Different routes to reflexivity: Voice vs. Perspective
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Goals: (i) to show that reflexivity (co-argument anaphora) may be voice- or perspective-driven (ii) to motivate and investigate perspective-driven reflexivity via Tamil. In many languages, unaccusatives and reflexives (and sometimes, passives and middles) tend to be identically-marked suggesting that reflexivity is a voice phenomenon (Grimshaw, 1982; Reinhart and Siloni, 2004; Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou, 2004). Dravidian ko], obligatorily marks co-argument reflexivity, but also marks unaccusatives, suggesting that it also chooses the voice route (Tamil (1)-(2)). Indeed, Lidz (2001, et seq.) proposes, building on Embick (2004), that ko] in the Dravidian language Kannada spells out a specifierless v head in reflexives and unaccusatives alike:

(1) பானை ஆறுகைக்கு கொடுத்தார் நாய்.
   Paanæ` oëæ-nãük-ko-ŋ[-adû].
   pot.nom break-intr.asp-ko]-pst-3nsg
   "The pot broke-ko]."

(2) ராமன் கர்த்தராவிய நாய் பக்கத்தில் காண்பதற்குப் பார்த்தான்.
   Raman, tann-æ(ī,īj) kanjã[ŋ]-læ paar-ttû-kko-ŋ[-aan/*paar-tt-aan.
   Raman.nom anaph-acc mirror-loc see-asp-ko]-pst-3msg/see-pst-3msg-comp
   "Raman saw himself[ī,īj] in the mirror."

However, closer inspection shows that the distribution of ko] at least in Tamil is completely independent of predicate valency. I. ko]-suffixation on unaccusatives is optional ((3) vs. (1)):

(3) பானை ஆறுகைக்கு கொடுத்தால் நாய்.
   Paanæ` oëæ-nã-[-adû/*oëæ-ã-[-adû.
   door.nom break-pst-3nsg/*break-tr.pst-3nsg
   "The pot broke."

II. ko] optionally also marks non-reflexive transitives (and unergatives):

(4) ராமன் க்ரிஷ்ணனுக்கு பாரும்பக்கத்தில் காண்பதற்குப் பார்த்தான்.
   Raman Krishnan-æ paar-ttû-kko-ŋ[-aan/paar-tt-aan.
   Raman[nom] Krishnan-acc see-asp-ko]-pst-3msg/see-pst-3msg
   "Raman saw Krishnan."

ko]-suffixation: see the contrast in (3). Thus, ko] is not a voice marker: reflexivity in Dravidian must be driven by something other than voice.

In order to understand what this is, we need to carefully tease apart the contribution of ko] (a morpheme that the Dravidianist literature treats as notoriously tricky to describe). Our first hint comes from the linear sequence in ((1)-(4)) where ko] occurs between the transitivity and tense morphemes. Structurally, it must thus realize a head above Kratzerian Voice but below T (Mirror Principle), suggesting that ko] might sensitive to both aspectual and thematic restrictions. An investigation of ko]-distribution across the Levin (1993) verb-classes based on a survey of 40 native Tamil-speaking informants comparing minimal pairs with/without ko] in different discourse scenarios, confirms this. Aspectual restrictions: Verbs that aren't compatible with a result state, either because they lack an eventive component (e.g. inherent statives), or because they actively resist the addition of one (e.g. involuntary emissives), are incompatible with ko]. However, telic change-of-state/location predicates (inchoatives) frequently co-occur with ko]. All other verbs which lack a result state but are compatible with one (e.g. most activity verbs) can optionally take ko] when such a result state is added. Thematic restrictions: ko] is incompatible with predicates that have an intrinsic mental/spatial viewpoint (psych- and path-verbs), and with verbs...
that are incompatible with mental/spatial viewpoint holding toward their result state by one of their arguments (e.g. involuntary directed motion verbs). Conversely, verbs that are especially conducive to such viewpoint-holding (postural/grooming verbs) frequently co-occur with ko]. Based on these results, I argue that ko] attaches to the result state of a main event predication. The highest argument of the main event predication (Agent in transitives/unergatives and Theme in unaccusatives) comes to hold/gets this result state in its mental/spatial locus, such that this result state becomes evaluated from the mental/physical space of this argument. Thus, ko] introduces a semantics much like those of Sells (1987)'s self (``one whose mind is being reported'') and pivot (`if someone makes a report with Mary as the pivot, that person is understood as literally standing in Mary's shoes'') roles -- as illustrated by (5):

(5) மாண்கி மாண்கி ஆங்கிலக் கிருட்டிண-குமார.
   Mansi paal-ae uutt-i-kko-n[=]-aa.
   Mansi milk-acc pour.tr-asp-kol[-3fsg]
   ```Mansi poured-kol the milk.''

The (optional) addition of ko] to the verb uutt- (`pour') in (5) adds the information that the result state of milk-pouring comes to be evaluated from Mansi's physical or mental space. Informally, we get the reading that Mansi either poured the milk for herself (mental space), or that she poured it on herself (physical space). Formally, ko] has the lexical-entry in (6):

(6) \( \text{[ko]}^{\text{c.o.}} = \lambda Q_{<s,t>} \lambda x.\lambda e' \exists s. Q(s) \wedge \text{Get}(e') \wedge \text{Locus}(e', x) \wedge \text{Theme}(e', s) \)

Note that the mental vs. physical nature of the Locus predicate is underspecified: this is discourse-contextually supplied, yielding the ambiguity in (5). The Locus predicate can be interpreted as a type of \( \theta \)-role. Given the locality of thematic relations, we might construe ko] as a (thematic-)raising predicate (along the lines of Ramchand, 2008, and adopting her loosening of the \( \theta \)-criterion) which raises the highest argument of the main event to its Spec and assigns it this \( \theta \)-role. This brings us back full circle to reflexives. Long-distance anaphora in Tamil (as in Italian, Icelandic etc) is observed (Bianchi, 2003; Sundaresan, 2012) to be perspective-driven: i.e. the antecedent must denote a sentient individual that holds a mental/spatio-temporal perspective toward some minimal predication containing the anaphor. However, while reflexivity in Tamil requires the addition of ko], long-distance anaphora doesn't:

   Maya Sri anaphhit-pst-3msg think-pst-3fsg
   ```Maya, thought [CP that Sri, j hit her[i/*himself].''

and (2) is that the antecedent starts out as a co-argument of the anaphor in the latter but not in the former. I propose therefore that perspective-holding cannot occur under co-argumenthood: i.e. the individual denoted by a DP may not hold a perspective toward a predication in which it is properly contained (dominated). This makes sense of the connection between ko]'s independently supported status as a raising predicate and its obligatory presence in reflexives. I.e. the addition of ko] in (2) allows the agentive DP to ```escape'' the VoiceP containing both itself and the anaphor, to [Spec, koP] where it scopes over the VoiceP and has the right perspectival syntax/semantics required to antecede the anaphor.

Crosslinguistic consequences: 1. This shows that perspective may regulate not just long-distance (as typically assumed), but also co-argument anaphora: and more generally, that it plays a role in regulating thematic dependencies. 2. It provides insight into some of the quirks of anaphora in psych predicates. Although ko] is obligatorily absent in psych-predicates (as mentioned), reflexive binding is nevertheless possible:
(8) `Sri hated himself fi; jg.

This suggests that psych predicates already have a (mental)-perspective built into their meaning -- an intuitively appealing notion. Furthermore, if strict co-argumenthood indeed blocks perspective-holding, this means that the experiencer antecedent in (8) must be somehow also raised (or just merged higher) yielding a more complex event-structure similar to the ko-structure in (2). This in turn might help explain the unique possibility of `backward binding' in psych-predications in many languages. The same argumentation may be used to explain cases of perceptual anaphora across spatial PPs which, interestingly, have been independently argued to be more structurally complex (Svenonius, 2008) than other PPs. 3. The representation of perspective has been argued for in CPs (Sells, 1987; Koopman and Sportiche, 1989; Speas, 2004), PPs (Svenonius, 2008; Rooryck and vanden Wyngaerd, 2011), and APs (in `taste' predicates Stephenson, 2010). The evidence for perceptual interaction in the event/\nu domain discussed here thus extends the range of predications in which perspective may play a role, suggesting indeed that all predications may involve the representation of perspective at some level, with languages parametrically choosing the range of phenomena they are linguistically relevant for.

References


