Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics (co-authored with Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin). 2016. Annual Review of Political Science 19: 565-84.
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown, ruling-coalition formation and leadership change, protests and repression, formal institutions and elections, and censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the foundational assumptions and political intuition behind key models. Our survey reveals a field populated by disparate models of particular mechanisms that nonetheless share two major analytical themes: asymmetries of information and commitment problems. We propose that future models move toward a genuinely comparative study of authoritarian institutions.
Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud, co-authored with Ashlea Rundlett, 2016. American Political Science Review 110(1): 180-197.
Most election fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a machinery consisting of a multitide of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his agents deliver fraud when needed and as much as is needed? We address this and related puzzles in the political organization of election fraud by studying the perverse consequences of two distinct incentive conflicts: the principal-agent problem between an incumbent and his local agents, and the collective action problem among the agents. Using the global game methodology, we show that these incentive conflicts result in a herd dynamic among the agents that tends to either oversupply or undersupply fraud, rarely delivering the amount of fraud that would be optimal from the incumbent’s point of view. This equilibrium dynamic explains when and why electoral fraud fails to deliver incumbent victories, why incumbents who enjoy genuine popularity often engage in seemingly unnecessary fraud, and it predicts that the extent of fraud should be increasing in both the incumbent’s genuine support and reported results across precincts. A statistical analysis of anomalies in precinct-level results from the 2011-12 Russian legislative and presidential elections supports our key claims.
Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation. 2015. British Journal of Political Science 45(4): 715-738.
This paper develops a new, change-point model of democratic consolidation that conceives of consolidation as a latent quality to be inferred rather than measured directly. Rather than assuming that consolidation occurs, the present model estimates both whether and when consolidation occurs. Consolidation is hypothesized to occur when a decline in the risk of a democratic breakdown is i) significant and ii) durable. This approach is applied to new data on democratic survival that distinguish between two processes by which an overwhelming majority of authoritarian breakdowns occur: coups d’etat and incumbent takeovers. I find that the risk of authoritarian reversals by each of the two processes differs both in its dynamic and determinants. Crucially, new democracies appear to consolidate against the risk of coups but not the risk of incumbent takeovers. These empirical findings suggest that separate theoretical mechanisms account for the vulnerability of new democracies to these alternative modes of breakdown.
Equilibrium Analysis of Political Institutions. 2015. Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. Edited by Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino.
Third-Party Actors and the Success of Democracy: How Electoral Commissions, Courts, and Observers Shape Incentives for Election Manipulation and Post-Election Protest, co-authored with Svitlana Chernykh, 2015, Journal of Politics. 77(2): 407-420.
When and how do third-party actors — most prominently electoral commissions, courts, and observers — contribute to the integrity of the electoral process? We approach these questions by studying how third-party actors shape politicians’ incentives to comply with the outcomes of elections. Third-parties are most beneficial in close elections, when the threat of a post-election confrontation alone fails to ensure self-enforcing compliance with election outcomes. Our analysis highlights that third-parties do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential, that it is third-parties with a moderate pro-incumbent bias that will be in the interest of not only the opposition but also the incumbent, and that incumbents adopt politically consequential third-party institutions when they fear that their narrow victory might not be recognized and result in a costly post-election confrontation. Extensions of our model discuss the role of repression, examine the differences between commissions, courts, and observers, and clarify not only the potential but also the limits to institutional solutions to the problem of electoral compliance in new and transitioning democracies.
Contracting on Violence: Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics, 2013, Journal of Conflict Resolution. 57(5): 765-794.
Why does the military intervene in the politics of some countries but remain under firm civilian control in others? I argue that the origins of military intervention in politics lie in a fundamental moral hazard problem associated with authoritarian repression. Dictators must deter those who are excluded from power from challenging them. When underlying, polity-wide conflict results in threats to the regime that take the particular form of mass, organized, and potentially violent opposition, the military is the only force capable of defeating them. The military exploits this pivotal position by demanding greater institutional autonomy as well as a say in policy, and it threatens to intervene if the civilian leadership departs from a subsequent compromise on these issues. I develop a theoretical model of such contracting on violence and show that the likelihood of military intervention in politics is greatest at intermediate levels of mass threats. Original, large-N data on military intervention support these claims.
Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability, Government Performance, and the Consolidation of Democracy, 2013. American Journal of Political Science. 57(3): 685-702.
This paper examines the distinct challenges to electoral accountability faced by new democracies. I explain why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system, thereby precipitating its breakdown. After a transition to democracy, politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of those who see this period as their “one-time opportunity to get rich.” After repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may come to believe that “all politicians are crooks,” stop discriminating among them based on their performance, to which politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks.” I call such an expectation-driven failure of electoral accountability the “trap of pessimistic expectations.” Once politicians establish reputations for good performance however, they act as barriers to the entry to politics of low-quality politicians and strengthen voters’ belief that elections can deliver accountability, thus facilitating the consolidation of democracy. These arguments generate new insights into the relationship between government performance in new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability; and they suggest theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations in the literature on democratic transitions.
Incentives, Institutions, and the Challenges to Research on Authoritarian Politics. 2013. APSA Comparative Democratization Newsletter (June 2013).
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships, co-authored with Carles Boix, 2013, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300-316.
Why do some dictatorships establish institutions that may constrain their leaders? We argue that institutions promote the survival of dictatorships by facilitating authoritarian power-sharing. Specifically, institutions such as parties, legislatures, and advisory councils alleviate commitment and monitoring problems between the dictator and his allies caused by the secrecy in authoritarian governance. However, because authoritarian power-sharing succeeds only when it is backed by a credible threat of a rebellion by the dictator’s allies, institutions will be ineffective or break down when an imbalance of power within the ruling coalition undermines this threat’s credibility. Our arguments clarify the complex interaction between collective action, commitment, and monitoring problems in authoritarian governance. We use both historical and large-N data to assess new empirical predictions about the relationship between political institutions, leader survival, and the concentration of power in dictatorships.
Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Fate of Dictators, 2011, Political Economist (Winter 2011): 7-9.
Power-sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes, 2009, American Journal of Political Science, 53(2): 477-494.
- online appendix with complete proofs
I examine a fundamental problem of politics in authoritarian regimes: the dictator and the ruling coalition must share power and govern in an environment where political influence must be backed by a credible threat of violence. I develop a model of authoritarian politics in which power-sharing is complicated by this conflict of interest: by exploiting his position, the dictator may acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, which may attempt to deter such opportunism by threatening to stage a coup. Two power-sharing regimes, contested and established dictatorships, may emerge as a result of strategic behavior by the dictator and the ruling coalition. This theory accounts for the large variation in the duration of dictators’ tenures and the concentration of power in dictatorships over time and it contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of power-sharing and accountability in authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation, 2008, American Political Science Review, 102(2): 153-168.
- the working paper version, online appendix with complete estimation results and some additional goodness-of-fit diagnostics, data summary, data and estimation code
I examine a new empirical approach to the study of democratic consolidation. I distinguish between democracies that survive because they are consolidated and those democracies that are not consolidated but survive because of some favorable circumstances. As a result, I am able to identify the determinants of two distinct processes: the likelihood that a democracy consolidates, and the timing of authoritarian reversals in democracies that are not consolidated. Importantly, whether a democracy is consolidated is not directly observable but must be inferred from the data. I find that the level of economic development, type of executive, and authoritarian past determine whether a democracy consolidates, but have no effect on the timing of reversals in democracies that are not consolidated. That risk is only associated with economic recessions. I also find that the existing studies greatly underestimate the risk of early reversals while they simultaneously overestimate the risk of late reversals, and that a large number of existing democracies are in fact consolidated.
Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 2006, American Journal of Political Science, 50(4): 909-925.
- a note with a numerical example.
I characterize how incentives to lie affect international cooperation and the design of cooperation agreements. I study the optimal structure of cooperation agreements in an environment where the costs of cooperation fluctuate over time. Cooperation is complicated by the fact that the costs of cooperation are private information and participants can benefit from lying about them. When the extent of asymmetries of information between the cooperating governments can be measured in terms of the transparency of the political process, democracies face greater contracting opportunities than authoritarian regimes. However, I show how even under asymmetries of information, a limited extent of cooperation can be achieved when the design of cooperation agreements recognizes incentives to lie.