Here are a few responses to my work. Most of them say that I am wrong in one way or another. In some cases, I note explicitly that a paper succeeds in refuting one of my views, but the absence of any explicit note on a paper should not be taken as an indication that I disagree with it.
Elise Cardinale, Elizabeth Finger, Julia Schechter, Ilana Jurkowitz, R.J.R. Blair and Abigail Marsh. (2014). The moral status of an action influences its perceived intentional status in adolescents with psychopathic traits. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, 1.
Edouard Machery. (2008). The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind & Language, 23, 165-189.
Response to the response: Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2009). Is the ‘trade‐off hypothesis’ worth trading for? Mind & Language, 24, 164-180.
Shaun Nichols and Joseph Ulatowski. (2007). Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited. Mind and Language, 22: 346-365.
Lawrence Ngo, Meagan Kelly, Christopher G. Coutlee, R. McKell Carter, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Scott Huettel. (2015). Two distinct moral mechanisms for ascribing and denying intentionality. Scientific Reports, 5.
Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2008). The folk strike back; or, why you didn’t do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it. Philosophical Studies, 138, 291-298.
This paper refutes my initial claim that the moral judgment influencing people’s intentional action intuitions is a judgment about whether the side-effect is bad. I now think that the relevant moral judgment is a judgment about what attitude the agent ought to have had toward this effect (see Pettit & Knobe, 2009).
Steven Sloman, Philip Fernbach and Scott Ewing. (2012). A causal model of intentionality judgment. Mind & Language, 27, 154-180.
Chandra Sripada and Sara Konrath. (2011). Telling more than we can know about intentional action. Mind & Language. 26, 353 -380.
Response to the response: Florian Cova and Hichem Naar. (2012). Testing Sripada’s deep self model. Philosophical Psychology, 25, 647-659.
Kevin Uttich and Tania Lombrozo. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. Cognition, 116, 87-100.
Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel and Marc Hauser. (2006). Does emotion mediate the effect of an action’s moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 291-304.
Mark Alicke, David Rose and Dori Bloom. (2011). Causation, norm violation and culpable control. Journal of Philosophy. 108, 670-696.
Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood and David Rose. (2012). Two types of typicality: Rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43, 814-820.
Sarah-Jane Leslie. (2015). “Hillary Clinton is the only man in the Obama administration”: Dual character concepts, generics, and gender. Analytic Philosophy, 56, 111-141.
Mark Phelan, Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols. (2013). Thinking things and feeling things: On an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 12, 703-725.
Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical Studies, 151, 299-327.
Mikkel Gerken and James Beebe. (2014). Knowledge in and out of contrast. Noûs, 50, 133-164
Keith DeRose. (2011). Contextualism, contrastivism and x-phi surveys. Philosophical Studies, 156, 81-110.
Response to the response: Wesley Buckwalter. (2014). The mystery of stakes and error in ascriber intuitions. Advances in Experimental Epistemology, 145-74.
Chandra Sripada and Jason Stanley. (2012). Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism. Episteme, 9, 3-26.
Response to the response: Wesley Buckwalter and Jonathan Schaffer. (2015). Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes. Noûs, 49(2), 201-234.
Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Bruno Dubois. (2012). Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 851-864.
Adam Feltz and Florian Cova. (2014). Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis. Consciousness and Cognition, 30, 234-246.
In combination with the previous paper, this paper refutes our claim that the abstract/concrete effect on moral responsibility judgments is due to people’s affective reactions. Subsequent studies consistently show that there is indeed an abstract/concrete effect, but it seems that this effect does not arise for the reasons we thought it did. The explanation of this effect now strikes me as a genuinely open question. (I suggest one possible answer in footnote 2 of the paper here.)
Dylan Murray and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, 434-467.
This paper shows that people’s intuitions about free will and determinism are influenced in part by a phenomenon of ‘bypassing.’ I think this is a very valuable contribution, and I discuss it in the paper here.