WAR-MAKING, STATE-MAKING, AND NON-STATE POWER IN IRAQ

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of coercion in the history of Iraqi state formation. It contends that the twin processes of war-making, competition in a highly militarized regional system, and state-making, suppression of significant internal challengers, shaped the way the Iraqi state dealt with society and led to a state that constantly sought to gain a monopoly over the use of violence and eliminate armed non-state actors. This trajectory is rare in much of the developing world, where many states have accommodated or even encouraged armed non-state actors to provide local security. The interaction between insecure regimes, powerful societal actors, and imperialist interventions, spurred Iraq’s leaders to augment and centralize their coercive power. The added element of regional and international rivalries meant that the Iraqi state could not permit non-state actors to have access to the means of violence; when they did, the results were disastrous. This process culminated in the emergence of the hyper-militarized Ba’th society, where nearly one in twenty Iraqis were associated with the state security forces. At the same time, since the fall of the Ba’th in 2003, the Iraqi state has struggled to assert coercive power over society, reverting to an older form of bargaining between state and armed non-state actors.
About the Author

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Violence has always been intrinsic to state formation, especially where state structures are transplanted and imposed by colonial and imperial power. Yet even by these standards, violence has been particularly prominent in Iraq. Indeed, the history of Iraq from its establishment under British mandatory rule in 1921 until at least the late 1980s has been a herculean effort to centralize coercive control and eliminate domestic competitors. Many aver that in the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam Husayn’s Ba’th Party transformed Iraq into a totalitarian regime whose very ideological premise was the domination of society by force. From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, an astonishing one million Iraqis, five percent of the entire population, were enrolled in some branch of the state’s security services. Equally remarkable has been the profound degradation in Iraq’s coercive power in the last quarter century. Beginning with the 1991 Gulf War and accelerating after the 2003 American occupation, the beleaguered Iraqi state has resorted to co-opting tribal and sectarian militias, some barely distinguishable from criminal gangs, in an attempt to devolve violence to local non-state agents.

Max Weber famously provided the touchstone definition of the state as the entity “that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” yet, as Michael Mann notes, “most
historic states have not possessed a monopoly of organized military force and many have not even claimed it. Many developing states have survived, and indeed prospered, while relying on armed non-state actors to patrol local neighborhoods and far-flung frontiers. Bellicist theories of state formation argue that threat of war and predation compelled European states to assert greater control over sundry feudal barons and other, more or less autonomous, local bearers of arms. Those states that failed to centralize power in this manner fell victim to their more powerful neighbors. By the same logic, the exact opposite mode seems to prevail in the developing world. Protected by superpower patrons and international norms of inviolable sovereignty, developing states face little risk from their neighbors and thus have no need to centralize. For many states in Latin America, Asia, and especially Africa, the absence of war permitted significant devolution of coercive authority to local strong men, warlords, tribal leaders, and village chiefs. Applied specifically to Iraq and the Middle East, many scholars point to superpower intervention, reliance on oil rents, and domestic instability to explain the divergence from the European pattern of state formation. War is deemed a secondary or even irrelevant factor in the consolidation or dissolution.

This paper contends, however, that the drivers of Iraqi state formation more closely resemble those of Europe than is commonly assumed. Compared to other developing regions, the Middle East is differentiated by the significance of interstate war and the emergence of larger, more technologically-advanced and more centralized armies that systematically opposed the devolution of coercive power to local hands. Like its
neighbors, the Iraqi state doggedly pursued monopoly over the use of force in response to what Tilly calls the twin demands of war-making, competition in a highly militarized regional system, and state-making, suppression of significant internal challengers. These measures were mutually reinforcing and, in a sense, circular. The application of violence domestically augmented Iraq’s projection of force internationally and vice versa. This trajectory was launched due to unique aspects of the regions’ colonial legacies and became locked-in and path dependent due to the constellation of regional threat. Leaders and regimes suffered profound repercussions when they tried to veer from the course of centralization and empower local armed actors. In this respect, Iraq’s emergence as a military behemoth under Saddam was the culmination of a decades-long process. The end result in Iraq was not a strong state, in the sense of one capable of penetrating societal boundaries and definitively setting rules of the game. Although mobilization for war-making and state-making did stimulate a notable expansion of bureaucratic infrastructure tasked with administering a precocious redistributive welfare system, the effort to mold a new Iraqi citizenry that transcended the old ties of sect and tribe enjoyed only limited success, in part because the regime itself remained tethered to a patrimonialist core that undercut its own agenda for social transformation. Rather, to use Nazih Ayoubi’s apt phrase, Iraq was a perpetually fierce state, jealous of rival sources of power and quick to use force against perceived challengers within and without.

This understanding is crucial not just for explaining Iraq’s past history of violence but also for understanding
the current predicaments of the Iraqi state in dealing with various armed non-state actors, from pro-government militias like the Mahdi Army to rebel forces like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and its shadowy allies, as well as to the Sunni tribal militias that hedge their support for either side. Instead of being a caesura—a dramatic rupture with the past—the American invasion of 2003 represented, at most, a temporary respite from the pressures that constrained and propelled Iraq’s military build-up into the 1990s. Upon (and probably even before) the American withdrawal, these factors continue to bear down as the ‘new’ Iraqi state struggles to reconsolidate power and limit the extent to which the state can seek out societal partners in the application of force. Unlike the typical developing states, with its coercive and infrastructural weakness and reliance on a bevy of non-state actors for internal suppression, in Iraq the devolution of violence has intensified instability and made the turn to armed non-state actors prohibitively risky.

**Making And Breaking A Military Behemoth, 1921-2003**

In a confidential memorandum in March 1933, less than a year after the mandate’s expiration and Iraq joining the League of Nations, King Faisal observed that “there is still—and I say this with a heart full of sorrow—no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings devoid of any patriotic idea.” He went on to lament (somewhat hyperbolically) that the Iraqi state was still “far and away weaker than the people…
had] more than 100,000 rifles whereas the government possesses only 15,000.”

The precarious nature of the Iraqi state is often attributed to its artificiality. The amalgamation of three Ottoman provinces, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, under a single British mandatory territory created a country beset by internal fissures from its inception. Although Sunni Arabs were tapped to rule the country, Shi’is made up the demographic majority and Kurds in the north held their own nationalist aspirations. The bequeathal of military institutions from outside powers enabled the Iraqi state to use violence to overcome internal opposition. Importantly, Faisal was no warmonger. Politically astute, he tended to be deferential toward Iraq’s tribal leaders and religious dignitaries from all sects. Local leaders could be bought off and granted large land holdings and positions in the national parliament. However, cooptation was often paired with a resort to suppression, empowered by the application of new technologies like air power. Under British mandate (1921-1932), the RAF was called upon 130 times to help put down local disturbances by tribal leaders in the north and south. When Iraq gained formal independence, its military institutions had learned the techniques and patterns of colonial repression. In August 1933, Iraqi forces under the command of Bakr Sidqi launched a combined air and ground assault on the Assyrian Christians, who had refused to submit to the newly sovereign Iraqi authority. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed. The British deplored what they saw as an unconscionable atrocity against their former protégés, heedless of their own role in arming and training the Iraqi forces that carried out the attack.
The Assyrian campaign was greeted as a vital step toward national independence in most of Iraq. Tribal sheikhs who had just a few years earlier blocked any move for mass conscription began volunteering for service. Parliament passed new bills expanding the armed forces and mandating conscriptions. When Shi’i tribesmen, supported by Grand Ayatollah Kashif al-Ghita, rose in revolt, the British advised the government to offer concessions: expand Shi’i representation in the parliament, cabinet, and civil service, provide greater funding for Shi’i religious institutions, and invest in alleviating poverty in the rural south. But the balance of coercive power had already tipped away from the tribes. Bakr Sidqi launched a ruthless campaign of aerial and ground assaults, including the execution of numerous rebel leaders. As Hanna Batatu notes:

[t]he ease and grim rapidity with which Bakr Sidqi’s soldiers and airplanes suppressed the tribal outbreaks of 1935 and 1936 presaged the end of the shaikh’s era. Prior to this, Iraq’s history was to a large extent the history of its shaikhs and their tribes. Its problems, its convulsions, its politics were essentially tribal…. After the thirties, the towns came conclusively into their own. The history of Iraq became henceforth largely the history of Baghdad.

The mid-1930s did not end challenges to the state’s authority and cohesion, but they marked a critical juncture in which violence, rather than cooptation, become the modal response to these threats. Given the mounting strength of the Iraqi army, there was no need to compromise with recalcitrant religious or tribal leaders. With the increasing reliance on coercion came
the increasing prominence of coercers. Bakr Sidqi carried out Iraq’s first military coup in 1936. In 1958, a pair of colonels marched on the palace, murdered the royal family, and declared Iraq a republic. By that time, the Iraqi security services had grown fourfold and become an institution poised for ferocity.

When Saddam and the Ba’th party seized power in 1968, they were cognizant both of the dangers and the necessity of having a strong security force. Having been outmaneuvered and ousted by their former military co-conspirator after February 1963, the Ba’thists were wary of military conspiracy. At the same time, however, Iraq’s security remained precarious through the turbulent period of praetorian rule. The Kurds, backed by Iran and Israel, were perennially in revolt. The entire region seemed locked in an escalating arms race.\textsuperscript{xxi} Iraq became an eager weapons importer, first from Britain and later from France, United States, and the Soviet Union. Those Middle Eastern countries that failed to match their neighbors’ military prowess fell victim to foreign meddling, as witnessed in Yemen and Lebanon’s civil wars, or outright destruction, as befell the Palestinians in 1948.\textsuperscript{xxii}

The Ba’th funneled ever larger portions of oil revenue into the modernization and expansion of the military force, especially after calamitously intervening in the Arab-Israel war of 1973. Conscription was enforced with greater alacrity. Iraq became one of the world’s leading arms importers, acquiring 1,600 Soviet tanks (including advanced T-72s), Brazilian armored troop carriers, French Mirage fighters, Italian frigates, and a host of other advanced weaponry.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Iraq jumpstarted
its nuclear weapons program with the purchase of a French-made nuclear reactor and expanded its chemical weapons capability with the help of West German firms. At the same time, Saddam took pains to inoculate the army from political activity by installing political commissars to monitor military units and creating a series of overlapping intelligence agencies to monitor the activities of civilians and the military alike.

The Islamic revolution in Iran provided an opportunity for Iraq to gain a relative advantage in the region. Yet Iraq's limited offensive into Iranian Khuzestan in September 1980 quickly bogged down, and the conflict soon expanded in size and scope. The eight years of war marked the perverse pinnacle of Ba'thist rule, a crescendo in its militarization and penetration of society. The fighting itself bore many comparisons to the First World War. To man the interminable rows of trenches and fixed positions that characterized most of the war, both Iraq and Iran had to engage in massive mobilization campaigns, bringing millions of people under arms and spending billions of dollars in armaments. Iraq's resort to chemical weapons and the escalation of missile attacks on Iranian cities bespoke the desperation of the campaign. Conservative estimates hold that Iraq suffered 200,000 dead and 400,000 wounded, not to mention the tens of thousands of Iraqis killed by their own government on suspicion of disloyalty.

If the Iran-Iraq War was the pinnacle of the Ba’th’s efforts to transform society, Gulf War I (1990-1991) and its aftermath were the nadir. Again, the war began with a gross miscalculation by Saddam. The Kuwaiti
army was no match at all, but Saddam underestimated the American capacity and willingness to protect its ally. Following defeat at American hands in the winter of 1991 and the March uprisings in Kurdistan and the Shi’i south, most of the Ba’th’s ideological pretenses were abandoned in favor of the simpler calculations of regime survival. As such, Saddam began to tap explicitly into the latent power of tribal identity, an element of Iraqi society that the Ba’th—along with every other Iraqi ruler dating back to the 1930s—had tried to suppress or at least obscure.\textsuperscript{xxvii} During the more desperate periods of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iranian forces threatened Basra, the regime tried to invoke Iraq’s Arab tribal heritage as a way to mobilize the population of the south. Since many Iraqi tribes included both Sunni and Shi’i branches, tribalism was seen as countering Iranian appeals to their Shi’i co-religionists.

After the military defeat, the uprising, and the crippling sanctions placed on the regime, Iraq in the 1990s degenerated from a totalitarian to a patrimonial, sultanistic regime that privileged primordial networks over bureaucratic forms of allegiance and outright control. Neo-tribalism was articulated overtly as delegations of tribal sheikhs were honored at the presidential palace and previously disparaged tribal rituals gained prominence in the official media. Saddam granted pliant sheikhs land, extra rations, and even diplomatic passports. They were encouraged to provide adjudication under tribal law (including the reinstatement of honor killing), levy taxes, and ensure security in their territory. Although the state, did not break down altogether (as it would in 2003), its basic functions were badly degraded. In response, many
everyday citizens turned to tribal heads for security and adjudication.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

Tribal fealty became the primary basis for recruitment into the Republican Guard and intelligence branches. It also provided the backbone for the newly-established Fedayee Saddam (Militants of Saddam, FS), a militia force of some 15,000 to 20,000 men under the command of Saddam’s son, Uday. FS functioned as a kind of government-sponsored assassination squad. Indicatively, Iraq’s top generals were opposed to the creation of FS and the group was notorious for corruption.\textsuperscript{xxix} Tribes received rifles, grenade launchers, mortars, and even howitzers from the state. When a second insurrection seemed imminent in August 1992, sheikhs cabled Saddam declaring that they would “remain his men in times and crisis… their guns were at the ready.”\textsuperscript{xxx} After American air strikes on southern Iraq in December 1998, armed tribesmen in civilian clothing were seen patrolling key installations around the capital.\textsuperscript{xxxi}

This devolution of violence undermined whatever bureaucratic structures and power remained in Iraq. The police, judges, and other civil servants were subject to intimidation or threats as the tribes attempted to expand their authority. Two hundred and sixty-six people were killed in a tribal land dispute in fall 1991, prompting an official Ba’th newspaper to complain that the “tribes were given weapons to fight the United States… not to fight among themselves.”\textsuperscript{xxxii} In western Iraq, tribes along the Amman-Baghdad highway took to hijacking and smuggling. In an effort to curb the independent use of force, in 1997, the Ba’th Regional Command Council
forbade the application of tribal legal principles against government officials.xxxiii

Neo-tribalism was singularly deleterious to the Iraqi army, which faced shortages in both men and material. Even Republican Guard units were forced to accept older equipment to replace what had been destroyed in 1991. As tensions with the U.S. escalated after 2001, Saddam’s hopes hinged on stymieing the American advance through asymmetric warfare. He hid thousands of caches of arms around the country in the belief that the Iraqi masses would rise up to defend him. In fact, only the Republican Guard, special Republican Guard, and a few dedicated FS eventually took up arms.xxxiv Though useful in defending the regime from coups, conspiracies, and popular uprisings, neo-tribalism left Iraq even more vulnerable by siphoning power from the centralized, formal institutions of coercion. By 2003, the U.S. held such a preponderance of military power that no defense was really possible.

Occupation And State Failure, 2003-2015

Even before American troops reached Baghdad in April 2003, Iraq was an enfeebled state. Gangs loyal to the young Shi’i firebrand cleric Muqtada as-Sadr seized police stations and weapons, redubbing Saddam City, the predominantly Shi’i slum of eastern Baghdad, as Sadr City. Abu Hatim’s Iraqi Hizbollah militia moved from their hideouts in the southern marshes to assert control over Amara.xxxv The exiled parties that returned with U.S. forces, including the Kurdish Democratic
Party, the Popular Union of Kurdistan, the Da’wa Party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (later re-dubbed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraqi, ISCI), the Iraqi National Congress, and the Iraqi National Accord, brought their own militias, totaling between 60,000 and 100,000 men.

The insufficient size of the American invasion force and the decision to disband the army left the Iraqi state with only a tiny fraction of its previous coercive potential. Local elites and their non-state forces moved to fill the gaps. In July 2003, Sadr announced the formation of the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM), an organization that combined elements of Iraqi nationalism, Shi’i millenarialism, and a protection racket ‘taxing’ local communities desperate for security.xxxvi Though a neophyte, Sadr came from an illustrious clerical family and sought to challenge the authority of the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, whom he deemed a usurper. On August 10, Sadr’s forces surrounded Sistani’s Najaf offices, demanding the elderly cleric cede his authority or quit the country. Sistani responded by calling in his own cortege of 1,500 tribesmen from the rural hinterlands to restore order, if not law. JAM, however, continued to maintain strongholds in the Baghdad slum of Sadr City (named for Muqtada’s father) and other parts of the south.xxxvii

In the Sunni heartland west and north of Baghdad, a similar combination of political and religious grievances and economic opportunism spurred the emergence of another insurgent front. Armed groups functioned as dacoits and gangs, extorting money, seizing property, and attacking rivals. With the aid of foreign al-Qaeda
infiltrators, militants launched a string of devastating suicide attacks against Kurdish and Shi’i leaders associated with the American coalition, as well as against American troops themselves.xxxviii At the same time, however, as early as 2003, Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar approached the occupying authority, offering to turn their forces against the Islamists in return for guarantees of autonomy and immunity from what was perceived as a hostile Shi’i-dominated central government. American field commanders favored such an arrangement, but civilian officials vetoed the proposal.xxxix

Much like the British, the U.S. tried to isolate each local revolt and confront it with overpowering military force. Although the U.S. decreed that all armed groups would have to submit to reorganization under the new Iraqi army, only minimal funding was allocated to help pension off and demobilize the militiamen. Iraq’s interim defense minister refused to induct Shi’i and Kurdish militiamen who had fought for Iran in the 1980s. The newly empowered exiled parties, for their part, had little interest in surrendering their respective military forces.xl

The formal resumption of Iraqi sovereignty in 2004 and installation of a Shi’i-led government in 2005 saw a continuing decline in the power of the state. Attacks on government officials seemed designed to provoke reprisal and led to the proliferation of self-defense forces while state forces were powerless to help. In response, ordinary citizens sought out the protection of militias or organized their own armed retinues. While the army and the defense ministry remained redoubts of Sunni control, the Interior Ministry, under ISCI control,
integrated its party’s militia into the national police.\textsuperscript{xli} Iraq’s security forces became, in Ahmed Hashim’s words, “official ethno-sectarian militias in uniform,” cooperating with paramilitary forces in abductions, torture, and extra-judicial killings of hundreds of Sunnis.\textsuperscript{xlii} Once Sadr joined the ruling coalition in December 2005, his independent JAM forces were essentially deputized by the state to become the primary security providers in Sadr City and other areas. By 2006, Baghdad’s ethnically mixed neighborhoods became battlegrounds in a Sunni-Shi’i civil war. U.S. officials deplored the proliferation of government-backed militias and vigilantes and actively tried to block Iraqi police from entering Sunni neighborhoods, but could do little to stem the trend toward the devolution of violence.\textsuperscript{xliii}

By contrast, in western Iraq, the U.S. actually encouraged the proliferation of armed non-state actors in the form of the Sunni tribal “Awakening” (Sahwa) movement. In response to the degradation of public security, many Sunni communities established informal tribal and neighborhood guards, ostensibly for purposes of self-defense but often working in collaboration with insurgents. It was cheaper and more effective to buy the loyalty of these tribes than to fight them, especially considering the still dysfunctional state of the Iraqi police and army. Minister of Defense Sa’adon ad-Dulaymi, himself a leader in of one of Iraq’s largest tribes, funneled weapons and money to set up tribal paramilitaries.\textsuperscript{xliv}

Among the first tribal leaders to seek out an alliance with the U.S. was Abd as-Sattam ar-Rishawi (Abu Risha), of the Dulaymi tribe from Ramadi. He had helped al-
Qaeda in the first years of the occupation but had chaffed at the movement’s puritanical ideology and attempts to displace tribal leadership. In return for a sheikh’s willingness to suppress insurgent activities, the U.S. not only offered increased reconstruction aid but also permitted the re-assertion of tribal law and dominion, transforming the tribal leadership into mediators between the state and the people. Both American and Iraqi officials saw the arming of Sunni groups as providing a counterbalance to the Shi’i-dominated interior ministry forces and their allied militias.

Coupled with the surge in American boots on the ground, the expansion of the Awakening movement brought dramatic improvements in stability to regions of Iraq that had been virtually lawless in 2005 and 2006. U.S. forces began to vet militiaman and set up a payment system of $300 per month, turning over control of numerous neighborhoods and towns to the tribal forces. By the end of 2007, an estimated 75,000 to 85,000 men, largely Sunnis, had joined what was dubbed the Sons of Iraq militia, expanding from Anbar to Babil, Nineveh, Salah ad-Din, Tamim, Diyala, and Baghdad.

Still, the gains in security and stability came, as Adeed Dawisha notes, “not because of the state, but in spite of it.” Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was wary of that the U.S. would have bilateral relationships with armed Sunni factions. As an advisor to the prime minister presciently complained, “we have enough militias in Iraq that we are struggling to solve the problem. Why are we creating new ones?” In Baghdad alone there were seventeen separate militia councils. In western Iraq, tribal authority splintered after Rishawi’s assassination in...
September 2007, leading to renewed inter-tribal conflict among the militias. In Babil, many militia fighters were believed to be former members of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, leading to suspicions that insurgents had infiltrated their ranks. In Diyala, Sunni militias seemed to merge with local crime syndicates. Many Awakening-associated militiamen demanded to be incorporated into the interior or defense ministries. Yet the ISCI-dominated national police continued to arrest various militia-leaders, heightening distrust between Sunni fighters and the government. It was not just Sunni militias that resisted Baghdad. In the north, the Kurdish peshmerga sought control over oil-rich Kirkuk. In the south, various elements of JAM rejected Sadr’s truce with the central government and continued their periodic bouts with American and Iraqi security forces.

Despite considerable training at the hands of the U.S., Iraqi forces crumbled in April 2008 in the fight against JAM splinter groups in Basra and had to be rescued by U.S. reinforcements and air support. Through 2009, the U.S. reported slow progress in building up the Iraqi armed forces, with less than a quarter of Iraq’s 225,000-man state security forces deemed capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations without U.S. support. Echoing the 1920s and 1930s again, Iraqis accused the U.S. of blocking access to advanced aircraft and other weaponry in order to sabotage the reestablishment of a formidable Iraqi army and ensure that Iraq was dependent on the U.S. in the long term. Iraq’s army was just a glorified gendarmerie, “a lame horse in the competition with neighboring states,” warned one senior officer.
Indeed, Iraq’s sense of regional insecurity remained unabated, underscoring the need for a larger and more heavily armed force than the U.S. was prepared to grant. Turkey routinely launched incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish separatists and provided weaponry and support to Iraq’s Turkmen minority. U.S. intervention alone prevented escalation and a potential Turkish invasion of northern Iraq in early 2008. Despite burgeoning ties between the Maliki government and Tehran, Iranian forces seized the Fakka oil fields in December 2009. The incident was resolved peacefully, but it demonstrated that international borders remain contentious and that coercion is still an integral element to inter-state relations. Moreover, rapprochement with Iran is seen by many Iraqis, especially Sunnis, as an affront to Iraqi nationalism and as further alienating Iraq from its Sunni Arab neighbors.

Maliki continued to consolidate his personal power. Special commando units, often barely distinguishable from Shi‘i militias, persisted in their practices of torture, secret detention facilities, and extra-judicial killings against alleged terrorists and Ba‘thists. The trend remained after the hotly contested 2010 election, when Maliki assumed not only the post of prime minister but also the portfolios for interior, defense, and national security affairs. With the U.S. withdrawing from Iraq, Maliki seized the opportunity to purge Sunni politicians, including indicting Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi on terrorism charges.

Maliki carried on many of the techniques of neo-tribalism that undermined state power in the 1990s. During the JAM uprising of April 2008, tribal militias
mobilized as government auxiliaries and Maliki later thanked the tribesmen for helping to combat “criminals” and “terrorists.” He sought the creation of new tribal councils in the south and declared his respect for tribal autonomy. These councils provided crucial backing to Maliki’s slate of candidates during the December 2008 provincial elections. Meetings with tribal leaders in the south, Maliki openly talked about using tribal institutions and a national tribal council to bypass what he deemed a dysfunctional central government. Ironically, this appeal to the tribes alarmed some of Maliki’s erstwhile parliamentary allies, who feared that such militias would provide the prime minister with a counterweight to their own armed wings.

In many respects, the dramatic ascent of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 unmasked the precariousness of Iraqi state institutions and their continued vulnerability to regional disorder. ISIS originated as a splinter faction from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and had maintained small pockets of control in the Anbar heartland for years, as well as in ar-Raqqa and areas on the western side of the Jazeera and Syrian deserts. By spring 2014, many Sunni tribes, some of which had previously been associated with the Awakening, had allied with ISIS. The Iraqi army besieged the ISIS stronghold of Fallujah, but no to avail. Indiscriminant violence, including shelling and aerial bombardment, drove civilians from their home and worsened Sunni antagonism toward the central government.

In June 2014, ISIS launched a massive offensive that reached from Anbar to Nineveh and Salahuddin
provinces. Shadowy networks, probably affiliated with ex-Ba’thists, overcame local police and army outposts, helping ISIS quickly take the city of Mosul. Many local security forces were already deeply penetrated by ISIS loyalists. Ill-trained and lacking cohesion, the Iraqi army crumbled in disarray, leaving millions of dollars in U.S.-supplied weapons and material in the field. Seizing the opportunity, the Kurdish peshmerga drove from the east, seizing the long-sought-after oil fields. With the army in disarray, Shi’a militias loosely tied to the central government mobilized to defend Samarra and Baghdad. Though officially disbanded, the local JAM cells, for instance, suddenly took to the barricades. Meanwhile, ISIS itself had taken the trappings of an alternative statehood, asserting control over the flow of water and oil resource, extracting taxes on goods and services, and taking charge of education and culture.

Conclusion

Iraq is no longer the artifice that it was at its inception. As Sami Zubaida reminds us, in Iraq (as in many other countries) it is the state that made the nation. Economic and fiscal administration, education, employment, military conscription, the media and social and cultural organization—all make the nation a fact or “facticity” that compels the cognition and imagination of its members. Though oppressive, over the past century, these institutions have bound together many of Iraq’s highly heterogeneous citizens by collective interest, if not by collective identity. Still, the turn to militias in Iraq may denature these still tenuous institutional
frameworks and, in effect, hollow out the Iraqi state. Militia mobilization is emblematic of the cynical “politics of survival” that is so common when weak states are confronted with entrenched societal power-holders. State elites alternate between strategies of patronage to coopt the local power-holders and intimidation to deter or prevent them from challenging central authority. Even as they help to protect individual leaders and regime, these practices have dire consequences for institutional integrity and the rule of law. Yet, as Joel Migdal argues, in many circumstances, there are no other ways forward.\textsuperscript{lxv}

Responding to the ISIS threat, the Iraqi government, with renewed backing from the U.S., is looking to recruit Sunni tribes in the hopes of re-creating the success of the 2006 Awakening once again. With ISIS’s own form of state-building often proving equally oppressive and predatory as the Iraqi state itself, some Sunni tribes have already voluntarily ‘flipped’ and are clamoring for positions in a still nascent Iraqi National Guard.\textsuperscript{lxvi} Still, the relationship between central authority and these local wielders of violence remains murky.\textsuperscript{lxvii} Would the new National Guard be subordinate to the army? To the prime minister? To provincial governors? Beyond formal chains of command, the central government’s ability to bargain with the tribal forces is also uncertain. Would the Shi’i central government permit Sunnis greater autonomy in their provinces and districts, including allowing them to keep an autonomous armed force? How could the Baghdad check the power of the Sunnis should they use the militia to defy the central government?
Iraq’s regional insecurity further complicates the bid to devolve violence to local forces. Iraq’s neighbors have each played a hand in sponsoring and supporting armed non-state actors within Iraqi territory, both as pro-government militias or rebel insurgents. Iran, far and away Iraq’s closest ally, maintains strong ties to the Shi’i militias operating in the country. The idea of setting up the National Guard to bulwark Sunni power would necessarily lead to greater international penetration of Iraq and turn militias into the cat’s paw of foreign intervention. Iraq’s internal security, then, is inextricable from its international positioning.

In many ways, then, Iraq today has reverted to its original condition of state-building, struggling to construct a military force capable of both domestic suppression and international competition. As Lustick correctly argues, the failed bids by Saddam to transform Iraq into a great power by means of war are illustrative of the determining impact of different norms in the international system and of its hierarchical configuration. Great powers helped launch the region on its bellicose path, but subsequent interventions blocked any aspiring Middle Eastern Bismarck from pressing the predatory logic of war-making and state-making to its conclusion. The provision of enormous quantities of military aid paradoxically augmented the ferocity of Middle Eastern states, but also deepened their dependence and ultimate inferiority to outside powers. The partial suspension of Iraqi sovereignty with the implementation of the no-fly zones in 1992 and the emergence of the de facto Kurdish autonomous zone was followed by a complete suspension in 2003 with the U.S. invasion and occupation. As illustrated by the case
of Iraq, state formation in the Middle East is a race that has been launched but can never be won, at least not under the current rules.
APPENDIX I

Iraq’s military development, 1932-2008


![Graph showing the size of security forces and the percentage of the population under arms from 1932 to 2008.](insert-graph-url)
APPENDIX II

Military Development in Selected Middle Eastern States


30 War-Making, State-Making, and Non-State Power


For an extensive account of the uprisings and military response, see Marr, 62-7 and Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 84-7; On the upgrading of the Iraqi army, see Raja Husayn Husni Khattab, *Tasis al-jaysh al-‘Iraqi wa-tatawwur dawrihi al-siyasi min 1921-1941* (College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1979), 63-9; Marashi and Salama, 34.


Batatu 118-9.


Sassoon, 95-128.
Of course, the nucleus of the Ba’th since the mid-1960s had always been patrimonial, but this remained sub rosa in the first two decades of Ba’th rule.


Sassoon, 149-50.

Dawisha, “‘Identity’ and Political Survival,” 62.


Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, 519.


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