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Responses

Here are a few responses to my work. Most of them say that I am wrong in one way or another. In some cases, I note explicitly that a paper succeeds in refuting one of my views, but the absence of any explicit note on a paper should not be taken as an indication that I disagree with it.

Intentional Action 

Elise Cardinale, Elizabeth Finger, Julia Schechter, Ilana Jurkowitz, R.J.R. Blair and Abigail Marsh. (2014). The moral status of an action influences its perceived intentional status in adolescents with psychopathic traits. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, 1.

Edouard Machery. (2008). The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind & Language, 23, 165-189.

Response to the response: Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2009). Is the ‘trade‐off hypothesis’ worth trading for? Mind & Language24, 164-180.

Shaun Nichols and Joseph Ulatowski. (2007). Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited. Mind and Language, 22: 346-365.

Lawrence Ngo, Meagan Kelly, Christopher G. Coutlee, R. McKell Carter, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Scott Huettel. (2015). Two distinct moral mechanisms for ascribing and denying intentionality. Scientific Reports5.

Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2008). The folk strike back; or, why you didn’t do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it. Philosophical Studies138, 291-298.

This paper refutes my initial claim that the moral judgment influencing people’s intentional action intuitions is a judgment about whether the side-effect is bad. I now think that the relevant moral judgment is a judgment about what attitude the agent ought to have had toward this effect (see Pettit & Knobe, 2009).

Steven Sloman, Philip Fernbach and Scott Ewing. (2012). A causal model of intentionality judgment. Mind & Language27, 154-180.

Chandra Sripada and Sara Konrath. (2011). Telling more than we can know about intentional action. Mind & Language. 26, 353 -380.

Response to the response: Florian Cova and Hichem Naar. (2012). Testing Sripada’s deep self model. Philosophical Psychology, 25, 647-659.

Kevin Uttich and Tania Lombrozo. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. Cognition116, 87-100.

Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel and Marc Hauser. (2006). Does emotion mediate the effect of an action’s moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 291-304.

Causation

Mark Alicke, David Rose and Dori Bloom. (2011). Causation, norm violation and culpable control. Journal of Philosophy. 108, 670-696.

 
David Danks, David Rose and Edouard Machery. (2014). Demoralizing causation. Philosophical Studies171, 251-277.
 
Michael Strevens. (2013). Causality reunified. Erkenntnis, 78, 299-320.

Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood and David Rose. (2012). Two types of typicality: Rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43, 814-820.

Concepts

Sarah-Jane Leslie. (2015). “Hillary Clinton is the only man in the Obama administration”: Dual character concepts, generics, and gender. Analytic Philosophy56, 111-141.

Consciousness 

Mark Phelan, Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols. (2013). Thinking things and feeling things: On an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences12, 703-725.

Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical Studies151, 299-327.

Knowledge

Mikkel Gerken and James Beebe. (2014). Knowledge in and out of contrast. Noûs, 50, 133-164

Keith DeRose. (2011). Contextualism, contrastivism and x-phi surveys. Philosophical Studies, 156, 81-110.

Response to the responseWesley Buckwalter. (2014). The mystery of stakes and error in ascriber intuitions. Advances in Experimental Epistemology, 145-74.

Chandra Sripada and Jason Stanley. (2012). Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism. Episteme9, 3-26.

Response to the response: Wesley Buckwalter and Jonathan Schaffer. (2015). Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes. Noûs, 49(2), 201-234.

Free Will

Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Bruno Dubois. (2012). Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists. Consciousness and Cognition21, 851-864.

Adam Feltz and Florian Cova. (2014). Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis. Consciousness and Cognition30, 234-246.

In combination with the previous paper, this paper refutes our claim that the abstract/concrete effect on moral responsibility judgments is due to people’s affective reactions. Subsequent studies consistently show that there is indeed an abstract/concrete effect, but it seems that this effect does not arise for the reasons we thought it did. The explanation of this effect now strikes me as a genuinely open question. (I suggest one possible answer in footnote 2 of  the paper here.)

Dylan Murray and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research88, 434-467.

This paper shows that people’s intuitions about free will and determinism are influenced in part by a phenomenon of ‘bypassing.’ I think this is a very valuable contribution, and I discuss it in the paper here.

Experimental Philosophy 

Antti Kauppinen. (2007). The rise and fall of experimental philosophy. Philosophical Explorations, 10: 95-118.
 
Brent Strickland and Aysu Suben. (2012). Experimenter philosophy: The problem of experimenter bias in experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology3, 457-467.

This paper raises some serious questions about the methodology are used in earlier works. I have tried to revise my methods in light of it (see Newman et al., 2015; Phillips et al., in press).

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