with an impressive advantage over any candidate inclined towards reform or change of the institution."

Peabody 1971 ms #2

p. 23. What themes appealed well to the establishment types?
party loyalty, for one (Boggs used it)

p. 23-24. "Finally, the senior Louisianian selectively emphasized his southern ties. A defeat for Boggs, it was claimed, would mean a defeat for the South, seniority and the whole process of decentralized, committee-centered ~~legislation~~ legislating." (He's a little vague here) "Not all these arguments were persuasive. Still, they found a receptive ear with many members who were fond of emphasizing geographical ties, preferred the seniority system, and appreciated the benefits of a logical and orderly pattern of leadership succession."

p. 24. "The evidence that can be put together from candidate polls and interviews strongly supports the interpretation that House Dems were, in fact, largely divided along senior-junior lines in the preliminary and final caucus votes."

p. 27. region: "Boggs, with the highly critical support of O'Neill, ~~xxx~~ C rey and other northeasterners, put the two largest regions together. In short, he maintained the southern-big city leadership axis which has dominated the House Democratic party for decades."

Deamr. Bulmer, The Case Against Congress ...

If you want some particulars on the 1966 Xmas tree tax bill, see
pages 317-320.

Don't forget that political actors can include foreigners,
as on sugar bills.

Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy (revised edition, 1971: Brookings, Wash DC)

ch. 3: "The Tax Legislative Process"

p. 46: on the tax committees: (with lots of outside witnesses):

"In such an atmosphere, the sec of the treas assumes the role of defender of the national interest. He spends much of his time fighting off new tax advantages and is only moderately successful in eliminating old ones."

p. 47: on the Q of fiscal balance: fragmentation of tax and approps committees:
"Some have argued that this fractionation of the expenditure-tax process encourages higher expenditures, since no one committee must face up to the need for balancing benefits against costs. In fact, however, the process has probably been too restrictive in recent years. Congress has been slow to accept the principle that a major objective of fiscal policy should be to promote full employment, although a good deal of progress has been made since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1964...The ~~X~~ appropriations committees, which act through a large number of ~~scx~~ working on individual approps, view their roles as primarily that of watchdogs over the efficiency of govt operations, rather than of general policy makers; and the tax committees are conservative about changing the level of taxes either upward or downward. The disappointing performance of the economy in the late 1950s is now widely acknowledged to have been in large part the result of overly restrictive fiscal (and monetary) policies." He says the 1969 expends restrictions were too restrictive too, given domestic needs.....

Pechman #2

p. 48 joint committee? "This was tried in 1947 and 1948 (the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget), but the results were dis~~a~~pointing. The committee did not have enough information to make judgments regarding overall fiscal policy, and its recs were not binding on the approps and tax committees. As a result, the committee resolutions were political in nature and served little purpose.~~X~~ The effort was abandoned after both houses ignored the resolutions."

p. 51. "Some believe that the federal tax leg process impedes progress toward a better tax system, but this is probably an unfair assessm nt of the work of the cong ~~ra~~ax committees and an unrealistic appraisal of the balance of forces for and against tax reform. While many questionable provisions have crept into the U.S. tax ~~XXXXXX~~ laws, erosion of the tax base has been halted in recent years, and some steps have been taken to reverse it. Moreover, the overall distribution of federal taxes continues to be progressive despite the strong interests arrayed against progression and equitable taxation."

Walter Pincus, "Silent Spenders in Politics--They Really give at the Office,"
New York Mag, Jan 31, 1972.... (in Campaign Finance file)

This is definitely usable, but it's too long to copy. pp. 39-40 on Union Carbide is good. It tells how they raise executive money, they sprinkle it around among congressmen, and why they do it.

pp. 42-43. BANKPAC and how they got burned. (Money shoveled to House B&C committee)
pp. 43-44 dairymen.... big money p. 44: "With a kitty of more than \$650,000 the dairymen in 1970 were able to make substantial contributions to no fewer than 96 House candidates and 37 of the men running for the Senate. House Agriculture Committee members were, obviously, among the major recipients." including \$5000 to Poage, who was unopposed!

pp. he says (p. 44) AMPAC created a model in 1961 with its anti-medicare operations.
pp. 44-45. new outfits are springing up.

What this shows is a very (or quite, anyway) sophisticated financing network, of individual corporations and trade associations. (also unions, of course) And there's no way to find out about the effects of this by asking candidates.

I should definitely use this. It shows sophisticated targeting on specialty issues.

Charles R. Plott, "Some Organizational Influences on Urban Renewal
Decisions," 58 American Economic Review 306-321, May 1968

307 Appropos process is bypassed.
The members of the banking advisory committees have a rather direct control
over the magnitude of URA activities."

Analysis on pp 306-311, which is good, ^{shows} ~~suggests~~ that there is a relation
between URA (Urban Renewal Admin) spending + committee membership.

So this can be cited on the subject, I guess.

Richard Cheney; Reorganization Roosevelt's Government, 1936-1939; No Controversy
over Executive (Harvard UP, 1966)

Congressional hostility: ~~an~~ example: "Congressional devotion to pet bureaus was apparent. Senator McNary admitted: 'Here is the thing that bothers me: I am tremendously interested in certain agencies remaining where they are. I want them static,' (p. 46)

p. 79 "A ~~big~~ phalanx of war veterans, labor unions, civil service reformers, doctors, and business organizations opposed the measure. They were joined spokesmen for various government agencies.....Nearly every pressure group in American society took exception to some feature of reorganization. The program commanded no support among organized interests; those that did not actively assail reorganization remained neutral, and their influence counted for little."

p. 90 and the bureaucrats: "Officeholders of all ranks--Cabinet members, White House aides, commissioners of the regulatory agencies, bureau chiefs, and ordinary federal employees--tried to evade the plan." **XI**

U.S.

Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives,"
62 APSR 144-168, Mar 68

145. An instzd org has 3 properties: 1) boundaries clear, 2) complexity, 3) universalism

146 Excluding 1789, there were 15 19c elections (last 1882) when % of frosh over 50%.
Highest 20c was 37.2%, a figures exceeded 47 times in 18c and 19c. It does tail
off ~~off~~ after 1882 (only 2 elections over 40 after that: 1891 and 1895)
Also, mean terms served starts its rise in the 1880's. (The 1890's are clearly
~~XXXX~~ 20cish, compared to previous decades, on both counts)

148-52 - data on Speakers. p149: "strong indication of the development of the
Speakership as a singular occupational specialty."

153. Coming of committee complexity. (Not an attribute of early House)

156. (He points to flux in earlier Houses; both in leaders and in committees.
Now there's stability. a 2c devt.)

159. "the growth of resources assigned to internal House management"

160. 20c committee appointment system (seniority) as token of universalism.

161. Also, 20c means for settling contested elections

165-68 speculation on consequences of instzn

Polsby Instzn 1968 #2

(Consequences of instzn):

166: "The increasing complexity of the division of labor presents an opportunity
for individual Rep. to specialize and thereby enormously increase their influence
upon a narrow range of policy outcomes in the political system at large. Considered
separately, the phenomenon of specan may strike the superficial observer as productive
of narrow-minded drons. But the total impact of a cadre of specialists operating
over the entire spectrum of public policies is a formidable asset for a political
institution; and it has undoubtedly enabled the House to retain a measure of autonomy
and influence that is quite exceptional for a 20th century legislature.#

166. "norms of predictability, courtesy, and reciprocity" are encouraged in this
kind of instzd outfit.

Good: what I'm talking about can really only
flourish in an instzd house. Note that the
tariff game outdates "take off" instzn.

Nelson P. Polsky, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962"

in P + P (1963), ch. 9

1962 choice of Albert (over Bolling, who withdrew before a caucus vote.)

242 - Not a census - lib battle.

245-49 - Albert's "inside" strategy - personal contacts, etc.

250-69 - Bolling's "outside" strategy -

issues, mass media, interest groups (AFL-CIO, eg)

260 - Bolling got a WT endorsement, eg, and NY Post too.

Just cite this generally, to show insider outside

Price, David E., et al., The House and Senate Committees on Commerce

The following is from the John Paris chapter on communications.
he's talking about cable tv and Toberrt Macdonald's sc on communix.
This is like Dexter on military committees; you can't assume that they are
actually legislating!

p. 161: "One of Macdonald's former committee aides, Martin Kuhn, confirmed the Congressman's lack of initiative in communications policy. Kuhn, a one time editor of Broadcasting magazine, was hired by the Commerce Committee at \$20,000 a year as a communications specialist. When he arrived, Kuhn had no specific policies in mind. He assumed that he and Macdonald would sit down to work out priorities and plans for the future. The meeting never occurred. Incredible as it may seem, Kuhn relates that in the year and a half he worked for the sub-committee, he and Macdonald never got together to plan areas of responsibility or desired legislative programs.

"Because 'Torby didn't have any plans in mind and didn't know what he wanted me to do,' Kuhn spend his time 'keeping up with the field.' He never planned anything nor did he ever learn Macdonald's designs for communications policy. Finally Kuhn decided that 'what Macdonald wanted was a PR man to do some work for him in the district.' Since that prospect did not interest him, Kuhn resigned."

Price, DE, COMMERCE #2

Still the Paris section:

Macdonald at one point threatened to kick Tiernan off the committee for activating a DSG task force on communications--1971.

p. 165: "Macdonald's threats do not extend to industries he is charged with overseeing. His fear of opposition from some of these industries is so overwhelming that they have succeeded in immobilizing him with regard to regulatory legislation. For example several years ago he received a political scare when the electric companies bankrolled his opponent in the general election. Since then, according to Tiernan, 'Macdonald will not touch them.' That interpretation is confirmed by Macdonald's former aid, Marty Kuhn, who states that "Even though Torby easily defeated his opponent, the experience made him sort of paranoid. He is now reluctant to do anything that would offend the power people."

p. 174: on the sc's oversight of FCC: Paris says the 1971 review is typical: "The superficial nature of the inquiries showed that there had been no extensive staff preparation for the hearing. The questions that did occur reflected the protectionist intervention of the broadcasters, the local technical problems of members' constituents, and such relatively insignificant problems as the use of drug lyrics and 'X' rated films on TV."

Price, DE, COMMERCE #3

This is the Price chapter on "Health and Environment" OK

Next, the Price chapter on "Merchant Marine, Fisheries, and Oceanography"

Part III: "The Committees in Perspective"

p. 395 members of the 2 committees: "largely but not exclusively valuing their committee seats because of the special relevance of Commerce Committee matters to their districts and to powerful economic interests...."

p. 407: Staggers: "Basically localistic in his orientation, with few well-developed legislative ideas and little innate taste or capacity for policy leadership, Staggers has not translated his good intentions and liberal leanings into innovative or energetic or even expeditious legislative undertakings."

p. 444 "...if ~~WASTELAND~~ the servicing of the merchant marine promises little in the way of broad-scale publicity, it is often uniquely profitable in terms of campaign contributions and the support of powerful local interests."

Price, DE, COMMERCE, #4

p. 447 "But the most salient feature of the policy-making environment in consumer and environmental affairs is not the diverse and contending groups and constituencies organized and active there, but rather the opportunity these issues offer the legislator to appeal over the heads of the dominant groups to a largely unorganized, quite diffuse, but still politically potent public sentiment. This is not to say, of course, that legislators are generally inclined to make such an appeal. We have seen how rare an entrepreneurial approach to public policy is; the easier and 'safer' course is often to hold back in deference to the entreaties of the most visible and best organized 'affected' groups."

pp. 28-29. By 1965 Senate Commerce had a staff quite useful to the libs. Why? p. 29: "...the ~~key~~ key event was Magnuson's near-defeat in 1962." The key staff man's "progressive and reformist inclinations harmonized nicely with his conviction that legislative activism and a refurbished image help the key to Magnuson's future, and incidentally to his own." After 1962 Magnuson became more hospitable to this whole idea.....So a covey of lib staff people materialized.....

p. 31. Magnuson picked up fair packaging. But: "...Hart noted, Magnuson's involvement did not change one fundamental fact: 'Back home, 'Hart' and 'fair packaging' are synonymous."

p. 36 interest groups. Fair packaging is not traceable to such pressures. "...Hart, in his publicizing and formulating efforts, and later Magnuson, demonstrated that political leaders had incentives and motivations that transcended the rewards promised and the sanctions threatened by interest groups."

DE Price, #2

Cigarettes pp. 37ff. p. 38-39: the FTC order.

p. 50. Traffic safety issue..Ribicoff's 1965 hearings...."Both his style and his committee positions suited him better for a publicizing than for a mobilizing role...." Yes....he profits from publicity on this.... (a Gov Ops subcom)

p. 51. Magnuson puts in his own Fire Safety bill (sort of lifted from Nelson Magnuson "resented Ribicoff's headline-grabbing.."

p. 54 Commerce hearings on the bill. "One reason for the increasingly strident tone of the hearings was the growing involvement of Senator Vance Hartke. Hartke, like Ribicoff, was a senator who often concentrated on the 'public' aspects of his job—making frequent policy pronouncements, introducing bills on a wide variety of subjects, and fighting valiantly for ~~amendments~~ amendments on the floor (which he may or may not have bothered to offer in committee); as a publicizer, however, his ~~successes~~ successes rarely matched those of Ribicoff. (this is now on p. 55) Moreover, during the 89th Congress Hartke, for reasons best known to himself, had supported efforts to weaken both the fair packaging and cigarette labeling bills. So it was with great relish, and perhaps with a touch of compensation, that Hartke assumed the role of the exponent of the strongest possible auto safety

DE Price #3

bill." Magnuson was willing to let him go on. "Thus, many hours of the hearings found Hartke in the chair, asking questions fed to him by Nader, and a number of committee amendments were worked out and presented under his name."

p. 59 Still traffic safety. The House committee had been expected to sympathize ~~with~~ with the industry position, and to pass a much watered down bill only under adm. pressure. "The reason it did not behave in this fashion can be summarized in a single word: publicity." Nader and Ribicoff publicity. "...the publicity was prominent and specific enough to make it politically attractive to ~~try~~ try to strengthen the bill (witness Hartke) and to make it politically risky to undertake even seemingly ~~inconspicuous~~ inconspicuous changes." p. 60: given all this: "Staggers' panel therefore joined the derby and set out to strengthen the bill." So the bill was pretty good, a tribute to publicity. (The section is pp. 49-61)

DE Price #4

p. 63 Magnuson on Merchant Marine and fisheries area generally. This was his specialty (as opposed to the consumer stuff) A stake driven down....

"Shipping and fishing...were areas in which Magnuson had been interested since he first came to Congress in 1937. They were important to Washington, and the groups involved wielded considerable influence there and controlled sizable campaign chests. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ As Magnuson gained seniority and influence, he was increasingly in a position to champion the interests of American shipping and fishing; his assumption of that role worked to his and industry's mutual advantage. ~~box~~ The fact that Magnuson felt the need after 1962 to espouse another kind of cause, one that involved less campaign money but more media coverage, bore witness to the changing character of Washington politics.".....

p. 66 Also, same argument...."....Bartlett's first interest was fishing."

p. 67 Fishing industry not very well orgzd for lobbying purposes, not too much govt money previously involved, not much bureaucracy in fed govt., etc.

"All this meant that a senator could champion fishing interests with a relatively free hand. He could not be subject to competing pressures from the industry or the executive branch but still could find it politically profitable to dream up legislation to promote the industry, to publicize his program, and to activate support."

DE Price #5

p. 67 contd: "Senator Bartlett perceived the opportunities this situation offered, and,....he moved to take advantage of them. The result, during the 88th and 89th Congresses, was a plethora of legislation relating to the fishing industry...." support from the interests involved came later....

p. 68 "It was in this context, then, that Bartlett proposed the creation of a new agency to carry out a program of marine exploration and continental shelf resource devt." Magnuson was a little uneasy with this encroachment, but the relation was complicated (NB: a chmn hogs his interest-relations)

p.73 Finally a bill was passed with some sort of exec creation in it (More or less Magnuson's, I guess.)

(Summary. Here's yet another example of sen initiative, featuring in addition a jr cuttin in on a senior, and an example of a senator's real base.)

p. 78 Magnuson after 1962: "Onto the old Magnuson, interested in fishing, shipping, and Boeing Aircraft, and running a rather sleepy committee, was grafted a new one: ~~the~~ the champion of the consumer, the national legislative leader, and the patron of an energetic and innovative legislative staff."

Commerce in general: 1) nice for jr sens trying to ~~do~~ do QC. 2) not just a resultant of interest groups pressures.

DE Price #6

Ch. 4 Finance Committee

p. 123. Sugar Act Amendments of 1965....
postwar sugar program, p. 126. "It was also certain that the relations between ~~the~~
these participants would be competitive and conflictful. There was no once-and-for-
Xall 'solution' to be reached. Almost every producer wanted a greater share of the
market than he had; what was a gain for one was a loss for another. #

Not much of use here on sugar. The industry seemed to write its own ticket
this time..... Cooley still in the picture....

LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE COMMITTEE, p 199ff

Education: all packaged.

Health: Hill plugged into the NIH-Lasker circuit

Cold War GI benefits; Yarborough as promoter P. 227 of Finally a bill went
through in 1966, with Teague's approval. Yarborough had been promoting it for
years (from his L&FW sub. chairmanship). Not clear now much credit RY really
deserves for it all. L&FW gave him a nice base

DE Price, #7

ch. 7, "Hill's 'Condominium'"

He talks quite a bit about "activism" among libs on L&FW.....(though the bills
used are not personal innovations—ed, poverty, FLSA, etc.)

Hill gave pretty free rein to the libs. And (p. 268) every D except freshman
R. Kennedy had a subcommittee...

p. 268. "The situation was made to offer for activists like Morse, Clark, Yarbo,
and Wms, who...were enabled to undertake major legislative projects by virtue
of the independence and resources their chairmanships afforded." (and sometimes
get things enacted—DRM)

Bouglas Price, "Computer Simulation and Legislative 'Professionalism':
Some Quantitative Approaches to Legislative Evolution," 1970 APSR paper

Professionalization of careers, Senate and House

p. 11 "Career data on the early Senate is a morass of resignations, short-term appointees, elective replacements, and more resignations."

p. 12 Senate: "Perhaps the most salient point of the data is that for most of the pre-Civil War cohorts one might reasonably expect almost 1/3 to resign before their terms were up; another 1/3 would finish their terms but not seek re-election; and slightly over 1/3 would finish their terms and seek re-election (this ignores the 10 per cent who die in office, with unknown career intentions).

p. 14 There's a change in the Senate in the 1850's. The Southerners come to stay. "Indeed, in the 1850's the dominant Southern Democrats dig in their heels and hang on for all they are worth."

p. 16. "After the Civil War and Reconstruction the Senate was at a peak of influence. The Executive branch was in a long eclipse, and Senators extended their sway into effective control of state party machines (or vice-versa). The national government was then of vital importance in regard to tariff policy, monetary policy, and--for the South--race policy. Senators controlled the allocation of federal patronage, and increasingly lorded it over the House."

HD Price 1970 #2

p. 16 He says that careerism set in (in effect) in the Senate after the Civil War. 1885: "By this time no...Senate committee chairmanships were being quite rigorously handled in terms of continuous committee service."

He says there was a House lag.

p. 16. The House: "It got off to a somewhat more impressive start than the Senate, but did not really shift into modern gear until the generation following the 1896 realignment."

NB-DRM: It was the Senate, not the House, that caused most of the grief on tariff matters in these years.

Seniority in the Senate...

p. 21. "In fact, the Senate drifted rapidly into a pattern of considerable continuity of committee chairmanships soon after the matter was left up to the parties in the mid-1840's."....."Real seniority--protecting all alike--~~was~~ only becomes evident around 1880."

Seniority in the House:

p. 23..."Up to 1900 it is doubtful that there was ever so much as a single House committee chairman who captured or held a chairmanship solely because of his committee seniority."

HD Price 1970 #3

p. 23 He mentions the "violations" literature. But..."...one can only conclude that there was no 19th century House norm guaranteeing a member's committee rank or chairmanship. What one gets from 'body counts' is more a measure of relative stability--sometimes high and sometimes low--than evidence of an ironclad norm."

"In the late 19th century House chairmanships were won or lost as a side product of the bargaining involved in ~~the~~ recurrent scrambles for the speakership."

p. 24. The coming of the norm of seniority, he says, was between 1900 and 1920.
p. 25. And, more specifically, between ~~1850~~ 1910 and 1920.

He traces seniority rigidification to career-seeking.

p. 25. "The pressures for stability, continuity, and what amounted to seniority ~~were~~ very hard to resist. This was something new for the House. Cannon's autocratic style reflected neither the fluidity of the 19th century House nor an appropriate response to the stability of the modern House. "Cannonism" was an aberration which could not last."

HD Price 1970 #4

discipline

Party ~~was~~ as an underminer of seniority has its last gasp in the 1921's
p. 26. "For a time the Republicans put up a bold front against LaFollete and his outright party bolt, but by the mid-1920's the party found it easier to relax and embrace dissidents ranging from LaFollete, Jr., to the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota, Fiorello LaGuardia in Manhattan, and most of the agrarian radicals. Nothing was left to challenge the sway of seniority in House or Senate."

P. 26. Seniority: "It is not an formal chamber rule, but rather an informal norm used by each of the major parties in both the Senate (since around 1880) and the House (since around 1920)."