Spring 2010
9:00-10:20 T/TH, 28 Hillhouse, Room 106
Dirk Bergemann
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #24
432-3592, Email
Office hours T 1:00-3:00
Juuso Valimaki
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #6
432-6519, Email
Office hours T 1:00-3:00
Topic: This course covers selected topics in the economics of information and uncertainty. The first part of the course will cover the theory of mechanism design and some of its applications. The second part of the course will cover some recent papers in communication, learning and networks..
Course Requirements: This course has five basic requirements. They are: (i) reading the assigned papers before the presentation in class, (ii) solving the problem sets, (iii) presenting one research paper, (iv) writing six referee reports (before the presentation of the papers) and (v) writing a term paper. The assignments will be given biweekly. Class participation, assignments, and the term paper will jointly determine the final grade.
Readings: The current reading list will be completed as the class proceeds.
Schedule:
Tuesday, January 12 (DB): Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency
- “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism” Econometrica, forthcoming
- “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism: Slides”
Thursday, January 14 (DB): Dynamic Mechanism Design
- “Bandit Problems”
- First Referee Report: Sequential Screening
- First Problem Set: Bandit Problems and Information Disclosure
First Problem Set Solution: Bandit Problems and Information Disclosure
Tuesday, January 19 (DB): Sequential Screening
- Sequential Screening
- An excellent introduction into the theory of stochastic orders is given by
M. Shaked and J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders and their Applications, Associated Press, 1994.
“Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship” is a two-period generalization of the earlier and seminal paper:
“Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost” - A recent and considerable generalization is offered in:
Dynamic Mechanism Design
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Slides
Thursday, January 21 (DB): Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanism
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- First Referee Report Due
Tuesday, January 26 (DB): Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust Mechanism Design
- The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design
- Multidimensional Private Value Auctions
Thursday, January 28 (DB): Incomplete Information and Robustness: Equilibrium Concepts
- Second Referee Report: The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design
Tuesday, February 2 (DB): Robust Implementation:
- Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanism
- Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules
- Designing Stable Mechanisms for Economic Environments
Thursday, February 4 (DB): Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games
- Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanism
- Belief Free Incomplete Information Games
- Lecture Notes 2007
- Robust Implementation: Barcelona Slides
- First Problem Set Due
Tuesday, February 9 (DB):
- Opacity and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision
by Tri Vi Dang - Opacity and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision: Slides
Thursday, February 11 (DB):
- Information Acquisition, Noise Trading, and Speculation in Double Auction Markets by Tri Vi Dang
- Secend Referee Report Due
- Second Problem Set
- Second Problem Set Solution
Tuesday, February 16 (JV): Large Auctions: Private Values
Thursday, February 18 (JV): Large Auctions: Common Values
Tuesday, February 23 (JV): Value of Information
Thursday, February 25 (JV): Information Orders
Tuesday, March 3: (JV) Information and Contracts
Thursday, March 5: (JV) Information and Auctions
Tuesday, March 23: (JV) Bayesian Learning
Thursday, March 25: (JV) Bandit Problems
Tuesday, March 30: (JV) Social Learning
Thursday, April 1: (JV) Timing with Private Information
Tuesday, April 6: (JV) Bubbles and Crashes
Thursday, April 8: (JV) Liquidity Shocks and Order Book Dynamics
Tuesday, April 13 (DB): Guest Lecture: Thomas Mariotti (IDEI, Toulouse):
- First Lecture: Dynamic Security Design
Lecture Slides - Second Lecture: Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
Lecture Slides
Thursday, April 15 (DB):
- Cihan Artunc: Morris and Shin (2002): The Social Value of Information
- Brian Baisa
Background Reading: Gal-Or (1987), Maggi (1989)
Tuesday, April 20 (DB):
- Sander Heinsalu: Ahn and Ergin: Framing Contingencies
Thursday, April 22 (DB):
- Noam Tanner: Galeotti et al. (2010) Network Games
- Andre Stenzel: Bramoulle, Kranton and D’Amours (2009): Strategic Interaction and Networks