

M

ch 1 - pp 30-36 - gives a good rundown of the steps in a project, from conception to christening.

p 61 - statement of FDR in vetoing a R+H bill in 1939, 84CR 11228  
"I understand the urge to get Federal money for expenditure in every corner dist in the US, but I believe, as I have often rec'd to Congress, that instead of taking a bite here + a bite there, there shd be a well-considered + well-rounded plan for projects to be undertaken in a definite order of human + natural preference + desirability, instead of putting them only on a local geographical basis."

Maass makes very clear the disunity of the CQAE to Congress (Committee + individual members)

pp 94-97 - on how CQAE was rescued from the Brownlow threat!

p 97 - 1945 Perry Act made some exceptions, and it put CQAE alone in a special category in which any violation was flatly prohibited!

in FDR's 2d term - a hassle really over general planning in water resource matters.

### Maass #2

[National Resources]

p 107 - "The long fight of the Planning Board to obtain permanent status ended in June 1943 when the Congress abolished the agency, assigned its records to the National Archives, and provided that its functions not be transferred to nor performed by any other agency. This decisive Congressional action, taken in the face of a personal appeal from a wartime President to retain the agency for postwar planning, was a final victory for the Congressional rivers + harbors bloc."

MM-NB: This is a coherence fight - each, by its own lights, is trying to distribute resources rationally.  
- use this as an example of conflict over law definition.  
- and notice that this is only indirectly a resources allocation problem, or is it?

p 115: - 1949 Hoover Report - he took on the CQAE too. - and openly opposed these aims.  
Hoover: "If the Army Engineers can succeed [in being exempt from reorg] it is evidence to every other agency that they can get away with it."  
(Hoover was in agreement with Truman)

### Maass #3

p 133 - an appraisal in 1949: "The Corps still regards the level of policy as the sole duty of Congress + regards itself as no more than the executing agent of specific Congressional directives."

only ch 5 here is devoted to the Kump River project (an illustrative case study)

So I can use Maass as a good illustration.

pp 149-153 - How he criticizes the GEC standards, as fully stated in what they shd be.

ch 1 - is about the studies EC makes. There's no good phrase... - Eco justification? - frankness? - QC like that. - cost-benefit det?

John P. Mackintosh "Reform of the House of Commons: The Case for Speech,"  
in Coventry ed.

039 "For the ambitious backbencher, the task is to impress ministers and particularly  
the Prime Minister."

Wend MacNeil, Frige of Democracy: The House of Reps

§342 - He says suspension of rules (which limited debate + precludes all amendments)  
(and which can be done only ~~by the~~ if Speaker approves bill + recognizes member  
to make motion)  
has long been used to restrain members.

"The leader of the House discovered that it was not only a convenient method of saving the House's time, but it also proved effective in restraining the House itself. The technique was used to process legislation granting bonuses to war veterans, building public buildings and highways, increasing the salaries of federal employees, and improving rivers and harbors. On such bills, unless the members of the House were restricted, the House leaders could expect an orgy of amendments to increase the bills' provisions."

p. 243: "In more recent years, suspension of the rules has proved particularly effective in controlling the demands of veterans organizations."

(Froman accepts the notion here, so it's OK. Specifically, recognition happens at Speakers' discretion.)

Renan Mac Rae Jr., Parliament Politics + Society in France, 1946-1958 (<sup>St Martin's</sup> ~~Amherst~~ NY, 1967)

"Communist" is the word for 4th Republic

— Surge movements

304 Note the high proportions ( $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{2}$ ) <sup>incl SF10!</sup> of deputies of center + right parties (4th Rep.) who were simultaneously mayors.

✓ "These statistics reveal a basic ~~pattern~~ problem for a conservative party in maintaining discipline. Normally such a party puts up candidates with local prestige of their own."

Not much usable here — The downplays pol gamesmanship, attitudes cabinet volatility to "ideology"  
— all the stats are statistical + indirect.

309-310 — Some interesting polls — The most regular names were D Gaulle, Mitterrand, + Pompidu — all of whom fought with the pol system, all of whom tried to rule.  
Generally a very low level of figural! OXFORD 1952

## Manley, The Rules of Finance #1

p. 31 says he jettisoned most of his initial theory + research design

p. 37 he shifted to Barnard, Horvath, + Blau

26-27 - oil depletion + apartment

revised in 1966  
(Barnard etc)

PARTY Loyalty is pretty tight on recruitment.

p. 47 - types: "Ways and Means members are, in general, pragmatic in their outlook, patient in their pursuit of objectives, unbending on few things, and inclined to compromise on all but the most basic issues." - altho they're partisans

p. 51 54 seats help

p. 56 "Fully two-thirds of those interviewed, however, did sound a common theme: they were attracted to the Committee because of its importance, power, and prestige."

## Manley P of F #2

p. 60-61 - Here's where he hauls out Barnard + Blau + Horvath

p. 62 - Here... "The focus is on the individual members of the Committee, ~~and what they~~ ~~do by way of contributions to the Com.~~ what they get out of membership on Ways and Means, and what it costs them by way of contributions to the Committee."

p. 63 F Restraint (partisanship) on W + M. (a norm)

- They deliberate on their bills in NP fashion.

Why? The committee stays prestigious as long as it's good.

p. 69 "The norm of restrained partisanship is rooted in these attitudes toward the Committee. Members of Ways and Means have serious disagreements over policy but they also have shared attitudes and perceptions of the status of the Committee and what they must do to maintain that status."

p. 70. "The main link between the legislative style of the Committee + its status + prestige in the House is most members' awareness that without the norm of restrained partisanship the reputation of the Committee, which they enjoy regardless of party, may be tinged or destroyed. Their reputation in the House as Committee members depends on how they perform their legislative chores."

## Manley P of F #3

p. 72. "The Committee is widely thought (and reputed) to be master of its grotesque subject matter, and in exchange for this expertise the House voluntarily gives up its right to amend W + M bills - or, as the vocal opponents of closed rules say, the House 'gags' itself."

78 F - constituent serving: "... most members concern that being on the Committee affords opportunities to serve their constituents."

79 One Congressman: "When I call up Soc Sec they know damn well who I am. If I say I want a Soc Sec free three blocks from my job it's done. And I don't kid around - I tell them!"

79 F "members' bills" also

80 - "what was described by one knowledgeable staff man as the 'gaggy' of the Committee."

81 These are important favors to other Congressmen.

82 The blocking function is tight (ie protect industries from housing)

82.3 W + M service doesn't seem to help much at home, except in the business set.

84 Congressman is probably helped. A party leader struck near the mark when he commented that, in all likelihood, members of the W + M C have little difficulty financing their campaigns."

84 F - "Mills, Byrnes: An Rejuvenation of Esteem"

220ff the closed rule

- 220 3 reasons for 1) complexity 2) interest groups 3) party leaders want it history
- 223 "the closed rule acts as a shield for w+m bills against hundreds of interest group demands that would be entertained if not fulfilled if the bill approved rolled on the floor."
- 226 Tax closed rule goes back to 30's; tariff + soc sec custom came later.

the Senate

- 250 "To Committee members, the Senate is characterized by irrevocable logrolling and by capitulation to politically popular but unwarranted demands; by the kind of decision-making, in short, that one can expect in the House without the closed rule."
- 250 "... the closed rule is created in the House as a barrier to Senate amendments just as it bars House amendments."
- 251 a member: "With all due respect to the Senate, they don't know what the hell they're doing over there. They're so damn irresponsible you can get unanimous consent to an amendment that costs a billion dollars. And the Senate is supposed to be a safety check on the House."
- 251 "It's for a discipline reason we have the closed rule," a Republican said. "There's enough derogatory appeals in the Senate."
- 258 "... in recent years the Senate increasingly has tended to let the conference committee worry about the fiscal consequences of the amendments."
- 258 1966+67 → plus here bills and the "Easter egg basket act of 1967."

There is a whole section here on the irresponsibility of the Senate.

- 258 "In some cases of Senate largesse no one seriously expects the amendments to become law."
- 266 - The San Francisco Comm is no better than the Senate.  
one FC member: "The ship was leaving port and everyone wanted to get his cargo aboard."
- 272 Taxes since WWII - there's a tendency for Senate to cut taxes lower than House bills ✓  
- 277 NB - not really - it's 11 one way, 9 the other.  
- but still, the hypothesis has much to commend it.
- 279 - And the Senate usually "wins" - Manley's explanation: "The reason the Senate does better in cases of conflict with the w+m is because politically Senate decisions are more in line with the demands of interest groups, lobbyists, and constituents than House decisions. W+m decisions, made under the closed rule, tend to be less popular with relevant parties than Senate decisions."
- 277 But the differences are not cosmic, and the "surprising thing" is that H+S together don't throw away more revenue ✓

279ff - see legislative - Senate is more liberal, but House dominant.

281: "The House has been insistent on publicly the ostensible soundness of the program..."

Again - H = closed rule; S = recesses and by floor amends.

281ff Trade legislation:

292 - protectionism has been mostly phoney [posture-taking]

282 "Protectionists have generally fared better in the Senate, and, of special concern here, the Senate has at times fared better than the House in conference."

284 (80th, 83rd Congresses are exceptions)

288 "Despite the diversity, one fairly regular pattern emerges: the Senate is more protectionist than the House."

288 Why Senate more protectionist & also dominant? "The Senate is generally more responsive to the demands of interest groups, lobbyists, and constituents than the House."

290. "W.M. with a consciously constructed Democratic majority in favor of the regional trade program, is probably not as reflective of protectionist strength in the House as the FC is in the Senate" - Also the closed rule

290 Trade legislation is largely symbolic anyway

294 ff - It is done that the anti tax reform interests control the conference (then Senate Finance committee) - Whigs get unlike.

307ff - The JT Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation

Then business (staff) seems to be

309 "explaining ... how individuals and groups will be affected by changes in the Internal Revenue code..."

310 - The Committees on taxes: "Their craft is dealing with demands, their material is the Internal Revenue Code, their tools are amendments, and their workshop is the executive session."

321 Deal with special particular tax demands: "The general principle of tax equity seems rather remote when members of Congress are involved with these kinds of demands; in fact, it appears to be unreasonable not to help as long as Treasury can stand the revenue loss. And, with a \$200 billion budget, Congressmen are likely to think that Treasury, despite its protestations, can stand the loss."

336) On taxes: "With no widely accepted tax philosophy to guide them in responding to special requests, the Committee members respond in the same way that the Committee did on habe legislation [in the old days]: positively." - (ie, inclusively)

337) - Manley doesn't think taxes will go to Exec control the way Staff did.

339) - here Congress dominant on tax policy

Harvey C. Mansfield, "The Congress and Economic Policy," ch. 6 in Truman (ed.)

A pleasing case.

p. 128. He remarks that it has come to be true that Congress drags its feet on Keynesian policies, and on loopholeism..... (not in quite these words)

pp. 128-129. Meanwhile, Congressional concerns are: who gets what?...

p. 129 1) ~~680000~~ One such category is "disposal of the public domain"....

e.g., public works, grants-in-aid, e.g., farm supports, stockpiling.  
"If the supply is ample the process is painless. If giving to one means denying another, a test of access and power ineluctable. If the claimants are individually weak, a logrolling omnibus bill is the typical result."

2) 2d category: "regulations that the Congress may impose, directly or ~~indirectly~~ by delegation to administrative agencies. Here the benefits conferred come not from some govt store but from restraints laid upon those who are regulated." Regulatory politics...

3) 3d category: "exemptions and dispensation, partial or complete, from burdens otherwise generally applied." e.g., the revenue code....

P. 130: "The same forces and methods that secure legislative dispensations commonly operate also, by logrolling, to defeat most efforts to close tax loopholes--...!!"

## Mansfield #2

He runs down the various committee sets with money powers....

p. 137 W&W vs. Approps: "Another difference is that the Approps Committees are acutely sensitive to the geo distribution of federal outlays, while the revenue committees deal with classes of taxpayers, wherever located.".....

pp. 136-139, on tax committees. Points to my conclusion, that they don't have much concern with broad policy questions..... (even though power concentrated in W&M)....

good on B&C (pp. 141-144) pretty inefficacious....

pp. 148-149 Good summary.



John Barklow Martin, "The Team that Tried Good Government,"  
in Edward C. Banfield (ed.), Urban Government: A Reader in Politics  
and Administration (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), pp. 276-284

p 280 — Resolutions

reference — refer meant any other things.

— not to please kids, necessarily.

~~to~~ aldermen.

Monarchs or Kings — Edward VII

Peroua

54. "By necessity and conviction I was a high-tariff man for years, favoring protection for the mills of Fall River and Taunton and the jewelry industry of the Attleboros against the competition of cheap foreign goods. In my early days, at least, labor as well as management demanded a protective tariff, and it would have been a political suicide for a candidate to advocate anything else."

55. "Over the years I established a reputation as a fighter for New England, and the voters have kept reelecting me because I have given them service. Every year that I have been in Congress it has been my practice to visit each post office in my district at stated times to make myself available to discuss their problems with the people."

55. "As a young Congressman I scurried all over Washington doing chores for my district. I beat a path to the National Rivers and Harbors Congress and to the War Department to see the Army Engineers about Taunton River and Fall River Harbor improvements. I hastened to the Interstate Commerce Commission to protest the discontinuance of two trains daily between Fall River and Middleboro. I turned up at the Navy Department to borrow a cutter for the Sea Scouts, and appointed young men to West Point and Annapolis. I introduced pension bills for widows of Civil War veterans in my district. I fought for appropriations for new post offices and more letter carriers. I appeared before the United States Shipping Board to advocate more shipping for Boston Harbor. I urged the use of Fall River granite in new construction at the Naval War College in

Joe Martin #2 (p. 56 now)

Newport. I introduced visiting constituents to President Coolidge.

"On behalf of the textile industry I worked for higher tariffs on cotton and wool products, and on behalf of the factories of the Attleboros I introduced a bill to repeal excise taxes on jewelry and silverware. I presented the case for a higher tariff on briar pipes before the H W&MComm. I asked the Taffiff Commission to raise the duty on products of duck-farming to protect my constituents who sold feathers and down. I sought protection on eggs from China and shoes from Czechoslovakia. I opposed trade pacts with Great Britain."

"In an Evacuation Day speech in Boston—the first delivered by a Republican since President Taft—I said: 'Boston was evacuated by the British just 162 years ago, and they shall not be allowed to return now to drive American workmen from their benches.' The South Boston Citizens Association presented me a shillelagh.

"In 1925 I sponsored a bill to remit duties on a carillon imported by the Church of Notre Dame de Lourdes in Fall River. This was, in fact, the first piece of legislation I ever introduced in Congress. Heeding the advice of older men that a young fellow should not make too much noise when he came to Congress, I did not deliver my first speech until February 15, 1927, when I rose to oppose the McNary-Haugen farm bill."

57-59. He goes on to give some examples of how he got into trouble! by doing constituency favors and getting projects. ....

Joe Martin #3

246. "In our large and increasingly complex society people are often bewildered and frustrated in trying to obtain assistance that they are entitled to. It is not only one of the obligations but one of the privileges of public life to help them find their way.

"In contrast to the great problems of government this service may loom small, yet I have found, at least where members of the House are concerned, that it is far more important on election day than national and international issues. The average person, while he is interested in the large questions, really knows rather little about them. He lets his Congressman and his Senator and his President grapple with these. But when it comes to voting for the man who will represent him in Congress, the thing that is most likely to impress him is the degree to which his Congressman has been helpful to him or to the people of his district.

"High among the lessons I have learned since I first paid my nickel on the interurban to campaign for the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1911 is that a Congressman must first of all speak for the interests of his own district. Either he does this, or he will soon be living back in his district for good, with the Capitol dome a mere memory."

Nichols A. Masters, "Committee Assignments," ch 2 in P & P (1963)  
(This is in the House)

045 - Membership on the top 3 committees is exclusive. (not on any of the others)

Criteria for assignment to the top 3:

- 046 1) "legislative responsibility"  
\* "According to the party leaders + the members of the committees - on - committees, a responsible legislator is one whose ability, attitudes, and relationships with his colleagues serve to enhance the prestige + importance of the H of R."  
— and this goes on.
- 048 2) "Type of District Represented"  
049 "The committee - on - committees wants to feel that his district will not only reelect him but also allow him to operate as a free agent, enabling him to make controversial decisions on major policy questions without constant fear of reprisals at the polls." — and this goes on too
- 3) "Geographical Area" — balance, etc.  
✓ (0240 in 2d ed)

Masters #2 — Other Committees (beyond the top 3)

050: \* The most important single factor in distributing assignments to all other committees is whether a particular place will help to insure the reelection of the member in question!  
— eg, Ag, PW, Incom, MARF are pretty easy.

051: E+L is very controversial — only Dems who can afford to take far out labor positions should be assigned, it's felt.

052: 60 members are generally pro-pugt.  
052 DC — Southerners are attracted to it. (PT!)

052: "All members of the committees - on - committees recognized that org'd grps outside Congress take a hand in the assignment process from June to June."  
— But there's little overt intervention.

053

Senators in years 1947-57.

p. 55. N = 180. 17 had U.S. Senate as first public office. Of the rest with prior offices, 28% had U.S. House as last prior office, 22% governorships, 10% state leg.

ch. 5: "The Folkways of the Senate"

p. 92-94 Apprenticeship

p. 94-95 Legislative Work p. 94: "The great bulk of the Senate's work is highly detailed, dull, and politically unrewarding. According to the folkways of the Senate, it is to those tasks that a senator ought to devote a major share of his time, energy, and thought. Those who follow this rule are the senators most respected by their colleagues."

p. 95-97 Specialization (to contribute to Senate's knowledgeable treatment of bills)

p. 97-99 Courtesy p. 98: "Few opportunities to praise publicly a colleague are missed in the Senate." Comity considerations also suggest (p. 99) that "despite partisan differences,....one senator should hesitate to campaign against another."

p. 99-101 Reciprocity e.g., vote trading. p. 100: "Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that reciprocity is a way of life in the Senate."

Matthews #2

(Folkways)

pp. 101-102 Institutional Patriotism. p. 102: "One who ~~seems to be~~ brings the Senate as an institution or senators as a class into public disrepute invites his own destruction as an effective legislator. One who seems to be using the Senate for purposes of self-advertisement and advancement obviously does not belong."

pp. 102-109 Former governors, and Amateurs (successful men elected to Senate at late age) conform less to Senate folkways as measured by index of floor speaking and index of speech of bills introduced) than congressmen and state legislators....

p. 109. Prexy ambitions also lead to nonconformity....

p. 110... Also: p. 111: "The senators from two-party states are a little more likely to be frequent floor speakers than those from modified one-party constituencies. Both are considerably more vocal than those from pure one-party states.. The picture is a little different so far as legislative speech is concerned. One-party state senators seem to be the most speechy; those from modified one-party states, least speechy; while the senators from two-party areas fall between."

*NB. This chart doesn't in my argument that speech is not for the House*

*In fact these figures aren't conclusive either. This is really quite inconclusive*

Matthews #3

(Folkways) Also: "...the larger in size and the more urban a senator's state, the more likely he is to be hyperactive on the Senate floor.....Urban state senators definitely specialize less than ones from rural states. The size of a senator's state, however, does not seem to have any effect on the range of his legislative interests." P. 112....

pp. 114: "...the liberals seem to talk considerably more and to specialize somewhat less than do senators of different political persuasion...Conservatives can afford to be quiet and patient. Reformers, by definition, find it difficult to be either."

p. 115 Index of legislative effectiveness (% of bills and resolutions passed): "The less a senator talks on the Senate floor, and the narrower a senator's area of legislative interest and activity, the greater is his 'effectiveness.'"

p. 135 his index of party effort (residual, with X=ideology, Y=party unity)

Matthews #4

p. 163, Among senators, seniority "is almost universally approved." "According to them, the most likely alternative to the seniority system, the election of the chairman by the committee, would lead to excessive logrolling and petty politicking." He quotes one: "The seniority system sometimes results in strange chairmen but not half so strange as we would get without it. Why, the backscratching--how know, you help me become chairman this year and I'll help you next--would be unbelievable.".....

p. 164 Also: "Of the twenty-seven senators for whom it was possible to obtain party-unity voting scores both before and after they became committee chairmen, twenty-one showed less frequent voting with their party after becoming a chairman, two showed no change, and only four increased in their party voting."

p. 216 An interesting point: the case of 2 Sens from same state.....

"The senator's locally oriented publicity is far less conducive to intra-Senate conflicts than are his efforts at making national news. Other members of the Senate are generally ignorant of the kind and amount of publicity a senator receives back home. They all know it is essential, and besides it does not affect them in any way. There is, however, one important exception to this rule:

Matthews, #5 (contd)

"the other senator from the same state. Each senator watches the publicity of his colleague very closely indeed, and many a feud has been touched off by the fact that one senator seemed to be getting better publicity than the other. Sometimes full-scale 'publicity battles' will break out between the two senators..... The relations between two senators from the same state are almost always strained, and their competition for publicity in the same arena seems to be one reason for this coolness."

Ch. 9 "Senators and Reporters" (includes the above). There's no particular quote here, but a passing point is that the relation between senators and reporters is in lots of ways symbiotic. They have things to give to each other. (There are limits, to be sure.) But the net effect is probably to help the incumbent.

p. 217 But reporters often stimulate nationally-oriented public conflict. "The reporters' desire for controversy-laden national news and the relatively uninfluential senator's desire to make it are highly subversive to the Senate folkways."

Matthews #6

p. 226 Casework probably has a multiplier effect. "The world's greatest publicity organ is still the human mouth," one senator's assistant said. "When you get somebody \$25.00 from the Soc Sec Adm, he talks to his friends and neighbors about it. After a while the story grows until you've single-handedly obtained \$2,500 for a constituent who was on the brink of starvation."

p. 229. "More than half of the postwar senators make regular weekly or bi-weekly broadcasts to the people back home." filmed or taped in Capitol basement, usually, and run free of charge as a public service. Senator pays costs of production.

p. 247. Senate "debate"

Some just like to hear themselves talk. "The most frequent motivation for taking the Senate floor, manuscript in hand, is something different. The speech is expected to pay off politically. It will please some constituents back home. It may help build up the senator nationally. Perhaps it will settle a political debt to, or built up credit with, Senate colleagues....." But, he says, motivations shouldn't be confused with functions. Speeches supply communication between advocates, e.g. And reinforcement and activation. Etc... Sens can also qualify positions. "p. 248: "In addition to quieting doubts, the debate provides ready-made justifications--rationalizations, if you wish--to be used in the event that his vote becomes the subject of controversy back home."

Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "Cue-Taking By Congressmen: A Model and a Computer Simulation" 1972 paper presented at Conference on the Use of Quantitative Methods in the Study of the History of Legislative Behavior

Yea-Nay votes on the floor, explaining them...

How to vote rationally (whatever goal is being sought).... (it's hard to know how to do things like "vote your district") so...cue,taking.

p. 18...~~cue~~-taking...."What is different in our approach is that we look upon it as the normal process of congressional decision-making, to which the other processes are exceptions."

pp. 27-30; 9 cue-givers operationally defined

- 1) Prexy (CQ)
- 2) State party delegation (when 3/4 vote the same)
- 3) Party leadership (floor leader & whip voting together)
- 4) Committee chairmen
- 5) Ranking minority member of committee
- 6) Conservative coalition (Rmaj + SDmaj vs. ND maj --- not the same as CQ)
- 7) DSG (leadership unanimity)
- 8) Party Majority (2/3 voting together)
- 9) House majority (2/3 voting together) (bandwagon effect)

Matthews & Stimson 1972 #2

A Simulation Model; The House, for a number of selected years in 1958-1969 (using all roll calls)

~~XXXX~~p. 34 For 1965-70, the years used in this latest & most complete simulation run, prediction was accurate 88.1% of the time. (with little yearly variation)

p. 36. And this seems to work equally well (not absolutely sure yet) across issue areas.

Unfortunately, there's no report here given of the weights of various cue sources.

Donald R. Matthews & James A. Stimson, "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Legislative Behavior: The Example of the U.S. House of Representatives" 1969 APS<sup>A</sup> convention paper.

This is an earlier version...but it does have some speculation about the effects of cue-taking that are missing in the later draft.

p. 18. "Cue-givers in most policy areas are a biased sample of the House membership in almost all policy areas they tend to be more senior than the average member, they tend also to be from congressional districts particularly affected by the policies in which the cue-givers specialize." and they're committee oriented.

p. 19. "These systematic biases in the development of experts result in House decisions which diverge systematically from the probable collective decisions which would be arrived at if each member had made up his mind independently. The directions of this bias are the familiar correlates of seniority on the one hand, and the committee outlooks on the other. The policies that result from cue-taking are thus more conservative and more sensitive to the wants and needs of the immediate parties-at-interest than would be the case with fully independent decision-making."

119 Munk. Sun, Dreyfus, // 127ff - 3 choices

HD 31 M365

|| certainty  $\rightarrow$  variable  
|| risk  $\rightarrow$  expected utility greatest  
|| uncertainty  $\rightarrow$  maximize, or minimize regret

also Luce & Raiffa, James & Deonors, p. 13

QA 269 L83

Sun - QTE 59 FMS5 - CEL FN to "satisfying"  
- aspirational level - tolerable level of satisfaction  
 $\rightarrow$  winning by a healthy margin

$\rightarrow$   
I talk about maximizing % of winning? certainly not maximizing  
or of reaching an aspirational level? what? percentage?

cue taking  
run ahead or behind party ticket

CALL CHRIS



James G. March + Herbert A. Simon, Organizations  
(Wiley, NY, 1963) CCL HD31 M365

137-38 — Rational action falls into 3 kinds

- 1) certainty: assumes decision maker has complete + accurate knowledge of the consequences that will follow on each alternative. So choice is easy
- 2) risk: theories that assume accurate knowledge of a probability distribution of the consequences of each alternative. Choice = alternative where expected utility is greatest. Expected U is defined here as the average, weighted by the probabilities of occurrence, of the utilities attached to all possible consequences.
- 3) uncertainty: theories that assume that the consequences of each alternative belong to some subset of all possible consequences, and that the decision maker cannot assign definite probabilities to the occurrence of particular consequences.  
Here the def of rationality is problematic. One proposal (of wide currency) is the rule of "minimax risk" — consider the worst set of alternatives that may follow from each alternative, then select the alternative whose "worst set of consequences" is preferred to the worst sets attached to other alternatives.

6253

B.T. McKenzie, British Rd Parties (NY, St Martin's, 1955)

Q52 Under post WWII rules, Tory candd (MP) are very restricted on funds they can spend in campaigns.

They can contribute no more than 'personal expenses' of £100 (and the constituency assns are encouraged to defray these expenses too)

And, up to a max of £25 a yr for the funds of his assn, and if elected to Parl, no more than £50 a year.

Q53 And the Central office gives the sternest warning to the assns not to try to influence MPs or they — and this works

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Q55 When MPs may contribute more than Taxes — probably a few do.

Q557 — "But it must be remembered that once the candidate has been elected he need not thereafter undertake to conform to the views of his constituency on any matter of public policy. The Labour Party in practice fully subscribes to Burke's conception of the relationship between the M.P. and his constituents."

"James Mill, "Government," in JM, Essays on Govt, Jurisprudence,  
Liberty of the Press, and Origin of Nations (1825)  
(Augustus M. Kelly (publisher), NY, 1967) — Ocg 65 M61 820)

018 — "There can be no doubt, that if power is granted to a body of men, called Representatives, they, like any other men, will use their power, not for the advantage of the community, but for their own advantage, if they can. The only question is, therefore, how can they be prevented? in other words, how can the interests of the Representatives be identified with those of the community?"

1879 Duration of term is the answer. (Make them go back as members of the community)

019-20 But reelection is OK. — (a fact he likes it — it's a tribute to good sense).

He seems to have the view that a man who puts across laws anti public, will  
later, out of office, suffer from them . . . ?

(But see the Columba case?)

# John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government

Q.15 "One person with a belief, is a social power equal to twenty-nine who have only 'interests'."

## Ch. 5: "Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies"

Q.95 - "... it is an open question what actual functions, what precise part in the machinery of govt, shall be directly, & personally discharged by the rep. body."

Q.95 - "There is a radical distinction between controlling the business of govt, and actually doing it."

Q.96 eg. the taxing power - Parl in UK votes it, but only on the proposition of the Crown

"It has, no doubt, been felt, that moderation as to the amount, and care & judgment in the detail of its application, can only be expected when the Exec govt, through whose hands it is to pass, is made responsible for the plans & calculations on which the disbursements are grounded."

Q.97 In general, rep bodies shouldn't administer. "NO body of men, unless organized & under command, is fit for action, in the proper sense."

## JS Mill #2

Q.97 "What can be done better by a body than by any individual, is deliberation"

Q.98 "But a popular assembly is still less fitted to administer, or to dictate in detail to those who have the charge of adm." — requires experience; expertise in adm. on adm interference!

Q.100-101: "To a minister, or the head of an office, it is of more importance what will be thought of his proceedings some time hence, than what is thought of them at the instant: but the assembly, if the cry of the moment goes with it, however hastily raised or artificially stirred up, thinks itself + is thought by everyone to be completely exculpated however disastrous may be the consequences."

Q.101: "The proper duty of a rep assembly in regard to matters of adm, is not to decide them by its own vote, but to take care that the persons who have to decide them shall be the proper persons."

(altn a rep assembly shouldn't nominat)

## JS Mill #3

Q.104: "But it is equally true, though only of late + slowly beginning to be acknowledged, that a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the direct business of legislation as for that of administration." (Quotes 2 are my words)

Why? takes experience by experts & coherence with existing laws  
Q.104-105 (he explains the way UK Parl itself for the chaos of its laws, its difficulty in dealing with the whole of a subject)

Q.107 - "Any govt fit for a single state of citizen, wd have as one of its fundamental elements a small body, not exceeding in number the members of a Cabinet, who shd act as a Commission of Legislation, having for its appointed office to make the laws."

Q.108. "Such a body, however, Parl - shd have no power to alter the measure, but solely to pass or reject it..."

JSnell #4

00104-108 :

Plus reads like a New Republic article. Clearly JSnell is unhappy with the inherence of Parl. legislation in mid 19c. It offers this set of ideas as a corrective.

But it's just possible that Parl govt always is more coherent than US wd like it to be.

P111 "Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a rep. assembly is to watch + control the govt; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition + justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and if the men who compose the govt abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, & either expressly or virtually appoint their successors."

JSnell #5 :

P112 - Beyond oversight (above):

"In addition to this, the Parl has an office, not inferior to this in importance; to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions: an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion... where every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind, as well or better than he cd speak it himself - not to favor or patronize exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons, and counsel themselves as such to the hope of the majority of the nation; where every party or opinion in the country can muster its strength, & be cured of any illusion concerning the number or power of its adherents; where the opinion which prevails in the nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts in the presence of the govt, which is thus enabled + compelled to give way to it on the mere manifestation, without the actual employment, of its strength...."

centralized reactions

JSnell #6

So Snell's rep assembly talks + watches

It doesn't govern, or administer, or legislate.

de VI :

P116 "It is, however, very likely, and is one of the dangers of a controlling assembly, that it may be lavish of powers, but afterwards interfere with their exercise; may give power by wholesale and take it back in detail, by multiplied single acts of interference in the business of administration."

96

Clem Miller, Member of the House

p 60 on the press:

To the congressman, however, publicity is his lifeblood."

p 93: ✓ "We live in a cocoon of good feeling - no doubt the compensation for the  
painful buffeting that is received in the world outside."

Again, the 116 districts in 1958

p. 355 "Far from looking over the shoulder of their Congressmen at the legislative game, most Americans are almost totally uninformed about legislative issues in Washington."

p. 356 - the three hoary issue sets.....

357 - for Congmen, readings on roll call position and on interview issue attitudes

- for opposing cand, attitudes.

- constituencies ranked on the same dimensions

- and constituency electorates broken up by voting behavior.

p. 359. roll call vs. districts views: .4 on soc & ec welfare, .2 on foreign, .165 on civil rights.....

p. 359 Break up the constituency... on soc&ec: roll call and constituency majority correlates at +.59; district majority and noninc cand correlates at -.44

(This is usable when I start talking about the sustaining majority coalitions back home.) (This is a nice big difference.)

#### Miller & Stokes CONSTITUENCY #2

pp. 360-361. The path between constituency attitude and roll call can go through either congrman attitude or congrman perception of constituency attitude.

p. 362. OK on the output: i.e., congrman's own attitudes and their perceptions (together) do predict their roll calls well....., esp. on civil rights.

p. 363. Correlations on the input side are much weaker (except on civil rights) (i.e., the relation between either congrman perceptions or congrmen attitudes and constituency attitudes is weak) "...Although a detailed presentation of findings in this area would show that the Representative's perceptions and attitudes are more strongly associated with the attitude of his electoral majority than they are with the attitudes of the constituency as a whole."

p. 364. All the paths are drawn, with arrows, with correlations for the civil rights issue dimension. The result: the route through congrman's perception is much more imp't than that through congrman's own attitude. (good)

p. 366. But on the soc & ec issue, the best path is through the congrman's attitude rather than thru perception.....!The reversal of the relative importance of the two paths as we move from civil rights to social welfare is one of the most striking findings of this analysis."

#### Miller & Stokes CONSTITUENCY #3

p. 368. The contradiction, between what voters do and what congrmen think they do... "Congressmen feel that their individual legislative actions may have considerable impact on the electorate, yet some simple facts about the Representative's salience to his constituents imply that this could hardly be true."

"In some measure this contradiction is to be explained by the tendency of Congmen to overestimate their visibility to the local public, a tendency that reflects the difficulties of the Rep in forming a correct judgment of constituent opinion. The communication most Congressmen have with their districts inevitably puts them in touch with organized groups and with individuals who are relatively well informed about politics. The Representative knows his constituents ~~mostly~~ mostly from dealing with people who do write letters, who will attend meetings, who have an interest in his legislative stands. As a result, his sample of contacts with a constituency of several hundred thousand people is heavily biased; even the contacts he apparently makes at random are likely to be with people who grossly overrepresent the degree of political information and interest in the constituency as a whole."

p. 368 ~~XXXX~~ Also the incremental argument. "The Congressman is a dealer in increments and margins. He starts with a stratum of hardened party voters, and if the stratum is broad enough he can have a measurable influence on his chance

Miller # Stokes CONSTITUENCY #4

of survival simply by attracting a small additional element of the electorate-- or by not losing a larger one. Therefore, his record may have a very real bearing on his electoral success of failure without most of his constituents ever knowing what that record is." (GOOD)

p. 369 And also, the filter down view....."Very often the Rep reaches the mass public through these mediating agencies, and the information about himself and his record may be considerably transformed as it diffuses out to the electorate in two or more stages. As a result, the public--or parts of it--may get simple positive or negative cues about the Congman which were provoked by his legislative actions but which no longer have a recognizable issue content."

p. 369 AND ALSO (they cover the bases well)... "Third, for most Congmen most of the time the electorate's sanctions are potential rather than actual. Particularly the Rep from a safe district may feel his proper legislative strategy is to avoid giving opponents in his own party or outside of it material they can use against him. ....Nevertheless, the fact of constituency influence, backed by potential sanctions at the polls, is real enough." And they go into the Brooks Hays case.... pp. 369-70 The Brooks Hays case....."a striking reminder of what can happen to a Congressman who gives his foes a powerful issue to use against him."

Miller & Stokes CONSTITUENCY #5

pp. 369-370 Brooks Hays. All voters in sample were aware of both cand, and they got the issue positions straight too.

p. 370 "In some measure, what happened in Little Rock in 1958 can happen anywhere, and our Congressmen ought not to be entirely disbelieved in what they say about their impact at the polls. Indeed, they may be under genuine pressure from the voters even while they are the forgotten men of national elections."

All in all, pp. 366-370 are an excellent discussion of the ramifications of their findings.

p. 371. The three models.

civil rights - matches instructed-delegate best....

soc & ec - responsible party model

p. 372. maybe the foreign policy relation trusteeish.



Booth Mooney, Mr. Speaker (Felleth, 1964, Chicago)

Q 167 - Rayburn - Keeping members in line

Once after several Cong Rec. memoirs on the Boston Symphony Orchestra.

"It costs eighty-five dollars a page to print the Cong Rec in which more memoirs are printed. The bill mounts up if we continue to congratulate everybody in the United States. It's time to stop issuing a memoir every time someone has done a grand deed or lived a good life."

and he refused the TVing of committee hearings:

"When a man has to run for re-election every two years," he explained, "the temptation to make headlines is strong enough without giving him a chance to become an actor on television. The normal process toward good law are not even dramatic, let alone sensational enough to be aired across the land."

Donald G. Morgan Congress and the Constitution

Q27 Court vs leg body.

UK parliament unites concerns for policy and for constitutionality.

Daniel Proxmire, One Politics of a Guaranteed Income

Q268-69 - P.O. suggest for FAB (after Nixon's endorsement) was high + stayed high.  
P389 - JT Ashmun et al paper - shows less suggest.

Q482 - On Senate Finance + its rejection of FAB.

A different committee might have done differently, he says. eg, revised the bill.

"But the SFC was not bent to any such notion of justice, workmanlike persistence. The senators were individuals, and more than a nominal quota were exhibitionists as well. At the expressive, symbolic level of politics they are hardly to be faulted, but there was lacking an essential seriousness which is the hallmark of mature govt."

Q483 - "Even Harris, a self-proclaimed populist, friend of the dirt farmer, the Indian, the black, the depressed everyman showed no real interest in getting a bill. To the contrary, he stayed upon the descriptive of the Adm witnesses as an opportunity to suggest dark things in high places."

Refused to do the work of legislators

Dennis C. Mueller, Robert D. Tollison, + Thomas D. Willett,  
"Representative Government Via Random Selection"  
12 Public Choice 57-68, Spring 1972

They talk about interest in a national ref. procedure (previous articles)

The problem: geo-based Congress → district oriented loyalty, →  
"force the polity into negative-sum games."

"Purely national issues presumably have no representatives except the Pres + Vice-Pres  
who are the only nationally elected officials in the present system, + even in this case  
there is considerable implicit loyalty via campaign platform, just serves to vitiate  
the Pres's ability to take a purely national stance on many issues."  
and other problems.

60. Original: select a national legislature at random! (Dele, Athens, Rousseau)  
83 (no prob panel because no geo base (?)) (no money for reelection) ←  
(always all fresh!)

63 - also, plus the leg. to weed out off legislators!

64-65 - One of either supplement or replace the present.

Frank J. Meyer + Richard F. Fenno Jr., National Politics + Federal Aid to Education

P 168 - on the popularity of unpaid areas

"In 1960, 319 members of the House had received a total of \$314 of in-area money for their constituencies."

James T. Murphy, "Partisanship and the House Public Works Committee"  
1968 apsa convention paper

He puts a lot of emphasis on partisanship here, but I can sidestep it.

p. 3 #Each member who is attracted to a FW seat wants both programs and projects w  
which either directly or indirectly benefit his district."

\* p.3 "...House expectations that public works program benefits will be distributed  
'fairly' and without respect to party tend to re-inforce the internal Committee  
constraints on partisanship."

p. 8 Members tend to see benefits in terms of state delegations as well as districts

p. 10 a FW Democrat quoted: "We are all national legislators in a sense and we  
have to be but the national issues don't mean da damn thing back home--oh, sure,  
they read about it in the newspapers but it doesn't mean much to them. They've  
got to see something; it's the bread and butter issues that count--the dams, the  
post offices and the other public buildings, the highways.\* They want to know what  
you've been doig. You can point to all these things yo've done and all of them  
go through my committee."

JE Murphy #2 (FW)

p. 10. A Republican FW member is quoted ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ "The announcements  
for projects are an important part of this....And the folks back home are funny  
about this--if your name is associated with it, you get all the credit whether  
you got it through or not."

p. 23. He see an important rule of behavior on FW: the "norm of mutual advantage."  
"Each member of the Committee, this norm prescribes, shall have the support of  
all other members of the Committee, party notwithstanding, in his efforts to  
assist ~~in~~ his district or to assist a member of his state's delegation. A Democratic  
subcommittee chairman stated the rule as follows: '/We/ have a rule on the Committee,  
it's not a rule of the Committee, it's not written down or anything, but it's  
just the way we do things. Anytime any member of the Committee wants something,  
or wants to get a bill out, we get it out for him....Makes no difference--Republican  
or Democrat. We are all Americans when it comes to that."

p. 39 "House members expect the public works program benefits to be distributed  
without respect to party."

projects have to be justified, of course.

pp. 39-47. Discussion of Army Corps projects. All this is pretty objective  
involving cost-benefit formulas, altho these can be overruled at the margins.

Jerome T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Creation of Implementing Federal Education Reform," 41 Hawaii Educational Review 35-63, Feb 1971

(Elementary + Secondary Education Act — Title I = aid to the disadvantaged)

- Q 36 - Study has = implementation, with USOE, Mass. Dept of Ed, and local school districts.
- Q 36-37 - Title I was designed to eliminate poverty, by giving extra funds to schools with lots of poor families
- Q 37-38 Title I was not a response to pressure. It was a pretty new idea, with little interesting support; + the poor are of course unorganized — and USOE was not the sort of place where ed. leadership could be done well.
- Q 38 ✓ "As far as the educational associations in Washington were concerned, their primary interest was general support for ongoing school activities."
- Q 38 "In sum, Title I was not a reflection of pressure from the poor and had little support among educational administrators." → The program fitters away, the guidelines were then
- Q 51 "Most federal legislators are sure to be more responsive to the wishes of state + local school officials than to the desires of bureaucrats in the Exec Branch. As a result, the Title I program administrators act as though their main constituency lies in the Congress + the state + local school officials, rather than among the poor people whose children the legislation is supposed to assist."
- The local school systems end up doing more or less what they want — Hard to impose fed reform. The federal agency has to have a constituent or die.

Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court (Chi, UCh Press, 1962)

① 43 ff the Ecclesiastical phase.