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R.E. Lane, Political Ideology

p. 148 "Congress, it appears, is an 'oral' agency--the congressman's job is one of talking and listening, often quite informally. He is rarely pictured in debate on the floor of the Senate or the House; rather he is seen meeting the folks from back home streaming endlessly through his office; he is answering his mail, traveling to see his constituents. He seems to receive his information and advice in conversation directly from the common man, the people."

151-52: "From the Congress, and more particularly from the idea ~~XXXXX~~ of home-state congressmen, these men derive a sense of protection, of a friend in power, of an accessible person who is not likely to be protected by a number of secretaries. The right of petition here is expressed in personal, human contact, not through paper forms and proper channels. Flynn once petitioned for a change in civil-service rules and, with others in the same position, sent a delegation to Washington. They got what they wanted. Ruggiero sees ~~WV~~ Morreli, Eastport's congressman, on the problems his friends in the post office want taken care of; he is warmly received. The congressman's self-interest is seen as closely congruent with the economic prosperity of his district; his interests correspond to the interests of men like these Eastport fifteen, and this is true regardless of party."

LaPalombara, Joseph, Interest groups in Italian Politics
(Princeton UP, 1964) CCI JN 5477 P7 L36

p. 207-08 "...a group is likely to be given an advantage if it can provide campaign money, campaign workers, or masses of electors who will cast appropriate ballots and, better still, selected preferential votes on election day." etc...

213-214 Lobbyists do go after individual deputies (a la US)

p. 215 "If, as certainly seems to be the case, Italian deputies can deviate from the party line in the legislature to some degree, and if they can represent the views of groups to their party leaders, it is obvious that interest-group approaches to them can pay some rewards."

The general above point is made in pp. 212-218.

p. 220. The importance of igs and committees (relevant ones)

The committees can operate in "sede deliberante". "This procedure, in which the committee, by majority vote, can actually enact legislation, applies to all laws except those concerning treaties, taxes, the budget, public expenditures, and elections." So the comms have great power, and igs flock around them.....

The Coltivatori Diretti, a massive interest group representing small and medium landowners and farmers. p. 245: some 100 legislators (both houses) (all CDIs) are in the camp of the Col Dir.

LaPalombara, Interest Groups #2

p. 245 (contd)

"Our respondent tells us that all of these Christian Democrats, who owe their elections to the confederation's capabilities for preference-vote delivering, will naturally do the bidding of Bonomi on most legislative issues. # 1 (Bonomi is the leader of the group)

p. 248-49 He disagrees with the popular view that Italian govt is in the grip of monopoly industry. "My view is that the picture is exaggerated, particularly, because Christian Democracy is able to tap sources of electoral financing and campaigning that to some extent free it from abject dependence on Fiat, Montecatini, Italcementi, Pirelli, and other industrial giants of the country. Thus, although as we shall see, the industrial sector is not without its sources of influence, it is essentially on the defensive—particularly in the legislature, where nothing seems to count so much as the ability to deliver the required number of preference votes. In this particular game, organized industry takes a back seat to its friendly or antagonistic counterparts among the trade unions, Catholic Action, Coltivatori Diretti, and the other mass organizations."

Joseph G. LaPalombara, "The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation",
47 APSR 676-703, 1953

678) Italy got PR in 1919 (apparently single district before that)

again after WWII.

Plus article is really about the majority bonus reform of 1953 (DCD4)
and on the 1953 returns

I can't find any mention of the
intra-party preference system here

George Gardner, Jr., "The Day Congress Played Santa: A Look at the
Christmas Tree Bill," Washington Post, Dec 25, 1966,

p. 1 → cont. on p. 10

(210) There's no clear + specific instance here of company funds
as a swap for tax favor by out of state outfit.

But say this permits strong inference that Varne Huth did it here
Had no plants in Indiana.

a California aluminum firm

There's a Virgin Islands plant. — Be audit

extension of investment tax credit to ^{US possessions and} cover V.I.

\$2 million tax cut for firm

The company's VP in DC, had been mixed up in Democratic affairs, still is — though it's
not clear he was shoveling \$ to Huth.

Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (1948)

p. 20. He talks here about "political types," found across societies.
(people who seek power and want is, perhaps)

p. 20: "The conception of a political type is that some personalities are power seekers, searching out the power institutions of the society into which they are born and devoting themselves to the capture and use of government."

p. 38. "The political type is characterized by an intense and ungratified craving for deference."

"These cravings, both accentuated and unsatisfied in the primary circle, are displaced upon public objects (persons and practices connected with the power process)."

"The displacement is rationalized in terms of public interest!"

"We sum up the political type in terms of the development of motive as follows:

Private Motives

Displaced on Public Objects

Rationalized in Terms of Public Interest"

So, a good reason here why internew process would
sum up pol. ambition. There's a rational process at work.

Simon Lazarus + Leonard Ross, "Rating Nader"

20 New York Review of Books, No. 11 (?) June 28, 1973

— a review of 2 books on Nader's stuff.

JLE

Open book club

Parsons, Pers

CP. 31-33

32 - Nader record mixed, they say. (qtd on higher safety, etc.)

But many of his regulatory creations have proved weak in operation.

(eg, gas propane safety, nuclear safety, mixed, occupational health & safety laws)

32 Frank Graham bk on the reg agencies generally:

"These essays provide scant support for the claim that regulatory agencies can be liberated from the narrow mission they originally were once meant to serve. In most of the cases covered by the bk, anti-common policies are the product not of bureaucratic decay, but of legislative design."

32 Welford bk - shows perverse effects of Wholesome Meat Act of 1967.

how it passed: the industry came to the job when it perceived a weak act to more proactively.

Frank A. Lentz, Electroengineering in a Democracy (1968 Wiley, NY)
& Leavels in 105FBay distuls, 1962 (GF)

NOTE (DAM) - One intensity of a House or Sen campaign is such that
you really have to want to do it.

Q38. "This great reliance on personal resources in primary than in general elections helps to explain the comparatively greater advantage that incumbents have in primaries."

P44 || "... in the Bay Area a fairly highly developed technique was that of denying the opponent the support of his own party or, at least of neutralizing that support. Such denials or neutralizations were accomplished by securing endorsements from the leaders of the opposition or by forming clubs of supporters from that party."

B44-45 (The Connolly factor) [most info in 67th (Oakland) - he got 3 percent Democrats to serve as vice-chairs of a M committee, + to sign a letter to all district D voters. - he also got the support of O'Connell's chief primary opponent.]

P49) Some old data on the types of people who send mail to Congress

Lentz #2

Q50 - He says mail can alert incumbents to local concerns (that nominees don't know about).
"... one of the values of mail is its indication of the issues that are personally significant to constituents, even though they may not be of national significance."
- eg. the FM regulation issue in the Bay Area in 1962.

Q56: Nominees have difficulty getting issue info, + hence have a disadvantage in their appearances.

Q68 - Newspapers: liberal candidates all assume that liberal newspapers wd endorse them before their first election or for their first reelection. But moderate papers wd begin endorsing them in their third or fourth terms, and that more conservative papers wd begin endorsing them later."

(In 1962 the Oakland Trib endorsed a lib Dem, 18 yr vet, for 1st time - probably Miller) !
- Knowledge paper.

Outbid #3

Money:

Q75: "Incumbents needed less money because they wasted less money than nonincumbents."
Q76: — and also other reasons — eg, field sources, finishes money.

Q92 — "About 50 percent of the campaign workers were college graduates, compared to 12 percent of the Bay Area pop."

94 — these tend to be more come oriented than the general public

Q109 — "Some of the most effective congressional mailings, judged by comments made by housewives at coffee, were the infant care books sent to new mothers, and the small Department of Ag cookbooks sent to new brides."

Q113: Type of card used: More than $\frac{1}{2}$ the appeals (in all houses), were based on ✓
qualities of card & his opponent. name & picture ads prominent.

Q114 Experience is prominently emphasized.

Outbid #4

In last chapter emphasizes (+ deplors) incumbency advantage.

Q123-24-25 The Baldwin case — a poorly financed, inexperienced challenger

Q131: \$25,000 ^{possibly} advantage consisting of

- any salaries (MC's)
- salaries of field reps who serve as campaign mgs.
- frank
- research facilities (LO/C)
- fee free space
- secretarial staff

C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy

pp. 127-128. He talks of legislators, and coordination through partisan mutual adjustment.

p. 128 "That the vote is no substitute for partisan mutual adjustment in coordinating the decision of legislators is indicated, at an extreme perhaps, in the frequency of unanimous decisions in legislative bodies. They are unanimous because the coordination of legislators has already somehow been accomplished--by partisan mutual adjustment, among other influences; and the unanimous vote gives emphatic testimony to the fact that it has indeed been accomplished."

p. 174. He discusses late 1940's effort in Congress to have over all fiscal policy. At least 3 reasons for breakdown: 1) an intolerable burden 2) it remained defective because of contingencies. 3) lots of congressmen were more interested in discrete expends...

Ch. 12: Reasoned Coordination. Here he discusses the claim that central coord invokes reason, a kind of intellectual problem-solving activity. But he dismisses all this because of a lack of criteria.

p. 187. "There are of course those who, in appraising coordination, are willing to make the appraisal by their own criterial. They may draw their standards from mere postulation, from Divine inspiration, or from nature; but whatever the origins,

Lindblom #2

they are willing to use them in confidence despite disagreement within the society on criteria."

Comment: publicly willed (in some sense) outcomes can differ by process (along Barry's lines) French comparison, etc. Eco management; medicare; and QF it's difficult to say what public wants (SRC on taxes vs. expends); civil rights; info costs.... All these are questions of democratic linkages. But there are residual questions of rules.... The Rawls questions; the Downs bit on remoteness; the U.S. SCt in its different eras. Are these demo linkages? In some sense maybe, but.....

ch. 13 "Consistency" He knocks down some examples.

p. 193. "It is easy to find a combination of short- and long-range objectives, and of objectives with respect to growth as well as to distribution of income, that make crop restriction and acreage increases consistent by any ordinary meaning of the term." etc... (consistency more or less in the eye of the beholder)

p. 193 He wants to define "consistency" as Pareto optimal (p. 194)

p. 194. "We think that here, at least, is a clear cut case in which decisions get in each other's way." This is one useful concept of consistency, he says.

His last chapter is an attack on party discipline theories and practices.

Umbdon, Intelligence of Denmark

Security, No. 74-76 : This is good, and covers what I
need in my own form.

No need to copy it here.

John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (Wesley Arts Press, NY, 1952)

p 44: — "And thus the Commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that Society - which is the power of making Laws...."

49-50 "And here we have the regard of the legislature + exec^{power} of civil society, which is to judge by standing Laws how far offenses are to be punished when committed within the Commonwealth, and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be redressed...."

382: "The legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the Commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community + the members of it."

Q53: "The average member of the Bundestag works under Spartan conditions." ~~Under conditions of~~
~~arrangement regarded as rigorous when made in 1949, but it easily improved so long as~~
"Half the members - quite naturally, the backbenchers - share their one-room offices with a colleague. Most of these same members rely on a stenographic god father only secretarial assistance. Only Speakers of the House, including Comm. chairs, have their own assistants and secretaries. The Research Division of the Bundestag has a staff of only seventeen hand-picked officials available to do reference work for Members."

Q66: The electoral system combines a) the Weimar PR tradition, and b) the Empire single district - 2 ballot runoff system.
(But now the SD elections are by plurality)

Q67: Voting for both sets is pretty much by party. "... like their British counterparts, the local party nominating bodies in Germany are under little compulsion to consider the electoral appeal of potential candidates. They are primarily responsive to the pressures generated by the local party activists."
"The party orgs which exercise such remarkable power in the nominating process are the products of an extraordinarily narrow membership unrepresentative of the electorate. On average, only 3 percent of the voters are enrolled in one or another of the parties."

Loewenberg #2

Q69: Nominating procedure of parties is regulated by law. (secret ballot, etc.)
"The militants in local party orgs zealously defend their legal prerogative to select candidates against interference from higher party councils."

Q70: But this is complicated. Constit. courts tend to see "reincarnated" as list candidates, giving the Land Committees some clout over local ones. And the list candidates who win tend to identify themselves with particular constituencies. And most of the list winners are also running as constituent candidates anyway.

Q75: In 1957 nearly 80% of constituent (1/2) were residents of their constituencies.

Q77: "But in general, the 'wall-to-wall' effect of local candidates is doubtful. Voters are strongly inclined to vote for the party rather than the candidate, especially in balloting among party lists."
looks rather like UK.

Loewenberg #3

Q151 - Committee chairmen in Bundestag are destituted X PR!
(so the minority parties get their share)

Committee: There is cross-party élan & expertise on these, which softens party line splits, QF holding up or modifying bills.
But still the party is generally in control.
Govt initiative is the rule on legislation.

Q174-75: Oppos: "The appropriations power of the House is therefore largely exercised by its Appropriations Committee, whose votes decisively determine the action of the Bundestag on the budget, and whose year-round work entails frequent actions on behalf of the entire body. The resulting autonomy of the committee has given it an unusually high sense of corporate identity, and an orientation toward budgetary questions which is usually inspired neither by partisanship nor by opposition to the executive, but by professionalism & expertise."
It is financially orthodox, & tends to resist demands.

Richard Lovvorn, "The Role of Parliaments in Modern Political Systems,"
in Lovvorn (ed) —

- Q3 - Parliaments, or assemblies, or whatever (he chooses no one term as preferred) all share two "identifying structural characteristics" (derived from Eur. Parliament assembly)
- 1) "Their members are formally equal to one another in status, distinguishing parliaments from hierarchically ordered organizations."
 - 2) "The authority of their members depends on their claim to represent the rest of the community, in some sense of that Cartesian concept, representation."
- Q4 - There are no functional departments that will work ✓

A.L. Lowell, Governments & Parties in Continental Europe I (1896) ^{Vse}
(Boston, Houghton - Mifflin)

P 133-136 - as nice discussion of nomination practices in France - (define, the Jury we wd expect)
Paris is really good - the nominating cliques, plus the agents to PD, the favors.

France: P 136. "A few years ago a couple of deputies gave an account at a public dinner of the letters they had received from their districts. Some constituents wanted their representatives to go shopping for them; others asked him to consult a physician in their behalf; and more than one begged him to procure a wet nurse, hearing that this could be done better in Paris than in the provinces."

Italy: 157-58 - The problem of deputies being too locally oriented.

P 192 - late 19c - badly demarcated parties

193 - deputies under control of local patrons.

P 200 - 1880's: Cabinet formation. "... There had ceased to be any essential difference between the principles of the various groups, so that the struggles in the Chamber were chiefly based on personal ambition..."

Italy much like France except less national feeling and more local personalism

A. Lowell #2:

Italy, P 214: He says Italian politics "centres to an unusual degree about the personal struggles between the chiefs of rival factions in the same party...."
- He says the personal element is soft in Italy; The French are more attracted to abstract theories.

Italy, P 219: "But however the local factions are organized, the deputy must seek to propitiate them, and must in turn be conciliated by the ministers; and on the other hand the extensive functions and arbitrary power of the government render every local interest and every commercial enterprise more or less dependent upon its good will, and thus compel every one to secure its countenance through the intervention of the members of Parliament. The deputies, in fact, look upon themselves as agents to procure favors for their constituents, and a striking illustration of the extent to which this is carried is furnished by the difficulty the government found when it managed the railroads in running fast express trains, on account of the interference of the members of the chamber, who insisted that all the trains passing through their districts should stop at way stations."

! Vse Paris & Italy

A.D. Lowell #3

P 220 ITALY AND FRANCE: "In both countries the deputies have bands of supporters in their districts, and use their influence in Parliament to promote the special interests of these dependents. In both the attitude of the deputies toward the ministry is influenced by questions of local administration, and conversely the action of the govt in matters of local concern is to some extent determined by the relation of the deputies to the cabinet; and thus the issues that arise in Parliament are a good deal involved with those that affect only the province or the commune."

Lowi Politics of Disorder (1971)

xvii-vii "Basically, juridical democracy is a name for formal democracy, a majority rule democracy limited only by the absolute requirement that government be run as closely as possible according to the way it says it is run. The most outstanding feature of juridical democracy, I felt now and fell now, is rule-of-law, which contrasts in the extreme from the pluralist practice of policy-without=law."

p. 117 There's a nice graph showing HUAC days devoted to public hearings, 80th thru 89th Congresses. Peaks in ~~XXXX~~ 81-84..... This doubtless shows public demand for this sort of thing.

Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism.....

ch. 3: "The New Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism"

lib-conservatism; the empty debate on govt intervention

p. 61: "...those who espouse social change in the abstract, especially government-engineered social change, are seldom peddling policies that would clearly effect any such change."

p. 63 Income tax, eg., in effect: "...taxation in the United States is a government policy to preserve the established economic relations among people and classes."

p. 71 IGL defined...i.e., in general, accepting orgd groups as the public, accepting their demands, policymaking as logrolling, etc.....corporate state, etc. Public gets shut out, creation of privilege,

ch. 4: "The Origin and First Consequences of Pluralistic Government"

p. 101: "Liberalism replaces planning with bargaining. Yet at bottom power is unacceptable without planning."

"Liberal government seems to be flexible only on the first round of a response to political need."

pp. 102-115: "Agriculture: The New Feudalism".....(distinction between public and private nearly vanishes.....

LOWI EofL #2

AGRICULTURE:

p. 110: there are at least 10 separate, autonomous, local self-governing systems.

p. 111: "The politics of each of these self-governing programs is comprised of a triangular trading pattern, with each point complementing and supporting the other two. The three points are: the central agency, a congressional committee or subcommittee, and the local or district farmer committees. The latter are also usually the grass roots element of a national interest group." e.g., Extension
pp. 112-115; Clinton Anderson, Benson, Freeman have all failed.....

Later on in the chapter: Commerce and Labor Depts are clientele depts, that shd be abolished.....

p. 126. Libsm = delegation of power.. "Delegation of power provides the legal basis for rendering a statute tentative enough to keep the political process in good working order all the way down from Congress to the hearing examiner, the meat inspector, the community action supervisor, and the individual clients with which they deal."..... "policy without law".....

p. 127 Political science has a stake! "Clear statutes that reduce pluralistic bargaining also reduce drastically the possibility of scientific treatment of government ~~itself~~ as simply part of the bundle of bargaining processes and multiple power structures."

Lowi EofL #3

ch. 8: "Interest-Group Liberalism and Poverty". Here he acclaims the old social security system for its clarity, enforceability, savagely attacks the 1964+ poverty program for its lack of clarity, confusion, effects.....

ch. 9: "Federal Urban Policy—What not to Do and What to do about Apartheid" Here he goes into housing....A effects analysis. I may be able to cite this... Effects very conservative, very far removed from intentions of passers; shows that policy without law won't work.....

His enemy is laws passed without clear standards, producing bargaining of all sorts in the adm. process. Interest groups get what they want, vitiating the initial intent.....

p. 271. In cities: "To be effective and to avoid tarnishing national legitimacy, the Federal role must be limited to those practices for which it is possible to develop a clear and authoritative rule of law, enacted democratically and implemented absolutely."

Lowi Eof L #4

ch. 10: "Toward Juridical Democracy"

pp. 288-293. What's wrong with JG liberalism: ~~it~~ deranges and ~~can~~ confuses expectations about demo govt; it makes govt planning impossible; it demoralizes govts because govts can't achieve justice (no general rules); it undermines formalism of rule.....p. 292: "Liberalism has opposed privilege in plicy formulation only to foster it, quite systematically, in the implementation of policy."

p. 297 "juridical democracy" is his candidate for a paradigm....
2 97-298 reinstate Schechter rule, to outlaw delegation sans clear standards....
299ff Administrative rule-making, rather than ad hoc decisions... i.e., make the agencies make rules

p. 304 Have a Senior Civil Service...

p. 305 Use of state governments

p. 306ff, Use of fiscal policy, which he likes for its attributes (over such things as ~~pcctk~~ pork barrel politics)

p. 309 a tenure-of statutes act!

Lowi EofL #5

p. 310ff JD is good, for it allows planning, and justice; it strengthens demo forms.

p. 312. "The decline of Congress, supposedly the popular branch, began with the expansion of delegation of power. The emergence of control by congressional committees absolutely parallels those devts. Congress is at its classic best when a proposed bill embodies a good rule. Good recent cases include Landrum-Griffin, the 1962 Trade Act, Medicare, and Civil Rights."

Comments: He has very little directly to say about Congress here.....
The general thrust here is clearly toward universalistic standards (of some sort) in appraising policy-making. He deplores messiness of various sorts.
A classical UK viewpoint.....

Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," World Politics, vol. 16, July 1964, pp. 677-715

p. 689:

3 categories of public policy, ~~6XXXX~~ "...these areas of policy of government activity constitute real arenas of power. Each arena tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations."

p. 690: Distributive policies: "...in the short run certain kinds of government decisions can be made without regard to limited resources." e.g., land policies, most contemporary public land and resource policies; rivers & harbors; defense procurement and R&D; labor, business and ag 'clienteles' services. (?) and the traditional tariff. (I guess he means to put in all the ag programs here.)

p. 690: "Distributive policies are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule."....."These are policies that are virtually not policies at all but are highly individualized decisions that only by accumulation can be called policy. They are policies in which the indulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direct confrontation!" (But does this include the farm programs?) (If, so, the question of district connection is a separate one.)

Lowi WP #2

pp. 690-691

~~XXXXXX~~ "Regulatory policies are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable of the almost infinite amount of disaggregation typical of distributive policies."....."....distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involved a direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived." i.e., applicants for a TV license; labor vs. mgt in a mgt practices decision; So general rules are needed. p. 691: "Since the most stable lines of perceived common impact are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral lines; regulatory policies are usually disaggregable only down to the sector level."

p. 691. "Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations among broad categories of private individuals are involved and, hence, individual decisions must be interrelated. But on all other counts there are great differences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes." Income tax and welfare state programs....

p. 692. Distributive: like Schatts on tariff. the same, he says, now, as rivers and harbors and land devt policies; tax exemptions; defense procurement, area redevt; government 'services' (He's silent on farm subsidies.)

Lowi WP #3

p. 692 (distributive): "When a billion-dollar issue can be disaggregated into many millions of nickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with without regard to the others, multiplication of interests and of access is inevitable, and so is reduction of conflict."

p. 693. the coalitions. Schatts's idea of "mutual non-interference"
"A log-rolling coalition is not one forged of conflict, compromise, and tangential interest but, on the contrary, one composed of members who have absolutely nothing in common; and this is possible because the 'pork barrel' is a container for unrelated items."

p. 693. Distributive: Congress is the locale. "... 'policy' is best understood as cooptation rather than conflict and compromise."

p. 695. "Distributive issues individualize conflict and provide the basis for highly stable coalitions that are virtually irrelevant to the larger policy outcomes; thousands of obscure decisions are merely accumulated into a 'policy' of protection or of natural-resources devt or of defense subcontracting."

Lowi WP #4

p. 695 Regulatory: "...policy tends to be a residue of the interplay of group conflict." pluralist model, group theory.....

p. 697 coalitions form around shared interests (temporary)

p. 698. Tariff has become regulatory. He says Congress settles these conflicts. He's pretty muddled here on what he means.....

p. 703. He says tariff became a regulatory policy in 1962. But this is muddled. Better to talk about coherence standards...

p. 703 Redistributive: 1935 soc sec... (elite level) ?

p. 705 Congress ratified agreements.

p. 711. CW Mills again: "In many respects the upper-class directors perform the functions in the redistributive arena that are performed by Congressional committees in the distributive arena and by committees and Congress in the regulatory arena."

Donald S. Lutz and Richard W. Murray, "Coalition Formation in the Texas Legislature: Issues, Payoffs, and Winning Coalition Size." Midwest PSA paper, 1972

p. 2 gives the rights references in Rikers's book, if I need them.....

Data on T x. H and S in sessions in the 1960's.....

p. 6 It's^e not clear whether ~~tb6c6tc~~ all unanimous decisions are included here in the roll calls. It is clear that lots of the roll calls are unanimous (which is easy with machine voting.) In more than 2/3 of votes, the minority got less ~~gt~~ than 5% of vote!

p. 20, Figure 1, gives a curve for totals for all sessions. ^It looks rather like mine, with the two end modes, but the mode at or near unanimity is much higher. (Only 5% of votes, about, were in very close range --not clear just what this means.)

p. 11 and Table 2 (p. 28) Broken up by issue: Closeness comes most often on "moral issues" (e.g., prostitution, blue laws, racing, gambling, liquor, prohibiting welfare to mother who has child while on welfare) and on "resolutions" (e.g., memorializing U.S. Congress for balancing budget, declaring support for releasing POW's, declaring oppo to forced busing, commending Prexy for law and order support) So, in both these categories, symbolism is very important. (Third ranking in closeness are agriculture bills.

p. 11. Bills dealing with special districts are always the least close.

This is a v. gd discussion of the whole subject, + I shd say so.